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This dissertation aims to illuminate the changing nature of the Kurdish 
contention in Turkey since the 1990s as well as its ubiquitous dissemination among 
the Kurdish grassroots through examining the repercussions of political violence and 
the relocation of the grassroots from rural to urban centers. My understanding of the 
recent internal displacement of Kurdish citizens in Turkey in the late 1980s, but en 
masse in 1990s relates the issue to three overarching intertwined trajectories; 1) the 
end of the cold war, resulting in the changing nature of political violence and of 
identity politics; 2) the incursion of neoliberalism and the changing paradigms 
regarding the nature of state-society relations, resulting in a tendency for 
decentralization and a decline in the welfare functions of the state 3) the increasing 
salience of new international concerns-- particularly international human rights 
rhetoric--and their influence domestically.  Against this backdrop, I examine how the 
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displacement of Kurdish citizens on a large scale has become part of the changing 
nature of the Kurdish Question, and in turn has started to redefine its contemporary 
face in Turkey in the 1990s. I argue that following the 1990s, the Kurdish question in 
Turkey has [re]surfaced as 1) a problem of political legitimacy between the state and 
(Kurdish) citizens affected by conflict and displacement 2) an ethno-nationalist claim, 
3) a poverty and social citizenship problem. I analyze these three propositions in 
relation to three main processes. First, I propose that new dynamics have been 
introduced into the state/center-citizen/periphery relations, through which ‘legitimate’ 
Kurdish citizens and secure spaces/geographies are distinguished by the Turkish state 
in contrast to the ‘illegitimate,’ ‘so-called’, ‘undeserving’ and/or ‘suspicious’ ones. 
This process, in turn, brought in question the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the 
displaced Kurdish citizens. Second, previously existing Kurdish contention has turned 
into an ethno-political issue, which is entrenched among the Kurdish masses mired in 
poverty in the urban centers of southeastern Turkey. Finally, the discontents of neo-
liberal restructuring in the form of poverty, unemployment and social exclusion have 
converged with the ethnicized discontent prevailing among the Kurdish masses in the 
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CHAPTER 1   
FORCED MIGRATION AS POLITICAL VIOLENCE                                                    
  
There is a dialectical relationship between democracy, issues of citizenship 
and political violence. Political violence exists in every stage of democratic 
consolidation, even in ‘western democracies’, and is linked to the “changes in rules 
and patterns of state-society” relations (Unger et.al 1999:4). Political violence further 
entails (re)articulation between the state and society through negotiation in terms of 
rights and justice (Jelin 2005). State violence and/or non-state violence disturb the 
premises of the social contract between the state that undertakes proactive and 
reactive measures against contention and citizens who experience violence and/or 
consider the state responsible for the suffering and consequences. Political violence in 
turn redefines the articulation between the actors involved.  
This study aims to illuminate the changing nature of the Kurdish contention as 
well as its ubiquitous dissemination among the Kurdish grassroots since the 1990s.  
This new era is peculiar because, on the one hand, political violence has become ever-
present in the lives of the millions of predominately Kurdish citizens of southeastern 
Turkey. On the other hand, pro-Kurdish mobilization and discontent that triggered 
violence and reproduced by violence in the region have more to do with the 




an autonomous pro-Kurdish political commitment1 (for a parallel reading see for 
example Yeğen 2006). Though the focus of this study is the socio-economic and 
political implications of the forced (armed conflict-induced) migrations of the 
predominately peasant Kurdish communities in the 1990s in Turkey, this dissertation 
is not about the technicalities of forced migration and/or population displacement2. It 
is in fact about understanding a particular form of state-society alienation/antagonism 
or contention at the conjunction of national, regional and international dynamics 
through an analysis of forced migration as a form of political violence. It is about 
delicate sites of power struggles where state-society relations break down and are 
transformed into something that goes beyond nation-state boundaries.    
This dissertation is also about the limits of citizenship in a multiethnic society, 
Turkey, in which ethnic differences are not officially recognized as a means of 
distinguishing between citizens3 and social, political and economic dynamics 
politicize ethnic cleavages in a radical way as do state practices of inclusion and 
exclusion. This dissertation is most importantly about a powerless group of people 
gaining national and international recognition, and a controversial socio-political 
                                                 
1 Even in Iraq where the Kurds have managed to create a de facto autonomous state owing to the 
propitious global conjecture shaping with the end of the Cold War.   
2 I acknowledge that there are analytical differences between the terms ‘forced migration’ and 
‘displacement’ in different contexts-- ‘forced migration’ indicates the ‘involuntary’ nature of 
displacement more assertively and processes of ‘population displacement’ are more subtle and even 
may include forms of ‘voluntary’ human mobility. However, throughout this dissertation, I use the 
phrases of ‘forced migration’ and ‘displacement’ interchangeably since in my particular analysis of 
conflict-induced migration, the two terms overlap considerably. 
3 In the same way as the case of France where citizenship is based on a civic- rather than ethnic or 




leverage/agency that can be employed in, at times, violent claim-making. This study 
aims to open for analysis a space that is scantily studied and understood by the 
theories of political violence, the state and citizenship. In this study, issues of 
citizenship, international rights discourses and identity politics come to the fore as 
well as the forces of social exclusion, state repression and political radicalization.  
In this dissertation, I examine how the displacement of Kurdish citizens on a 
large scale has become part of the changing nature of the Kurdish Question, and in 
turn has started to redefine its contemporary face in Turkey in the 1990s. I argue that 
following the 1990s, the Kurdish question in Turkey has [re]surfaced as 1) a problem 
of political legitimacy between the state and (Kurdish) citizens affected by conflict 
and displacement 2) an ethnonationalist claim, 3) a poverty and social citizenship 
problem. I analyze these three propositions in relation to three main processes.  
First, I propose that new dynamics have been introduced into the state/center-
citizen/periphery relations, through which ‘legitimate’ Kurdish citizens and secure 
spaces/geographies are distinguished by the Turkish state in contrast to the 
‘illegitimate,’ ‘so-called’, ‘undeserving’ and/or ‘suspicious’ ones. This process 
brought in question the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the displaced Kurdish 
citizens. Second, previously existing Kurdish contention has turned into an 
ethnopolitical issue, which is entrenched among the Kurdish masses mired in poverty 
in the urban centers of southeastern Turkey. This process indicates the dissemination 




course of violence. Finally, the discontents of neo-liberal restructuring in the form of 
poverty, unemployment and social exclusion have converged with the ethnicized 
discontent prevailing among the Kurdish masses in the city centers in southeastern 
Turkey. This final process is analytically different than the second one in such that it 
refers to the ethnic politicization of poverty, impoverishment, social exclusion and the 
feeling of injustice and discrimination associated with that status of poverty. These 
three processes have reinforced each other in the 1990s.   
Throughout this dissertation, I illustrate that displacement as a form of 
political violence not only crystallized the traditional alienation between the Kurdish 
peasant communities in southeastern Turkey and the central state, but also redefined 
the parameters of state- (Kurdish) citizen articulation incorporating a distinct ethno-
political tone. Violence has turned into a means of articulation between the state and 
the Kurdish citizens who either supported the PKK (PKK-Partîya Karkêren-i 
Kurdistan- Kurdistan Workers Party)4 activities or refused to collaborate with the 
elements of the state even if they did not support the PKK. State violence in 
southeastern Turkey to insulate the civilian population from the PKK has functioned 
as a facilitator for the dissemination of identity politics, and also justified the  
                                                 
4 The PKK is a previously Marxist-Leninist separatist insurgent organization that has changed its 
discourse significantly over time, especially after the arrest of the leader of the organization in 1999. 
They formally laid down their arms in 1999. But the organization continued keeping an armed guerilla 
force and has started to engage in attacks on strategic Turkish security points since June 1, 2004. The 
organization is recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkey, US, EU and many other countries in 




‘Kurdish cause’ in the eyes of many citizens with Kurdish origins that affected by 
violence. Moreover, throughout the course of the conflict, the Turkish army 
mobilized its resources in order to accommodate the rural Kurdish communities that 
supported the army operations in the region, meet their needs and provide them with 
social services (Cemal 2004). Indeed, I explain in this study that state antagonism has 
not been directed towards the ‘Kurds’ in the region, but rather towards the ‘suspicious 
Kurds’, the ‘so-called citizens’ and the ‘accomplices of the separatist terrorists’.   
The affinity between a politicized Kurdish identity and a violent guerilla 
organization with separatist goals has confused the central state responses and 
hindered the Turkish state’s ability to reconcile with potential PKK supporters among 
the civilian Kurds starting from the 1990s. As I mention in more detail later on, this 
rural Kurdish population potentially antagonistic towards the state in the 1990s had 
been oppressed under the social and economic burden of the Kurdish tribal feudal 
structures in southeastern Turkey before the armed conflict started in late 1980s and 
had suffered from the state’s absence in the region as a social, economic and political 
guarantor and provider, rather than its presence.5 Since the local support for the state 
                                                 
5 This is an intriguing point that complicates the traditional argument that the Turkish state has been 
invasive towards the Kurdish population in southeastern Turkey and therefore should give more 
autonomy to the pre-dominantly Kurdish areas. As reminded us by Beber (2004: 270) “… in many 
cases the problem doesn't seem to be that the state has too large of a presence in these territories. On 
the contrary, the state is often too limited in its presence, and in some cases it is limited to a single 
institution: the military. The key then is to reduce the role played by military forces in these territories, 
while integrating members of minority groups as equals within state institutions and giving them a 
stake in the polity at-large.”  This analytical consideration challenges the demands for decentralization 
in southeastern Turkey questioning the validity and effectiveness of the proposition that the central 




and the army operations has come from the strong Kurdish tribes and their civilian 
constituency who were concerned about the increasing popularity of the PKK among 
the local peasant population, ethno-political Kurdish contention around the PKK has 
also been antagonistic towards the state-friendly Kurds in southeastern Turkey. 
Violence triggered Kurdish ethno-nationalism among the grassroots, but also 
introduced new forms of divisions and enmities among the local Kurds.   
Previous marginalization, social and political alienation and economic 
insecurities have been coupled with political violence that the displaced Kurds 
experienced during the course of displacement in the 1990s including uprootedness, 
extrajudicial killings, disappearances, detention and torture. 1999 is a peculiar 
indicative point6.  Indeed, my research among the migrant communities in the 
southeastern Turkey has convinced me that identity-based politicization and local 
antagonism towards the Turkish state is mainly a part of a politics of survival.  Many 
displaced migrant Kurds have developed a politics of survival to make sense of their 
experiences with violence and to imagine life chances. Socio-economic stability 
entails political security; and in turn, political security guarantees socio-economic 
well-being if not today, definitely tomorrow given that the ‘rights of the Kurds are 
                                                                                                                                           
social democratic proposition that the central state should assume a greater responsibility to guarantee 
the rule of law, redistributive justice, social equity and welfare in the local/periphery.  
6 The year that the PKK laid down arms after the arrest of their leader in 1998, Turkey-EU 
negotiations were officially started and the gradual lifting of the emergency rule in southeastern 
Turkey was started. 1999 was considered as a turning point in Turkey’s Kurdish Question as many 
assumed that the armed and political conflict was over. Following years and developments have 





recognized’ as stated by the majority of my interviewees. It is through politics of 
survival that many displaced Kurds position themselves within the structural changes 
that have overwhelmed them and assert themselves sometimes as victims, sometimes 
as citizens, but in many times as committed supporters of the ‘Kurdish cause’ and 
fighters of the ‘Kurdish struggle.’  
In this study, I do not intend to reduce socio-economic insecurities and 
political insecurities into each other; I explain that they do not necessarily overlap 
each other. However, I do think that during the course of the forced migrations, 
different forms of insecurities have reinforced each other, which in turn contributed to 
the radicalization of the Kurdish identity and the increasing popularity of the 
separatist PKK in the region. Ubiquitous state violence as counter violence against 
the PKK and its supporters together with the deteriorating social, economic and 
political situation in southeastern Turkey during the course of the armed conflict have 
deeply affected the lives of the Kurdish masses who tend to articulate their 
experiences in terms of their ‘Kurdish identity’ and perceive the violence of the pro-
Kurdish actors legitimate, moral and just, appropriate acts of retribution. Identity-
based politicization has in turn articulated as ethno-nationalist sentiments with PKK 
support and sympathy gaining ground among the Kurdish grassroots that are now a 




nationalism provides individuals with a “symbolic and emotional… domain which 
most acutely links individual survival with the sense of collective destiny…”7  
When examining political radicalization among the poor displaced migrant 
communities (particularly among the young Kurds), I show that neither does ethnicity 
nor poverty and unemployment by itself cause people to rebel against the state 
violently. My evaluation is in line with Wieviorka’s analysis of violence in ethnically 
mixed societies 
[Violence] does not emerge directly from downward social mobility, or crisis; 
thus, the riots in the declining urban areas in France or in England, and those 
in major American cities, are more frequently the immediate outcome of 
police abuse of power or inadequate legal decisions than of protests against 
unemployment. Young people’s anger and hatred is definitely expressed in a 
context of social difficulties, but it corresponds in the first instance to 
powerful feelings of injustice and nonrecognition, cultural, and racial 
discrimination.  
Unemployment and poverty, even when they are a mark of a brutal social 
collapse, as in the countries of the former Soviet empire, seldom end directly 
or immediately result in social violence—something we have known since 
Lazarfeld’s classical study on unemployed workers in Marienthal (1993)—but 
instead nurture frustrations that may possibly be expressed in an exacerbated 
form of nationalism…(Wieviorka  2003: 119).  
In this respect, specific social, economic and political factors come together 
and reinforce each other. Therefore, the focus of the attention should not be 
‘ethnicity’ but rather the politicization process of ethnicity under a pro-Kurdish 
                                                 
7 The same rationale might also be used to explain the rise of rabid Turkish nationalism in Turkey 
starting from the 1990s when the PKK violence reached unprecedented levels across Turkey spilling 
over the conflict zones together with the increasing macro-economic instability and deteriorating social 




political agenda; not displacement as a physical relocation8 but rather the 
displacement process as a form of political violence; not poverty and unemployment 
but rather the ethnic politicization (or ethnicization) of poverty and the feeling of 
injustice and discrimination associated with that status of poverty; not only a 
motivation to use violence but also the existence of counter-violence in the form of 
the Turkish armed forces.      
Guiding Research Questions  
What are the local processes that accompany the armed conflict and political 
violence? How did the people on the ground experience what we call ‘ethnic conflict’ 
and ‘political violence’? How do their experiences relate to what we see as 
international changes and/or global trajectories that mark the post-cold war era? What 
are the implications of local experiences with violence of contentious, agitated, 
disturbed citizens and what are the associated social, economic and political 
insecurities that affect state-citizen relations and state legitimacy? In order to shed 
light on these issues, I examine the social and political processes of the conflict-
induced displacement of Kurds in Turkey based on field research and observations on 
the ground in its local context of southeastern Turkey.  
There are two main and two complementary questions that this dissertation 
aims to address in relation to the socio-economic and political insecurities of the 
                                                 
8 Thousands of Kurdish villagers have also been displaced due to the development initiatives going on 




Kurds that surfaced and became transformed during the course of displacement and 
its aftermath;  
1) What is the role of Kurdish displacement in changing the scope and 
substance of pro-Kurdish contention and the articulation between the pro-Kurdish 
elite and grassroots?  
2) What is the role of Kurdish internal displacement in changing state-
(Kurdish) citizen relations in Turkey in the post-1980 era?  
The two complementary questions are:  
3) What is the role and leverage of international actors and rights discourses in 
(re)defining the pro-Kurdish demands as well as the parameters of the changing 
articulation between the Turkish state and displaced Kurdish citizens especially after 
1999?  
4) What is the role and relevance of (urban) space in redefining the state-
(Kurdish) citizen relations, and in the emergence of new forms of pro-Kurdish 
demands, expectations and new forms of pro-Kurdish mobilization?  
Contextualizing the Research Proposition   
Since the early 1990s, the actors in the Kurdish mobilization and the nature of 
the Kurdish contention have changed. As Yeğen points out “the ideology and the 
leadership of the Kurdish resistance of the last two decades are totally different from 
                                                                                                                                           
legal terms and under the jurisdiction of the rule of law. Their displacement process does not 




those of the early 1900s9” (Yeğen 1999: 565). Prior to the 1980s, Kurdish 
mobilization(s) were limited to elite actions and politics; periodically repressed and/or 
co-opted by the Turkish nationalist movement (late Ottoman times and the early 
republican period), Turkish party politics and political clientelism (during the 1940s 
and 1950s) and left-wing class-based politics (during the 1960s and 1970s)10. Starting 
from the late 1980s, Kurdish mobilization has gained a distinct ethnic tone instigated 
and organized by groups of students that separated themselves from class politics and 
resorted to violent Kurdish ethno-nationalist politics under propitious global 
circumstances.   
Particularly since the beginning of the 1990s, pro-Kurdish contention over 
ethnicity has disseminated among the poor peasant grassroots (and later on among the 
poor urban forced migrant communities) who had been until that point marginalized 
not only from the circles of the Turkish state but also from the organized Kurdish 
elite groups. In the same vein, the social, economic and political implications of the 
recent displacement of Kurdish peasant communities in Turkey starting from the late 
1980s have been analytically different than those of previous forced migrations that 
many Kurdish tribes experienced symptomatically during the Ottoman times and the 
                                                 
9 Kurdish resistance movements in the early 20th century Republic of Turkey primarily aimed to 
maintain the status quo of the local tribal/feudal structures and religious establishments against 
modernization and secularization processes associated with the nation-building project of the Kemalist 
elites. Those movements were debilitated by internal tribal rivalries as well as their inability to initiate 
a unified Kurdish movement in Turkish territory (or not in the Middle East what so ever). A detailed 
history of Kurdish resistance movements can be found in Kirisci and Winrow (1997).  
10 For detailed historical analysis see for example Özoğlu 2004, Klein 2001, Natali 2005, Yeğen 1999, 




early period of the Republic of Turkey as a process associated with nation-state 
building, political secularization and centralization11.  
My understanding of the recent displacement of Kurdish citizens in Turkey in 
the late 1980s, but en masse in 1990s relates the issue to three overarching 
intertwined trajectories; 1) the end of the cold war, resulting in the changing nature of 
political violence and of identity politics; 2) the incursion of neoliberalism and the 
changing paradigms regarding the nature of state-society relations, resulting in a 
tendency for decentralization and a decline in the welfare functions of the state 3) the 
increasing salience of new international concerns-- particularly international human 
rights rhetoric--and their influence domestically.    
I construe the political violence of 1980s and 1990s in Turkey as ethnicization 
of political violence and the course of the violence as politicization of ethnicity 
(Brubaker and Laitin, 1998). My analysis contradicts the culturalist perspectives that 
see the Kurdish Question as originating from incompatible ethnic differences in 
Turkey.12 Rather, the historical trajectories of the Kurdish Question(s) have unfolded 
differently in countries like Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey- the country that houses more 
than half of the Kurdish population in the Middle East (see for example, Kirisci and 
                                                 
11 For an analysis of the internal migration of the Kurdish tribes and resettlement politics during the 
early Republican period see for example Cağaptay 2002.  
12 My understanding of the Kurdish question in Turkey also contradicts with the strand of the previous 
research (including a recent study by David Romano 2006) that collapses all of the separate forms of 
the tribal, religious and class-based Kurdish mobilizations and revolts under the category of 
‘nationalist movement’; and further misses the causes of the emergence of the distinct forms of 




Winrow 1997, see also Natali 2005). My position is in line with the argument that the 
Kurdish question is not something in itself but rather refers to the changing 
contention among the Kurds under the influence of national, regional and 
international forces and structures; and is shaped by the means utilized by the Turkish 
state to co-opt and/or to repress the ever-changing manifestations of contention (see 
also Yeğen 1999 for an analysis of the Kurdish Question in the changing Turkish 
state discourse between 1920-80). 
Map-1  
Internal Displacement of the Kurds in Turkey in 1990s 
 




My aim is however not merely to examine a particular form of ethnic 
politicization (or politicization of ethnicity), but further pinpoint the circumstances 
specific to the era of neo-liberal restructuring that lead to an ethnic discontent that 
challenges nation-state formation and state legitimacy. Ethnicity becomes 
increasingly salient as the core of social problems such as exclusion, discrimination, 
injustice, poverty, unemployment and also violence. Although the implications of this 
study may seem to be more applicable to the developing world and/or socio-
economically and ethno-politically vulnerable societies than to developed societies, 
yet my research results are comparable with the various cases of ethnic discontent and 
precipitate forms of ethnic urban movements in western countries such as the US, 
Britain, Ireland, Spain, Germany, and France.  
The 1990s were interesting in Turkey because not only did political violence 
victimize the masses of marginalized Kurdish communities in southeastern Turkey 
through forced migrations, but also because internal migration that had previously 
worked as an important factor in the integration of the Kurds into Turkish society 
through the formal economy, the urban class structure and the housing market ceased 
to be a mechanism of social, economic and political integration (Erder 1995, 1996, 
1998; Buğra and Keyder 2003, 2006) . Instead, it turned into a process leading to 
discrimination, injustice, impoverishment, unemployment and social exclusion in 
metropolitan centers. This happened not only because the migrations of the 1990s in 




voluntary; but also because forced migrations were intertwined with the social, 
economic and political repercussions of neo-liberal globalization, a process that as 
noted by Wieviorka (2003:117). “exacerbat[es] cultural fragmentation and the 
radicalization of social identities….and accentuat[es] the frustrations that originate in 
social inequalities.   
THEORETICAL CONCERNS: 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE, IDENTITY POLITICS AND CITIZENSHIP 
In this section I argue that studying a particular aspect of political violence 
(i.e. Forced migration and/or population displacement) requires synthesizing multiple 
strands of the available literature. Throughout this dissertation, my interest is to tackle 
the social, economic and political processes that shape the issues of citizenship, social 
exclusion and poverty, ethnic identity formation and claim-making in relation to 
political violence. Therefore, I locate my study in the borderlands where citizenship, 
identity politics and claim-making crisscross with spaces of radical political 
contention.    
I construe population displacement as a socio-political process embedded into 
the power dynamics of political violence and armed conflict in a particular locality. 
Even though there might be economic factors involved, forced migrations are 
particularly political and/or politicized, and they are ‘involuntary’ by nature. Forced 
migrations further inform us about contingencies of the armed conflict associated 




sovereignty, citizenship, political and ethnic identity. Accordingly in this dissertation, 
I construe forced migration as:  
a barometer of social, economic and political struggle in a given place. Studies 
of the ways in which people’s lives are uprooted and homes are forfeited in 
return for safety provide grounded insights into the otherwise abstract 
concepts of ethnicity, identity, state-building, and citizenship (Giles and 
Hyndman, 2004:6). 
Research on political violence has focused on organized contentious violent 
actors; the state(s) vs. the other state(s); organized non-state actors versus the state 
and/or organized non-state actors versus other organized non-state actors. Basically 
political violence has been mainly construed and studied in relation to the organized 
motivated power actors, parties, terrorist organizations, militia groups, guerilla 
organizations, militaries and paramilitaries etc. What about the civilians involved in 
political violence en masse especially after 1980s since when violence has become 
ubiquitous in ethnically dissolving geographies? Theoretical attempts are needed to 
understand social and political agency of civilians in political violence situations, 
their political experiences and progressive and/or reactionary leverage of civilian 
experience and political agency for social and political stability and advancement of 
peaceful democratization processes in conflict geographies. Rather than treated as 
social and political actors embedded (even though they are already physically 
uprooted) in their context, civilians tend to be perceived in much policy and academic 




 Policy-oriented research even with humanitarian intentions, perceives 
victimized civilians as impoverished, hungry, sick people waiting for food, medicine 
and shelter to be provided. In IR (international relations) studies, civilians have been 
forgotten in attempts to understand diplomatic relations. Anthropological research has 
done some of the best work in studying the local dynamics of political violence, 
however, it does not escape victimizing the ‘identities’ and romanticizing the 
victimized ‘identities’, thus failing to understand the politics and economics of 
identity formation  and of civilians’ relations with violence. Especially after the 
1980s, with the increasing number of uprooted people internally and internationally 
mobile in conflict geographies, civilians have been treated as ‘security threats’ not 
only by the international power actors including the western states and United 
Nations; but also by political science and some strands of conflict studies research 
‘assessing’ how much instability uprooted civilians could pose for international 
security. This security paranoia indeed has been the root causes of the UN policy 
regime towards internationally and internally displaced people in the world (see for 
example Harrell-Bond 1996 and Hyndman 2000 for a critical analysis).   
In a relatively recent research on forced migration, Castles (2003:14) says that 
“[t]he most obvious reason why we should study forced migration is because it has 
grown dramatically in the post-Cold War period.” However, considering that forced 
migration is a phenomena beyond our mere understanding of physical human 




terms of citizenship and nation-state legitimacy, that forced migration has linkages 
with poverty and social exclusion, that forced migrant groups are political entities 
with sometimes political claims and antagonistic stances in nation-state politics, there 
is still dearth of analytical research aiming to understand the social, economic and 
political implications of forced migration in conflict situations, which seems like a 
serious void to fill in especially in political sociology research.  
In my study, the focus is internally displaced forced migrant communities, 
which makes issues of ethnic identity, citizenship, claim-making and political 
radicalization even much more pertinent. The actors in question are the ‘legitimate 
citizens’ of a state; they are not internationally displaced refugee communities 
begging for the mercy of the ‘host’ countries, whose official status is at stake; but 
rather very ‘legitimate citizens’ uprooted within their own country largely by their 
own state. Their needs, concerns and expectations; demands and claim-making; 
antagonism and contention are engaged with the state with which their affiliation is 
now in question.  
First, I discuss the literature on citizenship. Citizenship literature falls short to 
understand the radical contention between the Turkish state and many conflict-affect 
Kurds including the displaced. However, the notion of citizenship helps me 
understand to what extent state-society articulation could be achieved through 
pushing the boundaries of Turkish citizenship for greater inclusiveness for socio-




Second, I discuss the literature on identity politics and claim-
making/politicization which I use to understand the displaced Kurds’ political 
affiliation with the Turkish state through identity politics. Also, predicaments 
associated with identity politics help me better understand the antagonism and lack of 
legitimacy between the Turkish state and the contentious pro-Kurdish actors. 
Finally, the literature on social mobilization with a specific emphasis on 
space/geography helps me better articulate the nature of politicization and claim-
making in southeastern Turkey by taking into consideration the factor of ‘urban 
space’ in a contentious geography.  
Citizenship, Rights and Ethnicity 
I use the notion of citizenship to understand the changing nature of state-
society relations in southeastern Turkey during the course of the armed conflict. As 
opposed to what otherwise would be thought, displaced population during the course 
of the violence faced violence and rights violations not necessarily because of their 
ethnicity but rather because of peculiar concerns traditionally embedded into the 
politics of Turkish citizenship to distinguish between the ‘legitimate’, ‘loyal’ and 
‘deserving’ citizens from the ‘illegitimate’ ones. After 1980s, there have been 
introduced distinct ethnic connotations into the state’s practices of distinguishing the 
‘good’ citizens from the ‘bad’ ones (see for example Yeğen 1999, 2004 and 2006 for 
a critical analysis of the changing nature of Turkish citizenship throughout time). The 




forms of social politicization and claim-making on the ground with predominately 
Turkish military conducted mass displacement of Kurdish communities from rural 
areas into a complex web of urban relations. Violence indeed rendered the notion of 
citizenship questionable as citizens and the state started to lose their legitimacy in the 
eye of each other in face of raising salience of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in 
southeastern Turkey.  
I am particularly interested in the articulation [and/or lack of articulation] 
between the conflict-affected masses/social actors and the state (Jelin 2005: 191). 
This articulation can be conceived in terms of citizenship, but as I discuss below, as 
articulation gets more and more contentious there emerged a need to introduce further 
theoretical parameters to capture what is beyond the boundaries of citizenship. 
Citizenship refers to a national identity and belonging. As processes of nation-state 
building are imposed upon from above by the founding elite, they are also supposed 
to be supported, complemented and/or resisted by the societal forces from below. 
Citizenship consolidation and expansion of rights occurs as a product of these 
sometimes contradictory and sometimes complementary forces from above and 
below. Citizenship also refers to rights and duties granted to the state and citizens. As 
societal forces from below could push for further rights and/or redefinition of 
previous ones, expanding citizenship rights is also a strategy for the state elites to 





Building upon the original work of T.H. Marshall ([1949] 1964), the 
contemporary sociological notion of citizenship goes beyond the formal rights and 
duties of citizenship to include “the social relations among citizens and between 
citizens, the state and its agents” (Roberts 2002:2), and further citizenship is 
construed as “a conflictive practice related to power-that is to a struggle about who is 
entitled to say what in the process of defining the common social problems and 
deciding how they will be faced” (Jelin 1996:104 also see Van Gunsteren 1978). With 
regard to conflictive forces between the state and citizens, between citizens as well as 
between the state, citizens and would-be-citizens, claims to citizenship and rights can 
be defined as struggles (or movements) against the exclusionary mechanisms of 
modern nation-states and as claims to inclusion into the boundaries of a politically 
defined notion of citizenship rights as well as access to opportunities available in 
society (Roberts 2002).  
An important strand of research on citizenship and exclusion is presented by 
the research of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) and Engin Isin (2002). 
These scholars elaborate on claims to citizenship as processes through which subjects 
articulate rights-claims and their particular identities. Citizen subjects, in turn become 
‘political’ asserting their excluded interests against exclusionary institutional 
processes of citizenship. Isin defines ‘becoming political’ as “that moment when one 
constitutes oneself as being capable of judgment about just and unjust, takes 




fulfilling that responsibility” (Isin 2002:276). However, ‘being political’ in Isin’s 
terms gets more radical when it comes to group rights with ethnic connotations. 
Indigenous movements, for example, struggle for inclusion and rights on the same 
basis with the other citizens in their countries. But they also sometimes struggle for 
autonomy and reject to connect with the state as it is the case with Zapatistas (see for 
example Davis 1999).  
Kurds in Turkey cannot be treated on the same basis as indigenous 
populations in Latin America (see for example Yeğen 2006 for a detailed 
explanation). Kurdish citizens in Turkey have never been systematically 
discriminated against or excluded from citizenship rights available to the other 
citizens. Rather citizenship practices have been diverse, complicated and sometimes 
contradictory in Turkey whenever religious and ethnic groups are involved (Kirişçi 
2000, Yeğen 2004; Çagaptay 2006). Kurds have been considered equal citizens and 
granted social, economic and political rights based on a civic understanding of 
citizenship similar to the French case. Indeed, citizenship politics has facilitated the 
voluntary integration and assimilation of many Kurds into Turkish society, economic 
life and politics since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. A substantial portion of 
the Kurdish population in Turkey has taken their places in business and politics 




egalitarianism13’ promised to grant social rights (i.e. health and education services, 
and social security pension for the employed) to all citizens, and until 1980s 
contributed to the integration of the Kurds into mainstream Turkish society without 
any distinct form of institutional discrimination based on ethnicity14 (see for example 
Yeğen 2006). Kurds in Turkey have also quite well distributed across Turkey through 
economic as well as conflict-induced migrations. Though southeastern Turkey is still 
predominately Kurdish, Istanbul is counted as the major city with the highest Kurdish 
population in the world which makes territorial pro-Kurdish claims questionable (see 
for example Kirişçi and Winrow 1997 and Barkey and Fuller 1998 for detailed 
discussions on this point).   
The current trend in rights and claim-making discourses is also deeply 
associated with the internationalization of these discourses through ‘advocacy 
networks in international relations’ that complicates but also facilitates the  
                                                 
13 I should note that in practice, ‘social egalitarianism’ discourse in social policy turned into a form of 
‘inegalitarian’ corporatism’ in 1950s, 60s and 70s favoring employed urban populations. Still, free 
educational and health services were the state priorities and made available to the majority of the 
citizens. Social egalitarianism in social policy has particularly worked for the Kurdish migrant 
communities in western urban centers who were relatively more able than the post-1980 migrant 
groups to integrate with the urban social and economic life and find jobs in the formal sector. 
Marginalization and exclusion were rather in class terms than ethnic terms until the 1990s. Since 
1980s, neo-liberal restructuring has reduced even the inadequate forms of previous welfare provisions 
provided by the central state, whilst since 2002 a new direction towards a distorted form of ‘universal 
social rights’ approach has been adopted by the pro-Islamist government (Buğra and Keyder 2006). I 
elaborate further on this point later in this dissertation.  
14 As opposed to the religious minorities, Muslim ethnicities are not considered as ‘minority’ groups in 
Turkey. In the same vein, Kurds have been welcome in Turkish politics, state posts and even in 
Turkish army without any discrimination while religious minorities have experienced systematic 
institutional discrimination at an overt form as they have been excluded from many state posts and 




negotiation between the state and groups of people including ethnic and 
religious minorities (Sikkink and Keck 1998, also see Watts 2004 for her work on 
Kurdish transnational advocacy groups). In this respect, transnational processes of 
globalization shaped by powerful organizations such as the UN, INGOs and the 
World Bank have strengthened the leverage of human rights discourses in domestic 
and international politics, which have also in turn promoted the relevance of 
citizenship (Roberts 2005: 144, Sikkink and Keck 1998). Scholars like Soysal further 
argue that internationalization of ‘rights’ discourses even enables non-citizen social 
groups such as immigrants and guest workers to engage in claim-making against 
states using human rights discourses and pushing the official boundaries of the notion 
of citizenship (Soysal 1994, 1997, also see Kemp et. al 2000). Research on 
citizenship after 1980s in this respect, goes hand in hand with increasing salience of 
‘human rights’ discourses in understanding state-society relations and demand-
making. 
The second half of the 20th century has indeed become the era of ‘rights’ of 
people against state repression. In the 1960s, rights were defined in economic and 
class terms by social movements including student and worker activists around the 
world and in Turkey. In the 1970s, social movements emphasizing economic and 
class relations were suppressed severely by dictatorships and military coups (1980 
military coup in Turkey). International human rights organizations multiplied in the 




involving alliances with domestic organizations and initiatives (Keck and Sikkink 
1998, Brysk 1998). As Jelin (2005: 185) states “previously, domination or social and 
political struggles were interpreted in terms of class or national revolutions. The 
incorporation of the notion of “violations of human rights” was a true paradigmatic 
shift…”  
Starting from the 1980s, in face of decreasing power of class-based 
polarization, increasing salience of discourses of democracy and identity politics 
(ethnic, religious and gender), the social and political demand-making has been 
concerned with oppression of identity-based social groups seen as deprived  of human 
rights and access to citizenship.  In my research, I have a contradictory stance towards 
the human rights discourses, one considers human rights discourses important in 
oppressed people’s quest for justice in cases that domestic functioning of law and 
institutions make it impossible for citizens to communicate with state agents; second 
considers human rights discourses alienating and confusing for state-society relations 
with over involvement of the international actors into domestic social and political 
tensions that require direct negotiation of the national actors without being 
subservient to the international interests.    
In her insightful piece on human rights, political violence and people’s quest 
for justice in the Neo-liberal context of Latin America, Elizabeth Jelin for example, 
provides valuable insights about how to understand repressed people’s demand for 




political systems. Her analysis of the 1990s in Latin America (applicable to other 
geographies including Turkey with similar experiences) disentangles human rights 
movements into various strands. On the one hand, she takes into consideration the 
impact of neo-liberal policies on society including impoverishment, inequality, social 
exclusion and social polarization. On the other hand, she examines how human rights 
movements perceive past violence today in relation to the claims of “life, truth and 
justice” with regard to the past. She therefore, points out the dialectical relationship 
between past, present and future in demanding justice to settle past accounts with a 
violent state, but also redefining demands “in face of the new realities of inequality, 
social exclusion, and social polarization….recuperating and integrating the issues of 
economic, social, and cultural rights within the logic of human rights and citizenship 
participation.” (Jelin 2005: 192).  
Jelin’s analysis shows us the connections between past repressions and state 
violence, today’s rights demands articulated in human rights rhetoric, and claims to 
citizenship in face of the increasing burden of impoverishment/poverty, social 
exclusion and inequalities especially in developing countries.  
At first, the emphasis of the demands was on stopping illegal repression.… the 
main ideas shifted first toward a claim for “truth and justice,” and since then 
the movement diversified its goals and demands. On the one hand, it demands 
truth and justice with respect to the past. This has proven to be a key and 
enduring action, multiplying its strategies and international dynamics (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998). On the other hand, the human rights movement redefines 
its demands in face of the new realities of inequality, social exclusion, and 
social polarization that have been a persistent feature of the 1990s. This strand 




cultural rights within the logic of human rights and citizenship participation” 
(Jelin 2005: 192). 
Jelin’s two-stranded approach to understand social mobilization challenging 
the state through internationalized rights discourses (human rights in her case) in a 
neo-liberal era is also applicable to my specific case of the transformation of the pro-
Kurdish demand-making in 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, international rights discourses 
including human rights and cultural rights discourses have been an integral part of the 
pro-Kurdish mobilization in Turkey after 1980s. Rights discourses have facilitated the 
PKK-led politicization in the civil domain and have turned into an outlet for 
expressing pro-Kurdish discontent. However, pro-Kurdish mobilization has failed to 
integrate issues of economic and social rights into its predominately identity and 
culture oriented demand making. Pro-Kurdish mobilization in Turkey and also 
Diaspora has been unable to articulate itself in relation to social democratic, political 
and class conscious terms with no concrete understanding of the social, political and 
economic problems of the impoverishing Kurdish masses.  
In the domestic arena, too much involvement with identity and culture has 
hindered the pro-Kurdish mobilization to gain a well-founded ground in politics and 
civil society in alliance with the social democratic progressive forces in the country 
crosscutting ethnic divisions. Human rights discourses have actually worked against 
the pro-Kurdish mobilization in domestic politics and civil society albeit assisted to 
gather international attention and interest in human rights violations against Turkish 




the ethnic visage of the Kurdish Question to come out and mobilize the grassroots, 
but have not really helped with articulating the real life problems of millions of 
conflict-affected Kurds in social, economic and political (different than identity 
politics) terms in a neo-liberal era.  
In a parallel vein, I think that multiculturalist formulations aiming to bring the 
issues of language, culture and identity into the definition of citizenship would not 
even capture the basic problematiques with the Turkish state’s inclusiveness and 
exclusiveness. Rather, an understanding of civic citizenship should be consolidated 
and strengthened in addition to institutional arrangements to ensure democratic 
channels for citizens to seek justice for human and citizenship rights violations (see 
for example Argun-Ercan 1999). This approach does not ignore the fact that citizens 
have also the right to claim control over their cultural domain; rather my point is that 
while cultural freedom is the most basic human right, institutionalization of cultural 
differences (including religious and ethnic forms) and politicization of ethnicity might 
lead to deepening social cleavages in a society and not necessarily guarantee social, 
economic and political stability and security for the citizens (Beber 2004). Parallel to 
my argument, human rights discourse interestingly has had two contradictory 
implications for state-society relations in Turkey recently; antagonizing when it is 
used to support identity-based claims, reconciliatory when it is integrated into 
demands for social citizenship, civil rights and justice. I explain this further in chapter 




Moreover, ‘culture’ when it comes to Middle East should be treated very 
carefully as it works something quite strongly resistant towards secularization and 
advancements in citizenship. Charrad’s (2002) innovative comparative analysis of the 
relationship between the degree of power historically granted to kin-based tribal units 
in politics and the level of secularization in law offers analytical tools to understand 
the importance of weakening primordial social ties for achieving secularization in the 
state system. Her research, dealing with women’s rights in Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco, is considerably eye opening to conceptualize the obstacles to 
democratization in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Political relations in many 
Middle Eastern countries are arranged around primordial identities with substantive 
amount of power granted to kin, family, tribe, ethnic group and sectarian relations. 
Charrad’s work illuminates the fact that democratization and secularization is painful 
and violent if not impossible without dissolving the salience of ethnicity, religion and 
tribe in politics.  
In the same vein, tribal structures in predominately Kurdish areas in Turkey 
have been a challenge for modernization and secularization project of the Republican 
state-building. The first historical manifestations of the Kurdish discontent in the 
early days of the Turkish Republic were upheavals against state centralization project, 
organized by previously autonomous religious and tribal units. Here ethnic, tribal, 
sectarian relations cannot be reduced to the notion of ‘culture’ as they indeed refer to 




liberating, majority of its members especially groups like women subjugated under 
patriarchal system (a point eloquently reminded by Mojab (2004) in her analysis of 
violence against women in Iraqi Kurdistan) and/or landless peasants oppressed under 
tribal/feudal economic relations. Also, identity politics and demands around the 
notion of ‘culture’ cannot be justified without taking into consideration the structural 
inequalities and injustice embedded in ‘culture’ and identity-based group formations. 
To be optimistic, one can expect that political turmoil is likely to reveal structural 
inequalities in a society and provide channels of opportunity to negotiate claims, 
demands and interests; reconcile conflicts and tensions; and settle past wrongdoings 
of actors. Turner’s (2000) statement can be tested in this study.  
I develop what we might call a conflict model of democratic citizenship. 
Warfare, occupation, and civil wars can often produce unintentionally the 
modernizing force necessary to erode gender hierarchies, status divisions, and 
the presence of primordial associations within the public domain. In 
Citizenship and Capitalism (1986), I tried to show how migration, social 
struggles, and warfare can often lay the foundations for advances in 
citizenship. This model was developed in response to the static version of the 
sociology of citizenship in the work of sociologists like Marshall. (Turner 
2000:36)    
Identity Politics and Political Violence  
The ending of the Cold War accompanied the emergence of identity politics 
around the world with ethnic and religious polarization invading the political domain 
particularly in East Europe and Central Asia; but also in Latin America and Africa. 
Class-based polarization was rapidly replaced by ethnic and religious politicization, 




neo-liberalism and the US led proxy wars around the world. Within the last two 
decades, internal wars have replaced the previous norm of international wars (van 
Creveld 1991, Holsti 1996; also see Tilly 2002). Leaving aside the substantive 
international human mobility in 1990s, the number of internally displaced people 
(called IDPs in the international refugee regime) has skyrocketed by the end of 1990s 
(Cohen and Deng 1998). 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States and the international 
community encouraged and supported ethnic group leaders in East Europe and 
contributed directly to the ethniciziation of social and political instabilities in the 
Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, which led to the massacres of 
civilians in places like Bosnia (Tilly 2002 also see Denich 2003). Memories of 
ethnicized violence have in turn contributed to new ‘collective memories’ with 
collective reimagining of ethnic identities and/or creating new ‘enemy-others’ to 
settle accounts that are entrenched in political economies rather than ethnic 
differences (Volkan 1994, 1997; also see Murer 2002, Tainter 2003).  
Civilians have been increasingly involved in a mounting number of intra-state 
wars and have experienced violence at unprecedented rates through various forms of 
political violence including armed repression, ethnic cleansing, use of selective 
migration and forced migration strategies to control rival groups and resistant 
geographies like Bosnia and Chechnya. Reflecting the domestic political economic 




been instigated by groups of actors called in the literature ‘boundary keepers’, ‘ethnic 
brokers’, and/or ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ “who  supply its [ethnic conflict] doctrine; 
and …exploit ethnic solidarities.” (Seligmann 2003:135) What is noteworthy to 
underline here is that identities are political constructions. As Wieviorka (2003:110) 
reminds us “[g]enerally speaking, identities constitute something new; they are 
produced far more than reproduced, an invention more than a tradition.” 
Since the1980s, indeed, it has been impossible to easily disentangle the 
economic and political processes responsible for ethnic(ized) conflict and political 
violence around the world. Economic transformations, structural inequalities and 
economic distress are all being reconfigured with other socio-political dynamics in 
trajectories leading to politicization of ethnicities in a radical way.  It is thus difficult 
to define any conflict as ‘ethnic conflict’ and violence as ‘ethnic violence’ due to the 
existence of structural power differentials entrenched and mainly originating from the 
unequal distribution of economic resources, assets, services and provisions. 
Incorporating the geography factor, Agnew (2001: 103) notes that “[r]egional 
resentments are not always simply ethnic”. In many cases, the political economy and 
geography of the conflict introduces parameters and dynamics that are not explained 
solely by ethnic subordination/domination (Bush and Keyman 1997, Ruane and Todd 
2004).  Unger et.al (2002) notes in a parallel vein,   
Unequal access to services, favoritism in spending, controls over key assets, 
and policies creating dependency of one group on another long aggravated 
tensions among different groups. When disturbed by political change, such 




negotiated away. Such economic relations help fuel civil wars, as in Northern 
Ireland and the former Yugoslavia, violent rebel movements, as in Peru and 
Burma, or violent street protests, as in Guayana and Fiji. (Unger et.al: 2002, 
p:5) 
 
A focus on identity politics helps me understand the antagonism between the 
displaced Kurds and the Turkish state—their conflictive stances towards each other 
that are difficult to reconcile. More than that, I am particularly interested in 
explaining the problems associated with claim-making around ethnic identity. In 
order to better understand the changing articulation between the state and conflict-
affected Kurdish masses, I disentangle the specificities of the pro-Kurdish grassroots 
mobilization in order to understand why it has failed 1) to establish social, economic 
and political linkages beyond their identity-based ethno-nationalist circles and across 
social groups in quest of justice and peace in Turkey and 2) to mediate effectively 
between the state and the discontented masses. 
Indeed, the current dynamics of globalization and the changing nature of 
social mobilization due to the ‘neoliberal ascendancy’ have caused many students of 
social movements to question the effectiveness and role of social mobilization in 
policy making and implementation. As Foweraker (2005) points out, based on his 
research on Latin America, ‘There is no disputing the enormous investment of 
political energy and imagination in social mobilization. But what political difference 
does it make?’ Despite his cautious stance towards and questioning confidence in the 




the success stories of indigenous movements around collective rights demands in the 
areas of land tenure, education and political representation.  
Many local Kurdish politicians and activists mentioned to me the Latin 
American ‘success stories’ with admiration on many occasions. However, so far pro-
Kurdish politics has not been able to achieve the same degree of articulation and 
organization that characterize some of the indigenous movements of the Latin 
America.  Fragmentation based on class, religious sect and political orientation has 
been the Achilles’ heel in any pro-Kurdish mobilization in Turkey since the 
foundation of the Republic (see for example Kirisci and Winrow 1998). But more 
importantly, since 1980s, too strong an emphasis upon the notion of ‘identity’ 
(particular civic and political engagement with Kurdish culture and language) has 
hindered the analytical incorporation of other issues, such as social empowerment, 
political pluralism, social equity, distributional justice and class into pro-Kurdish 
demands (A problem that I point out in chapter 6 of this dissertation).  Also, 
increasing salience of Kurdish identity politics has also gone hand in hand with 
increasing Turkish nationalism (see for example Öniş 2000 for an analysis of the rise 
of Turkish nationalist party politics).  
Moreover, identity politics (both ethnic and religious) seems to have a 
destabilizing impact on the Turkish society and politics. Kurdish identity politics in 
particular challenges the state rather than relates to and/or negotiates with the state. 




parameters of identity politics as grassroots (particularly conflict-affected urban 
migrants) get further alienated from the central state given their experiences with 
violence and strengthening affiliation with pro-Kurdish organizing in many 
southeastern city centers. Identity politics, rather than expanding the scope of 
articulation between the state and society-- as argued by some students of Latin 
America referring to various nature of success stories of indigenous movements-- 
works to the detriment of reconciliatory relations between the elements of the Turkish 
state and the contentious population (i.e. conflict-affected displaced Kurdish 
population)15.  
Indeed, one can consider the Turkish army’s counter guerilla activities and the 
subservience of Turkish civil politics to military decisions during the 1980s and 
1990s as a general nation-state reflex aimed at maintaining the national integrity and 
territorial unity of the country against separatist insurgents. The violence used was in 
fact a ‘legitimate’ force in the eyes of the Turkish state and the Turkish public as well 
as to certain extent from the perspective of  the international law that granted 
sovereignty to the nation-state over its internationally recognized boundaries. From a  
                                                 
15 In the same vein, Islamist identity politics also destabilizes the societal balances which have been 
attempted to be scrupulously balanced by the revolutionary secular ideals of the Kemalist founding 
elite. Recent pro-Islamist ascendancy in the central government, Parliament and expectedly at the top 
of the level of state presidency is, what I expect, likely to disturb the secular institutional structures and 
introduce tension between the secular arms of the state (the military and the state bureaucracy) and the 
increasing Islamized government and institutions under its control. Institutionalization of Islam also 
introduces social tension among the citizens creating artificial cleavages such as non-Muslims/infidels 




theoretical perspective, the violence waged by the Turkish state against the elements 
of the Kurdish insurgent organization (and later on against the Kurdish civilians) can 
be conceptualized as a result of the ‘unfinished’ character of the Turkish state (Yeğen 
1999, Agnew 2001) and/or a part of the process of ‘state [re]making’ (Tilly 1985).  
On the other side of the equation, there is violence perpetuated by a non-state 
actor; and it is much more complicated to understand and explain non-state violence 
than state inflicted violence. If the proposition that violence is chosen by the non-state 
actor(s) among different political options to settle a contention with the state and/or 
other non-state actors is valid, I would agree with Wieviorka’s (1999) argument that 
violence emerges when politicized actors exhaust the other options and are not able to 
negotiate with the power holders. Some scholars of the Kurdish question including 
Bozarslan (2000) have also resorted to parallel propositions arguing that the armed 
conflict was the only option for the insurgent Kurdish actors to follow considering the 
authoritarian and repressive nature of the Turkish state.  
I however, would also agree with the strand of scholarly work that conceives 
of violence as counterproductive for social and political reconciliation in the long-run. 
Motives for forgoing and in some cases even refusing to capitalize on channels of 
peaceful political negotiation should be analyzed critically as pro-Kurdish actors in 
1990s, were systematically engaged in challenging the premises of the nation-state in 
Turkey and much less interested in negotiating with the power holders. Wieviorka 




contention among the Kurdish grassroots in face of the lifting of the emergency rule 
in the region between 1998 and 2002 and the democratic spaces recently opened via 
EU democratization reforms (An issue that I discuss in chapter 6). Since 1999, 
democratic openings in Turkey in general and in southeastern Turkey in particular 
seemed to be in contradiction with the recent upsurge in ethno-nationalism (Kurdish 
as well as Turkish) and also religiously motivated violence in Turkey. Democracy 
does not guarantee peace and reconciliation. Do we need new paradigmatic shifts in 
understanding the relationship between identity politics and violence, especially in 
the case of Middle East?  
The Kurdish Question in the Middle East has been so far treated in the 
literature as a deadly challenge for the national unity of respective states, as if an 
intractable and irresolvable problem inherited from the partition of the Ottoman 
Empire by the European powers (see for example Chaliand 1992, McDowall 2004, 
for a relatively analytical and comprehensive analysis see for example, Kirisci and 
Winrow 1997). If we follow this logic, the respective states are to try and learn how 
to manage the problem rather than resolve it and/or let the Kurds have their own 
country. And violence may even seem a natural part of the state politics in the Middle 
East under the same rationale. Critical research has failed to adequately analyze the 
Kurdish Question as a form of non-static contention surfaced in different historical 
periods with different faces in relation to the structural deficiencies sometimes 




underdevelopment and intra-regional uneven development, some other times in 
inequality and lack of distributional justice and especially since 1980s in chronically 
perpetuated regional violence (for a parallel reading see Yeğen 1999, 2006).  
Leaving the cases of Iraq and Iran aside due to complications that I cannot 
discuss here, in the Turkish case, there was a nation-state building and consolidation 
process going on in the southeast as well as across the country in the early years of 
the Republic. Contingencies of nation-state formation; modernization and 
secularization processes that have been pursued by Turkey in the southeast (and also 
by Iraq and Iran in their respective Kurdish areas to differing degrees), therefore 
deserve to be taken into consideration. What is further needed is also an examination 
of distorted forms of economic relations (pre-modern tribal vs. newly introduced 
modern; feudal landowners vs. landless peasants; intensifying migration patterns vs. 
growing urban poor) and unequal political power dynamics (tribal chieftains and 
religious establishments vs. the modern secular nation-state; patronage politics vs. 
internal Kurdish enmities; growing necessity for middle class and civic consciousness 
vs. existing primordial forms of civil society arrangements etc.) that emerged out the 
uncompleted processes of modernization and secularization undertaken by the 
Turkish state and resisted by the traditional structural forces entrenched in social, 
economic and political relations common to the tribal system and religious 




And finally, an analysis of the global trajectory developing beyond 
jurisdiction of nation-states since 1980s; and international developments favoring 
ethnic and religious disintegration and challenging the very premises of the nation-
states around the world should be incorporated in our understanding of the Kurdish 
Question in Turkey. In this respect, theoretical focus has rarely been on how to 
overcome the structural social, economic and political inequalities entrenched in the 
countries with Kurdish concentrations where ethnic tension has arisen as a symptom 
rather than as a root cause.  
Escaping the political, economic and social foundations of what has emerged 
as ‘Kurdish Question’ might result in reducing the issue to merely a matter of ethnic 
identity recognition without understanding the root causes of distributive injustice, 
lack of political representation and power differentials among social groups changing 
under repercussions of international and global forces. In my understanding, under 
the circumstances of the end of the Cold War, the same rationale that the Kurdish 
Question was an irresolvable problem unless Kurds are given their own country has 
been reinforced. Therefore, an engagement with ‘identity’ rather than a spectrum of 
social and political solutions has been forgone as pro-Kurdish mobilization after 
1980s has resorted deeper and deeper to an ideal of independent ‘Kurdish nation’ and 
the Turkish state has become more and more paranoid and aggressive against any 




Pro-Kurdish demand-making beyond a demand for inclusion into Turkish 
politics and society, involves a demand for recognition of a particular ideologically 
defined Kurdish identity, which in turn refers to a particular form of self-
determination and autonomy. In this respect, since the 1980s, the pro-Kurdish 
movement and its articulation at the grassroots level through increasing numbers of 
urban protests especially in the southeastern provinces, but also in western city 
centers like Istanbul, develop around rigid forms of demand-making, based on 
‘identity’ (a form of mystified Kurdish culture and language at the center as well as 
the image of the PKK as savior) (I discuss the new forms of pro-Kurdish grassroots 
mobilization in chapter 6).  
The dilemma is that this is a form of identity politicization that excludes 
millions of mainstream Turkish Kurds who are considered ‘betrayers’ making the 
ideal of a unified ‘Kurdish nation’ even for the Turkish Kurds controversial. It is also 
ironic that pro-Kurdish identity politics in Turkey engages with domestic party 
politics since 1980s with formation of ethno-nationalist Kurdish political parties that 
refused to establish social and political allegiances and create political agendas 
crosscutting ethno-political cleavages; therefore getting itself more and more 
marginalized in legitimate party politics. Maybe the most systemic problem with 
identity politics, in this respect is that it carries the potential risk of depoliticizing and 
obscuring structural problems and inequalities in society. In order to evaluate the 




grassroots, I draw upon Nancy Fraser’s analysis of recognition claims. Fraser for 
example addresses the problem entrenched in identity-based politics and calls it ‘the 
problem of reification’;  
Yet many others [recognition struggles] take the form of a communitarianism 
that drastically simplifies and reifies group identities. In such forms, struggles 
for recognition do not promote respectful interaction across differences in 
increasingly multicultural contexts. They tend, rather, to encourage separatism 
and group enclaves, chauvinism and intolerance, patriarchalism and 
authoritarianism. I shall call this the problem of reification. (Fraser 2003:91-
92)      
Bozarslan (2004) further points out the dialectic relation between the radical 
politicization of ethnic and religious identities and violence in the Middle East as 
follows:  
[E]specially during the last three decades, violence in the Middle East 
emerged as the product of power relations, authoritarian structures and an 
absence of integrative social contracts. The criminalization of political, ethnic 
and sectarian identities and the divisions resulting therefrom have contributed 
to the formation of a “tragic mind” that perceives violence as the surest 
provider of justice and hope (Bozaraslan 2004: 15).   
Bozarslan seems to be quite keen in pointing out certain outcomes of ethnic 
and religious politicization including the resorting of ethnic and religious politics to 
violence and criminal activities, and the formation of a “tragic mind” in ethnic and 
religious movements seeking justice and peace through violent means. Turkey has 
indeed been struck by multiple manifestations of ‘tragic minds’ fed by upsurge in 
ethnic and religious radicalization. Tragic minds embedded in Kurdish ethno-
nationalism as well as Turkish nationalism seem to be further aggravating each other 




Turkey. As another example in point, a similar ‘tragic mind’ once operated in 
Yugoslavia in the recent history when Serbs were looking a way out of an IMF 
tailored economic depression and political corruption (Denich 2003). 
There is indeed a need to draw upon some structural forces leading to social 
tension and transforming it into one form of violence (i.e. ethnic) or another. In this 
respect, political violence refers to means exploited and employed by the contentious 
sides to control power positions, people, resources and territories/geographies. This 
conceptualization evinces certain ‘structural’ factors entrenched in conflict and 
violence, but also the structures beyond what we physically define as ‘conflict’ and 
‘violence’. Galtung (1996) clarifies this point saying “[c]onflict is much more than 
what meets the naked eye as ‘trouble,’ direct violence. There is also the violence 
frozen into structures, and the culture that legitimizes violence.” Cockburn (2004) 
further illustrates this point by explaining when violence is more likely to exist; 
“[v]iolence exists whenever the potential development of an individual or group is 
held back by the conditions of a relationship, and in particular by the uneven 
distribution of power and resources” (Cockburn 2004:30).  We therefore, need to go 
beyond what seems like ‘identity’ instigating political violence.  
Mobilization and Geography  
Political geography research has been interested in the dynamics between 
space, geography and political processes for a long time. Early scholars of political 




incorporating the factor of geography in their models (Dahlman 2001). Starting from 
1990s (Post Cold War Era), political geography research has taken a more “critical” 
approach to understanding international relations in terms of inter-state power 
relations and the political economy of the post cold war era (Slater 1997, Pile and 
Keith 1997, Agnew 1997, Davis, 1999, Harvey 2000, Miller 2004). Looking at the 
ground level (non-state actors), after the collapse of the socialist bloc, the previous 
state-centered approach (in interpreting the political) has been replaced by theoretical 
inquiries aiming to incorporate non-state directed political movements involving 
identity concerns (Dahlman, 2001).  
Starting from the 1980s, sociologists have appreciated the relevance of space 
to understanding societal processes (for example Manuel Castells 1983, Davis 1999, 
McAdam et.al 2001, Tilly 2003, Auyero 2006). In the same vein with the increasing 
sociological interest to embrace geography in analyzing mobilization and social 
movements since 1980s, a significant strand of political geography research has 
switched its focus to the analysis of social movements, ‘resistance/opposition’ and 
political violence in relation to the factor of geography (Slater 1997, Watts 1997, Pile 
and Keith 1997, Agnew 2001, Miller 2004). Recently, there have been intellectual 
initiatives in Sociology to incorporate space and geography more systematically into 
the analysis of social and political processes including social movements and 
mobilization. In the year 2003, the international journal of Mobilization published a 




and political science in the study of contentious politics and social movements. 
Important names in social movement research including Charles Tilly were among 
the contributors, who agreed on the necessity of linking contentious politics to space 
and place.  
I think that a geography perspective would clarify some of my discussion in 
this dissertation. For this study, I preferred to focus on southeastern city centers in 
Turkey rather than western city centers that have received equally substantial amount 
of (if not more) displaced Kurdish population. This was because of my specific 
interest on the changing nature of pro-Kurdish contention in its origin. The 
importance of ‘geography/space’ in this study unfolds at two different levels: at the 
first level, there is ‘Southeastern Turkey’ which refers to a particular region 
characterized by the “Eastern/Kurdish Question”, armed conflict, political violence 
and economic underdevelopment. This has repercussions in terms of how this 
geography is perceived at the international level (a geography that is contentious in 
terms of the Turkish state’s sovereign control over it, therefore from the perspective 
of the international community, political intervention might be justified).  
At the second level, there is an ‘urban topography’ where the majority of the 
displaced Kurds has ended up, and became ‘political’ and also ‘radical.’ Aside from 
technical definitions, ‘urban’ refers to the political space offering physical visibility, 
networks and communication as well as political opportunities to mobilize. In this 




undeveloped ‘rural’ where grassroots mobilization has been until recently limited to 
guerilla warfare. I am particularly interested in understanding the role of geography in 
recent pro-Kurdish mobilization in southeastern Turkey; not only the direct grassroots 
mobilization around the PKK, but rather the processes of politicization and 
mobilization that many conflict-affected Kurdish migrants have been involved in 
southeastern city centers following their experiences with displacement and political 
violence; therefore predicaments as well as opportunities available in a particular 
locality to make voices heard in a way that make resonance at policy level.  
Borrowing the notion of ‘disciplining space’ from Kim Rygiel (1998), I 
construe the processes of conflict, violence and displacement as embedded in 
geography in such a way that the aim of the parties in struggle is to control and 
discipline a particular geography as well as to assert their claims to it. I think that not 
only the power actors such as in my case the Turkish army and the PKK guerilla 
units, but also actions of civilians are meaningful within geographical processes. 
Feldman et.al.for example make the following observation about the significance of 
space in understanding the local dynamics involved in the process of displacement:  
In prior thinking, connections to place and movements from it, interactions 
across place and complex negotiations in place, were often, although not 
always, assumed. This meant that the concept of place was deployed more as 
a descriptive than an analytic notion, and generally given only limited 
theoretical review. It also meant that questions associated with processes of 
negotiation, and with the capacities of people to make choices about 





Adding to Feldman et.al’s observation, I think that displacement is a process 
that does not end at the moment that people are settled in a new locality. Rather, 
processes of physical displacement are incorporated into politics and economics of 
people’s experiences in destination (i.e. gradually politicized city centers in my case). 
My aim in this respect is to explore whether and under what circumstances—in 
Miller’s (2004: 223) words-- ‘social movements give voice to people and causes 
outside the established power structures and through ongoing discussion, education, 
and mobilization, create the conditions and pressures necessary for broader debate 
and action within the official institutions of democracy’. Indeed, the particular 
geography that I am looking at- Southeastern Turkey- is peculiar in a sense that there 
is substantial state oppression in the region in political, social, economic and cultural 
terms together with a political immunity discursively granted by the European 
Union’s leverage in Turkish domestic arena through the imposition of 
democratization reforms and zero-tolerance to human rights violations policies. 
Recent political immunity enjoyed in this region is conducive to demand-making and 
‘making the voices heard’.   
The southeastern urban space with its capacities-- including their ethnically 
homogenous character as opposed to western city centers with ethnic fragmentation 
open to ethnic tension -- is important for the Kurdish politicization to express and 
make itself visible. Pre-dominantly Kurdish urban space harbors forced migrant 




resources for guerilla activities in distant mountainous areas. Those Kurdish migrants 
carried into the politicized, impoverished urban settings by the waves of internal 
displacement are also now closer to the attention of the state elements, civil society 
and international community. Southeastern city centers that were relatively 
“neutral”16 at the beginning of the armed conflict have in a sense lost their neutrality 
as conflict (in terms of increasing and intense appearance of armed vehicles and 
security personal as well as increasing number of hit and run attacks to the security 
points by the insurgents) and already “politicized” groups of displaced moved into 
urban areas from the rural periphery. Migrant communities have in the meantime 
developed close membership affiliations with the pro-Kurdish political party and civil 
society that made them familiar with new languages like ‘democracy’ and ‘human 
rights’ as I discuss in chapters 4,5 and 6.   
However, geography/space presents ‘constraints’ as well as ‘opportunities’ for 
organization and claim-making (Tilly 2000). Miller (2004) eloquently explains the 
importance of a social movement’s ability to communicate a particular collective 
identity across various scales building local, national and transnational alliances. In a 
parallel vein, Tilly (2003: 222) sees collective identity as a continuum with embedded 
                                                 
16 Here again, I am using the word “neutral” in a sense that urban centers were relatively immune to 
the conflict at the beginning of the armed conflict when the guerilla activities were concentrated in the 
mountainous and rural areas and displaced have flowed into the provincial centers to find shelter in 
those relatively “neutral” spaces. Furthermore, rather than considering the civilian people becoming 
affiliated with one or the other side of the armed conflict, it seems theoretically and methodologically 
more accurate to conceptualize them as social agents adopting strategies of accommodation to certain 
conditions of the armed conflict by trying to maneuver within the balance of power structures (see for 




and detached identities representing the polar ends. While, embedded identities refer 
to a wide range of social interactions necessary to claim-making, they are meaningful 
in small-scale spatial interaction and difficult to mobilize beyond that scale. Detached 
identities on the other hand are more all-encompassing and easier to mobilize across 
scales. In this respect according to Tilly (2003: 224), a collective action is successful 
when it manages to take locally embedded identities and ‘makes the basis for new 
larger scale, detached identities’. Miller (2004: 224) further agues, ‘[t]raditional 
geographies of mobilization, rooted in localized places and the nation-state, appear to 
be in relative decline’ and ‘… oppositional groups have failed to transcend these 
confines of ‘militant particularism’ or ‘particular localism’ (also see Swyngedouw 
1997). 
In this respect, I explain in this dissertation that pro-Kurdish mobilization at 
the elite level as well as at the level of grassroots before and during the pervasive 
violence against the civilians has failed to establish strategic allegiances with 
different social, economic, political and intellectual groups in Turkish society through 
operationalizing the notion of justice and/or social, economic and political rights that 
would have appeal to social groups across ethnic identities. Grassroots mobilization 
remained subservient to the organized elite pro-Kurdish organizing. Articulation of 
pro-Kurdish demands has been rather contained within a notion of ‘victimization’ of a 
people. Displacement of the Kurdish communities during the armed conflict years 




attention to the extent that the Kurds are portrayed as ‘victims’ of human rights 
violations rather than as a collectivity able to organize and mobilize a legitimate 
cause. In this regard, transnational rights discourses have been in fact 
counterproductive for the interests of the pro-Kurdish mobilization in the long run by 
confusing the demands of the movement as well as depoliticizing those demands by 
reducing them to the (individual) human rights.       
Pro-Kurdish mobilization has further been unable to maintain the sympathy of 
their European allies in the Diaspora due to the radicalization and criminalization of 
the PKK in European countries and the declining tolerance in European states and 
politics towards violent illegal organizations (Eccarius-Kelly 2000, 2002, Lyon and 
Ucarer, 2001). Despite the geographic advantage, Kurdish Diaspora politics has been 
trapped into a kind of ‘militant particularism’.17 Pro-Kurdish demands have been 
unable to legitimize their cause in domestic domain and/or internationalize the local 
experiences with oppression at a same articulation level as for example groups like  
                                                 
17 The limited support that Kurdish Diaspora has received from Europe is an issue that requires further 
research. As I mention later on in this dissertation, EU has used the Kurdish card against Turkey 
during the 1990s in order to postpone the membership negotiations with Turkey. So, human rights 
violations in southeastern Turkey and socio-economic disparities between eastern and western Turkey 
have always been in the EU progress reports on Turkey and on the diplomatic table. However, it is 
open to question and necessitates further research to assess to what extent EU engagement with the 
Kurdish question was a product of the autonomous pro-Kurdish movement and commitment and to 
what extent civil and political pro-Kurdish mobilization has been effective in influencing the EU 
agenda in a substantive way. Considering that the post-1980 Kurdish mobilization by civil and political 
actors has been led by the PKK and this organization is considered as a terrorist organization by EU, 
the US and many other countries around the world, it is quite problematic to argue that the pro-Kurdish 
mobilization in Turkey and by Turkish Kurds in Diaspora has a ‘legitimate’ stance in the eyes of the 




Zapatistas who formed transnational alliances with a spectrum of civil society ranging 
from human rights groups to leftist organizations (see for example the discussion on 
Zapatistas in Harvey 2000).  
METHOGOLOGICAL APPROACH 
In order to understand the social and political processes of the armed conflict, 
I used a multiple-level research design. I was particularly interested in the changing 
nature of articulation between the contentious actors including the displaced Kurds, 
the elements of the Turkish state and the pro-Kurdish organized actors. My principal 
method was semi-structured, open-ended interviews, the majority of them conducted 
with the displaced Kurdish communities in Diyarbakir city center. Diyarbakir is the 
major provincial center in southeastern Turkey and the center of pro-Kurdish politics 
in Turkey. For reliability and validity purposes, a lesser number of interviews were 
also conducted in the provincial center of a second major southeastern city, Van with 
a different social, economic and political composition- for the findings in the second 
place to be juxtaposed against the findings derived from the interviews conducted in 
Diyarbakir.  
Van is different from Diyarbakir in such that in addition to the strength of the 
pro-Kurdish politics (DEHAP/DTP-Democratic People’s Party/Democratic Society 
Party) and organizing in the province there is also considerable power of the pro-
Islamist political party (AKP-Justice and Development Party) competing with the 




elections with the victory of the pro-Islamists against the pro-Kurdish political party. 
In Diyarbakir, in that respect, pro-Kurdish organization is much stronger and 
effective in reaching and mobilizing the grassroots in comparison to the other pre-
dominantly Kurdish provinces including Van. Van is also socio-economically more 
isolated and culturally traditional and closed in comparison to Diyarbakir that is the 
center of pro-Kurdish civil society and politics in Turkey with a relatively more 
complicated urban culture and socio-economic structure. More detailed information 
on sample and methodology can be found in the Appendix.      
Interviews were conducted in the major migrant receiving neighborhoods in 
all local districts under the jurisdiction of the Diyarbakir metropolitan center. 
Interviewees were identified via my personal networks with the local NGOs, the local 
municipalities and the informal neighborhood commissions as well as through my 
personal efforts to reach out to the displaced Kurds who were basically out of reach 
of the organized groups. These interviews may or may not represent the views of the 
entire displaced population. However, certain patterns presented in the data are 
enough to draw conclusions with regard to the trajectories of radical politicization, 
increasing marginalization and social exclusion experienced by the urban poor and 
the past and the present root causes of the declining legitimacy of the state in the eye 
of local Kurds.  
I chose in-depth interviews as my principal method because I was interested in 




political violence, their encounters with the state agencies and interactions with the 
organized Kurdish groups. I was interested in how these people perceive their own 
ability (and/or agency) to make changes, to engage with the local and national power 
holders to initiate change as well as their judgments about the limits of their agency. 
More importantly, I was interested in how these people interpret their needs, 
concerns, expectations, demands and rights, and how they imagine their future ‘life 
projects’ to secure material well-being, peace and political safety. More than half of 
the migrant interviews were conducted in Kurdish (in Kurmaji or Zazaic dialect) with 
the help of an interpreter. The rest were conducted in Kurdish and Turkish or only in 
Turkish. All migrant names have been changed in the dissertation for privacy 
purposes. 
I also conducted in-depth interviews with a group of local and national key 
informants to investigate relations and channels of communication between the 
organizations with which the informants were associated and the state and the civil 
society on the one hand and the displaced groups of people on the ground on the 
other. My key informant interviews include the mayors of local municipalities 
(Diyarbakir and Van), representatives of NGOs (Diyarbakir, Van, Ankara and 
Istanbul), ‘Socio-economic Development Program’ officers in the GAP 
administration (Southeastern Development Project) (Diyarbakir, Urfa), one 
representative from Diyarbakir Chamber of Commerce, representatives from the 




(Diyarbakir), UNDP and UNHCR representatives (Ankara), one Kurdish MP 
(member of Parliament) from Diyarbakir (Ankara) and lawyers (Diyarbakir, Istanbul) 
to assess the social, political, economic and legal consequences and implications of 
violence and the conflict related population displacement. The key informant 
interviews were conducted in Turkish. Names of the key informants and their 
affiliation can be found in the Appendix. Some of the key informant names are 
omitted and the names of their organizational affiliations have been replaced with 
pseudonyms upon informants’ request or based on my discretion for privacy and 
security purposes.    
In Diyarbakir and Van, I also had a chance to meet and have informal talks 
with many people from various backgrounds including local, national and foreign 
journalists, people working for pro-Kurdish local news media, engineers and 
architects working in state agricultural development projects as well as in 
municipality projects, local and foreign social workers, village teachers, Kurdish 
writers and activists including a group of foreigners from Syria and Iraq. I also had 
meetings with several former PKK members who were at the time of the encounters 
officially or unofficially affiliated either with pro-Kurdish political party (DEHAP) or 
pro-Kurdish NGOs.  
I also conducted participant observations in Diyarbakir and Van. This entailed 
attending NGO meetings, activities and seminars, attending weekly municipality 




informants to learn about their activities and engagements with their local target 
groups. These observations were an integral part of this project because they enabled 
me to learn more about the internal dynamics in the NGOs that I interviewed and also 
the local dynamics between the organized pro-Kurdish groups and their constituency. 
Participant observation also allowed me to diversify my networks and to reach out to 
migrant communities with different characteristics.      
Finally, I also collected documents from the Turkish parliament, NGOS and 
political organizations and the local municipalities, as well as relevant issues of 
national newspapers (including the pro-Kurdish ones) between the years 2004 and 
2006.  
In the coming chapters I first describe the political context in Turkey for the 
changing nature of Kurdish mobilization in Turkey. I focus on the local context of 
southeastern Turkey and explicate how local socio-economic conditions, politics and 
relations have been shaped under the influence of global, international and national 
structures and forces; and experienced by local people as processes. It is the very 
local context in which various forms of pro-Kurdish ethno-nationalist and ethno-
political sentiments emerge, interplay with the national, regional and transnational 
dynamics and are transformed into expectations, demands as well as contention 
between the local and the central state. This very local context is embedded into 
broader structures, but entertains its very specific meanings, relations and power 





CHANGING FACE OF THE KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY IN THE 
LAST TWO DECADES 
 
This chapter sketches the three general domestic trajectories that developed 
after 1980s in Turkey, which the rest of this dissertation analyzes in relation to the 
impact of the ethnicized political violence on the displaced civilian Kurdish 
population in southeastern Turkey.  First is the declining state legitimacy in the public 
domain following the infamous 1980 military coup. Second is the rise of identity 
politics and pro-Kurdish politics as an ethno-political claim. The third one is 
associated with socio-economic restructuring, increasing poverty and declining limits 
of social welfare in Turkey. I therefore point out in this chapter that the new faces of 
the Kurdish Question in Turkey have in fact been defined under the forces of the 
domestic transformations in Turkey’s social, economic and political domain that are 
associated with the changing global conjecture after the end of the Cold War.  
The contemporary face of the Kurdish issue in Turkey is rooted in the 
systemic problems of Turkish politics and the economic restructuring since the late 
1980s.  Kurdish ethno-political identity was reconstituted and mobilized during 1990s 
as mass scale population displacement intensified, spreading ethnic-based 
politicization and mobilization.  The new era in the Kurdish resistance coincided with 




1980 MILITARY COUP AND THE STATE LEGITIMACY                         
Although, state violence and violent Kurdish resistance have their roots in 
Turkish history, the late 1980s marked a new turning point in Turkey’s Kurdish 
Question.The pro-Kurdish mobilization started by the PKK has been analytically 
different than the earlier forms of pro-Kurdish riots and uprisings organized around 
tribal and religious establishments targeting the Turkish state, not because it was 
‘Turkish’ but because it was a ‘state’, a modern, centralized, secular one (Bozarslan 
2000, also Yeğen 1999). In 1990s, Turkey’s ever-changing Kurdish Question started 
to be ethnicized and Kurdish identity to be politicized. As also noted by Icduygu et.al 
(1999:993), “the solidification and propagation of Kurdish ethnicity were largely 
products of recent years”.  The point here is such that it is not the ethnic characteristic 
of southeastern Turkey that make it a peculiar geography, but (rather) recent-mainly 
last two decade- politicization of the region through a web of socio-economic and 
political trajectories that have been imposed upon it. The 1980 military coup violently 
repressed the societal contention and democratic civil society in Turkey, instead of 
helping to reconcile the political bifurcation and radicalization in society. Repressive 
political engineering undertaken by the military facilitated the starting of the large-
scale political violence in southeastern Turkey, as well as its turning into an ethno-
political question for Turkey to resolve.       
Foundations of social and political polarization that led to the 1980 military 




Europe had already started in 1960s with initiation of tariff reductions that debilitated 
the small and medium sized businesses throughout time (Taspinar 2005). A gradual 
transition from the ISI to market economy selectively favoring the big business class 
was already underway starting from 1970s, which economically marginalized social 
classes such as workers, small capital owners and peasants across Turkey. Pro-market 
policies had particularly hit hard the poor peasant communities as the lifting of import 
tariffs on agricultural products together with ongoing mechanization left millions of 
unemployed peasants barely surviving in rural areas and/or rushing in urban centers 
to look for jobs in 1970s (Cam 2005). Therefore, market economy was gradually and 
unevenly infiltrating into an economic system characterized by the import substitution 
(ISI) policies including import restrictions and manipulation of the exchange rate.   
As mainstream political parties started to lose their image and legitimacy in 
face of the growing socio-economic distress in the country, pro-Islamist party politics 
gained grounds during 1960s and 1970s as their ideological emphasis on development 
and industrialization without compromising ideals of solidarity, community and 
religious brotherhood seemed to cure the economic stagnation and deterioration in the 
country as well as marginalization that the Anatolian masses had found themselves in. 
On the one hand, class politics of left wing-right wing camps turned into violent 
battles and ubiquitous social tension; whilst, as Taspinar (2003) argues identity-based 
groups had already started to surface within the left and right wing camps of 1970s. 




rightwing political parties…..the majority of Alevi [a non-Sunni Muslim category 
crosscutting ethnic groups18] and urbanized Kurdish communities supported leftist 
political movements.” (Taspinar 2003:137) Therefore, identity-based politicization 
surfaced, but to a large extent encapsulated within the class-based politicization 
during the 1970s.            
By the year 1980, political violence waged by the right-wing and left-wing 
activists especially in urban centers reached unprecedented levels. The atmosphere of 
anarchy was prevailing in Turkish society. The political system was unable to tackle 
the social tension and ideological polarization, as the existing political parties actually 
contributed to the socio-political chaos with their disorientation (Taspinar 2003). The 
national economic indicators were rapidly deteriorating in face of economic 
stagnation. In September 1980, the Turkish army intervened in civilian politics for the 
third time in Turkish history and remained in power for three years before it handed 
power to the civilian authorities in 1983. During the three years of military rule, urban 
violence was suppressed, right wing-left wing extremist groups were crushed and 
favorable conditions for the upcoming neo-liberal restructuring were prepared. Trade 
Unions and the bargaining power of labor were strictly restricted in order to prevent 
any public resistance towards the liberal economic structural adjustment programs 
                                                 
18 There are Turkish Alevis as well as Kurdish and Arab Alevi citizens in Turkey. As representing an 
ethno-religious group marginalized by the Sunni tendencies of the state practices, Alevi identity 





(see for example Demir, 2005, also see Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan 2000). The 
army in fact intervened to ensure that already started pro-market transformation 
would continue at a faster pace without any resistance from society.  
The Turkish army with the 1980 military coup while preparing the socio-
political ground auspicious for the implementation of the neo-liberal restructuring 
gave a fatal blow to Turkish democracy by repressing resistant progressive civil 
society; and in turn, contributed to the crystallization of identity-based cleavages 
(religious and ethnic identities)19. During the repressive military junta rule, not only 
the extremist leftist and rightist groups, but also progressive social groups such as 
writers, academicians, journalists and organized student and labor groups were 
violently suppressed. Hundreds of intellectuals, journalists and politicians were held 
responsible for inciting and inflicting socialist ideas, and arrested or deported. The 
military regime also undertook the task of writing a new constitution. The 1982 
constitution written under the close military surveillance destroyed the promisingly 
                                                 
19 There is an increasing tendency among the scholars of Turkey to associate the authoritarian nature 
of the Turkish military and the central bureaucracy with the original Kemalist founding premises of the 
Turkish Republic. On the one hand, I think that the highly centralized and secular nature of the 
founding premises of the Republic was meant to protect the country against Islamist fundamentalism 
and ethnic-nationalist (Turkish as well as Kurdish and/or any other ethnicity residing in the Turkish 
territory for that matter) radicalization (for a parallel reading, see for example Ercan-Argun 1999). On 
the other hand, I am also convinced that the path followed by the Turkish military especially starting 
with the 1980 military coup has diverged from the original Kemalist ideals of economic and political 
sovereignty further and further (for an analytical work done on the political economy of the Turkish 
military see for example Demir 2005, Öniş 2000, 2003, Cizre-Sakallioglu and  Yeldan 2000). I think 
that an analytical examination of the current position of the Turkish army in Turkish politics and/or in 
relation to Turkish politics should be done within the changing domestic, regional and international 
political economic context that the Turkish army has evolved into without holding the Kemalist 
revolution (which has never been successfully completed anyway) responsible for each and every 




democratic spirit of the 1961 constitution, which was also a military product 
following the first military coup of the Turkish Republic in 1960. Turkish democracy 
experienced a rapid deterioration with the ban placed upon the freedoms of thought 
and association as trade unions and labor organizations were abolished and 
universities were put under strict state control in order to fight the ‘communist threat’.  
Kurdish activist groups were among the many segments of the politicized 
groups that the military regime pushed out of the realm of the politics and suppressed. 
Indeed, the discontent among the Kurdish activists had already started in the 1970s 
since those groups were gradually frustrated with the failing of the class politics and 
alienated from their Turkish socialist and communist counterparts who were reluctant 
to introduce ethnic elements into the spirit of their socialist revolution (Taspinar 
2005). Considering the increasing visibility of the Kurdish groups in 1970s, the 
military coup took repressive measures including a ban on the Kurdish language20 
(that was lifted in 199121). In the year 1983, the formation of ethnic parties was 
prohibited by new legal amendments. And it is ironic that the first pro-Kurdish 
political parties started to organize in 1990s not earlier (a point that is reminded by 
Yeğen 2006). It was in this domestic environment that Kurdish ethno-political 
                                                 
20 It is interesting and noteworthy that an official ban on Kurdish language was placed in 1980s (not 
earlier times) as a reaction towards the politicization of the Kurdish identity which was a new 
development in the making.  
21 The ban on Kurdish speech and publications was lifted in 1991 during the army-sponsored 
government of Turgut Özal who claimed to be half Kurdish. The ban on education and broadcasting in 




organizing around the PKK went underground and resorted to violence starting right 
after the military coup (Bozarslan, 2000).  
The military regime transferred political power to the civilian authorities by 
1984. Through repressing class-based politics together with the newly organizing pro-
Kurdish groups and embracing Islamist politics as a bulwark against the communist 
threat, the Turkish army aimed to depoliticize Turkish society. The repercussions of 
these military-sponsored political engineering led to an upsurge and radicalization in 
ethnic and religious terms in 1990s within the new era of neo-liberalism that is 
ironically seen as a phase of ‘democratic opening’ in Turkey by the circles supporting 
a liberal economy. Dissemination of identity-based politics (ethnic as well as 
religious) was indeed prompted by the hands of the Turkish army that in the 
subsequent years would be riddled with struggles against the upsurge of Kurdish 
nationalism and Islamist fundamentalism as well (for a rough account on the role of 
the Turkish army in nationalist and fundamentalist upsurge, see for example Cam 
2005).  
Dissemination of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist sentiments among the 
grassroots and mass-scale grassroots mobilization in southeastern Turkey did not 
happen until 1990s. In the same vein, pro-Islamist party politics gained momentum 
only in 1990s after a decade of socio-political experience with drastic neo-liberal 
restructuring measures and IMF that led to political corruption and favoritism, further 




increasing socio-economic inequalities and poverty in Turkey. Indeed, both mass 
ethnic radicalism and fundamentalist Islamist upsurge occurred in 1990s as the 
utmost manifestation of the declining legitimacy of the mainstream politics as a 
social, political and economic guarantor in the eye of the Turkish as well as Kurdish 
masses22.    
Local Discontent turning into Political Violence  
Southeastern Turkey has been subject to unprecedented levels of intra-
regional and interregional inequalities since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. 
Throughout time, social equity within the region as well as between the region and 
the rest of country has deteriorated due to uneven modernization and economic 
development, and the recent armed conflict (M.E. Bozarslan 1966[2002], Özer 1998 
and also see Avcioğlu 1969). Original socio-economic projections of the Kemalist 
revolution in the form of land reform to set the foundations for distributive justice and 
rural education projects (Village Institutions/Köy Enstitüleri)-- parallel to political 
secularization process at the state level--to initiate social and civic empowerment on 
                                                 
22 These developments should be examined as domestic and regional repercussions of the 
contemporary nature of globalization, the upsurge in ethnic and Islamist violence in the world after the 
end of the Cold War. Violent face of ethnic radicalism in the form of the PKK insurgency as well as 
Islamist fundamentalist violence perpetuated both in the form of organized acts of groups such as 
Hezbullah and also sporadic acts of individuals affiliated with the fundamentalist organizing including 
the massacre of 37 secular Turkish intellectuals in an Anatolian city in 1993 by a group of radical 
Turkish Islamists all emerged as parallel forms of the regional and local repercussions of the post Cold 
War  globalization and neo-liberal restructuring. A straightforward relationship between the upsurge in 
Islamist fundamentalist violence after the Cold War and the US international interests and proxy wars 
during the Cold War is eloquently pointed out by scholars like Mamdani (see for example Mamdani 
2006). It is also noteworthy to mention that a de facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq was established 




the ground could never been realized23. Historically, the region has been dominated 
by the tribal chiefs having majority of the land resources distributed among each 
other. The land reform undertaken by the state in 1930s aiming to redistribute large 
land properties among landless peasants could not be implemented in southeastern 
Turkey due to the state’s reluctance to antagonize powerful Kurdish tribal chiefs. 
After the transition to a multiparty regime in 1940s, under political party competition 
and patronage relations, it has even become more difficult to implement a land reform 
in southeastern Turkey which has been a major hindrance for overcoming poverty, 
achieving even economic development in the region and ensuring intra-regional 
redistributive justice (M.E. Bozarslan 1966[2002], Cin 1987).  
Land distribution has remained quite the same until present time (see for 
example, Baris NPT:2006). As McDowall (1997: 243) notes, today “…8 percent of 
farming families own over 50 percent of the land, while 80 percent of farming 
families are evenly balanced between those holding up to 5 hectares and those who 
own no land at all.” The contradiction is that while breaking down the traditional 
socio-economic structures based on feudal and/or tribal relations in certain parts of 
the southeastern region (population displacement was a means to facilitate this 
                                                                                                                                           
in international relations right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which directly stimulated the 
ethno-nationalist cause of an ethnic broker like the PKK.        
23 For a discussion on the political economy of the rural southeastern Turkey, see for example 
Avcioğlu 1969 and Karaömerlioğlu 2000.  Although I do not have space to go into details regarding 
the problematic of democracy, I would like to note that together with democratization and later on 
economic liberalization in Turkey, it has been much more difficult to achieve land redistribution in 




political aim throughout Turkish history), the state has also deliberately maintained 
the traditional forms of social structure in other parts of the region by co-opting the 
state-friendly tribal units and religious establishments within the populist party 
politics.  
Already existing systems of exploitative power dynamics based on socio-
economic relations embedded in tribal/feudal system-concentration of land, economic 
opportunities and political power in the hands of a small group of tribal chiefs were 
redefined by the central Turkish state marginalizing the peasant communities that 
have been socio-economically dependent on the very same system.24 Coupled with 
the uneven penetration of the capitalist economy in the region after 1950s, socio-
economic development trajectories worked for further marginalization and 
impoverishment of the peasant communities. Local communities were left in political 
vacuum as well as in further social and economic vulnerabilities that emerged out of 
                                                 
24 However, the Turkish state’s consolidation process was neither limited to the Kurds nor did it 
merely target the Kurdish populated areas of the new Republic of Turkey. Even though the 
underpinnings of the Kurdish nationalist thesis are hard to dispute, these arguments contain plenty of 
generalizations and use very broad strokes to paint a picture where primordially defined Kurdish 
people have always been fighting a static and monolithic Turkish Republic. Rather than seeing such 
policies of the new republic as acts of aggression and invasion directed only at the Kurds, we should 
remember that in those years the new Turkish state tried to remake not only the Kurds but everybody 
who remained within the borders of the new country to found a centralized secular nation-state. The 
general nature of the Kemalist nation-state building as well as the state violence used to centralize, 
modernize and secularize is not something unique to the Kemalist revolution (see for example Tilly 




the rapidly changing structural forces in the southeast that failed to offer economic 
and political integrative measures for those distant, marginalized Kurdish peasants.25   
Immediate recruitment for the PKK came from these poor peasant 
communities. Especially poorly educated youngsters with no social and economic 
future prospects, education and/or employment opportunities were willing to join the 
organization in search of better social status. These young people had also already 
been highly radicalized during the class-based bifurcated domestic political 
environment of the 1960s and 1970s so that violence was not difficult for them to 
embrace (Bozarslan, 2004). Martial law in southeastern Turkey continued to be 
implemented even after the withdrawal of the Turkish army from civilian politics in 
1984. In 1986, the majority of the southeastern provinces were officially put under a 
state of emergency (OHAL) for about a decade until it was gradually lifted between 
1999 and 2002. Though Kurdish insurgency in Turkey has not been limited to the 
PKK, the emergence of this Marxist-Leninist separatist organization has opened a 
new phase in Turkey’s ‘Kurdish Question’ with its leadership organized by  
university dropouts and mass support coming from the landless/poor peasant 
communities. Although the PKK was already active during the late 1970s, it started 
                                                 
25 As opposed to arguments casting the Kemalist Revolution and Kemalist state-building policies as 
the root causes of the emergence of the PKK in the southeast; I believe and argue that the pro-Kurdish 
mobilization under the ethnicized PKK ideology was a product of the failings of the implementation of 
the Kemalist premises of secularism, pluralism, distributive justice and egalitarianism based on civic 
virtues rather than ethnic divisions. I think that ethnic conflict in the region emerged not due to the 
Kemalist policies; but rather due to the fact that they have never been successfully implemented in 
social, economic and political arena. A parallel reading of the Kurdish Question was eloquently done 




the guerilla war against the elements of the Turkish state and the Kurdish 
collaborators in the first half of 1980s.  
Starting from the early 1980s, southeastern Turkey was caught in between the 
PKK violence, state violence, extralegal practices of the emergency rule, and the 
massive forced migrations of Turkish Kurds in and across the region. Together with 
the geographical dissemination and the rising intensity of the armed conflict in 1990s, 
the state presence in southeastern Turkey took a more and more militarized nature. 
The Turkish army started to militarize state-friendly Kurdish communities under the 
system of ‘village guards26’ (Köy Koruculuğu) in 1985 by providing them with arms 
and keeping them in the conflict zones to fight the PKK. The primary goal of the 
army was to restore central state control in the region as well as to exterminate the 
centrifugal forces that could jeopardize national unity (see for example Chaliand 
1992, Kirisci and Winrow 1997, Barkey and Fuller 1998, McDowall 2004 for a 
general historical background). While the insurgents’ violence targeted the state 
                                                 
26 According to a 2006 source, there are currently more than 70,000 Kurds working for the Turkish 
state as ‘village guards’ in their original rural places of residence. This number evinces that together 
with their family members, there are hundreds of thousands of Kurds in the southeast organized around 
gun-power. Village guards are given armed power and paid salaries by the Turkish state to protect their 
own villages, collaborate with the state and the Turkish security forces, and prevent PKK abuses and 
terror in the region. It is also noteworthy that village guards have become a serious problem when they 
started to abuse their armed power against their own villagers and neighboring villages and force the 
local people to leave their homes in order to expropriate the land and property left behind. Therefore 
the village guards themselves have become a cause of displacement in many Southeast villages. The 
interviews during the field research show  that more than half of the interviewers give the village guard 
system as either the cause of their displacement or the obstacle preventing them from returning back 
home.  There are also a few Arab villages armed through the village guard system. Though the exact 
number of the Turkish citizens with Arabic origin is not known due to lack of systematic information 
on ethnic origin, Arabs constitute a small minority among Kurds in Southeastern Turkey. (see for 




supporters, such as Turkish civil servants and the state-friendly Kurdish communities 
as well as infrastructure and public investment sites; state violence turned against the 
armed guerilla and also the civilians allegedly providing logistic support for the 
illegal organization. Plantations and forests were also burned down by the Turkish 
army in order to better control and monitor the conflict topography.   
Peasant communities hesitant to side with the Turkish security forces under 
the Kurdish paramilitary system (village guards) were considered by the Turkish 
army actual or potential dissidents ready to join the PKK or support the separatist 
organization logistically. Further the PKK launched attacks against the ‘enemy’ (the 
Turkish state) and the ‘betrayers’ (state friendly Kurdish communities). Polarization 
among the rural communities as pro-PKK vs. pro-state has introduced new enmities 
into already fragmented and hostile relations among the rural Kurds. These enmities 
between the PKK and state-friendly Kurdish communities and between the PKK and 
the fundamentalist Kurdish Hezbullah27 which would enter the scene of violence in 
1990s displaced thousands of people during 1990s. Displacement in a peculiar way 
turned into a means for the sides of the armed conflict to see “who is with us” and  
 
                                                 
27 Hezbullah is an outlawed radical Kurdish Islamist organization founded in Diyarbakır in late 1970s, 
engaged in violent activities against the elements of the Turkish state as well as the PKK members and 
sympathizers throughout the Southeastern Turkey. It recruited members from the local Kurdish 
communities. Turkey’s Hezbullah is unrelated to the Lebanese Hezbullah although they have some 
common ideological basis (see for example Jon Gorvett, 2000, Hikmet Cicek, 2000, Taha Akyol, 2000 




“who is not” as well as differentiates the geography in terms of who controls which 
part of the topography.   
A considerably larger amount of civilian Kurds were displaced during the 
operations of the Turkish security forces aimed at depopulating the conflict zones in 
order to cut the human and logistic support that the PKK was extracting from peasant 
communities.  According to a recent state-sponsored study on village evacuations, 
during the course of the armed conflict from 1986 to 1995 between 950.000 and 
1.200.000 people were driven out of their places of residents due to ‘security reasons’ 
(TGYONA, 2006). Villages, but also towns such as Lice- the original physical base 
of the PKK within the provincial borders of Diyarbakir and the provincial center of 
Şirnak were completely or partially evacuated during 1990s (TBMM-Parliamentary 
Report, 1998). Displacement particularly targeted two groups of Kurds that are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive; PKK supporters and sympathizers, and the Kurdish 
communities that were not willing to fight on the side of the Turkish security forces. 
Both groups ‘failed’ in the eyes of the state to show/prove their ‘loyalty’ as 
‘legitimate’ citizens.  
Population displacement, either by the hand of the Turkish army or due to 
other conflict-related causes, was strategically important for the Turkish security 
forces to disconnect the PKK guerilla from the local communities with the hope that 
the displaced Kurds would mingle with urban populations and assimilate (Then Vice 




most ironically- even made similar comments about his conviction that it would be 
much easier to ‘assimilate’ the local Kurdish communities into the broader Turkish 
society if they were settled in western urban centers,(Cemal 2003)). However, in most 
cases, not only PKK propaganda, but also state violence targeting ‘suspicious’ 
civilians, contributed to the increasing popularity of the illegal organization among 
displaced Kurds including those who were not even initially sympathetic with the 
organization (Ergil 1995). Through political migrations, frustration and political 
anxiety among the local people have been carried to new places including the western 
and southern Turkish provinces as well as the Diaspora in Europe.28  
Between 1992 and 1995, political violence in the southeast reached 
unprecedented levels. The PKK established almost de facto control in towns like Lice 
of Diyarbakir and provincial centers of Hakkari and Sirnak. It is not surprising that 
Lice district center and Sirnak city center were evacuated by the Turkish security 
forces between 1992 and 1995 in addition to thousands of villages and hamlets in the 
region. The Turkish security forces also extended their operations across the Iraqi 
border deploying armed forces in northern Iraq and chasing the PKK guerillas across 
the border (Romano 2006 and Taspinar 2005). The civilian politicians watched the  
                                                 
28 Dogu Ergil’s (1995) survey study on displaced Kurds in major provincial centers in Turkey, 
although criticized a lot due to the reliability and validity problems involved in the survey 
methodology, provides valuable insights about the prevalence of anti-state sentiments among Kurdish 
forced migrants in comparison to Kurdish economic migrants also see Van Bruinessen 1998 and 
Eccarius-Kelly 2000 for general discussion on conflict-produced Kurdish Diaspora in Europe and 




violence with their hands tied, mostly unwilling to intervene in the military actions or 
unable to do so. According to a 1998 parliamentary report, village evacuations were 
admitted as incompatible with the principles of the rule of law; but indeed military 
actions could easily be justified under the legal jurisdiction of the emergency rule 
regime granting colossal authority to the regional governor of OHAL (emergency 
situation) and the elements of the army. The Human Rights Minister of the 
government in power in 1994, Azimet Köylüoğlu- who himself was a Kurd from the 
province of Tunceli in the southeast, stated that the village and hamlet destructions 
were nothing but ‘state terrorism’ calling attention to the fact that about two million 
people had been displaced in southeastern Turkey between 1984 and 1994 
(Parliamentary Report 1998).  
Interestingly enough, conflict-induced displacement of Turkish Kurds 
including village evacuations did not get publicized enough by the Turkish media in 
1990s. While the Turkish society watched the Iraqi Kurds rushing towards the 
Turkish border in two different occasions in 1988 and early 1990s29, mass village 
                                                 
29 About 100,000 Iraqi Kurds rushed to the Turkish-Iraqi border in search of refuge during the 1988 
refugee crises that erupted after Saddam Hussein’s attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja (see for 
example Romano 198-204). While the entire world media turned their attention to the situation 
involving the death of about 5,000 Iraqi Kurds and thousands of other desperate civilians on the border 
waiting for the Turkish authorities to open the border, the event became one of the first alarms for the 
Turkish public and politicians who started to conceive Turkey’s own Kurdish issue as having “a 
clearly articulated ethnic dimension” (see for example, Taspinar 2005:102). The second event was the 
even bigger refugee crisis following Saddam Hussein’s government’s attacks in Northern Iraq to 
suppress the Kurdish uprising after the 1990-1991 Gulf War. This time about two million Kurds 
accumulated on the Turkish-Iraqi and Iranian-Iraqi border seeking to enter Iran and Turkey.  In 
Turkey, Turkish soldiers with guard dogs stopped the unwelcome masses. Iran was much more 




evacuations in southeastern Turkey especially during the first half of 1990s remained 
unknown to political memories of many Turkish citizens living outside of the conflict 
zones. When the Kurdish communities started to be driven out of their homes in the 
conflict-affected areas across eastern and southeastern Turkey, there was no political 
incentive and public interest to assist these uprooted people30.  
National Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were either non-existent or 
unable to draw attention to the immediate needs of the conflict-driven communities. 
International CSOs were not allowed to access the displaced Kurds for various 
political and institutional limitations31. Aside from limited aid provided by a 1994 
national “Return to Village Project” initiated during the presidency of Bülent Ecevit 
to encourage the return migration from urban to rural across Turkey, there was no 
systematic state program to help the social and economic adjustment of the displaced 
Kurds in their places of destination and/or to facilitate their return to their original 
places of residence until the year 1998. The political sensitivity associated with the 
issue has prevented the state taking meaningful political actions to cope with armed 
conflict-driven displacement of its Kurdish citizens during the armed conflict in 
1990s.  
                                                                                                                                           
ironically, Turkey collaborated with the international community to establish a ‘safe haven’ for Kurds 
in Northern Iraq which actually secured an Autonomous Kurdish Zone for a de facto Kurdish state in 
the region (for a most recent account see for example Romano 2006).  
30 TBMM-Parliamentary Report—“constitutional rights violated during and after the village 
evacuations included the principle of equality before the law, the right to protect and develop one’s 
life, the sanctity of private and family life, the sanctity of domicile, the right to property, and the 
principle of protection of basic rights and freedoms” (listed in Ayata and Yukseker 2005:18) 




Despite reactions from members of the Turkish parliament against Turkish 
army operations targeting the civilian population during 1990s, the displacement 
issue was perceived by the Turkish army and the state actors in general as a normal 
and necessary part of counterinsurgency activities32. Apart from their inability to 
influence military decisions, the few politicians who brought up the issue into the 
Parliamentary agenda did not even gather enough support within the parliament to 
stop the village evacuations and to initiate a state program to meet the basic needs of 
the displaced population. One year after my fieldwork, in a follow-up meeting with 
Algan Hacaloğlu, a previous and current member of the parliament from the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP), Hacaloğlu talked about his efforts together with a 
handful of Turkish and Kurdish parliamentarians during 1990s to ‘warn’ the Turkish 
                                                 
32 At this point, I disagree with the strand of recent research which argues that the Turkish state denied 
the forced migration of civilians during the course of the armed conflict (Ayata and Yukseker 2005, 
2006). In fact, Turkish state reaction to the forced migration of the Kurdish civilians was not 
monolithic. Various actors within the state including some Parliamentarians brought the issue into 
attention. Prime Ministers of 1990s such as Bülent Ecevit made declarations about the issue in several 
occasions stating that the villages were evacuated for ‘security reasons’. The general state stance 
towards the issue was to cast it as a security precaution. In this vein, the causes of forced village 
evacuations were defined within the state discourse as ‘security reasons’ aiming to ‘protect’ the 
civilian population from the PKK exploitation (TBMM-Parliamentary Report (1998) presents the 
contradictory stances of the different elements of the state towards the issue in 1990s). In addition to 
that it is fair to say that the central governments and the Turkish army refused to negotiate on the issue, 
but extended limited aid to the displaced who agreed to declare that the cause of their displacement 
was the ‘PKK terror’. Together with the cessation of the armed conflict and the gradual lifting of the 
emergency rule in the region by the end of 2002, state discourse and stance towards displacement has 
changed. The Turkish government (which happened to be the pro-Islamist AKP) started to negotiate 
the displacement issue with international actors including UN and took actions for policy preparation 
and implementation. In 2004, the government also agreed to pay compensations for village evacuations 
with a new law as a response to accumulating burden of the lost cases against the displaced villagers at 




army generals about the “social and political costs of the Kurdish forced migrations 
that Turkey would by no means be able to afford in the future.”33  
In addition to the humanitarian concerns involved in the issue, politicians like 
Hacaloğlu were also pragmatically alarmed by some possible future socio-political 
ramifications of the forced migrations including an upsurge in Turkish and Kurdish 
nationalisms on the ground in the city centers. In retrospect, one can argue that the 
military rationality failed to take account of the political contention that these poor 
rural forced migrants would create in the near future, the extent of the social problems 
such as poverty and urban crime to which they would contribute and also the ability 
of these poor, powerless disoriented groups of people to make the Turkish state liable 
to pay unusual amounts of monetary compensation at the ECtHR (European Court for 
Human Rights) in the very near future (Yildiz 2005). It is however, difficult to 
imagine that the army did not see something that obvious to some parliamentarians, 
political analysts and journalists in those years. Rather, it is realistic to argue that the 
army acted in a self-defensive manner in order to defeat the separatist threat. The 
                                                 
33 Follow-up Interview with Algan Hacaloğlu, a Member of the Parliament from the Republican 
People’s Party provided me with his insights regarding the impacts of the displacement of the Kurdish 
citizens on the political and social stability in Turkey and the regional economy of Southeastern 
Turkey. Especially since 1990s, Hacaloğlu has been the initiator of extensive policy research on 
Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, the ‘Kurdish Question’ and conflict-induced population 
displacements in the region. The results of those policy studies have been compiled in various reports 
including the 1996 “Parliamentary Report”- “Report of the Parliamentary Investigation Commission 
Established with the Aim of Investigating the Problems of our Citizens who Migrated due to the 
Eviction of Settlements in East and South-east Anatolia and to Assess the Measures that Need to be 
Taken” and 2000 Republican People’s Party report on “Democratization- Kurdish Question- 
Development of the East and the Southeast”. Hacaloğlu indicated during the interview that he was not 




state seemed ready to face any consequences associated with the systematic political 
intolerance shown to the displaced Kurds so long as national unity was protected34. 
The military consolidation in the conflict zones was achieved with colossal violence 
if needed. Civilian state remained subservient to the army decisions in terms of the 
treatment given to the civilian population that the security forces were not anymore 
able to distinguish from the PKK militia organized in the rural.  
The intriguing question coming to the fore is why the state failed to protect 
and accommodate the displaced Kurds, if not during the physical displacement 
process, after displacement.  There was indeed systematic disregard towards this 
population within the civilian state circles despite a group of Parliamentarians trying 
to bring the issue into attention as a set of citizenship and human rights violations. It 
would be less then well-founded to argue that these Kurdish communities were 
disregarded because of their ethnicity. Enormous amount of funds and resources have 
been allocated for the Kurds under the village guard system up until today. The state 
has extended enormous benefits to the large scale Kurdish land owners in the region 
under the jurisdiction of the ongoing rural development project of GAP (Southeastern 
Anatolian Project) during the course of the armed conflict. Small groups of displaced 
Kurds (especially former village guards who were displaced by the PKK attacks35) 
                                                                                                                                           
with leftist politics, some of his previous friends have joined moderate and radical pro-Kurdish politics 
throughout time. Summer 2006, Ankara. 
34 Interview with Hacaloğlu 2006 Ankara  




have been given housing and/or aid to return and rebuilt their rural livelihoods again 
some under the rural development initiations of the GAP project36. One 
straightforward proposition, I would argue, is that the armed conflict and the rising 
salience of Kurdish ethno-nationalist politics have introduced new dynamics between 
the state and the conflict-affected Kurds through which the ‘deserving’ citizens with 
Kurdish origin have been distinguished from the ‘so-called’ citizens. The former have 
continued to be welcomed by the state as long as they proved their ‘loyalty’ and 
embraced the legitimacy of the Turkish army operations in the region. The later were 
suppressed and excluded further in so far as they remained ‘suspicious’ in terms of 
their ‘loyalty’ to the Turkish state.  
Considering the displaced population as less then legitimate Turkish citizens, 
the state had deprived the displaced Kurds from their citizenship rights as well as 
human rights. But the responsibility to accommodate those masses and/or compensate 
for their damages was avoided as the evacuation actions were projected as state 
actions ‘to protect’ citizens from the PKK terror, as consequences of legitimate state 
acts to fight ‘terrorism’. Displaced Kurds have been left on their own after 
displacement too, and basic urban problems arising from massive urban in-migrations 
have been inadequately dealt at the municipal level.37 This is basically how the 
decline in state legitimacy in southeastern Turkey started to be ingrained particularly 
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among the civilians that the state was not willing to protect if did not make them a 
target of the army operations.  
The conflict in general and displacement experience in particular destroyed 
the initially neutral stance of many Kurds in the southeast leaving them disoriented if 
not antagonistic against the Turkish state. One implication of this process has to do 
with the changing nature of the political agency at the grassroots level which I discuss 
from the perspective of the displaced Kurds in the forthcoming chapters. Detached 
from and unable to return to their original places of residence (mainly geographically 
and politically distant and isolated rural areas), they have been ignored by the central 
state until very recently and settled in precarious urban neighborhoods with no 
adequate social services and/or infrastructure. The armed conflict lasted until 1999 
costing the lives of more than 35,000 people in the region. After a short cessation 
between 1999 and 2004 following the ceasefire declared by the PKK, clashes 
between the Turkish security forces and the Kurdish insurgents restarted in June 
2004.  
IDENTITY POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN TURKEY 
Consolidation of the Islamist as well as pro-Kurdish identity politics happened 
during the 1990s. Islamist politics were subtly supported by the Turkish military as a 
bulwark against communism in 1980s. Despite the awakening of the Turkish military  
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in the second half of the 1990s to the danger of the fundamentalist threat; Islamists 
have managed to institutionalize their agendas, pragmatically transforming their 
radical rhetoric and creating a dynamic Islamist identity in terms of political, 
economic and cultural issues. The Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
became the government in the year 2002 (and re-elected recently in July 2007), with a 
rhetoric that ironically drew upon the Kemalist and secular premises of the Turkish 
state.  
The 1990s created auspicious domestic and international political opportunity 
structures for the Islamists to organize in politics and business, institutionalize at the 
public and political levels and finally take over control of the government and the 
Turkish parliament. Indeed, the foundations of the Turkish state have taken fatal 
blows to its secular basis in face of the systematic institutionalization of the Islamist 
agenda in the public and political arena at the central and local government levels. 
Interestingly enough, it is not a coincidence that the violent fundamentalist 
organizations of the 1990s (i.e. Turkish-Kurdish Hezbullah) are currently still 
organized and arguably searching for ‘political channels’ to express their demands 
and claims with ‘non-violent’ means (see for example Faraç 2005). This is, for the 
most part because of the political opportunity structure that is open to exploitation by 
the Islamist agendas.  
Organized Kurds, on the other hand have constantly failed to come up with 




defended on legitimate grounds and expanded through the emerging political 
openings in the country pushed by the European Union. The Kurdish question in 
Turkey has not experienced a similar transformation as the Islamist politics that 
would create the flexible political vision to position itself within the Turkish political 
system as well as in Europe38 (see for example Keyman, 2005, also see Kasaba, 
2001). During the most violent phases of the armed conflict, pro-Kurdish political 
actors found political channels to get their agendas represented by party politics in 
Turkey. However, pro-Kurdish political parties were founded one after another by 
groups of politicians organically tied to the PKK ideology and cadres, and annulled 
one after another by the constitutional court due to their affiliation with the illegal 
organization.  
There is an intriguing paradox in this picture in terms of the politics of 
‘identity politics’. Despite the fact that they and their agendas were not welcome in 
mainstream Turkish politics, groups of pro-Kurdish politicians established political 
parties and participated in national and local elections during the armed conflict years 
(see for example Barkey, 1998). They did not win seats in the Parliament on their 
own due to the 10% electoral threshold that they never managed to reach at the 
national level, but in certain cases, these pro-Kurdish circles negotiated with the 
                                                 
38 Here I do not mean to praise the pragmatic nature of the pro-Islamist politics. Rather, I point out the 
fact that two separate dissident political agendas with anti-democratic tendencies followed different 
paths, pro-Islamist politics (through the system, making their ways within the system gradually 
transforming the system), pro-Kurdish politics (staying outside of the system, challenging the system 




mainstream political parties such as SHP (Social Democratic People’s Party). They 
even once formed an electoral pact with the SHP that enabled them to get their 
representatives into Parliament in 1991. They also won municipal governments in 
many southeastern provinces in local elections during 1990s. 
In 1991, a group of pro-Kurdish party members from the HEP (People’s labor 
Party) entered the Turkish Parliament owing to their electoral pact with the SHP in 
the national elections. During the swearing-in ceremony in the Parliament, they read a 
text in Kurdish. Acting against the Turkish constitution by using a language other 
than Turkish in the Parliament, the pro-Kurdish parliamentarians were expelled from 
their posts and arrested. The genuine purpose of the pro-Kurdish actors who were 
very well aware of the consequences of their actions in Parliament, seemed to show 
their ability to challenge the premises of the Turkish constitution and the state, and 
their lack of willingness for the time being to politically  negotiate with the state 
within the state. In retrospect, one can argue that during the early 1990s, pro-Kurdish 
political actors were less interested in becoming a part of the Turkish political system 
and more interested in externally targeting the very established premises of the state 
and Turkish citizenship with demands requiring institutional restructuring (i.e. 
institutionalization of the Kurdish identity).  Indeed, this has become rather a political 
strategy followed by the organized legal as well as illegal pro-Kurdish groups until 




central Turkish politics. Their goal has been rather to challenge the state than to take 
part within it and negotiate subtly39.  
The political space that was opened to these pro-Kurdish actors to get 
involved, maneuver and negotiate invalidates the argument that the armed conflict 
was the only option available to the pro-Kurdish actors. It was indeed the reverse. The 
more dynamic and closer the relationship between the PKK and its extensions in 
party politics, the more restricted the space of opportunity was (and still is) for pro-
Kurdish actors to be in legitimate politics and the lesser their chances were (and still 
are) to justify their cause. This actually complicates the argument by the students of 
political violence such as Wiovierko (1999) that conflict arises when the dissident 
actors cannot negotiate with the power holders. The dynamics of political violence 
are much more complicated since in fact negotiation between the dissident actors and 
the power holders are hindered when the dissidents are affiliated with violence and/or 
perpetrators of violence, which leaves us with a vicious circle of violence and 
counter-violence, at least as evinced in the Turkish case.  
In the 1990s, the relationship between the pro-Kurdish non-violent politicians 
and the violent PKK cadres contributed to the general civil and political perception in 
                                                 
39 This argument is in line with Yeğen’s (2006:40) point that pro-Kurdish politics has been ‘de-
nationalizing’ rather than being an oppositional force within the nation-state. In the last general 
elections hold on July 22 2007, the pro-Kurdish political party entered the Turkish parliament with 20 
MPs (Member of Parliament). The party’s rhetorical emphasis on unity and Turkish and Kurdish 
brotherhood/sisterhood in Turkey together with their confession of the ‘past mistakes’ done by their 





the country that the Kurdish Question was indeed a security problem, a matter of 
‘separatist terrorism,’ which in turn justified the Turkish military approach to the 
issue with counter-violence at least in the eye of the civil politics and general Turkish 
public. The Kurdish movement, including the pro-Kurdish human rights movement 
after 1980s, has been unable and/or unwilling to establish effective strategic alliances 
with social, political and intellectual factions in Turkish society. Moreover, violence 
has always been welcome within pro-Kurdish politics and justified on the basis of 
‘lack of political channels available’ for pro-Kurdish actors in Turkish politics. In 
turn, pro-Kurdish actors in the Turkish political arena have been marginalized by the 
state and repressed due to their organic ties with the illegal radical circles of the PKK 
organizing in the Middle East and Europe.   
 
Political Violence turning into an Ethno-nationalist Claim at the Grassroots 
In the early 1990s, political violence in southeastern Turkey was on rise not 
only in the remote mountainous areas but also in city and town centers in close 
proximity to the conflict zones. The Turkish army tightened the security measures 
endorsed by new laws and regulations including the new Anti-Terror Law and Decree 
412 that granted further powers to the Governor-General (see Taspinar 2005). The 
PKK was also broadening its scope of influence trying to consolidate its control over 




traditional Newroz celebrations40 turned into a bloody rampage in some southeastern 
cities and towns including Van, Cizre, Sirnak, Mardin (Nusaybin), Hakkari 
(Yüksekova). According to the state records, PKK was behind the scene as a 
provocateur41. During the events 92 civilians and PKK members were killed.42 As 
retribution, in the year 1993, 33 unarmed Turkish soldiers were captured and killed 
by an independently acting PKK unit without authorization from the PKK leadership. 
These events made it obvious that the organization was getting out of the control of 
the Turkish security forces, but was also riddled by internal power rivalries. Various 
other Kurdish organizations (PDK-I in Iran and PUK and KDP in Iraq) also engaged 
in opposition movements in their respective states in the early 1990s. Violence in the 
region became chronic as the Kurdish actors ‘acted as dependent components in a 
region-wide system of violence and were not able to master their own violence, let 
alone that of the states.’ (Bozarslan, 2004: 41, also see Romano 2006).    
In December 1991, just after the national elections, new Prime Minister 
Suleyman Demirel gave a public speech in Diyarbakir during which he stated that 
“Turkey [had] recognized the Kurdish Reality” (Taspinar 2005: 104). It was the first 
                                                 
40 Spring festivals to celebrate the New Year according to central Asian tradition. Newroz is celebrated 
widely in Turkey, particular among the Kurds.  
41 http://www.belgenet.com/dava/dava11.html (Turkish) 
42 The March 22 1992 rampage was propagated and initiated by the PKK members who organized the 
civilians to participate. Although, some sources including the Turkish security forces argued that the 
majority of the rampage participants were the PKK members (see for example, 
http://www.belgenet.com/dava/dava11.html), this argument is problematic due to the difficulty in 
distinguishing the actual PKK members from the civilian population in the rampage towns and cities, 




time in the history of Republic that a mainstream politician with a conservative line 
declared the ‘Kurdishness’ of the Kurdish Question in public. This declaration 
showed the changing perception of the Kurdish issue in the eye of the Turkish state. 
Unlike the 1920s and 30s when the Kurdish Question was considered as a matter of 
uncivilized tribal politics, ignorant religious establishments, and/or tradition and pre-
modern social structures or the 1950s, 60s and 70s when it was seen as a problem of 
regional economic and social underdevelopment (Yeğen 1999), the late 1980s and 
early 1990s showed that the issue had gained a conspicuous ethnic dimension. State 
circles realized that the ‘Kurdish identity’ could be political and mobilized at the 
grassroots, could turn into a threat for the subtle Turkishness of the state and could 
militantly demand radical structural changes in the state system and institutions. 
However, it was just because the radical nature of the Kurdish demands flamed the 
PKK insurgency, whilst the hardliner state circles were unable to develop social, 
economic and political measures to integrate the most vulnerable segments of the 
southeastern population that the Kurdish Question has turned into an ethno-political 
predicament in Turkey.   
In 1994, local elections pointed out another facet of the changing dynamics of 
political identity in southeastern Turkey. The Pro-Islamist Welfare Party (RP) won a 
significant victory in the region after the self-withdrawal of the pro-Kurdish 
Democratic Labor Party (DEP) from the local elections (see for example Barkey 




the southeast as well as across Turkey. The pro-Islamists have until today remained as 
a viable alternative to the pro-Kurdish politics as well as a strong rival in the local 
government elections in the predominately Kurdish provinces. This is certainly not 
surprising considering that both pro-Islamist and pro-Kurdish politics have been in 
tension with the central state structure and aimed to redefine the premises of the 
nation-state and civic understanding of Turkish citizenship albeit in different ways; 
Islamists challenge the secular Turkish state structure while pro-Kurdish politics 
challenges the national unity. Their ‘anti-systemic’ stance in secular Turkish politics 
gave the Islamist political parties a leverage to gather support from the masses that 
feel outside of the central state circles. Moreover, both pro-Islamists (across Turkey) 
and pro-Kurdish political parties (in the southeast) have managed to reach out to the 
grassroots and organize at the very local level in neighborhoods, in city centers and 
districts; something that none of the mainstream political parties have managed to do. 
Indeed, constituencies of the Islamist politics and the pro-Kurdish politics have 
overlapped with each other starting from the mid 1990s (see Öniş 2000, also see 
Ercan-Argun 1999).   
Considering the upsurge in Islamist tendencies in Turkey in general together 
with the spreading influence of the PKK in the southeast, it was not a coincidence that 
fundamentalist groups, especially the affiliates of the Hezbullah43, started to wage 
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provinces, especially in the province of Batman bordering Diyarbakir. This research includes those 




violence across southeastern Turkey in the early 1990s. Southeast-based Kurdish 
fundamentalist organization mainly targeted the PKK in its competition for control 
over the regional population. In 1997, the pro-Islamist RP party already reached its 
heydays in Turkish politics and formed a coalition government with the center-right 
DYP (True Path Party) after the national elections. It did not take long for the Turkish 
military to acknowledge the symbiotic relationship between the fundamentalist and 
ethno-nationalist upsurge in southeastern Turkey.  
Ironically, it was the Turkish security forces that subtly supported the 
Hezbullah during the 1990s and secured a space of activity for the illegal organization 
in the southeastern provinces as a counter-insurgency strategy against the PKK. In 
April 1997, the military announced a new “Concept of National Security Strategy” as 
the Internal security and Planning Department of the Chief of State declared that 
“national security guidelines shifted the perception of threat from outside the country 
to the inside: Islamic movements and Kurdish separatism consolidate each other.” 
(Taspinar 2005: 235). Subsequently, the pro-Islamist RP was banned from politics in 
1998, this time with an indirect military intervention. By the year 2000, Hezbullah 
was also repressed through numerous anti-terrorism operations against the illegal 
organization in the southeast and in western cities like Istanbul44. 
                                                 
44 Mehmet Faraç, a journalist expert on Islamist terrorism, argued that the Turkish/Kurdish Hezbullah 
was never eradicated, but just silenced. According to Faraç, the fundamentalist organization is 
currently looking for ‘legal’ and ‘non-violent’ channels to organize and get institutionalized. (Mehmet 




Map-2 Dispersion of Majority Provincial Votes by Political parties in the General 
Elections in 1995 
 
 
RP-Welfare Party (predecessor of Justice and Development)- pro-Islamist 
DYP-True Path Party-centre-right wing  
ANAP- Motherland Party-centre-right wing 
DSP-Democratic Left Party-centre-left wing with nationalist tones 
HADEP-People’s Democratic Party-Pro-Kurdish 
CHP-Republican People’s Party-Center left with democratic, secular, Kemalist rhetoric 
 
By the year 1998, PKK started to lose its strength as well as political and 
logistic support in Turkey and abroad. Turkish army had been constantly developing 
its technical competence to fight against the guerilla insurgency while local logistic 
support vital for the guerilla resistance had been cut off to a large extent with village 
evacuations occurred in actual and potential conflict areas. The guerilla units 
withdrew into northern Iraq and the leader of the organization, Abdullah Öcalan, with 




Syria that hosted him for about two decades. PKK declared a ceasefire following the 
arrest of Öcalan until 2004-the year that the organization ended the ceasefire under 
the influence of rapidly changing domestic and regional changes.  
 
Map-3 Dispersion of Majority Provincial Votes by Political parties in the General 
Elections in 1999  
 
DSP-Democratic Left Party-Left wing with nationalist tones 
MHP-Nationalist Action Party-(Turkish) Nationalist 
FP-Virtue Party (successor of RP)-pro-Islamist   
DEHAP-Democratic People’s Party (successor of HADEP)-Pro-Kurdish 
DYP-True Path Party-conservative right wing  
 
Between 1999 and 2004, there had emerged an atmosphere of peace and hope 
in southeastern Turkey. EU-sponsored democratization reforms in the areas of 




2002 also contributed to the hope held by exponents of multi-culturalism who had a 
predisposition that more cultural freedom would bring stability and reconciliation of 
the Kurdish Question in Turkey45. Pro-Kurdish party politics also successfully 
retuned back to the election box in 1999. Pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party 
(HADEP- replaced the outlawed DEP) received only 4.5 percent of the votes and 
could not enter Parliament; still, won quite a victory in local government elections in 
the same year taking over most of the municipal control in southeastern provinces 
like Diyarbakir, Van, Hakkari and Batman. In the 2002 national elections, pro-
Kurdish DEHAP again emerged as the major political power in the region despite its 
inability to send representatives to the Parliament due to the 10% national threshold 
that it never managed to surpass.  
Sweeping success of the party in 1999 and 2002 indicated the strong local 
support for Kurdish ethno-political cause and reinforced the idea of the consolidation 
of the pro-Kurdish politics in the region. However, the 2004 local government and the 
2007 general elections showed the delicate political balances prevailing across the 
southeast. Pro-Islamist politics, indeed not surprisingly, emerged from the election 
box as an alternative outlet for the local people in the southeast with its well-
established local organizing as well as particular appeal to the conservative poor  
                                                 
45 2002 the Turkish parliament abolished the death penalty and undertook substantive democratization 
reforms granting important cultural rights to ethnic minorities including the Kurds. The bans on 
Television and Radio broadcasting and private education in Kurdish were lifted (for details see 




masses. The Islamists have in addition managed to achieve cross-class allegiances not 
only in the southeast but across Turkey gaining the support of conservative middle 
and upper classes in Anatolia (Öniş 2000). Although, the pro-Kurdish Democratic 
People’s Party (DEHAP) was overshadowed by the sweeping victory of the pro-
Islamists in many pre-dominantly Kurdish southeastern provinces in 2004 and 
recently in 2007; the party maintained dominance in its stronger castles such as 
Diyarbakir, Tunceli, Sirnak and Hakkari.  
 
Map-4 Dispersion of the Provincial Votes by Political Parties in the General 
Elections in 2002 
 
 
AKP- Justice and Development Party (Pro-Islamist) 
CHP-Republican People’s Party (Center-left-Democratic/Secular/Kemalist Rhetoric) 
DEHAP-Democratic People’s party (Pro-Kurdish)-The only legal political party in Turkey 





Map-5 Dispersion of the Provincial Votes by Political Parties in the Local 
Government (Municipality) Elections in 2004 
 
 
Source: Milliyet Newspaper, March 28 2004 
AKP- Justice and Development Party (Pro-Islamist) 
CHP-Republican People’s Party (Center Left-Democratic/Secular/Kemalist Rhetoric) 
SHP-Social Democratic People’s Party in coalition with DEHAP (Democratic People’s party 
(Pro-Kurdish)- Provinces under its municipal control: Batman, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Sirnak 
and Tunceli 
MHP-Nationalist Action Party (Turkish Nationalist)        
SP-Felicity Party (Pro-Islamist)                                             
DSP-Democratic Leftist Party (Leftist/Nationalist Rhetoric) 
DYP-True Path Party (Center Right);  
Bağimsiz-Independent 
 
The atmosphere of normalization was replaced by further violence and 
political tension in the southeast with the PKK ending the ceasefire in June 2004 at a 
time that I had just arrived to Diyarbakir-- my field site in southeastern Turkey. This 




negotiations with Turkey for full membership. As I was expecting a ‘post-conflict’ 
context, I indeed found myself in an interestingly evolving chains of local events at 
the junction of the contradictory processes of 1) the newly opening democratic spaces 
following the lifting of the years long regional emergency rule between 1998-2002, 2) 
the starting of the official negotiations between the EU and Turkey, and 3) the 
restarting of the armed conflict and even more civilian displacement in certain distant 
rural areas. The local population was quite concerned and anxious waiting for 1) a 
reconciliation of the pro-Kurdish demands that predominately defined during the 
course of the events in 1990s including the ending of the conflict and the return of the 
thousands of PKK guerillas back home from the mountains46 and 2) a systematic 




                                                 
46 Demands for ‘peace’ and the return of the guerilla became evident during my forced migrant 
interviews. Concern, frustration and anxiety were common especially in forced migrant families with 
relatives among the PKK guerilla. However, people’s views on how to achieve ‘peace’ and under what 
circumstances the guerilla should be returned back provided a quite interesting picture as demands for 
‘peace’ and reconciliation between the state and the PKK are coupled with more complicated claims 
with regard to the Kurdish identity, culture and language referring to discursively defined ‘autonomy 
for the Kurds’ and freedom for the arrested leader of the PKK. I discuss the details in chapter 5 and 6 
and with a gendered perspective in chapter 7.   
47 These two main strands of expectations came to the fore during my interviews with the displaced 
Kurds and interactions with the local people during my fieldwork. Another major frustration voiced by 
my interviewees was the arrest of Öcalan, which many displaced interviewee perceived as unjust to the 





Map-6 Dispersion of the Provincial Votes by Political Parties in the latest General 




AKP- Justice and Development Party (Pro-Islamist) 
CHP-Republican People’s Party (Center Left-Democratic/Secular/Kemalist Rhetoric) 
MHP-Nationalist Action Party (Turkish Nationalist)        
Bağimsiz-Independent (Pro-Kurdish DTP-Democratic Society Party- Candidates) 
 
The renewal of conflict in 2004 proved the Kurdish Question to be more 
complicated than envisaged. More democracy did not guarantee the end of the 
conflict and political violence. Or is it even just the other way around; did more 
democracy bring more violence? In the Turkish case, it seems like exogenously 
introduced ‘democratic openings’ via Turkey’s elusive EU accession process have 
changed the nature of violence instead of ending it (see for example MacGinty, 2002 
for a cross-national discussion on democracy and violence; also see Bozarslan 2004 




witnessed peculiar forms of violent attacks that the PKK and the Turkish security 
forces accused each other for responsibility. These newly emerging forms of-- what 
Bozarslan would call a kind of ‘privatized violence’ have been perpetrated by certain 
militant units (previously or currently) affiliated with the Turkish security forces 
and/or the PKK acting independently from their respective central decision-making 
mechanisms. As I illustrate in chapter 6, Kurdish guerilla resistance has also recently 
translated into urban radicalism, civil disobedience and violent and non-violent 
protest actions in city centers predominately inhabited by the migrants of the conflict 
years. The relationship between the grassroots and organized pro-Kurdish politics and 
actors including the pro-Kurdish political parties and municipal governments has 
been articulated into claim-making and civic activism against the state which I 
discuss in the chapters 4, 5 and 6.   
ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING, POVERTY AND SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP 
IN TURKEY  
Social and economic problems that the processes of armed conflict and 
population displacement have highlighted entail an engagement with the issues of 
distributive justice, employment creation, public investment and extensive social 
policy initiatives in Turkey in general and in the Southeast in particular. Conflict-
induced economic deterioration in Southeastern Turkey due mainly to the armed 
conflict, political insecurity and emergency practices put the region in a seriously 




resources, lands, crops, and forests were systematically destroyed during the course of 
the armed conflict by the Turkish security forces as well as by the PKK militants who 
targeted the strategic state investment including schools, roads, dams and irrigations 
systems.  
Regional disparities between southeastern Turkey and rest of Turkey in social 
and economic terms have widened, albeit the consequences of the armed conflict 
have been suffered all around Turkey (see for example Kurmuş, 2006). However, all 
these conflict-induced processes did not happen in a void; rather socio-economic 
deterioration in the southeast has been aggravated by the changes at the domestic 
level if not caused by. Considering that the socio-economic situation and political 
position of the most vulnerable social groups in the conflict geographies cannot be 
conceived independent from the recent conflict-induced structural transformations in 
the region and also the broader political economic trajectories of the neo-liberal era; I 
explain in this section how domain of society and politics are tied to the domain of 
economy in terms of the instigation of identity-based politicization. This section is 
particularly important for me to show how Kurdish contention in southeastern Turkey 
has recently been turned into a debilitating social citizenship problem undermining 
the state legitimacy even further in the eye of the impoverishing migrant masses in 
city centers.   
 As I try to disentangle the politics and economics of the major developments 




despite the conspicuous impact of the 1980 military coup for Islamist and pro-
Kurdish politicization in the country; 1980s were rather an incubation period. It is 
important to note here that it was indeed the end of 1980s that pro-Islamist politics 
started to gain ground in party politics and Islamist violence became overt in public 
on the one hand and pro-Kurdish radicalism around the PKK in southeastern Turkey 
started to be a mass contention in southeastern Turkey48. Indeed if we acknowledge 
that secularism and national solidarity based on civic citizenship rather than ethnicity 
and religion are the basic premises of the Turkish state system, the political regime in 
the country came under a ‘threat’ with the ethno-nationalist and religious upsurge and 
that became evident starting from 1989.  
All these developments in the socio-political domain are likely to be tied to 
the developments in the domain of economy as it was the year 1989 that the central 
government riddled with a heavily indebted economy moved to completely deregulate 
the financial markets in Turkey. This was the starting of a spiral down effect in 
Turkey’s macroeconomic indicators and further deterioration in income distribution 
and social equity (Cizre-sakallioğlu and Yeldan 2000).  
In the section below, I explain how economic deterioration has been 
materialized in Turkish society as poverty and socio-economic inequality while 
simultaneously feeding the contention in society including Islamist politicization and 
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Question is the year 1989 not earlier. According to him, it was 1989 that PKK radicalism started to 




pro-Kurdish discontent. Increasing socio-economic gaps between social classes, 
distributional injustice, growing poverty and unemployment together with political 
corruption entrenched in the rapid economic transformation in 1980s, have turned 
into declining state legitimacy in the eye of the citizens as the ‘corrupt’ state 
abandoned the citizens gradually and insulated the political decision making 
mechanisms further from society. State legitimacy was in decline in the eye of the 
general society as “corruption rather than populism becoming the more appropriate 
term to describe the economic dimension of state-society relations” (Buğra and 
Keyder 2006:212). It was under these circumstances that pro-Islamist Welfare Party 
(RP) and consequently its extension, the pro-Islamist Justice and Development (AKP-
current government) have consolidated their local support from impoverishing urban 
and rural masses.  
Moreover, during 1990s, not only the poor and working classes, but large 
segments of the middle class found themselves plunged into social and economic 
insecurity that gave rise to social conflict between social classes divided by 
increasingly distinctive socio-economic contours (see for example, Öniş 2000, 2003, 
2004). It was not surprising that in 2002 national elections, pro-Islamists declared 
their over-sweeping victory across Turkey except in the southeast where majority 
votes continued to go to the pro-Kurdish party (DEHAP). In the 2004 local 
government elections, Islamists grow stronger and even took control of the many 




DEHAP such as Van, owing to their ability to organize at the very local level and 
appeal to conservative impoverished classes (see Map 3). In the recent 2007 general 
elections, the victory of the pro-Islamists in southeastern Turkey frustrated and 
demoralized the pro-Kurdish actors even more.   
Socio-economic Transformation in Southeastern Turkey 
In many transition economies, transformations of economic liberalization are 
assumed to accompany a political transition from authoritarian forms of state to 
democracy. This proposition is however not a straightforward one as is shown by the 
economically ‘liberated’ countries riddled with indebtedness, economic inequality, 
political instability and democratic deficiency. In the Turkish case also, consolidation 
of economic liberalization following the 1980 military coup has accompanied 
economic crisis and economic inequality between rich and poor, urban and rural, east 
and west; political instability, corruption, and rentier politics. The situation has gotten 
worse with complete financial market deregulation and further integration with the 
global capital markets starting from 1989 (Cizre-Sakallioğlu and Yeldan 2000). 
Transformation of the state structure based on neo-liberal rationality has undermined 
the redistributive capacities of the state; which in turn contributed to the increasing 
gap between social classes and geographical regions.49  
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that extreme army spending to finance the military operations against the PKK in the Turkish territory 
and across the Iraqi border caused economic instability in the country contributing to the devaluation 




The war in the southeast has further worsened the situation by channeling 
state resources towards military expenditures and introducing new decision-making 
dynamics- between the state bureaucracy, business interests and the military- that are 
insulated from society (Öniş 2000, Demir 2004 also see Cam 2005). Economic 
reform programs embarked on under the authorization of the IMF have forfeited long 
term development initiatives for short-term economic benefits and rent-seeking 
politics. Economic liberalization has not only created economic crisis, chronic 
inflation and economic instability; but also reduced accountability and transparency 
in the public sector, undermining the civic consciousness and organizing (Demir 
2004).  
The socio-economic situation in the southeast was particularly alarming 
during 1980s and 1990s. There had been state development initiatives targeting socio-
economic underdevelopment that resulted in broadening intra-regional inequalities 
and feeding political favoritism in the region (Özer 1998). Along with the 
criminalization of economic activities including smuggling and heroin production, the 
regional economy almost collapsed during the conflict years, particularly in areas 
outside of the state-initiated gigantic hydroelectric project50 (GAP-Southeastern 
Anatolian Project). GAP-Southeastern Anatolia Project- started initially as a rural 
                                                 
50 In my encounters with the local administrative personnel from the GAP project-many were actually 
Kurds themselves working for the state, I was told on several occasions that in addition to its economic 
importance (including electricity production and agricultural productivity), the project also had a 
military importance since especially dam projects enabled the army to better control the topography 




development project which has turned into a large-scale, multi-sectoral rural/urban 
socio-economic development project throughout time with credits coming from 
various financial sources including the World Bank, European Investment Bank. The 
state had optimistic views about the GAP expecting the project to produce 
development and employment opportunities for the local people. Contrasting with the 
region’s economically and socially disadvantaged situation, abundant natural 
resources (i.e. land and water) have gained strategic economic as well as political 
importance with the implementation of the GAP.  
The GAP project did actually help agricultural based industrialization in 
southeastern provinces like Gaziantep and Sanliurfa –both remained relatively 
insulated from the armed conflict pervasive in the rest of the region. Spilling over 
impact of GAP-related development in those provinces with agro-businesses has been 
evident with their relatively greater ability to absorb the incoming migrant population 
in their formal and informal economy. Large-scale landowners and big agro-
businesses have benefited from the project to a large extent; however, the positive 
spill-over impact of the project in terms of employment creation and economic 
development has not been realized yet. The GAP project has ironically contributed to 
intra-regional inequalities (Özer 1998, Hürriyet, June 5 2005). Conflict-stricken 
provincial centers such as Diyarbakir and Van could not have benefited from those 
limited regional development sparkles as evinced with their limited urban economies 




GAP project has further contributed to the intra-regional inequalities in the southeast 
and further distorted the socio-economic disparities originating from the traces of pre-
capitalist feudal system in the region. (See for example M.E. Bozarslan 1966[2002] 
for an historical overview of structural underdevelopment in southeastern Turkey and 
Özer 1998 for a socio-economic analysis of the GAP; also see Hürriyet June 5 2005).   
‘Development’ initiatives together with the distorted entrenchment of 
capitalist economy in the region worked against the well-being of the peasant masses 
in the southeast. The region has been a source of economic as well as forced 
migrations towards western Turkey up to the present. While migrations have 
displaced/redistributed the Kurdish population of Southeastern Turkey throughout 
and across Turkey, Southeastern Turkey is no longer the designated area where the 
Kurdish population of Turkey is concentrated, although the region is still 
predominately populated by ethnic Kurds. Ironically, GAP has required population 
displacement too due to large-scale dam construction in the rural. This kind of 
population displacement is called “development-induced” displacement in the 
mainstream forced migration literature. Certain rural development areas under the 
jurisdiction of the GAP administration have been located within or side by side with 
the armed conflict areas under strict military control during the course of the 
conflict51.  
                                                 
51 During my fieldwork, I came across with migrants who were uprooted due to the GAP activities. All 
indicated that they were paid monetary compensation by the state for their property taken over by the 




Village guard system has been a further destroying effect to the regional 
agriculture as village guards in most cases do not engage in any other income 
generating activity52. Together with the village guard system, traditional tribal 
relations have been transformed into a different social structure organized around 
gun-power. Ergil (1995) points out that village guard system; in this sense, 
contributes to perpetuation of the traditional tribal system in the region with the 
guards’ economic and social survival in the region are completely dependent on the 
Turkish army and the state salaries they receive as state employees.  
What have been the further consequences of the 1980s economic liberalization 
in the southeast? In an interview with a Kurdish MP (Ali Ihsan Merdanoğlu, Member 
of Parliament representing Diyarbakir) from the pro-Islamist Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), I asked him to explain the specific reasons for economic 
underdevelopment and poverty in southeastern Turkey as a politician representing the 
interests of the citizens in the region. As a Kurdish politician from a wealthy pro-state 
tribe, first he told me about his family’s years-long affiliation with the mainstream  
                                                                                                                                           
compensation money into productive economic activities. In most cases, while those people lost their 
agricultural subsistence in the long run, the compensation money was mainly spent on non-productive 
consumption including ‘durable goods’, ‘weddings’ and ‘rent’.  My unstructured interviews with the 
development-induced migrants are NOT included in my forced migrant interview data which 
exclusively includes the conflict-induced migrants.      
52 Village guards are expected not to engage in any kind of economic activity other than their ‘state 
employment’. In my interview with Mehmet Acikgöz, the director of the Socio-economic development 
unit under the GAP jurisdiction, he stated that there was no state pressure over the village guards for 
not being involved in their previous rural economic activities, but it was the village guards’ will to 
decide. His statement does not comply with the research and sources evincing that the guards in many 




political parties in Turkey during 1980s and 1990s including the Motherland Party of 
Turgut Özal that consolidated the neo-liberalization process in the country following 
the military coup. Merdanoğlu pointed out several problems with ‘enormously 
generous investment credit programmes’ of the Motherland Party during 1980s that 
were tailored for the local and national business entrepreneurs willing to invest in 
southeastern Turkey. The then government aimed to create a spirit of 
entrepreneurship in the region, and to reduce poverty and regional disparities between 
eastern and western Turkey projecting that new business would bring job 
opportunities for the local people53. Merdanoğlu continued with the following 
statement: 
You cannot expect these top-down investment initiatives to create a miracle in 
a region with terror and with no adequate infrastructure, no qualified human 
resources -you need to educate the people first to get them employed, right?- 
and with no entrepreneurial class with a culture of entrepreneurship- people 
who did not have a culture of business became businessmen. Can you imagine 
the consequences? Waste of resources, corruption and ‘ghost’ 
businesses….Capital needs peaceful decks to settle down, human resources 
and business ethic… (Interview with Ali Ihsan Merdanoglu, Member of 
Parliament from the pro-Islamist AKP, representative of Diyarbakir, July 6 
2004, Ankara, Turkish Parliament) 
During the interview, Merdanoğlu outlined54  various political and economic 
factors in which underdevelopment in the southeast have been embedded. These 
                                                 
53 The same projections have also been made for the large-scale GAP project (Southeastern Anatolian 
Project) which has turned into a disappointment in that respect.  
54 He was also very cautious about not to say anything that could be considered ‘politically incorrect’ 
by his party. He refused to use the phase ‘village evacuations’ during the interview stating that it would 
put the Turkish army under responsibility, while in fact it was the ‘PKK terror’ causing Kurdish people 




includes the armed conflict and political instability in the region, lack of public 
investment, political favoritism and political corruption, rent-seeking behavior in the 
business community particularly under the auspicious circumstances of neo-
liberalism.  
As economic deterioration and increasing socio-economic insecurities for the 
urban masses have been an endemic problem across Turkey, the specificities of 
economic underdevelopment, lack of public investment and joblessness in 
southeastern Turkey have been translated into rapidly increasing unemployment in 
southeastern city centers with predominately peasant incoming migrants from 
evacuated villages and towns. 
Displacement turning into a Social Citizenship Problem in 1990s 
Today’s urban poverty in western metropolises as well as in the eastern and 
southeastern cities is cited as one of the most striking consequences of the 
displacement of Kurds during the last decade in Turkey. In fact migration from rural 
to urban areas, from southeastern Turkey to western provinces had already started 
mid-1950s with agricultural modernization and accelerated with socio-economic 
transformation that Turkey had been going through in 1960s and 1970s. Armed  
                                                                                                                                           
enjoyed by the other citizens of Turkey, including cultural and political rights. He gave himself and the 
other Kurdish MPs in the Parliament as examples for how Kurds can be proud of being a Kurd and still 
welcome in politics and parliament in Turkey. He indicated that what was needed in southeastern 
Turkey was an end to the ‘PKK terror’ and extermination of poverty that had tricked people to 
sympathize with radical ideologies  (Interview with Ali Ihsan Merdanoglu, Member of Parliament 




conflict between the Turkish security forces and the Kurdish insurgents (PKK) has 
radically intensified the rural-urban migration from Southeastern Turkey in 1980s and 
1990s. This new rural-urban mobility was quite different from economic migrations 
of the earlier years in social, economic and political terms. It is noteworthy to 
mention that poverty among the displaced does not refer to a static status55, but 
extends to the other segments of the poor as well as to the mainstream society in 
various forms of social exclusion.56  
‘Displacement’ is also a process that continues even after the physical 
relocation of the masses and reinforced by the debilitating forces of general poverty 
and social exclusion in society. Displaced Kurdish communities are, also, not distinct 
groups as they have mingled with various segments of the urban poor as well as other 
social groups sharing their socio-economic and political vulnerabilities. I construe the 
consequences of population displacement with its political implications, but also with 
its relations to the broader socio-economic changes in Turkey. In this respect, 
consequences of the Kurdish displacement have not merely been articulated recently 
in terms of political tension, mass pro-Kurdish politicization and mobilization 
especially in southeastern Turkey. Conflict-induced human mobility, urban 
                                                 
55 For their piece on population displacement and development, Feldman, Geisler and Silberling 
(2003) point out: “Despite the remarkable progress in the thinking about poverty creation and 
reduction, little in these discussions actually addresses the shift from poverty as a social status or 
condition of individuals, communities, or nations (especially in the peripheral economies of the 
worldsystem), to poverty as a social process related to development and displacement. Displacement 
provides a trace on impoverishment as a historically specific process embedded in particular 




impoverishment and social exclusion together with the agonies of the post 1980 neo-
liberal era have also been translated into a social citizenship problem that contributed 
to the new face of pro-Kurdish contention in Turkey in general and in the southeast in 
particular.  
Together with the adoption of neo-liberal policies since 1980s, social service 
and security nets provided by the central state have gradually diminished. Leaving 
aside its being an economic and political issue, poverty has turned into a problem that 
is only a partial responsibility of the central state. Moreover, not only right-wing 
politics, but interestingly left-wing politics have been unable to produce meaningful 
poverty alleviation strategies as poverty has become more and more embedded into 
broader market structures that are out of the central state control (Öniş 2000, Cizre-
Sakallioğlu and Yeldan 2000, Buğra and Keyder 2004, 2006). Traditional Turkish 
welfare system57-- a kind of ‘inegalitarian corporatism’ favoring the urban population 
in the formal sector over rural and urban population in informal economy-- indeed 
proved its unsustainability in 1990s owing to market-oriented economic and labor 
force transformation (Buğra and Keyder 2006).  
According to Buğra and Keyder (2006), three important pillars of the 
traditional socio-economic safety nets available for migrant communities collapsed in 
1990s which rendered the formal welfare regime acutely inadequate; 1) rural-urban 
                                                                                                                                           
56 Gough, Eisenschitz and McCulloch (2006), for example, successfully define poverty in terms of 




ties that previously created survival synergies for migrants in the cities (this pillar 
collapsed due to armed conflict as well as the declining economic opportunities 
available in Turkish agricultural sector nation-wide) 2) available informal housing 
(this pillar collapsed due mainly to the commercialization of public land and 
reinforcement of property rights after 1980s) 3) family/kin and neighborhood 
assistance mechanism (this pillar collapsed due mainly to mass impoverishment 
related to the other two developments above).  
Emergence of ‘new poverty’ in 1980s has then happened in face of the 
collapse of the traditional informal social safety nets as well as the gradual decline of 
the social state. Subservience of the Turkish social state policies to the austerity 
measures of the IMF in 1980s and 1990s has further distorted the social state ability 
to share funds for social assistance to the poor (Buğra and Keyder 2006). Starting 
from 1990s, with distributional injustice a chronic problem and social equity 
deteriorating, citizens have become even more dependent on welfare provision 
because of extreme economic insecurity. However, the state’s capability to be a 
guarantor of social rights has declined as part of economic transformation, 
urbanization and neo-liberal entrenchment. 
Increasing salience of urban problems, urban impoverishment and 
unemployment prompted the mass support for the pro-Islamist Justice and 
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Development Party (AKP) in 2002 (Cizre-Sakallioğlu and Yeldan 2000, Öniş 2000). 
A fertile ground for Islamist upsurge was consolidated during 1990s. Economic  
insecurities coupled with political insecurities have also reinforced the 
popularity of the pro-Kurdish party especially in southeastern Turkey where pro-
Kurdish politics are well-organized. The pro-Islamist part(ies) had appeal to the poor 
migrant masses in city centers as well as small capital owners close to conservative 
politics. Pro-Kurdish parties have consolidated their power among grassroots 
especially in local government elections starting from mid 1990s.  
Vulnerable and underprivileged urban masses (including the millions of 
conflict-induced migrants) have tended to support the identity-based political agendas 
as opposed to the mainstream political parties associated with the growing corruption 
and the increasing social and economic instability and insecurity of the neo-liberal era 
in the country in 1990s (see for example Önis 2000 as an analysis of Islamist, Turkish 
and Kurdish nationalist party politics in 1990s, also see Demir 2004). Ironically, Pro-
Islamist politics have; however, already contributed to the political and economic 
problems of the neo-liberal era in Turkey. Whether or not it has succeeded in fighting 
corruption and political favoritism, the pro-Islamist AKP has created its own rent-
seeking domestic business community affiliated with Islamist green capital around 
the world and further destabilized the economic and institutional environment in 
Turkey. The party has also adopted aggressive agricultural policies, a radical 




fatal blow to the state security nets available for the Turkish peasantry and urban poor 
that are in the form of agricultural subvention as well as welfare provisions in health 
and education (Bugra and Keyder, also see Önis 2000).    
However one interesting development was initiated right before the pro-
Islamist AKP came to the power in 2002. After the 2001 IMF-induced economic 
crisis, the Social Risk Mitigation Project (SRMP) was initiated with financial support 
provided by the World Bank. This project in a sense marked the starting of a new era 
in the state’s understanding of and approach to poverty, a ‘universal rights’ approach 
to poverty with a minimum amount of social provisions available to everybody. 
Therefore, a new concept of social citizenship was initiated not by the new 
government (as argued by some in Turkey to give credit to the pro-Islamist 
government), but rather as part of an international imposition of the globalizing 
understanding of ‘universalistic rights’ approach to social citizenship embarked upon 
by the World Bank, supported by the IMF and happened to be carried out by the 
current pro-Islamist government in Turkey.  
Major complication is associated with contradictory implications of the 
implementation of policies to establish the ‘universalistic’ approach. On the one hand, 
AKP gathers support from the poor sectors of urban and rural population owing to its 
promise for an all-encompassing system of socio-economic security as well as from 
the big business owners whose interests are well served with the weakening of an 




welfare package available to all citizens could easily turn into a guise for further 
privatization in health and education sectors as well as a revoking of certain forms 
previously available benefits, in face of which citizens are forced to look for 
complementary private insurance (see for example Buğra and Keyder 2006).   
What has been successfully achieved by the pro-Islamist government recently 
is the reinforcement of the public perception of poverty as the ‘destiny’ and 
‘incapacity’ of the underprivileged individuals in a society (This is indeed very in line 
with the understanding of poverty as an individual problem in liberal economy). The 
twist is the conservative tones introduced with regard to how to deal with poverty. In 
this respect, a kind of ‘voluntary’ redistribution mentality is encouraged by the pro-
Islamist agenda using the notions of ‘social solidarity’ and ‘religious 
brotherhood/sisterhood’. Poverty reduction is cast as a matter of ‘social 
assistance/aid’ in forms of ‘charity’, ‘benevolence’ and ‘solidarity’ expected to come 
from family, neighbors and benevolent citizens. Therefore, ‘society’ rather than the 
state is expected to compensate for the socio-economic insecurities not covered by the 
‘universalistic’ social citizenship rights (Buğra and Keyder 2006). 
There is one other important political implication associated with increasing 
poverty and declining social state in Turkey. As the presence of the state in the 
citizens’ life disappears, municipalities have become important social service 
providers across Turkey including the eastern and southeastern provinces such as 




counterbalancing the decline of central social state. As noted by Buğra and Keyder 
(2006:224) “while central government funds to the poor have declined, these types of 
assistance have significantly increased at the municipal level” since mid-1990s. 
Under the general socio-economic insecurity nation-wide, municipal governments 
have reinforced their significance in domestic politics as well as in the everyday lives 
of citizens all around Turkey.  
Municipalities have also transformed their leverage over urban poor migrant 
communities into new forms of urban clientelism mainly developing concomitantly 
with institutionalization of religious and ethnic identities across Turkey through 
municipal government practices (I examine the case of the pro-Kurdish municipalities 
in chapter 4). Political parties that are highly organized at the very local level have 
taken over the municipal governments in the most recent local elections; pro-Islamists 
across Turkey including many eastern and southeastern predominately Kurdish 
provinces and Kurdish ethno-nationalists in strategic southeastern provinces such as 
Diyarbakir, Şirnak and Hakkari (see especially Maps 4 and 6). In comparison to the 
pro-Islamist municipalities, pro-Kurdish municipalities have had to operate with 
relatively limited budgets and deal with more complicated urban problems for which 
they have recently turned their faces to the international financial sources, particularly 
European Commission. Pro-Kurdish municipalities in the southeast have not only 
been perceived by their local constituency as benevolent actors able and willing to 




to assert rights of Kurdish people58 and to fight for political security of the local 
people against the local elements of the state. Political security is in this respect 
perceived as a guarantee for socio-economic well-being if not today definitely 
expected to be tomorrow in case the ‘Kurdish cause’ is succeeded.   
CONCLUSION 
In order to position my analysis of forced migration and political violence in 
southeastern Turkey within a broader political economic and historical perspective, I 
have provided a discussion of the political economic context in which the (ethnic) 
political violence in the southeast has been embedded since 1980s. The political and 
economic implications of the armed conflict have always been well-entrenched in 
general Turkish politics and national economic trajectories of the 1980s and 1990s. 
The implications and consequences of the conflict and violence are therefore 
meaningful in the national political economic context that I provide in this chapter.     
Any type of identity-based radicalization and its consequences should be 
examined in relation to the major political economic transformations after 1980s. 
Ironically, identity-based political violence accelerated during 1980s and 1990s when 
Turkish politics and economy were going through a process of ‘liberalization’. The 
neo-liberal era has underlined the discontents of democracy in a socio-economically 
vulnerable country like Turkey. Declining state legitimacy has translated into political 
violence (ethnic as well as religious). Dissemination of political violence among 
                                                 




civilian masses in the southeast has reinforced the state’s declining legitimacy in the 
eye of the marginalized Kurdish citizens. Dissemination of political violence together 
with large scale population displacement in southeastern Turkey has also contributed 
to mass politicization among the grassroots.  
So what made the Kurdish Question so irreconcilable in Turkey in terms of 
citizenship especially after 1980s?  
One obvious development since the 1980s happened in terms of social 
citizenship. With the decline of social citizenship in the country in 1980s and 1990s 
due to neo-liberal restructuring, one of the most important integrative measures for 
the Kurdish citizens collapsed. I should note that in practice, ‘social egalitarianism’ 
discourse in social policy in Turkey was rather a form of ‘inegalitarian’ corporatism’ 
in 1950s, 60s and 70s favoring employed urban populations over informally 
employed and also rural populations. However, free educational and health services 
were still state priorities and aimed to be made available to the majority of citizens. 
Social egalitarianism in social policy has particularly worked for the Kurdish 
economic migrant communities in western urban centers who were relatively more 
able than the post-1980 migrant groups to integrate with the urban social and 
economic life and find jobs in the formal sector. Marginalization and exclusion in this 
regard were rather in class terms than ethnic terms before 1980s (Erder 1995, 1996, 




Since 1980s, neo-liberal restructuring has reduced even the inadequate forms 
of previous welfare provisions provided by the central state, whilst since 2002 a new 
direction towards a distorted form of ‘universal social rights’ approach has been 
adopted by the pro-Islamist government. I elaborate further on this point in chapter 4 
of this dissertation. Political violence has further complicated the state’s failure to 
accommodate the social rights of the displaced masses in city centers. Thousands of 
Kurdish migrants have been left by their own within the social and economic 
insecurities of city centers, a process complicated by global neo-liberal restructuring 
and the declining social state. As these politicized masses experienced further 
impoverishment, unemployment and socio-economic insecurity, their material 
deprivation and associated social problems with it-substance-addicted street children, 
prostitution and crime have emerged as a distinct face of the post-1980s Kurdish 
Question in Turkey. I elaborate on these socio-economic dynamics experienced by 
the displaced Kurds in chapter 3, and in relation to the broader institutional changes 
in chapters 4 and 6. 
Second agony of the Turkish citizenship in the post 1980 era has been 
something unique to the dynamics of the armed conflict in the southeast. Here is a 
radical social conflict with an ethno-nationalist and armed face where sides may have 
lost their legitimacy in the eyes of each other as a ‘legitimate state’ and ‘legitimate 
citizens’ (analyzed in chapter 4). Adriane Kemp (2004) for example, calls the 




perspective of the Israeli state. Given that misleading parallels are drawn between the 
Kurds in Turkey and Palestinians in Israel, the two populations are indeed quite 
differently affiliated with their respective states. As Butenschon (2000:20) notes,  
whereas Israel does not intend to integrate or assimilate the indigenous non-
Jewish population of Palestine into the core national collective, Kemalist 
nation building59 precludes any ethnonational differentiation within the 
borders of Turkey…Those who do not accept this conception of national 
loyalty have no legitimate rights to participate in the life of the nation. The 
message to the Kurdish population of Turkey is clear: either accept that you 
are an inseparable part of the Turkish nation and be welcome as equals or face 
the consequences (such as forced assimilation, political repression, forced 
relocation). (Butenschon:20)    
 
Therefore, in the Turkish case, it was the ‘ethno-nationalist’ separatist politics 
that has been targeted rather than the general Kurdish population. Citizenship has 
been conceptualized by the state in terms of loyalty and duties of citizens rather than 
in terms of the rights of citizens and the state responsibilities towards citizens. (see 
for example Keyman and Icduygu 2003). Citizens turn into a ‘threat’ when they fail 
to prove their loyalty and willingness to be subservient to the state interest especially 
when the state sensitivities in terms of national security and territorial integrity are 
involved. As in the 1960s and 1970s, socialist and communist organizing was 
considered as a national security threat and thousands of Turkish as well as Kurdish 
                                                 
59 I should note here that the Kemalist notion of ‘Turkishness’ does not refer to Turks as a race. 
Similar to the French case, the notion is based on citizenship and a civic understanding of 
‘Turkishness’ as citizens being a part of Turkey regardless of their race and ethnicity. Despite this 
original Kemalist commitment to embrace the citizenry of Turkey as a civic entity without any ethnic 
divisions, certain ethnic groups have been embraced more than the others through state practices. I 




activists experienced the state violence, since the 1980s, the threat has been defined in 
terms of ethnic disintegration in the country due to domestic repercussions of global 
and regional developments.   
Citizens with Kurdish origin have turned into a ‘dangerous population’ 
whenever they ‘fail’ in the eyes of the state to prove their ‘loyalty’ towards the 
premises of the unified Turkish state. Thousands of Kurdish peasants have 
experienced state violence and discrimination based on the assumption that they 
were/are accomplice of the separatist forces as thousands of Kurdish peasants have 
been protected and armed by the Turkish military to fight against the PKK as ‘loyal’ 
state constituency. Therefore, ethnicity as a factor in the ever-changing citizenship 
practices in Turkey has been something beyond ‘ethnicity’. I discuss the legitimacy 
problem between the Turkish state and the forced migrant Kurdish communities in 
chapter 4.  
Deteriorating macro-economic indicators, increasing distributional injustice, 
social inequity and poverty further destabilized Turkish society and reinforced 
identity based politicization including pro-Kurdish ethno-nationalist contention. 
Indeed, the social, economic and political trajectories of the 1990s have highlighted 
three main societal problems in Turkey, 1) declining central state legitimacy, 2) 
increasing salience of identity politics threatening the secular and unified nation-state 
structure and 3) debilitating problem with social citizenship that justifies and 




The other complication arises from the fact that the Kurdish Question has 
become a transnational issue with an autonomous Kurdish region in Northern Iraq 
that emerged right under the auspices of the changing power dynamics of the Cold 
War in early 1990s and a Diaspora in Europe and North America that started to form 
with economic migrations in 1960s and 1970s and politicized with political 
migrations in 1980s and 1990s. This means that regional and international 
developments are always ubiquitous and subtle enough to change the parameters of 
the Turkish state-(Kurdish) citizen relations with changing claims, demands and 
expectations on the side of the Kurdish citizens and concerns and sensitivities on the 
side of the state.   
European Union accession process has also recently become part of any kind 
of equation with respect state-society relations in Turkey and brought in contradictory 
dynamics. The EU with a promise of ‘European Union citizenship’ and ‘democratic 
openings,’ and with acute sanctions to protect human and minority rights has in many 
cases turned into the only viable political opportunity for the pro-Kurdish politics to 
communicate their claims with the Turkish state. On the other hand, with priorities 
defined by the EU interests, the EU accession process has confused the elements of 
the Turkish state to deal with infuriating domestic issues especially with regard to 
ethnic and religious politicization supported by the international human and cultural 




development, pro-Kurdish contention has gained more and more ethno-nationalist 
salience.  
The rest of the dissertation deals with the specificities of the situation of the 
conflict-induced migrants in southeastern Turkey in relation to the general themes 










SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FORCED MIGRATION:  
URBAN POVERTY in SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY 
 
Emergence of a Kurdish guerilla organization PKK and counter-insurgency of 
the Turkish military aiming to combat the separatist threat marked a new era in 
Turkish politics in 1990s. The ‘low intensity war’ hit hard especially the local 
population in conflict areas in southeastern Turkey. Between 1.2 million (official 
figures) and 4 million (unofficial estimates) Turkish Kurds have been internally 
displaced during the course of the armed conflict60. Predominately peasant 
communities displaced lost their subsistence through the course of displacement as 
destruction of villages, forests, farm-land and husbandry activities accompanied the  
                                                 
60 Kurdish population displacement also spilled over the Turkish territory. Hundreds of Kurds sought 
refugee in European countries (exact numbers are difficult to determine due to complications involved 
with RSD-Refugee Status Determination process). According to 2004 figures, there were also 
approximately 12 thousand Turkish Kurds in Northern Iraq. About 9 thousand is residing in the 
Mahmur refugee camp and the rest is dispersed in Northern Iraqi cities Dahuk and Arbil (Interview 
with UNHCR-Ankara, 12/22/2004). Several thousands of Kurdish refugees previously residing in 
Northern Iraq have been repatriated with assistance from the Turkish state and UNHCR up to present. 
Between 1997 and 2003, about 2200 Kurdish refugees were repatriated back to Turkey (Agence 
France, 2003). There have been no systematic repatriation and reintegration programs for those groups 
of Kurdish refugees as they have entered Turkey in small groups. Even though, UNHCR-Turkey states 
that there is not a significant socio-economic and political disparities among the groups of the 
internally displaced Kurds, Turkish Kurds seeking refugee in European countries and the ones residing 
in Iraq (Interview, 12/22/2004); the issue begs for further comparative research on these different 
groups of internally and internationally displaced Turkish Kurds. This study concerns Turkish Kurds 




activities of the Turkish security forces as well as the PKK guerilla. Previously 
marginalized Kurds residing in politically and geographically distant rural areas have 
found themselves in urban poverty and unemployment; mingled with previous 
economic migrants and suffered growing social and economic insecurity in city 
centers across Turkey.  
In this chapter, I examine the social and economic insecurities of displaced 
Kurds in southeastern provinces drawing upon my interview data on Diyarbakir and 
referring to the general socio-economic context in the region. This population 
represents one of the most politically vulnerable groups of Kurds in Turkey due to 
their direct experience with violence and encounters with the regional armed actors 
(Turkish security units, the PKK guerilla and in some occasions the Kurdish 
Hezbullah). I discuss specificities of the social and economic problems that the forced 
migrant population struggles with in the provincial center of Diyarbakir. I also bring 
the pre-migration conditions in the places of origin and previously existing rural ties 
with the urban into consideration in order to compare the migrants’ socio-economic 
conditions before and after displacement.  
I explain that forced migrants in southeastern Turkey  not only suffers lack of 
social and economic integrative mechanisms into city centers, but they are also 
caught within a general environment of poverty, joblessness and social exclusion that 
is pervasive in city centers across different migrant groups including economic 




southeastern Turkey is not limited to poor migrant population, but is systemic in 
regional urban economies across social classes. Socio-economic processes of 
displacement have highlighted already existing social and economic problems 
including poverty and unemployment. Displacement has further introduced new 
forms of poverty that displaced Kurds are not able to deal with as opposed to their 
previous poverty situation that they had developed ways to manage at self-sufficiency 
level.  
This chapter is important to show that conflict-induced displacement has been 
a peculiar socio-economic process in Turkey, intertwined with various other 
transformations in urban centers and contributing to changes in urban economy, 
social relations, labor and housing market. In this respect, while forced migration has 
its own unique mechanisms of social exclusion, impoverishment and 
disempowerment; its impact has spilled over the urban terrain including different 
segments of urban poor, formal and informal working classes. Moreover, 
displacement process has coincided with other forms of social and economic 
transformation in city centers which refer to globalization, market economy and 
declining salience of traditional social state as well as weakening traditional social 
safety nets. Degrees of impoverishment and increasing social and economic 
insecurities have been much more severe in the southeastern provinces in comparison 




impact of the armed conflict and political incapacity to address the growing socio-
economic problems of the region.   
DISPLACEMENT AND URBAN CONSEQUENCES in TURKEY 
While economic and social factors have driven masses of Kurds from their 
original places of residence towards western city centers in Turkey since mid 1950s, 
significant portions of these migrant groups have been well integrated into the general 
Turkish population through time (also see for example Özbudun’s piece on political 
integration of Kurds into mainstream Turkish politics, 1996). However, this 
integration/ assimilation argument is mainly valid for the Kurdish migrations before 
the 1990s (Erder 1995, 1996, 1998; Ergil 1995). Kurdish migrations after 1990s 
(mostly forced and/or conflict-induced in nature) have different social implications in 
terms of urban integration as economic causes of migration have been replaced and/or 
dominated by the anomalies of the political situation in southeastern Turkey. And in 
the city centers with high levels of conflict-induced Kurdish migrant population, 
socio-economic consequences have been intertwined with political repercussions of 
this rapid and massive human mobility.  
Starting from the 1990s, urban centers of Turkey have been unable to absorb 
the incoming migrants even in the case of the economically prosperous, industrialized 
provincial centers like Istanbul and Bursa (Erder 1995, 1996, 1998; also see Ayata 
1996 and Şengül, 2003). This was mainly a consequence of the post-1980 neoliberal 




transition from public employment to privatization and enlargement of the informal 
sector though outsourcing and subcontracting. Consequently, incoming migrant 
population lost opportunities in formal labor market previously available to at least 
some sectors of the economic migrants of 1960s and 1970s (Senses 1994, Cam 2005, 
also see Bugra and Keyder 2003, 2006).  
While some saw forced migrations as an accelerated form of pre-existing rural 
to urban economic migrations, others like Ergil (1995) in his controversial research 
on forced migrants in several western and eastern provincial centers argued that 
economic factors such as unemployment and rural impoverishment were intertwined 
with the emergency rule situation and village evacuations in causing migration among 
the rural Kurdish communities. It was not until towards the end of 1990s that the 
general Turkish public, media and politicians began to see that many metropolitan 
problems such as poverty, deteriorating slums, increasing crime rate and ‘street 
children61’ in the western cities such as Istanbul, Bursa and Izmir originated from the 
impact of the armed conflict on the Kurdish rural population in the southeastern and 
eastern provinces.    
Work done by a few researchers on the recent (after 1980s- conflict-
related/involuntary/mass migration) and previous (before 1980s-  
                                                 
61 Although these children are known as ‘street children’ in Turkish public, majority of them are 
working children living with their families. Interview with Yurdusev Özsökmenler, Mayor of the 
Bağlar subdistrict under the jurisdiction of the Diyarbakir Metropolitan Center. Also see TBMM-




economic/voluntary/individual and/or chain migration) migrant communities in 
Istanbul is outstanding in sketching the differences between these two groups of 
migrant communities in socio-economic, demographic and ethnic characteristics, in 
their survival strategies and in their ability to integrate into the urban setting (Erder 
1995, 1996, 1998). This strand of research suggested that the new phenomenon was 
demonstrating the socio-economically destructive implications of the lack of rural-
urban ties whilst in the past there had been a constant rural-urban connection to 
facilitate the socio-economic survival of the migrant communities in the cities and of 
their relatives left behind in the ‘village’. As Erder (1998:235) notes “[t]he village has 
had a very important function in the urbanization pattern of the poor.”62 In the course 
of the armed conflict, this important backup system collapsed.   
According to Bugra and Keyder (2006), rural-urban connection was one of the 
major social safety nets available for urban migrant communities until 1980s, which 
had compensated for the deficiencies of “inegalitarian corporatist” welfare regime. 
Starting from 1980s, a part of neo-liberal economic restructuring, both importance of 
the agricultural produce and the leverage of the peasants in politics declined 
substantially. Small peasants lost significant state-sponsored welfare schemes “in the 
context of comprehensive policies changing the way the state related to the 
agricultural sector mainly through revoking various programmes of agricultural input 
                                                 




subsidy and output price support” (Buğra and Keyder 2006). Indeed, collapse of the 
rural-urban ‘synergy’ during the post-1980 period was not limited to the conflict-
induced forced migrant communities, but rather a systemic phenomenon undermining 
one of the major social safety nets available for the migrant groups in urban centers 
for whom there has been so far no systematic formal welfare provision 
counterweighing their lost rural survival mechanisms. 
Moreover, during the course of the violence, displaced population mostly 
arranged their migration patterns based on their concerns with finding a secure place 
and an immediate shelter. Although, they also relied on family and kin living in city 
centers in deciding where to go and how to settle, traditional family and kinship 
networks in the cities became less capable of accommodating the new comers who 
tended to be larger in number including women, children and elderly. In turn, 
supportive family and kin relations collapsed too leaving the displaced population 
without any traditional social safety net available. Those kin-based social safety nets 
had previously helped incoming migrants to integrate into the urban class structure 
filtering them through the socio-economic channels of stratification and integrating 
them with the urban society and economy (Erder 1998). Without those informal 
integrative measures, social exclusion has aggravated among the migrant 
communities and poverty has turned into an intra and inter-generational chronic 
situation (This was a non-transitional ‘new poverty’ situation as opposed to the 




has a specific focus on Turkey’s southeastern region and is based on my six months 
fieldwork in the largest provincial center in the region, Diyarbakir. I empirically 
and/or intuitively support my analysis with my observations in neighboring provinces 
including Van.  
SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY: THE CASE OF DIYARBAKIR 
You will not have any difficulty with finding migrants to interview. Here in 
Diyarbakir, everybody is a migrant. The native urban population is gone. 
(Migrant Interview, Diyarbakir, summer-fall, 2004) 
The analysis in the rest of this dissertation is based on my field research in the 
sectors of Diyarbakir metropolitan center with high migrant concentration. Diyarbakir 
has culturally and historically significant position and geographical location. During 
the Ottoman times, the city was an important trade and administrative center (Acun 
2002). Throughout time, Diyarbakir has preserved its central position in the southeast, 
particularly its being a center of Kurdish culture and of pro-Kurdish politics since 
1980s. Especially after the takeover of the metropolitan municipality by the pro-
Kurdish party in 1999 and concomitantly increasing democratic tolerance towards 
practicing Kurdish culture in Turkey; there has occurred a cultural revival in 
Diyarbakir. Supported by the basic premises of the Kurdish identity politics; Kurdish 
culture, language and folklore have become a new face of the city. Ironic with the 
limited resources of the municipality, between 1999 and 2006, Diyarbakir’s pro-
Kurdish municipality has spent million dollars on historical reconstruction, cultural 




landmarks representing the ‘non-Turkish’ aspects of the city (see also Gambetti, 
2007).   
Contrasting with its newly polished cultured face, many corners of Diyarbakir 
provincial center display an urban catastrophe. The metropolitan population of the 
province has been one of the most rapidly growing provincial center populations in 
Turkey starting from 1990s, characterized by spreading squatter neighborhoods 
outward the city center and increasing visibility of urban poverty. Diyarbakir 
provincial center witnessed in-migration from the rural areas of the province as well 
as from the neighboring provinces. There also reported substantial out-migration from 
Diyarbakir to the southern and western cities, and probably to Europe (TMMOB, 
1998). The upper and middle classes including the educated and artisan groups started 
to migrate to the western cities with the start of the conflict, undermining the urban 
culture in the city center. During the course of the armed conflict, population of the 
Diyarbakir provincial center is estimated to have been quadrupled despite out-
migration (Aker et.al 2005). Together with the increasing urban population, poverty 
and unemployment have reached to unprecedented levels (Census Data, see Table 1 
in Appendix).   
In 2000, the total population of Turkey was 67.8 million; the provincial 
population of Diyarbakir was 1.4 million; the 10th in population vice among 81 
provinces in Turkey. Again, according to the 2000 census data statistics, urban 




545,983 people were living within the official borders of the Diyarbakir metropolitan 
center in 2000, where the fieldwork for this research was conducted. Official 
unemployment rate was 14.2 percent in the province, the unemployment rate in the 
provincial metropolitan center was over 30% (DIE-Census 2000), though unofficial 
records and pro-Kurdish municipality estimates for unemployment were much higher 
in 2004 when I was on the field63. Again, according to municipal sources, 
unemployment rate in Diyarbakir city center was between 60-70 percent in 200664.   
Central governments have been either unwilling or due to the military rule 
unable to intervene to provide housing, monetary compensation, educational and 
health provisions for the incoming migrant groups in the cities. Incoming conflict-
induced migrant groups have been mingled with the other segments of the urban poor 
and earlier waves of economic migrants making it complicated to distinguish between 
forced and economic migrants. International humanitarian NGOs and the interested 
international community have not been given access to southeastern Turkey to help 
displaced population. The burden of the conflict-induced migrations has mostly fallen 
on the shoulders of the local governments that are not technically and financially 
equipped to deal with the phenomenon of rapid impoverishment, infrastructural 
deterioration and joblessness in urban slums65.   
                                                 
63 Interview with Yurdusev Özsökmenler  
64 Interview with Osman Baydemir, Radikal 
65 In a conference on ‘internally displaced persons in Turkey’ in Istanbul in 2004, Diyarbakir’s mayor 




In the second half of 1990s, a few national NGOs including the Chamber of 
Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) released reports on the urban 
consequences of the armed conflict, and rural to urban migration in southeastern 
urban provincial centers including Diyarbakir and Van66. These reports pointed out 
that southeastern provincial centers such as Diyarbakir and Van had been going 
through a ‘ruralization’ process as a result of the urban centers’ inability to absorb the 
rural conflict-induced migrant communities (see for example, the ‘Research within 
the Scope of the province of Diyarbakır, on the Social Problems originating at 
Regional Forced Migration’ prepared by the TMMOB-Chamber of Turkish Engineers 
and Architects Association).  
Social exclusion and marginalization rather than integration have 
characterized the nature of experiences of the recent migrant communities in 
Diyarbakir. Housing has been an alarming problem in the city since 1990s. In face of 
the shortage of public land to capitalize on, new migrants moved to outskirts of the 
city center into neighborhoods with no infrastructure and meaningful interaction with 
the city center. Local authorities (municipality and state-appointed local governor) 
did/could provide very limited assistance to the conflict-induced migrants in terms of 
housing/accommodation. However, because of lack of systematic state aid and local 
resources to allocate for displaced people, local authorities have been compelled to be 
                                                                                                                                           
by the local governments rather than the central government as the central government was not willing 
to deal with the consequences of the forced migration. 




tolerant of the informal housing in the provincial city center during the conflict years. 
This local tolerance towards informal construction with sometimes humanitarian 
concerns led to irregular housing units including several floor apartment buildings 
without any safety inspection and adequate infrastructure. According to a recent 
report submitted to the European Parliament by the Diyarbakir mayor, there were at 
least 10,000 illegal housing units in Diyarbakir metropolitan center accommodating 
about 80,000 people in 200567.  
Mushrooming shantytowns attached to the city centers are common housing 
patterns, which look like isolated villages with no asphalt roads, no sewage systems, 
no running water in homes and livestock living side by side with humans. Indeed, 
there had been a years-long culture of shantytowns (gecekondu-built in one night) in 
urban centers in Turkey before 1980s starting from 1960s. However, those informal 
migrant residences had been very well integrated into the urban culture in migrant 
receiving city centers such as Istanbul, Bursa and Izmir in 1960s and 1970s. As Bugra 
and Keyder (2006) argue this previous form of shantytowns in Turkey were 
substantially different than their counterparts in most abject conditions in Latin 
American countries and the other developing countries.   
Shantytowns provided an important type of social and economic asset for the 
migrants up until 1980s. Informal housing was available to majority of the incoming 
                                                 





migrants in the form of public land that its informal expropriation by the migrant 
citizens was seen legitimate for the public and political authorities. Informal housing  
also provided ‘wealth, income and security’ for the migrants as they used the 
peripheral areas as farm land, rented their apartments to the new migrants and moved 
themselves up within the urban social hierarchy. Kurdish economic migrants had also 
benefited from this earlier form of housing opportunities available in the western 
metropolitan cities (Buğra and Keyder 2003, 2006).  
After 1980s, together with the increasing salience of neo-liberal restructuring 
especially in metropolitan centers (Diyarbakir has just started to be a part of this 
process owing to the substantial reduction in the violence since 1998); new migrant 
communities lost their edge in the informal housing market due to commercialization 
of the public land by the globalizing business sector and increasing political 
intolerance towards informal housing. In 1990s, the term gecekondu has been 
replaced by the term ‘Varoş’ (referring to gettohization); while gecekondu would 
indicate a degree of social inclusion and integration with the urban socio-economics, 
the Varoş refers to social exclusion as well as marginalization (Ayata 1996, Etöz 
1999). Based on this last point, it is possible to say that rural-urban forced migrations 
in Diyarbakir during the conflict years developed in compliance with the term Varoş 
rather than gecekondu since the urban socio-economic structure was never able to 




I should however note that in the case of the western provinces such as 
Istanbul, in addition to poverty and social exclusion, the Varoş also signifies ethno-
religious fragmentation in the city. In this respect, Varoş is the target of hostility 
coming from the rest of the urban population since it is seen as the source of poverty, 
crime, drugs, prostitution and all the other urban ‘diseases’ associated with ‘ethno-
religious’ identities of its residents. The Diyarbakir case is analytically different than 
those cases of western Turkey in such that the southeastern province including its 
metropolitan center is quite homogenous in ethno-religious terms. Also, urban 
problems are much more severe but also ubiquitous all around the city center as 
opposed to the concentration of poverty, crime and illegal activities in certain sectors 
of the urban space in western cities like Istanbul and Bursa.  
In western metropolitan centers like Istanbul, the problems of Varoş are 
tended to be perceived in terms of individual and/or group ‘inability’ and/or 
‘immorality’ rather than as consequences of distorted functioning of recently changed 
urban politics and economy that excluded the ethno-religiously distinct migrant 
groups from the urban opportunities. In Diyarbakir, the local population is rather 
politically oriented in their evaluating the urban problems as structural problems 
associated with the war, the state neglect and ethnic-based oppression. Migrant 
groups in Diyarbakir in turn seem to be feeling less discriminated against and 
systematically secluded in comparison to the Kurdish migrant groups in western city 




economically more fragmented western city centers, social tension between the Varos 
and the rest of the city is considerably higher and analytically different than the 
relations between the squatter settlements and the rest of the city in Diyarbakir. 
Considering the general national picture, Diyarbakir by itself stands like a Varoş of 
Turkey in the perception of the general Turkish public as the source of the migration 
of the impoverished masses and substance-addicted street children as well as of drug 
trafficking, child prostitution etc.     
The impact of conflict has transformed the physical appearance as well as the 
social fabric of the city drastically. Despite deteriorating transformation of the 
provincial center, there is a small business class and middle class in Diyarbakir whose 
existence is most apparent in emerging sub-urban neighborhoods as well as in newly 
built shopping malls, supermarkets, movie theaters, business centers, shick 
restaurants and hotels in the city center. It is the upper and middle classes in the city 
that are integrating into recently penetrating global economic restructuring, while the 
majority of the Diyarbakir population remains economically and spatially 
marginalized from the limited modern face of the city.     
Spatial Distribution of Forced Migrants in the City 
Two types of population mobility marked the changing spatial face of 
Diyarbakir in 1990s; inward mobility of the incoming migrant groups and outward 




buildings. 68 While, modern looking suburban neighborhoods for middle and upper 
classes emerged away from the city centers, thousands of forced migrants coming 
into the provincial center also settled on available land outside of the city center since 
the city was not physically able to absorb the entire migrant population.69  While 
migrants with previous ties and/or relatives in the city managed to move into 
relatively central neighborhoods such as Sur and Bağlar; the most vulnerable forced 
migrant groups were left with the peripheral neighborhoods such as Aziziye. The later 
has remained socio-economically isolated with rural-urban hybrid faces and a 
population representing the most vulnerable segments of the urban poor as well as the 
displaced population. These marginal migrant neighborhoods also suffer lack of 
infrastructure and social services much more seriously than the inner city 
neighborhoods, which have relatively better sewage systems, roads and the advantage 
of being in close proximity to social services such as health clinics, schools and 
administrative bodies.  
 
 
                                                 
68 In addition to the marginal migrant neighborhoods, there are also newly constructed modern 
neighborhoods away from the city center occupied by the socio-economically better of segments of the 
urban population who leave the overcrowded city center. See also for example, Bölgeiçi Zorunlu 
Göçten Kaynaklanan Toplumsal Sorunlarin Diyarbakır Kenti Ölçeğinde Araştirilmasi, TMMOB, 
1998.   
69 Interviews with the Mayor of Bağlar Municipality in July 2004. Many of the migrant interviewees in 
the marginal (peripheral) neighborhoods such as Aziziye Mahallesi stated that their houses were 





Subdistrict Populations based on 2000 Census Data and Distribution of Interviews 
across the Subdistricts 
 
Current Place                      Population Based on         # of Interviews      
Of Residence                         2000 Census                     with ‘forced*’     
                                                                                             migrants               
Bağlar  
(Metropolitan 
Subdistrict-MS)                           291,098                              39                   
Sur (MS)                                         91,680                                19                   
Yenişehir (MS)                              163,205                               25                   
Rural (Hazro&Egil) 
(Permenately                                                                              2   
returned) 
Mardin, Adana & 
İstanbul                                                                                      5 
TOTAL  
(Metropolitan Center)                   545,983                                90                  
Diyarbakir Province                   
(Subdistirct+District+Village)   1,362,708                             90                  
* ‘Forced’ and ‘Voluntary/Economic’ Migrants are self-defined 
Recently emerged peripheral neighborhoods with forced migrant 
concentration have received economic migrants in 1990s as well70 (also see 
TMMOB 1998). Shabby apartment buildings of the inner city neighborhoods are 
replaced by one floor cells made up with carton and plywood in these marginalized 
surrounding neighborhoods with migrant concentration. My interviews conducted and 
my talks with the residents in Aziziye revealed that majority of the houses were 
                                                                                                                                           
the interviews that the displaced who settled in ‘gecekondus’ were not able to afford to rent apartments 
in more central neighborhoods.  




informal (which the residents called gecekondu). Those housing units located at the 
peripheries of the city center; were in the worse condition I saw in Diyarbakır. 
Plywood and plastic materials that they are made up with, according to the residents, 
did not prevent cold and wind coming into houses during the severe Diyarbakir 
winters.  
Table-2  
Causes of Migration stated in ‘Forced’ Migrant Interviews (Self-Defined)  
 
                                   Year of Migration 
 Primary Causes Stated           Before 1984**            !984-1990            1991-2000 
Oppression/Armed violence 
From TSF                                          9                               12                         61 
Violence from VGs                           2                                6                          17 
Having family members 
among the PKK guerilla/militia        3                                4                          19 
Fear of PKK attacks                           -                                3                           4 
Fear of Hezbullah                               -                                1                           8 
Economic Factors*                            5                                2                          22 
TOTAL                                             9                               13                         68     = 90
   TSF-Turkish Security Forces 
   VG-Village Guards 
   *In the interviews where economic factors are stated among the primary reasons for 
migration, subsequent village evacuation and destruction, blockage to village visits by the 
TSF, VG obstruction of seasonal access to property are stated. These are the major reasons 
why these people consider themselves ‘forced’ migrants (‘Biz göçtürüldük/göçer 
edildik’/we have been turned into migrants, we were made migrants) rather than voluntary.  
 **I should note that displacement is not a one-time act of uprootedness. This table aims to 
clarify and simplify the causes of displacement that are way more complicated than 
presented here. People’s experiences with displacement (for example whether displacement 
was an individual, family, en mass phenomenon), ties with the original places of residence 
(for example whether people kept intermittent ties, regular ties, no ties at all) and/or any 
other nature of displacement process (for example whether people served as village guards, 
then quit and displaced and/or whether they displaced several times) vary considerably 
from one interview to another. Diversity and complication of the displacement accounts are 
not adequately captured in this table.  




FROM RURAL TO URBAN POVERY 
Based on the data I gathered, it is safe to argue that displaced Kurds have been 
driven away from rural poverty to different forms of urban poverty, deprivation and 
exclusion. The former was what they were familiar with and more capable of dealing 
with. The latter represents a situation in which they were caught up unexpectedly and 
with which they do not know how to deal. For example, settling down in the city has 
immersed the migrant communities in cash transactions with social needs requiring 
cash; they have to buy food that once they used to grow for their own consumption 
and many displaced families have to pay rent for apartments. New forms of poverty 
have emerged as food insecurity/food poverty71 is one of the most serious and widely 
stated problems. This is something that many migrant families faced for the first time 
after displacement that may imply that food poverty in Turkey is mostly a product of 
1990s.  
However, at this point, it is important to juxtapose previous and current socio-
economic situation of the displaced Kurds. Despite deterioration in their socio-
economic well-being, a close look at the previous socio-economic circumstances 
reveals some of the major rural problems that the forced migrant population was 
struggling with in their areas of origin; that might be overlooked especially when 
NGO research tend to romanticize the displaced Kurds’ original places of residence. 
                                                 
71 According to the Turkish state institute of statistics, food poverty rate in Turkey is 1.35 percent 




Pointing out the previous economic deprivation, Nusret, a landless peasant from a 
village within Diyarbakir’s rural provincial areas, stated  
We escaped from the war happening in front of our nose…..[but] we were 
going to leave the village anyway, we did not have any land. There was no 
employment for us in the village. We would send the sons to constructions... I, 
myself, would go with them time to time…in other times; we would work on 
the others’ land as laborer to feed our bellies (Migrant Interview, Diyarbakir, 
Fall 2004). 
Table-3  
Socio-economic Indicators on Rural Poverty/Deprivation BEFORE Migration 
 
  Infrastructre and Social Services 
Available in the Place of Origin  
Before Migration                                                               # of Interviews (out of 90) 
Working Primary School                                                          54 
Working Health Facility                                                           10 
Running water at home                                                             11 
Electricity                                                                                  12 
Asphalt Road to  
District center                                                                              8 
Rural economic activity 
Was NOT enough to survive                                                     35* 
 
*24 interviewees out of 35 stated that they and/or other household members would go to the 
western provincial centers to look for seasonal jobs including construction and agricultural 
work before they were uprooted from the original places of residence (predominately rural 
areas). The rest of the 11 interviewee stated that their economic production was limited to 
rural activities, they were too not satisfied with the economic life chances in the place of 
origin.  
 
Another interviewee, Muharrem, a relatively better off shop owner in 
Diyarbakir city center, whose village in the neighboring province Mardin was 




armed village guards against the PKK, put his feelings into the following ironic 
words:   
Sometimes, I think that it was the only good thing that the state did for us in 
our lives; it drove us out of the village that we would otherwise remain there 
stuck with poverty as we did not know how to get out. (Migrant Interview 
with Muharrem, Summer 2004) 
 
More than half of the interviewees (54 out of 90) stated that there was a 
working primary school within their close vicinity. When it comes to health services, 
only slightly more than 10 percent of the interviewees stated that there was a health 
service facility within their close vicinity (10 out of 90). While slightly more than 10 
percent of the interviewees indicated that there was running water in their residence 
(11 out of 90), almost all complained about the quality and cleanness of the drinking 
water.72 Also, only slightly more than 10 percent of the interviewees stated that there 
was electricity in their original places of residence (12 out of 90 in Diyarbakir 
interviews). Even less than 10 percent of the interviewees (8 out of 90) said that there 
was an asphalt road to district and/or city centers from their original places of 
residence. When I asked the interviewees whether or not they were satisfied with the 
output of their economic activities in their places of origin, many of them indicated 
that they were barely making ends meet and had to look for additional economic 
activities (24 out 90 interviews in Diyarbakir, see Table-3 for details). The answers to 
                                                 
72 In one of my trips to rural areas within the Diyarbakir provincial borders with TKV (Turkish 
Development Foundation) team on summer 2004, all three villages that we visited had good quality 
drinking water problems. The fact that the visited villages were relatively better-off villages with 




these questions actually contradict the displaced Kurds’ positive feelings and longing 
about the places they left behind.  
Interviews also revealed that there was substantial seasonal labor mobility 
between the original places of residence and the western metropolitan centers such as 
Istanbul and Bursa. Some young men looked for seasonal jobs in tourism, but the 
majority of the seasonal labors worked in construction sites before displacement 
especially in western cities as manual laborers. Sedat in his 50s gave an account 
similar to Nusret’s 
My sons have been working on the constructions in other cities. They have 
been away all the time. I used to go to work with them too. But then I would 
come back and take care of the farm in the village. After I brought my family 
here, we became even more desperate. Now, the farm is inaccessible. I started 
to work as a porter [hamal-manual carrier] here in Diyarbakir.   
On several occasions, interviewees mentioned that men would go to Diyarbakir to 
work as truck drivers in others’ trucks. Women would also engage in seasonal 
agricultural work in southern and western provinces including Adana (in the south) 
and Adapazari (in the west). This pattern of seasonal labor mobility in which the 
displaced population was involved before displacement has been also reported by 
recent NGO research done on Kurdish migrant communities in various provinces 
across Turkey (Aker et.al. 2006 and Kurban et.al 2006).  
Poverty vs. ‘New Poverty’  
With socio-economic underdevelopment and under the low intensity war 




migrants to integrate with either. As my interviews revealed, majority of the displaced 
Kurds look for temporary and/or seasonal economic opportunities and survival 
strategies outside of Diyarbakir since the job market in the city has already exhausted 
its meager limits. Not only the formal economy, but also informal economy is quite 
limited with lack of any dynamic industrial, manufacture or service-based sector. 
Economic migrations have been intermingled with conflict-induced Kurdish 
migrations in Diyarbakir as it has been the case for the other major provincial centers 
in the southeast and the rest of Turkey. However, during 1990s, conflict-induced 
nature of population mobility became the dominant pattern of migration into 
Diyarbakir city center with few socio-economic opportunities for the incoming 
migrant populations (see for example, TMMOB report, 1998; Ergil, 1995; Kongar, 
2000). On the other hand, the blurred line between economic and forced migrants in 
Diyarbakir remains as much an analytical challenge as it is for all forced migration 
research.  
Seasonal migration of men and seasonal agricultural migration of men and 
women continued after displacement. Heavy manual labor jobs in construction and 
agriculture are currently the most common seasonal jobs that the displaced families 
financially depend on. Many interviewed families currently have members seasonally 
or permanently living in the western cities, who contribute to the family economies 
through the cash they send back home. They are mainly the young single males 




When asked to which city they send the young male members to work, the answer 
most of the time starts with “wherever there is a job” then continues as “Istanbul, 
Bursa, Izmir, sometimes Adana...[They] live in baccalaureate houses-bekar evi with 
the others… They cannot even take a bath for months.” (Interview, July, 2004; 
Diyarbakir). Mehdi’s account points out the necessity of seasonal work and rural-
urban connection for survival of displaced families.    
My children go to the west to work on the farms. They used to do that when 
we were on the village too, because there was poverty. My daughter went to 
Istanbul with her husband before the village was burnt down. Her husband is a 
laborer, he works on the constructions… We have a small farm, but there has 
been no access to the village for years. We wanted to farm the soil 4 years 
ago, soldiers did not allow us to approach the village… 2 years ago, my 
brother went to the village one more time. He saw that everything was 
destroyed and there were nobody. There are still soldiers nearby the village, 
but they do not bother us anymore, we can now go there… We want to get 
some credit to farm… Yes it is a very small farm, but it is still something for 
us. I want to farm the soil during summers; I don’t want to stay there all the 
time (Interview with Mehdi, Fall 2004, Diyarbakir). 
As claimed by many, displacement was, in a substantial number of cases, not 
an abrupt act of thousands of people moving from rural to unknown urban places but 
rather an end process of an already started rural to urban mobility with a sudden 
disconnection from the rural under exceptional conflict circumstances. In the same 
vein, displacement not only refers to large number of involuntary migrants’ ending up 
in urban centers with no economic opportunities to start a new economic livelihood, 
but it also entails the collapse of traditional economic systems and the loss of 
traditional economic activities for an indefinite time period due to a systematic 




In most of the cases, displacement was not unexpected but rather something 
that people knew that would happen sooner or later. In many evacuations, rural 
communities were given an advance notice to vacate the villages within a certain time 
period.  In some cases, they left the village gradually during the given time span. 
Some of them waited until the moment that the Turkish security forces went to the 
villages to evacuate. On many occasions however, people state multiple causes of 
displacement including oppression by the security forces, pressure to join the village 
guards, pressure from the neighboring village guard communities and/or pressure 
from the PKK guerilla and militia not to join the village guards etc.   
Several interviewees, who migrated to Diyarbakir in the early 1980s with an 
intention to keep their ties with their villages and small farm land, identified 
themselves as first ‘economic’ migrants coming to the provincial center to find new 
jobs and then ‘forced’ migrants after the start of the armed conflict. With the start of 
the armed conflict in 1984, they lost their access to farm land and crops in their places 
of origin, -which they would access seasonally- as these areas were evacuated and 
turned into forbidden zones (yasak bölge); upon ‘losing their villages’ they have 
themselves turned into ‘forced’ migrants. Nazlıgül who migrated to Diyarbakir in 
1980 said 
We decided to come to Diyarbakir… My husband was sharing a piece of land 
with his brothers and father. It was not enough for anyone. He wanted to find 
a job in Diyarbakir. We kept going to the village during summers for about 8 
years to farm the soil… In 1992, the village was evacuated and burnt down by 
the soldiers. We are not able to farm the land for years… Now they say that it 




has turned into stones... you need to work hard to bring the soil back to its 
previous condition. We have no money to do that. (Interview with Nazlıgül, 
Diyarbakir, Fall 2004) 
These previous ‘economic migrants’ have actually found themselves turned 
into ‘forced migrants’ as their access to a socio-economic backup was cut off and as 
one family started to financially support their relatives who started to live with them 
after the villages were evacuated. Sevilay73 noted her parents’ and parent-in-laws’ 
experience with displacement as:       
I came to Diyarbakir when I got married to my husband. He had a job here… 
[Later on] his village got evacuated. His parents came to live with us. Couple 
of years after that, my village [meaning her original village before she got 
married] was evacuated partially, some families left including my father(s) 
[meaning her parents and brothers]. (Interview with Sevilay, Diyarbakir, 
Summer, 2004) 
Indeed, displacement in many occasions has been a process rather than a one-
time happening and has had spillover impacts in terms of urban poverty, affecting 
earlier migrant communities that still had socio-economic ties with the rural areas as 
well as their family members back home. Majority of the displaced Kurds had to and 
currently need to combine urban and rural economic activities to survive at a 
minimum subsistence standard. What is detrimental for many forced migrants is the 
fact that rural communities who had developed survival strategies combining rural  
                                                 
73 Sevilay is one of the few ‘economic migrants’ that I conducted brief unstructured interviews in 
Diyarbakir. I met her in a municipality-run laundry house when I was conducting an interview with a 
‘forced migrant’ woman. Sevilay defined herself as ‘we are not like them’ trying to make a clear 
distinction between herself (her family) and the ‘displaced’ woman that I had just interviewed. 




and urban economic activities before migration through seasonal jobs in the 
construction sector, industrial agriculture in Western Turkey or tourism sectors in the 
coastal regions of Turkey end up in the urban centers with no ties with their rural 
livelihoods and most of the time are unable to create a permanent urban socio-
economic subsistence.  
Table-4  
CURRENT Economic activity in Diyarbakir and availability of access to rural 
economic activity 
                                                                                                   Interviewee                   
                                                                                          
Seasonal farming on their own farm            13                                   
State Employee                                                                               3                                 
Retired*                                                                                            2                                
Small Shop owner                                                                           8                                 
Seasonal Cons. Laborer**                                                             15                                
Seasonal farm Laborer**                                                                3                                 
Porter (manual carrier)**                                                                5                                 
Street Seller**                                                                                 6                                 
Driver**                                                                                           1                                 
Works at a shop, restaurant, Coffee shop**                                   4                                 
Manufacture  worker**                                                                   2                                
Municipality worker                                                                        4                                
Work at home (handcraft) & Domestic labor**                             5                                 
Doesn’t look for jobs                                                                      23                               
Unemployed (presently)                                                                  9                                
Children working on street***                      8                                                    
TOTAL                                                                                           90 
+In some cases, interviewees indicated more than one economic activity engaged temporarily 
and/or seasonally. This table tends to simplify the general picture 
*This implies regular monthly retirement pension for previous state employees  
** These occupations, generally speaking, refer to irregular employment and/or 
underemployment.  
***This is the number of interviewees who stated that there were children in the household 
working as primary or secondary income generators. Child labor tends to be underreported 






Proportion of Employed Population by Economic Activity based on 2000 Census 
               (Diyarbakir Metropolitan Center) 
                                                        Male                          Female                Total Pop. 
Labor Force  
Participation                                 %59                               %11                           
Agriculture                                   %2                                  %3  
Service                                         %76                                %89 
Industry                                        %11                                %8 
Construction                                 %11                                   - 
Unemployed                                 %27.7                            %44.6                   %30.3 
 




Displaced Women in Resource and Income Creation 
 
 
Doesn’t work                                                     22 
Domestic cleaner                                                4 
Seasonal farm worker  
(on others farm)                                                  2 
Works for municipality  
(cleaning)                                                            2                                            
Handcraft at Home                                              3* 
Sales worker                                                        1 
(Textile) workshop worker                                  1 
TOTAL  #  women interviewed                       34 
*One of the three also works for the municipality 
 
As new needs and new forms of deprivation appeared, many migrant families 
remained unable to find support and develop economic survival strategies in 
Diyarbakir provincial center. This is not only a consequence of structural joblessness 




sometimes unwillingness of displaced population to embrace a new life style that they 
are not familiar with. The mayor of a sub-district under the jurisdiction of Diyarbakir 
metropolitan municipality stated that involuntary migrants could not be involved in 
productive urban economic activities; first because, “they do not know how to be 
urban entrepreneurs”, second “they are not interested in becoming urban 
entrepreneurs”. She noted that 
These are rural people, they are peasants, they do not know how to live in 
cities, neither are they interested in learning the urban culture. The simple 
example is that they never lived in apartment buildings before, now they do. 
They did not do anywork other than peasantry before, now they need to find 
out economic survival strategies in the city… [T]hey think about their village, 
and possibilities to go back. This hinders people’s willingness to integrate into 
the city. (Interview with Yurdusev Özsökmenler, the Mayor of Bağlar, 
affiliated with the pro-Kurdish party DEHAP, subdistrict, Diyarbakir, summer 
2004)   
On the one hand, the mayor’s evaluation of the displaced population has some 
political overtones. It has turned into a political strategy for the organized Kurdish 
groups to put an emphasis on ‘return’ in order to keep the image of destitute ‘Kurdish 
homeland’ alive- which is discussed in the upcoming chapters in terms of the 
politicization of the discourse of ‘migration’ by the pro-Kurdish politicians. The 
discourse of ‘return to homeland’ is therefore actively exploited by the pro-Kurdish 
actors despite the contradictory research results that have shown that the majority of 
the displaced is unwilling to permanently return (Aker et.al. 2006 My interview data 
also support the argument that displaced Kurds tend to prefer to stay in city centers). 




poverty and unemployment among them, many displaced Kurds wish to stay in the 
urban center permanently for various reasons ranging from previous poverty in the 
original places of residence to the fear of re-displacement (the general tendency is 
however, to re-establish ties with rural areas left continuing to stay in the current 
place of residence-this I discuss below).  
On the other hand, the mayor’s statement is still important to explicate. 
Despite the general willingness to stay in the current place, socio-economic 
integration of displaced migrants with the city remains a challenge since many of 
them lack access to urban jobs and displaced still tend to perceive their main possible 
economic activity as farming. Currently, there is a public center in the neighborhood 
of 450 Evler, working under the state's ‘Social Services Administration” (Sosyal 
Hizmetler Müdürlüğü), providing supplementary high school courses for the youth, 
literacy classes for women and regular food aid to residents. The entire neighborhood 
is occupied by forced migrants from the same provincial town of Lice that was 
evacuated almost completely in early 1990s. In collaboration with the Diyarbakir 
Chamber of Trade, the center also provides work opportunities to the interested 
residents including a market-oriented ‘Silkworm breeding’ business in which there 
has been almost no interest since the starting of the project. The public center director 
told me that the residents claimed that they were not familiar with the job. The 
center’s female director upset with the residents stated  
I tell them that they will earn much more if they start doing this work. We 




final product. The only thing they need to do is to feed the silkworm at certain 
times a day. We even provide the leaves to feed the worm. No investment 
necessary, no risk associated. But they prefer to go to Adapazari74 to work 
under the sun on somebody else’s farm as laborers. Because this is what they 
know and what they are accustomed to do (Director, 450 Evler Public Center, 
Interview, fall 2004). 
In this respect, migrants who used to work on the farm in rural areas try to use 
the same methods to deal with the new circumstances. The new urban poverty in 
which they have been caught up is a structural challenge against which they are not 
capable of finding and/or creating economic survival strategies. Lack of social 
support nets as a consequence of distorted family relations in the aftermath of the 
armed conflict, displacement and loss of family members further contribute to the 
socio-economic vulnerabilities of the displaced. Children working on the street as 
petty sellers and garbage collectors have turned into one of the most important cash 
resources for many displaced families. Exploitation of child labor has emerged as one 
of the major urban problems caused by conflict-induced migrations not only in 
Diyarbakir but also in western cities such as Istanbul and Bursa (Aker et.al. 2006). 
Together with urbanized child labor; a significant increase has been reported in other 
forms of related social problems in Diyarbakir, including drug abuse among children, 
child trafficking and child prostitution. According to the 2003 statistics released by 
the Social Services and Child Protection Administration, there were then about 
30,000 children working on the street in Diyarbakir. About half of them were 
                                                 




substance addicts75. Displacement has brought impoverishment, and impoverishment 
in turn has increased various other social risks particularly among children and 
women.  
Hanging on with Relatives   
Particular destination decisions were based on the social networks and/or 
economic relations established with certain locations before displacement. Displaced 
groups with previous linkages with Diyarbakir have settled down in more central 
neighborhoods. Some of them had already bought the apartments in which they 
currently live when they were in the village. Some of them had a close family 
member having a temporary or permanent residence in Diyarbakir before the entire 
family got uprooted. Many conflict-induced migrants have tended to settle down 
close to their relatives and fellow villagers. The general pattern is extended family 
formations with more than one nuclear family living together including the parents, 
children, married male children with wives and children, the elderly and sometimes 
the widowed with children. In some cases, throughout time, some extended families 
have scattered across the city and away from their previous social networks. As two 
migrants noted  
When we first came, we moved in with my uncle and his family. They already 
had an apartment in Diyarbakir center. We lived all together for about three 
years. Then we moved out from their place…    
 
                                                 
75 According to the Parliamentary Commission on street children, half of the entire street children in 




We were five brothers when we came to the Diyarbakir center. We lived 
together for a while, later on, two of my brothers moved out to their own 
apartments. But they still live in the same neighborhood.   
Lack of systematic assistance programs for displaced communities and urban 
poor and the incompetence of the social service provisions for marginalized social 
groups leave the informal channels of support such as kinship networks and neighbors 
as the only resources that people can mobilize for assistance. Still, kinship and 
familial relations most of the time fall short in meeting the needs of the displaced 
families.  
 
My family did not become village guards, so that we left… We had relatives 
in Diyarbakir… we came here and stayed all together… I go to work on 
constructions with my sons, my brother and his sons. It is always good to be 
close to the relatives even if they cannot help you a lot. 
My villagers are in a desperate situation. Most of them work as laborers and 
[manual carriers] porters [Hamal]. They would help us if they could, but 
under these difficult circumstances, people barely feed their bellies. Nobody 
can help each other. 
Despite their pessimism, displaced Kurdish families tend to keep their ties 
with extended family networks as well as with fellow villagers. Losing those social 
relations are seen as endangering the social, cultural and emotional well-being of the 
family members.  
Despite everything that happened to us, we need to stand together as relatives 
and support each other as much as we could. 
We [the former villagers] are all scattered around Diyarbakir. But we try to 
come together at least in the weddings and funerals to be together to share the 




My siblings are the only people that I can depend on. We all try to do our best 
for each other.  
We barely survive with the help of the neighbors. 
My uncle bought us this apartment. Without him, we would be on the street. 
Everybody knows that they cannot expect any help from the others. People 
around us are all desperate. But at the end of everything, I know that it is my 
relatives that I can turn to if there is an emergency situation.   
Table-6  
Active and Potential Resources Available for the Displaced Families to mobilize for 
Survival 
Financial, food and social assistance to rely on                               Interviewees 
 
Kinship Networks*                                                                                      58 
Neighbors                                                                                                      6 
 
Municipality                                                                                                 12 
DEHAP-‘the party’                                                                                      15 
NGOs** 
(Migrants’ Association,  
Human Rights Association, 
Bar Association,  
Women’s organizations etc)                                                                        27                             
Monthly Salary 
(Social Security& 
Retirement Fund)                                                                                          5 
Temporary social assistance 
(Social Solidarity Fund,  
Poverty Fund)                                                                                               12 
ECHR***                                                                                                      28 
 TOTAL                                                                                                        90 
 
*8 interviewees particularly stated that their family members living separately would send 
them money on a more or less regular basis. These are predominately brothers and sons living 
in Istanbul, Izmir, Germany and Sweden (except in one case where the financial supporter 
was the married daughter of the family).  
**These are the NGOs mainly providing legal assistance for the displaced. In few cases, 
interviewees stated that they received food and monetary assistance from the Migrants’ 
Association.  







Socio-Economic Vulnerabilities  
 
     Insecurities  stated in interviews                           
Unemployment/ 
Underemployment / 
Joblessness                                           49                   
Food insecurity                                    34                    
Lack of Access to 
Health services & medicine                 52                    
Housing                                                 51                   
Relatives cannot help                           33                   
Inability to send  
the children to school                            27 
Increase in problems  
among the family members  
(including domestic violence)               11 
 
TOTAL                                                     90 
 
 
Kinship networks were particularly important to displaced Kurds during their 
first settling in Diyarbakir, two or three nuclear families tended to came together to 
support each other as they previously would do especially in rural areas and villages. 
Many however, reported that the extended families with more than two brothers and 
parents together had to split up over the years, find their own housing and figure out 
their own economic survival strategies. Interestingly, the main reason for splitting up 
was given as impoverishment and the collective inability to accommodate large 
number of people together. Samet 34 year old displaced migrant previously living 
with his brother noted that he and his brother would look for jobs together and work 




before displacement. “He would find a job and I would go with him; I would find a 
job and he would go with me. We came to Diyarbakir and moved in together… After 
a while, we were desperate, [there were] no jobs anywhere… we realized that we 
were no use to each other… our suffering grew not diminish as we tried to cling on 
each other…My wife and I decided to move out taking our children with us…We 
could not go far away, we are still in the same neighborhood.” Kin relations seem to 
maintain their social and cultural importance for the displaced migrants; however, 
they do not provide a meaningful support system anymore. Despite the declining 
salience of supportive kinship relations, about 2/3 of the displaced interviewed 
indicated that kinship networks were the primary source of informal social security 
that they could rely on when they needed.  
Accommodating the Displaced and Welfare State 
The displaced have had access to certain forms of social security and 
provisions together with other segments of the urban poor. About half of the 
displaced families I interviewed in Diyarbakir (44 out 90) had ‘Green Cards’ and/or 
family members with Green Cards that enable them to access free health care. About 
one third of the interviewees indicated that they received ‘annual direct income 
support to farmers’ at least once since they got displaced even if they did not use the 
income for agricultural production. While very few (5 out of 90) indicated that they 
had regular income in the form of social security and retirement funds for state 




temporary cash, food and fuel assistance from the state’s Social Assistance and 
Solidarity Fund (Sosyal Yardimlasma ve Dayanisma Fonu) and Poverty Fund (Fakir 
Fukara Fonu). A recently released extensive NGO research results have also revealed 
that  
Despite the lack of specific projects addressing the current conditions of the 
displaced, many IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons] have benefited from a 
number of nationwide programmes targeting the poorest segments of the 
Turkish population. Chief among these is the “green card” which provides 
free health care and medication76 to the poor; one time only food, fuel, 
clothing, stationary and cash grants given by the local chapters of the Social 
Aid and Solidarity Fund; bi-monthly conditional cash transfers to families 
who keep their children in school and have their vaccinations done regularly 
[World Bank financed project]; and annual direct income support to farmers 
independent of agricultural production. In addition, some social services have 
become available for IDP children working on the streets in Ankara, Istanbul 
and Diyarbakir in the past few years and their families have been enrolled in 
the above-mentioned conditional cash transfer programme. (TESEV report 
2006:27, parenthesis added by myself).       
The TESEV report further states that more than 3 million people in Turkey’s 
eastern and southeastern provinces have the ‘green card’ among a total of 10 million 
card holders across the nation. Considering the population distribution across regions 
as well as the population living in poverty in each region, the report notes that access 
to the green card is widespread in the conflict region as well as among the displaced 
Kurdish population. The same is also reported for the ‘annual direct income support 
to farmers’ that appears as an accessible income source for many displaced families 




land and in utilizing the income for productive economic activities (TESEV 2006, 
also see my discussion above in this chapter, p:19-20).    
There are however complications arising from the specific circumstances of 
the displaced population. Although, most of the interviewees indicated that they and 
their family members had identification cards, there was one occasion when the 
interviewee indicated that they were unable to receive the green card because the 
family members had lost their ID cards during displacement. This family was unable 
to renew their ID cards because they could not prove their residency. They needed to 
get their residency documents from the headman in their original place of residence; 
however, the headman was a village guard with whom they had a hostile relationship. 
Some resources and NGO reports also point out that displaced people have been 
unable to receive the ‘Green Card’ since they have lost their ID cards during 
displacement and have not renewed them due to their concerns over approaching state 
representatives including the headmen. (IDP Project, Norwegian Refugee 
Commission, 2004-5, Human Rights Watch Reports etc.). With regard to the direct 
agricultural income support, there are also problems. Due to poverty and lack of 
access to agricultural land, agricultural direct income support cannot be turned into 
productive agricultural activity and is spent for more immediate needs such as food, 
rent and paying off debt. Centralized social state benefits are therefore not adequate to  
                                                                                                                                           
76 In fact, Green Card is limited to the health care and does not cover medicine (see for example Buğra 




accommodate the most vulnerable segments of the poor. Not only the displaced 
population, but rather different social groups with specific vulnerabilities should be 
included in policy initiatives through specific arrangements.  
After the 2001 IMF-induced economic crisis, the Social Risk Mitigation 
Project (SRMP) was initiated by the state with financial support provided by the 
World Bank in order to reduce the burden of impoverishment falling on shoulders of 
growing number of rural and urban poor by providing social assistance; and therefore, 
to compensate for the declining capability of the central state to care for those masses. 
As noted by the TESEV report above, many displaced families and their children 
have been enrolled for the cash transfer programme under the jurisdiction of the 
SRMP. The micro-credit programme of Muhammed Yunus, aiming to encourage 
productive economic activities for poor masses and food banks to distribute free food 
stuff to the poor families were also initiated recently by the AKP government under 
the jurisdiction of the state’s social assistance fund-the Fund for the Encouragement 
of Social Cooperation and Solidarity.  
As Bugra and Keyder (2006) are inclined to see the social assistance practices 
as a new chance to reinforce rights-based perspective in social state, I am inclined to 
construe those practices as a poverty management, rather than a poverty reduction 
strategy. Indeed, available research shows that displaced Kurds (who constituted the 
rural poor before displacement) in Diyarbakir as well as in western centers such as 




as other segments of the urban poor. The concern arising is associated with the fact 
that social service provisions fall substantively short of covering the majority portion 
of the poor population and meeting the basic needs of the poor77. Indeed, processes of 
displacement have been intertwined with social, economic and political processes of 
rural and urban impoverishment in Turkey, which seem to be embedded in neo-liberal 
economic and political restructuring including urban transformation, and are difficult 
tackle with social policies solely.    
There is an imperative political implication associated with increasing poverty 
and declining social state. As the presence of the state in the citizens’ life disappears 
municipalities have become important social service providers across Turkey 
including the eastern and southeastern provinces such as Diyarbakir and Van. 
Municipalities have transformed their leverage over urban poor migrant communities 
into new forms of urban clientelism mainly developing concomitantly with 
institutionalization of religious and ethnic identities across Turkey through municipal 
government practices (I discuss this point in detail in the upcoming chapters).  
                                                 
77 As also evinced by my interview data, about half of the displaced did not have Green Card which 
does not even cover for medicine while more than half of the people interviewed indicated problems 
with accessing health services and medicine. Moreover, as I discuss later in detail, social provision 
distribution as well as allocation of social assistance funds are manipulated with political motivations 




Can We Go Back Home Now? Problems With Re-establishing Rural-Urban 
Linkages 
During my interviews, many displaced Kurds indicated that they were very 
well aware that the conflict was not over and that permanent return was not possible 
under present security concerns. The disbelief in peace and long-term security as well 
as the presence of the Kurdish village guards controlling most of the rural areas left 
behind has hindered displaced Kurds willingness to restart lives back home. In the 
perception of the many displaced “the intensity of the fighting has been diminished 
significantly, but the ‘struggle’ is not over yet” as stated by a migrant. Although more 
than half of the interviewees stated that they would like to have access to their home 
villages and rural property, very few would think of staying there permanently. The 
younger they are, the more willing they are to stay in Diyarbakir, to find a job, to send 
the children to school, to buy/rent a better house and/or to go to Istanbul and even to 
Europe etc. Lives, expectations, opportunities and demands as well as oppressions, 
repressions and exclusions are rearticulated by the displaced in a space between the 
past (village) and the harsh circumstances of the present. Displaced Kurds try to find 
out new and alternative ways and spaces to reassure their physical, social, economic 
and also political security. One displaced woman articulates well the conflict in which 
she is caught between her past, present and future.  
We did not have a regularly operating school or health center in the village. 
There was no running water at home... But the good thing was that we did not 
need money in the village for many things. We were able to meet all our basic 




struggling with hunger here. But still I do not want to go back to the village. I 
want to believe that everything will be better here in Diyarbakir and our 
situation will improve…if there will be schools, hospitals, roads in my village, 
if there will be peace and dignity then I may go back (Leyla, interview, 2004) 
With temporary ending of the armed conflict between the Kurdish guerilla and 
the Turkish security forces in 1999, the social and political situation in the region 
started to normalize. Certain ‘no go’ areas were opened to access. Many displaced 
Kurds started to visit their homes in the conflict zones for the first time after their 
displacement. There started new rural-urban connections as some of them started to 
rebuild their socio-economic livelihood back home. According to the official reports 
and statistics, a few thousand displaced people have already gone back home, though 
the actual size of the population permanently returned back is not recorded 
systematically (Aker et.al 2006).  
Access to places of origin seemed to improve the socio-economic well-being 
of many displaced families as they are now able to combine rural and urban type 
survival strategies such as working in the city centers to earn cash income and 
working in the rural area to meet the family’s food consumption. During a visit to a 
village within the Lice district of Diyarbakir, I met villagers who had permanently 
returned and ones who were in the village only seasonally (only summer time) since 
2001. At the time of my visit, there was a working primary school and a health center 
in the village. The village was at a providential location due to its proximity to the 




The village was evacuated in 1993. Between 1994 and 2001, there was still 
access to the village with strict security control that made it impossible for the 
villagers to stay and/or farm their plots. There happened no security harassment over 
the villagers since 2001, so some of the displaced villagers started to return 
permanently and some temporarily. The families staying temporarily told me that 
they were not financially able to rebuild their houses, which was the major reason for 
their inability to consider settling down in the village. During the summer time, they 
would stay in tents. One women, Meliha, from a seasonal family also mentioned that 
they had a very small plot of land that was not enough for the family’s survival for 
the entire year. Therefore, half of the family was still in Diyarbakir (mainly the male) 
and the other half (mainly the children and women) was in the village working the 
plot for some food produce to be preserved for winter. Meliha stated 
Certain things changed with displacement, certain things did not. My husband 
was a truck driver working in Diyarbakir before we got uprooted in 1993. 
Today, he is still a truck driver. But before he owned the truck, now he 
doesn’t have the truck anymore; we sold it after what happened [after they got 
displaced]. Previously, I would work in the village all the time and he would 
go away. Nowadays, I stay and work in the village during the summer and he 
still goes away to look for work (Interview with Meliha, fall 2004, anonymous 
village in Diyarbakir’s Lice district).  
Some village men that I talked to in the village’s only coffee house also 
indicated that the soil was in a bad shape after remaining idle for years. Şeyhmus, a 
middle-aged permanent villager stated “considering how little they get from the land, 
it is way too expensive for many people to try to recuperate the land.” Şeyhmus also 




been receiving from the state even during the time that they did not have access to 
their land.78  
Agricultural direct income support has been one of the major income sources 
for many displaced families over the years despite their inability to access the land 
and farm the land (in about 1/3 of the interviews, interviewees informed me that they 
had received agricultural income support at least once since they were displaced; also 
see a recent report on availability of the agricultural income support to the 
landowners in the southeast, TESEV 2006). However, there are problems mentioned 
in the interviews preventing people from accessing state support for the farmers. 
Peasants’ lack of official documentation to their land, commonness of land shared by 
multiple siblings and the changes in the legislation that do not consider forest area as 
farm land are some of the problems mentioned by the interviewees for not being able 
to benefit or effectively benefit from the support opportunity (The income support has 
                                                 
78 After a while in the coffee house, I could not help and asked Halis, another villager sitting next to 
me, about the expensive-looking suit that he was wearing, “‘is there a wedding coming up tonight’ I 
said. Halis started laughing and told me that it was the way he would dress most of the time. ‘We 
became very wealthy in the early years of 1990s. Then my father and I got arrested in the airport in 
Istanbul on our way to Germany’ he said. ‘Were you going to Germany for political asylum or what?’ I 
asked”. He gave me the answer that I was expecting the least; “‘No, no! Heroin trafficking!’ Halis said 
with a genuine naivety” that surprised me and my assistant. “He told me about the ‘factory’ nearby the 
village that they would produce heroin and traffic it from Lice to Europe during the 1990s. ‘We spent 
several years inside [jail]. The factory got destroyed by the Turkish army after a while. Now I am clean 
[off any illegal business]. This suit is from those old days’” he added.  (Excerpts from Fieldnotes 
September 14 2004, anonymous village in Lice district of Diyarbakir). Drug and human trafficking 
from and through Southeastern Turkey was common during the armed conflict years. As the local 
economy collapsed, many local people resorted to illegal economic activities that the PKK was also 
involved in (see for example Cagaptay,2005; also see Hasan Cemal 2003 for a journalistic account). 
Bozarslan (2000:22) also draws attention to “competition among military and security factions for 
economic resources, namely the drug trafficking and the black market, gave also birth to “privatized” 




been channeled through the Ministry of Agriculture in collaboration with the World 
Bank). Another issue raised during the interviews is the displaced families’ inability 
to effectively invest the agricultural income support into farm land for reasons 
including their lack of access to land and their tendency to spend the income for more 
immediate needs such as housing rent, children’s education, health expenses and food 
consumption. 
 A nostalgic ideal of returning back to the village is not generally prevalent 
among the displaced; but still they demand access to their property left behind in 
order to support their urban survival. What emerged from the interviews as a pattern 
is the debilitating impact of larger urban structures on people’s ability to be 
economically active as well as socially engaged in urban life. Some of the factors 
contributing to the displaced Kurds’ inability to cope with the urban are widespread 
unemployment and lack of economic opportunities to exploit in Diyarbakir, as well as 
lack of social support nets as a consequence of distorted family relations in the 
aftermath of the armed conflict, displacement and loss of family members. 
Considering both the obstacles for return and unwillingness of the displaced to go 
back; integration of those groups of people into where they are, arises as a problem of 
poverty, unemployment, lack of public investment and infrastructure and inadequacy 
of social services. These common urban problems have blurred the lines among 





In this chapter I have discussed the urban experiences of the displaced Kurds 
in relation to poverty, socio-economic deprivation, unemployment and changing 
social support systems. I would like to pinpoint two intertwined issues relevant to the 
discussion in this chapter. One is that in terms of their social, economic and political 
insecurity, displaced Kurds represent one of the most vulnerable social groups in 
Turkey in general and in the southeast in specific. Their previous experiences with 
poverty, marginalization, deprivation and social, economic and political oppression in 
their places of origin have been rearticulated, perpetuated and aggravated throughout 
the displacement process and aftermath of displacement.  
Displaced have serious socio-economic vulnerabilities such as 
unemployment/underemployment, food insecurity, and lack of social security in the 
presence of collapsing traditional social support networks. Abuse of children by the 
displaced families and their increasing dependence on child labor is reported by the 
present research as well as many other national and international CSOs. Gettoization 
and spatially excluded neighborhoods emerging on the outskirts of provincial centers 
bring about further problems of inadequate housing, social exclusion, lack of access 
to social services, increasing crime rate etc. All these urban problems should be 
conceptualized in relation to the displacement processes and specific vulnerabilities 




Nevertheless, considering the complications involved in distinguishing the 
displaced migrants from the economic ones during the course of the armed conflict, 
the question arises as how futile it might be to pick up a ‘displaced category’ out of a 
conflict-affected population when the impact of conflict extends beyond the displaced 
communities and even to the general Turkish society. In this respect, under conflict 
and emergency rule situations, it might be impossible to disentangle the economic 
and political reasons for migration and therefore to distinguish clearly the processes 
of ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ migrations.   
Moreover, the distinction drawn by the international community and national 
civil society organizations especially the human rights groups, between the displaced 
Kurds (perceived as the victim-currently constitute the urban poor) and the Kurdish 
village guards (perceived as the armed perpetrator cooperating with the Turkish 
army-remained still back in rural areas) is quite problematic. This external distinction 
has the potential to further deepen the existing enmity between the displaced Kurds 
and the ones who remained as village guards. The displaced became visible in the 
urban centers; whereas the village guards who were destined to rural poverty, 
insecurity and military oppression remained invisible back in the village and 
condemned for abusing their armed power against the civilians and for taking over 
the property left behind by the displaced Kurds.  
Processes of poverty, socio-political exclusion and oppression are likely to 




segments of urban poor that the displaced Kurds have been mingled together. At this 
point we need to keep in mind that the displaced population is much more ‘popular’ 
than other conflict-affected groups in the international rights and refugee regimes, not 
because they suffered more than the others but because they are ‘uprooted’. They are 
therefore perceived as more unstable, more precarious and much more difficult to 








VICTIMS, CITIZENS or PARTIZANS?   
DISPLACEMENT and POLITICIZATION OF ETHNICITY 
‘Displaced persons’ may not represent the entire displaced population. Rather, I 
look at a particular segment of forced migrants; the ones who could not manage to 
integrate themselves into the economic, social and political relations in urban centers, the 
ones who have been excluded by those urban dynamics, the ones who share the social 
and economic insecurities of millions at the periphery of urban structures. There is 
substantial heterogeneity within the conflict-induced migrant population that escapes the 
interest of academic and policy research. Those are the people who have made 
themselves invisible in urban centers by becoming a part of it without falling into spatial 
and social locations with migrant concentration. Those people who have managed to 
make it in the cities also in several cases were reluctant to define themselves as 
‘displaced’ or ‘forced migrant’ despite sharing a similar experience of being uprooted 
with the others. Those are also the people with the most favorable opinions about the 
Turkish state and most opposed views towards radical Kurdish mobilization. It is 
important to keep in mind that displacement is a process shaped through social, economic 
and political experiences. People do not get displaced at a simple single moment in time; 
rather they become displaced in time through their experiences with socio-economically 
and politically oppressive and exclusionary processes.   
In this chapter, I continue my discussion of the socio-economic vulnerabilities and 
insecurities of the displaced Kurds. I examine local experiences with political violence 
and displacement in terms of the dissemination of pro-Kurdish politicization among the 




physical relocation of masses, their ending up in urban poverty, social exclusion and 
unemployment. Political violence (i.e. displacement) also has effects on people’s political 
orientation and identities. I discuss in this chapter that recent Kurdish contention in 
southeastern Turkey is not necessarily about poverty, unemployment and socio-economic 
problems of the city life that masses of displaced Kurds have recently found themselves 
overwhelmed with (I have discussed socio-economic processes including urban poverty 
and unemployment in the previous chapter). Rather, I show in this chapter that the new 
Kurdish contention in southeastern Turkey is about conflict-affected migrants developing 
identities, interests and relations with the pro-Kurdish politics and claims accordingly. In 
line with that, I examine how local people construct discursive discourses about what 
happened to them and why; and what should be claimed and/or demanded in order to 
secure lives in politically and economically precarious conflict situation.  
Drawing upon interviews with conflict-induced migrants and ethnographic 
research done in southeastern province of Diyarbakır, I have identified two major 
intertwined political and social processes that inscribe the everyday life politics at the 
local level. First, political violence facilitate dissemination of politicization as well as 
radicalization against the state among Kurdish grassroots. The Turkish state has lost a 
significant amount of its legitimacy in the eyes of the conflict-affected migrant Kurds due 
to pervasive military violence involved during the displacement process. Displaced Kurds 
at the juncture of several forms of political violence (re)constructed their perception of 
justice in relation to how they perceived the actions of the state, and also how they 
perceived the actions of state-friendly Kurdish communities. Throughout their 
experiences with political violence and displacement carried on by the Turkish security 




seeking to settle accounts with the perpetrators and to demand rights and make claims in 
ethnic terms.  
Second, throughout displacement and within the urban context aftermath, pro-
Kurdish ethno-nationalist and ethno-political sentiments have gotten entrenched among 
the grassroots interplaying with the national, regional and transnational dynamics and 
been transformed into new forms of protest activities and mobilization. Rural-urban 
population relocation has created new forms of affiliation between the grassroots and the 
organized Kurdish politics and civil society in city centers in southeastern Turkey which 
have been recently translated into urban movements and protest activities. I elaborate 
further on this second point in chapter 6. 
FIGURE-TWO 
Conflict-Affected Local Population in Southeastern Turkey 
 
These categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, meaning for example some displaced 
Kurds were previously village guards, many village guards are a part of the impoverish rural 
population while there may be a very discursive line between some of the displaced Kurds and 
economic migrants due to the impossibility to disentangle the economic and political causes of 
displacement from each other.   
Urban    Rural
                          
Displaced in city centers           Village guards              
  (predominately Kurdish too) 
 
Economic migrants   Displaced Kurds in towns and 




Displacement refers to processes that politicize the displaced in such that requires 
them to make judgments, take sides, develop survival strategies to act upon and to adapt 
to new circumstances. Abandonment of land and property, and appropriation of 
evacuated land and property by the Kurds who did not get displaced have contributed to 
changing the traditional social and power structures in the region. Displaced Kurds have 
in turn developed an ethnicized rhetoric of displacement antagonistically engaged with 
the Turkish state as well as pro-state Kurdish communities. Pro-Kurdish local 
government actors have been catalysts in perpetuating an ethnicized discourse of violence 
and the war as well as of poverty. I explain that together with the pro-Kurdish political 
party’s (HADEP/DEHAP/DTP) taking over municipal governments in 1999 and again in 
2004 in several strategic southeastern provinces after the nation-wide democratic local 
government elections, grassroots politicization among migrant Kurds has found new 
channels of expression and articulated in new forms of urban patronage relations between 
the pro-Kurdish political party and the conflict-affected Kurdish masses.  
Before and after displacement, displaced communities were exposed to a new 
understanding of justice defined first in terms of their rights- ‘our rights’- with ethnic 
connotations, construed to be granted inherently as a consequence of one’s being a Kurd. 
This first strand of rights is articulated in ethnic, cultural and linguistic terms and 
incorporate claims for ‘independence’ and ‘self-determination’ (ambiguous in such that 
do not answer the question ‘what should be the nature of ‘independence’ and ‘self-




Kurds!’… ‘which Kurds? who are the Kurds?’79). This first strand of rights was first 
instigated by the PKK, later on adopted by the pro-Kurdish, pro-PKK civil society and 
finally integrated into various other domestic and international civil and political agendas 
to accommodate and/or co-opt the Kurdish demands. Secondly, justice is requested by the 
displaced Kurds in terms of their rights- ‘our rights’- violated during the course of the 
armed conflict. This later group of rights specifically refers to the state violence including 
displacement, destruction of property, extra-judicial killings, disappearances, detention, 
torture etc80.  
In what follows, I examine in detail the social and political repercussions of 
population displacement in order to answer the following questions; how do displaced 
Kurds perceive their experiences with violence, armed conflict and displacement in 
relation to the state? How do they construct their experiences in relation to the PKK-led 
pro-Kurdish mobilization and pro-Kurdish demands?   
DISPLACEMENT AS A POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 
Displacement as a form of violence transforms social relations, power structures 
and even economic production systems, and alters the use of land and resources in 
conflict areas as groups of people get redistributed mainly from rural to urban81 as well as 
urban to urban. Throughout the processes of conflict and displacement, people lose their 
“neutrality,” becoming involved in conflict through their experiences (with violence and 
uprootedness). Here the word “neutral” is used in terms of immunity to, as well as 
                                                 
79 Ironically, pro-state Kurds and/or Kurds outside of the circles of the pro-Kurdish politics are excluded 
from this exclusive construction of Kurdishness that was discursively stated by displaced migrants and 
systematically constructed by the organized pro-Kurdish actors in their hegemonic discourses of identity.  
80 Both rights claims in ethnic terms and also rights claims to settle accounts with the state for political 
violence are supported by the increasing salience of the international human rights regime in 1990s. 




isolation from, the conflict. As people are physically located within the conflict 
geography (as civilians or armed paramilitaries) even if they are not necessarily 
sympathetic with one side or the other in the conflict, they are no longer immune to or 
isolated from the conflict. In most cases, they are obliged and expected to take sides by 
the power actors who aim to identify the enemies and the friends. Conflict turns into a 
socio-political experience for civilians as they try to find their way out or maneuver to 
survive in the conflict zones. Previous systems and structures of power and justice change 
considerably as earlier forms of traditional social relations and power structures are 
broken down by the dynamics of conflict and displacement; however, power relations are 
redefined as new forms of marginalization, exclusion and subjugation emerge at home 
and in the destination areas (see also Escobar, 2000 and Sanchez G., 2000 for 
international case studies).    
Bozarslan (2000) notes that there were two main state strategies used to manage 
the PKK guerilla mobilization in the southeast; resource allocation and coercion. In 
resource allocation tactic, the state offered economic and power assets to the local 
communities in exchange for their support in fighting against the PKK. This is how the 
village guard system was created. The state started to arm the pro-state Kurdish tribes and 
co-opted them politically. In coercion tactic, the resistant elements in the region were 
eliminated including the resistant population through destruction of the country side and 
population displacement. The Kurdish population who were not willing to join the village 
guards was forced to leave their homes.  
Changing power relations in southeastern Turkey during the course of the conflict 
have been a product of the dynamics of these two conflict strategies. By allocating 




traditional tribal struggles and enmities among the Kurds. By providing arms to the 
village guards, tribal struggles have been also militarized and enmities have gotten deeper 
as village guards used their armed force against unarmed Kurdish communities to seize 
property and reinforce their tribal power in the region. By using coercion in the form of 
destruction and village evacuations, the state was able to clear the resistant geographies 
and control them. There is however one missing power actor in this picture, the PKK.   
Indeed, PKK also used similar strategies to ‘honor’ and ‘venerate’ the supporters 
promising ranks, prestige, status and material rewards; and ‘punish’ the ‘traitors’ 
violently82. PKK employed guerilla strategies to extract support from the local 
communities and manipulated the traditional tribal enmities among the Turkish Kurds to 
secure spaces of maneuver in the region. Though the Turkish security forces and Kurdish 
village guards were primarily responsible for forced migrations during the course of the 
armed conflict, the PKK was indirectly involved in the process of displacement in almost 
entire cases in my interview data. Local people turned into pawns in between the PKK 
and the Turkish security forces as they try to avoid both and/or were forced to align with 
one side. PKK continuously threatened the local people against collaborating with the 
Turkish security forces and systematically deployed the villages for guerilla recruitment 
and logistic support despite local resistance and/or anxiety. Even the interviewees most 
sympathetic to the illegal organization were very articulate about the contentious 
dynamics of the displacement process. One forced migrant who was previously a PKK 
militia in his village admitted the following:   
                                                 




…the youngsters in the village had sympathy for the organization [PKK], older 
people including our parents were very concerned about the situation. In many 
occasions they begged us and asked us to stop working for the guerilla or to leave 
the village… they were scared to live with militia since villages with militia were 
being attacked by the Turkish soldiers one by one. We could not leave, we were 
everything for the organization, we were potential guerilla, we would provide 
strategic information regarding the movements of the Turkish security forces, we 
would give them [PKK guerilla] food, bed everything…at the end, the village was 
attacked by the Turkish soldiers and destroyed to get us out. Until that moment, 
we had to stay as long as we could.” (Interview with Hüseyin, Diyarbakır, 2004)   
Mahsun, another forced migrant, states; 
There was [Turkish] security pressure upon us. But in some way, we gave the 
decision to come here [Diyarbakır]…. Turkish soldiers were very suspicious of 
our village because youngsters started to go to the mountains to join the guerilla. 
My older brother joined them too. Then my other older brother and my younger 
sister decided to join. My parents and I stopped them hardly. My father decided to 
leave home to save my siblings from the guerilla (Interview with Mahsun, 
Diyarbakır, 2004). 
Çetin’s story--a young migrant from the province of Hakkari bordering Iraq and Iran-- 
reveals some of the other complexities involved in displacement process as well as in 
local people’s maneuvers to secure themselves in between the PKK and the Turkish 
army.  
 
There was no PKK pressure upon us until we decided to become village guards in 
1988. Despite that a few young people joined the guerilla; there was no common 
support for the PKK in the village. It seemed like a good idea for us to side with 
the Turkish army and get armed. We became guards and then every single day, at 
least one villager got killed by the PKK. Entire village decided to leave in 1995; 
the state said ‘no, stay and the army will protect you’. We said ‘no, we are 
leaving’. We decided to come to Van. Somehow, our story attracted [Turkish] 
media attention, you know we were the victims of the PKK in their eyes, it was 
something that the Turkish media wanted to see and publicize. In fact, we were 
the victims of both sides… But the publicity helped us; we were given housing in 
Van. The state and the Van governor provided everything, we provided the labor. 
We built up a neighborhood for ourselves here in Yalimerez [the name of the 
neighborhood in the province of Van] (Interview with Çetin, migrant from 
Hakkari a province bordering Iraq and Iran, interview conducted in Van, summer 




It is however noteworthy that majority of the interviewees refused to agree on that 
the PKK was one way or another responsible for uprootedness. Many hold the Turkish 
state and village guards responsible for their being displaced, though in almost all 
accounts, interviewees stated their fear of the PKK in case they would do something that 
the organization did not approve of and also various forms of PKK pressure on the 
village to convince the villagers to provide the guerilla with logistic support. 
Interestingly, PKK pressure and even violence were reported as ‘moral’ and legitimate 
while the village guard and the state violence was ‘immoral’ and ‘despicable’83.   
Dynamics of developing separate perceptions of two violent armed power actors 
are complicated. But for many displaced Kurds, PKK violence was legitimate and moral, 
because it was basically more understandable; it targeted the ‘betrayers’ of ‘the Kurdish 
cause’. The state violence on the hand was more incomprehensible because it was more 
pervasive and disoriented. Many displaced Kurds lost their affiliation to the Turkish state 
at the moment that they were caught by the state violence, a kind of affiliation that they 
never imagined until they lost it. It is at this point that many displaced Kurds started 
questioning their belonging to the Turkish state and nation. Sait, a forced migrant, 
representing many displaced migrants with no previous affiliation or sympathy for the 
PKK states  
The time that the Turkish army came to attack the village, I talked to a high-
ranked soldier. I tried to explain to him that we had nothing to do with the PKK 
and we did not know what the organization was about. He yelled at me and told 
me to go to the 36th parallel (Northern Iraq). He said that was where we deserved 
to be. By then I did not even know what 36th parallel was. I contemplated a lot 
about what he meant that day. Later on, I came to the realization that he was 
telling me that we [Kurds] did not have any place here in Turkish territory and 
                                                 




should be dumped into Northern Iraq with our fellows over there. It was quite 
offensive for me… Now I know what to be a Kurd is and what the PKK has been 
fighting for (Interview with Sait, Van, 2004)  
Another forced migrant makes a similar statement in questioning his stance in 
relation to the Turkish state and Turkish army; 
When the organization [the PKK] first emerged, we were scared of it. We would 
call them Apocular [men of Abdulah Ocalan]. We tried to stay away from them 
and not to mess with them… There was no support for the PKK in our village at 
the beginning. But we did not want to side with the state either. Why did I have to 
fight for the Turkish state? It was the Turkish army that should have protected us, 
the citizens against any danger. Some people in the village joined the village 
guards. Some refused to become village guards. Some have started sympathizing 
with the organization [the PKK]. Let alone the ones who refused to be village 
guards, the state got even suspicious of the village guards [in our village]. The 
arms were taken back by the state after a while. The state has never trusted us and 
in turn we have never had trust in the state nor had we in the [Turkish] army 
(Interview with Cevahir, Diyarbakır, winter 2004).    
The politicization process of the conflict-affected population is in this regard associated 
with Kurdish citizens questioning the concept of citizenship and/or their affiliation with 
the Turkish state as citizens.   
They [Turkish soldiers] asked us either to become village guards [armed Kurdish 
counter-insurgency groups] or to leave the village. I served my military duty years 
ago as a citizen of this country. When they asked me to join the village guards to 
fight the PKK, wasn’t I a citizen of this country then? I was a regular citizen of 
this country; I was just a peasant by then. Was it me who should have protected 
the state or was it the state that should have protected its own citizens against the 
terrorists?... Who was going to guarantee the security of my children [in the 
village against the PKK]?... I refused to become a village guard; many [villagers] 
did the same thing.   
The state is a state only for the village guards, not for us. We did not want to get 
involved in the fighting. If the Turkish army was unable to fight the PKK, how 
did it expect a handful of peasants to fight against the armed guerilla?  
(Interviews, Diyarbakır, summer/fall 2004)  
Meliha’s statement is interesting in such that it illustrates that the Turkish army 




to do with the PKK and the ones who allegedly supported the organization, as well as in 
terms of how to treat those different Kurdish communities. Meliha stated 
Our hamlet was burnt down by Turkish soldiers inadvertently, a Turkish general 
told us during the evacuation. He even apologized from us. He knew that there 
was no support for the PKK in our hamlet, but the soldiers had already burnt 
down the houses together with those of the other hamlets in the village before he 
arrived. Then they [Turkish soldiers] tried to save some of our belongings [from 
the houses] after an order from the general, but it was too late. A lot of villages 
were burnt down like that. (Emphasis added by myself, Interview with Meliha, 
fall 2004, anonymous village in Diyarbakır’s Lice district)   
 
The central state together with the state appointed local governors have provided 
limited provisions to certain segments of the displaced including the displaced who 
previously worked as village guards and the displaced who agreed to officially 
‘acknowledge’ that displacement happened due to ‘PKK terror’ by signing a petition84. 
These Kurdish communities released the Turkish state and the security forces from any 
legal and political responsibility for the forced nature of displacements. Moreover, they 
acted like ‘model citizens’/‘loyal citizens’ who accepted Turkish state actions 
legitimate85.    
However, a considerable portion of displaced Kurds in the cities, as revealed by 
my interviews and also supported by several NGO reports, refused to play the game 
according to the terms of the Turkish state. Many refused the conditional state aid; which 
means that those displaced Kurds did not only refuse to free the Turkish state and village 
guards from responsibility for village evacuation, but they also refused to put the blame 
                                                 
84 This procedure of getting the displaced to sign a contract to be eligible for the state aid was exercised by 
the local governors in each eastern and southeastern province under the state of emergency.   
85 In Diyarbakır ‘500 evler/500 houses’ neighborhood established on the outskirts of the city center is an 
example for the residences allocated for the displaced Kurds who collaborated with the Turkish state on the 




on the PKK. One representative from a pro-Kurdish migrants’ association noted the 
already entrenched sympathy for the PKK among the displaced Kurdish population with 
the following words, 
These people [displaced Kurdish communities] organize demonstrations for the 
release of Öcalan [the leader of the PKK], they hold his posters on the streets. 
And the state asks them to agree that it was the PKK terror that displaced them 
and made them suffer. (Key Informant interview with Şefika Gürbüz, the Director 
of Göç-Der- Migrants’ Association, May 2004]).    
Considering that thousands of displaced also signed the petition and received the 
state aid and some have already returned back home; the ones that stayed back in the 
cities may be representing the most contentious Kurdish communities antagonistic with 
the state and/or with the village guards back in the rural areas. Until very recently, this 
refusal to sign the state aid petition was a passive/silent resistance among displaced 
communities.86 I perceive this passive resistance as a ‘political act’ on the side of the 
displaced, a kind of assertiveness not to collaborate with the Turkish state before and 
after displacement, a way of stating an indirect political claim regarding their stance in 
the conflict.  
They asked us to sign that paper stating that our village was destroyed due to 
terror… We knew what they were trying to do using that paper. We told them that 
the village was destroyed by the [Turkish] soldiers. They said no!, it was due to 
terror… We refused to sign. 
I went to the state governor’s office to ask for compensation and help for return to 
our village. They told me to sign a paper to get state aid. I asked them to read the 
paper for me. One person read it. I refused to sign and they asked me to leave.  
 
                                                 
86  Recently, local Kurdish organizing and local civil society initiatives have started enjoying the support of 
the international community (i.e. EU and international NGOs) as well as the ‘democratization reforms’ in 
Turkish law as a part of EU accession process. So displacement issue has gain a voice in domestic and 
international arena that makes the displaced people more confident about their right to seek compensation 




Some villagers from our village were given apartments in ‘500 Evler’.87 They 
agreed to sign the contract. I did not. (Interviews, Diyarbakır summer-fall, 2004 
Being active in claim-making for justice can be construed as an engagement with 
the state to settle accounts of the past. But it is not always about being active, but rather 
adopting a particular stance (sometimes in a passive manner) against the state that in turn 
reflects these people being political.    
Armed conflict and political violence have crystallized the traditional alienation 
between the local Kurdish communities and the central state. However, newly emerging 
dynamics specific to 1980s and 1990s complicated the relationship between the local 
population and the Turkish state beyond traditional contention in the region. Particularly, 
the PKK factor in the region has had effects on local people’s developing new 
understandings of their position vis a vis the Turkish state and general Turkish society. 
As people have developed ideological and familial relations with the ethno-nationalist 
organization, state-citizen antagonism has sharpened and gained an accentuated ethno-
nationalist tone reflecting the PKK discourse. Indeed, PKK has successfully capitalized 
on local people’s social, economic and political vulnerabilities using ethno-nationalist 
sentiments. Ethno-nationalist sentiments have been reinforced by a quest for justice 
among the local population socio-economically marginalized before displacement and 
further victimized during the course of the armed conflict.  
On the one hand, PKK-led ethnic politicization on the ground quickly 
disseminated among the grassroots in 1990s with the appeal of the organization to the 
socio-economically marginalized, politically alienated peasants communities. Many 
                                                 
87 500 Evler (500 Houses)- the name of a neighborhood constructed with the initiatives of the Diyarbakır 




displaced Kurds (about a quarter of my interviewees) also found their family members 
among the PKK militia and guerilla before and after displacement. On the other hand, the 
state violence in the region reached unprecedented levels against dissident civilians as 
well as the ones caught in the middle of the violent armed groups including the army, the 
PKK and the Kurdish Hezbullah. Displaced Kurdish citizens experienced a multitude of 
several forms of violence during the course of displacement such as extrajudicial 
murders, disappearances and torture. State antagonism towards ‘suspicious’ Kurds has 
translated into increasing salience of ethno-nationalist and radical tendencies among the 
grassroots. Legitimacy of the state and pro-Kurdish actors including citizen masses in the 
eyes of each other has concomitantly declined.   
...We were ignorant peasants by then. We were enlightened by the organization 
[the PKK] and learnt about our rights. (Interview, Diyarbakır, summer-fall 2004) 
…do you know who the PKK is? We are the PKK, and our children in the 
mountains and in the prisons.88 
It has been through these dialectical processes of questioning the legitimacy of the 
Turkish state (the perpetrator of the violence in the eyes of the Kurds) and of becoming a 
part of the PKK and pro-Kurdish politics through personal or family affiliations that 
displaced Kurds have developed discursive relations between the violence they 
experience and their being target due to their being Kurds, ‘illegitimate’ children of the 
Turkish Republic.    
PRO-KURDISH ACTORS NEGOTIATING ABOUT DISPLACEMENT 
The southeastern province of Diyarbakır close to the Turkish-Iraqi border, 




the province (its distance from the Turkish west and the political capital, Ankara, but its 
centrality in southeastern Turkey and its closeness to strategic border areas) and because 
of the political identity of the province (in terms of its symbolic status as capital of 
Kurdish culture and center of ‘Kurdish struggle’). I selectively draw upon the interviews 
conducted during my short-term visit to another southeastern province Van. Diyarbakır 
represents a peculiar case due to its political importance and the ethnic, political and geo-
strategic connotations attached to this province.89 Population wise, Diyarbakır is 
predominately Kurdish though perception of Kurdish identity varies considerably among 
the local people90. The support for the pro-Kurdish political parties has been strong and 
persistent in Diyarbakır throughout years since 1990s. In the context of low intensity war 
and under the political suppression put by the emergency rule, civil organizing has been 
highly politicized and strongly engaged with the issues associated with the armed conflict 
and the state of emergency, such as human rights violations.  
Despite political surveillance and repression over the province, civil society 
organizations (CSOs) and civil initiatives have been well-developed relative to other  
                                                                                                                                                 
88 An answer given upon my naive inquiry of their affiliation with the PKK to understand the dynamics of 
displacement.  
89 Diyarbakır, not only among Kurds in Turkey, but also among politicized Kurds in general, is considered 
as the center of Kurdish political ‘struggle’. The province has also gained unofficial recognition from the 
international community, European states and EU during their attempts to identify a focal point among 
politicized Kurds to negotiate Kurdish demands.  
90 Perception of ethnicity in cultural terms and political terms is complicated as pointed out several studies 
on Kurdish Question in Turkey (see for example Kirisci and Winrow 1997). It was also evinced during my 
encounters with the local people having different political orientations that definition of ethnicity and 
people’s affiliation with ‘Kurdishness’ and ‘Turkishness’ is multi-dimensional. While some Kurds prefer to 
define themselves first as Turks (and/or Turkish citizens) and second as Kurds; some tend to associate with 
‘Kurdishness’ more strongly; some prefer to disassociate themselves from ‘Turkishness’ as it is the case 
with many displaced Kurds; some prefer to cling to their ‘Turkishness’. In one occasion, two Zaza Kurds 
(Zaza refers to an ethnically different Kurdish community in Turkey speaking a completely different 
language than standard Kurdish (Kurmangi)) got into argument in front of me as one argued that Zazas 
were Kurdish and the other argued that they were not; as one affiliated himself with pro-Kurdish politics, 




provinces in the region and even other Anatolian regions in Turkey. Pro-Kurdish civil 
organizing has been particularly assertive especially after the arrest of the PKK leader in 
1999 and the lifting of the emergency state rule (OHAL) 91 in 2002. The ethnic 
homogeneity of Diyarbakır as well as the scrupulously balanced tension between the 
politicized Kurds, the local government units and the security forces provides not only 
political spaces, but also ‘physical’ spaces for the organized Kurds to exploit since the 
lifting of the emergency rule in the region. Street demonstrations, urban signature 
campaigns and the pro-Kurdish civil society discourses (their local discourses vs. national 
discourses) tend to be more visible and radical in their ideologies and demands in 
southeastern Turkey than they are in other parts of Turkey.    
Parallel to the emergence of pro-Kurdish actors in the national arena; civil and 
political pro-Kurdish local actors have taken their positions in provincial centers in the 
southeast by the end of 1990s. Displacement of Kurds, destruction of Kurdish villages by 
the Turkish security forces and human rights violations committed by the elements of the 
state have turned into a leverage for local, national and Diaspora pro-Kurdish groups to 
speak to the state and the international community in the name of the ‘Kurdish victims’. 
As one metropolitan sub-district mayor states  
What happened in 1990s was a different phenomenon92. People were expelled 
from their homes in masses across the region. They were driven away 
systematically by the Turkish army as a part of a politics of dehumanization of the 
Kurdish homelands93. Authoritarian nature of the Turkish state, starting from the 
                                                 
91 OHAL, continuing martial law in the region, was initially introduced in eight provinces in eastern and 
southeastern Turkey on July 1987; including Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Elaziğ, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli 
and Van. Batman and Şırnak were included under the state of emergency after they were turned into 
separate provinces in 1990. 
92 She is distinguishing between displacement during 1980s and 1990s.  
93 The mayor’s comment here contradicts with my migrant interviewee’s account taken in Van where he 
says that the Turkish state tried to encourage them to stay in their village in Hakkari. In fact, the state 




early days of the republic, has wanted to crush the Kurdish identity, annihilate the 
Kurdish struggle…Now they [the government] came up with a new law, 
‘Compensation of Damage Arising from Terror and the Struggle against Terror’, 
which weakens the conflict-affected Kurds even further, degrades their honor. 
The state calls village destruction ‘the struggle against terror,’ not even one single 
honorable person can accept this! The only terror this people are familiar with is 
the state terror” (Interview with Yurdusev Özsökmenler, the Mayor of Bağlar 
(subdistrict within the Diyarbakır Metropolitan center) affiliated with the pro-
Kurdish party DEHAP94, Diyarbakır, summer 2004)   
She, the mayor, made a distinction between the 1980s and 1990s. In the late 
1980s, conflict-affected people escaped the conflict on a more individual or family basis 
after it started in 1984. Starting from 1989, the intensity of the armed fighting increased 
substantially and conflict spilled over civilian population as local support for the PKK 
increased together with the local contention against the Turkish army, upon which 
Turkish security forces started to undertook extensive village evacuation operations to cut 
off the ties between the guerilla and ‘suspicious’ peasant communities.95 Organized 
Kurdish groups tend to emphasize village evacuations in order to highlight the direct 
involvement of the Turkish security forces in the process of displacement. This 
predisposition also contributes to the construction of a nostalgic notion of ‘Kurdish 
homeland’ destroyed by oppressive nation-states in the Middle East.    
The mayor’s statement also contradicts with my migrant interviewee’s account 
taken in Van where the interviewee said that the Turkish state tried to encourage them to 
                                                                                                                                                 
ethnic identity private and agree to be a peaceful constitute of the general Turkish society and Turkish 
territory (see for example Yeğen, 2000). Also see Butenschon 2000.   
94 Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP-Demokratik Halk Partisi), recently transformed into Democratic 
Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi-DTP) 
95 Although this distinction is important, my definition of displacement in this study is not limited to 
village evacuations by the Turkish security forces. There is a great complexity associated with the causes of 




stay in their village in Hakkari96. Indeed, there is no solid ground in arguing that village 
evacuations were undertaken by the Turkish security forces in order to destroy the 
‘Kurdish homeland’. Rather, displacement was selective in such that certain geographies 
and certain groups of Kurds were insulated from and immune to the state violence. 
Displacement happened in localities where there was support for the PKK97 and 
especially village guards and their families have been encouraged by the state to remain 
put for surveillance of the topography as well as to consolidate the state power in the 
region. Displacement was rather a war tactic to distinguish between who was on the side 
of whom and who constituted a potential threat.  
The same tactic was also used by the PKK against the village guard communities. 
However, in contrast to a guerilla organization, the state was expected to protect its 
citizens and deal with the terrorist threat within the domain of rule of law in order to 
maintain its legitimacy in the eye of the civilians. ‘Suspicious’ Kurdish communities 
were not only displaced by the security forces against their will. They were also left 
without any form of state assistance to resettle and restart lives in secure places. From a 
human rights point of view, as advocated by the international organizations such as HRW 
and AI, the major problem is the Turkish army’s inability and lack of prudence to 
distinguish the civilian population from the armed PKK guerilla and/or the state’s failure 
to protect its civilian population squeezed in between different fighting fractions 
including the Turkish army, the PKK and the Hezbullah (HRW 2004, 2005, 2006; AI 
                                                 
96 Interview with Cetin 2004 Van Turkey 
97 In fact, the state discourses have been always welcoming towards Kurdish citizens, however as long as 
they keep their ethnic identity private and agree to be a peaceful constitute of the general Turkish society 




2004, 2005). The director of Göç-Der, national pro-Kurdish migrants’ association, points 
this out ; 
Lets say it was not the Turkish security forces but the PKK guerilla that displaced 
these people, in fact according to our national survey98 with various displaced 
communities in certain metropolitan centers, we found out that there are Kurds 
displaced by the PKK guerilla, very tiny percentage like 1-2% of the entire 
sample. Even if everybody was displaced by the PKK, it would not change our 
perspective. It would still be the Turkish state and army failing to protect 
civilians. It would still be the state’s responsibility to take care of these people 
and help them to safely go back home and compensate for their losses (Interview 
with Şefika Gürbüz, İstanbul, May 2004).   
She further notes in a pro-PKK civil society assembly99 in Diyarbakır after our meeting 
in Istanbul, 
We have not been able to resolve the migration issue. However, we have managed 
to get it into the national and international agenda…There has been produced no 
solution for it by the state… There have always been put obstacles [by the state] 
in front of people’s access to the European Court for Human Rights. The new law 
‘Compensation of Damage Arising from Terror and the Struggle against Terror’ 
does not allow people with family members previously affiliation with the PKK to 
make applications for their property destroyed by the Turkish army. This is not 
only against the Turkish constitution, but is also not in compliance with the 
Geneva Convention (Şefika Gürbüz, Official Director of Göç-Der, Fieldnotes, 
16/10/2004, Civil Society Assembly organized by Göç-Der, Kurdish Institute, 
Diyarbakır)     
Forced migrations have not only further contributed to politicization of the 
displaced Kurdish masses, but also brought those masses into urban centers where they 
have gained visibility and the ability to be political. Along with encounters with state 
agents after displacement, there happened encounters with organized pro-Kurdish groups, 
such as the pro-Kurdish CSOs operating throughout Turkey including migrants’ 
                                                 
98 I was given a copy of the report with survey results but denied access to the raw data. Although the 
survey suffers many methodological problems, the report came out of the survey is one of the few 
extensive sources available on the issue. The survey results and their accuracy should also be treated 
carefully due to the affiliation between the Goc-Der and the PKK     
99 The assembly that I was also invited started with praising the imprisoned leader of the PKK and the PKK 




associations, human rights organizations and local bar associations whose lawyers have 
also been affiliated with various CSOs.  
Hundreds of Kurdish villagers have carried their collective cases to the European 
Court for Human Rights (ECHR) since the early 1990s100. Human rights organizations 
and the local bar associations have put a significant effort into getting the evacuated 
villages organized to make claims in national courts and at the ECHR. The chain reaction 
of this organizing was that many villagers come together with their fellow villagers to get 
help from the bar associations to carry their cases to the ECHR. In an interview with 
Cihan Aydin of the Diyarbakır Bar Association, he stated that in case the Turkish 
government fails to open effective domestic judiciary channels for the displacement-
related human rights violation, there were approximately 6000 potential cases in their 
hand ready to be submitted to the Court. He added that the massive amount of cases lined 
up at the ECtHR and the potential cases waiting to be initiated was the major reason for 
the Turkish government to enact the Compensation Law (Compensation of Damage 
Arising from Terror and the Struggle against Terror) in 2004101.      
Organized pro-Kurdish groups in Diaspora also collaborated with the organized 
local civilian groups in the southeast to bring the Kurdish demands to the attention of the 
international civil society, including demands with regard to the Turkish army-induced 
                                                 
100 It is not easy to quantify the number of cases opened by the displaced Kurds at the ECHR since there is 
no distinct category for ‘displacement’ and human rights violations during the village evacuations have 
been treated under the category of ‘human rights violations due to activities of the security forces’. See for 
example Kurban, 2006. However, it is estimated that there are approximately 1500 collective cases 
currently suspended in the Court. In my interview with Cihan Aydin of the Diyarbakır Bar Association, he 
stated that there were approximately 6000 potential cases in their hand ready to be submitted to the Court in 
case Turkey fails to take necessary legislative steps to compensate property damage as well as other human 
rights violations during village evacuations (Interview with Cihan Aydin Diyarbakır 2004).  
101 Interview with Cihan Aydin, Lawyer, Director of the EU-sponsored ‘Herkes Icin Adalet Projesi/Justice 




village evacuations (Yildiz 2005). The signature campaign initiated in 2005 by the 
transnational Kurdish elite groups together with the local organized middle-class urban 
groups in Diyarbakır under the title of “I am a Kurd, I am a presence, I demand,” is an 
interesting example in this respect. The strongest support for this campaign comes from 
the Kurds in Europe and local urban middle-class groups in Diyarbakır (BİA, 2005). 
Stands were set up in Diyarbakır and signatures were collected under a list of Kurdish 
demands to be submitted to the Turkish Parliament and EU units (Hürriyet, July 17, 
2005). The political demands ranged from the creation of a federal system in southeastern 
Turkey to the acceptance of the Kurdish language as the second official language 
together with Turkish. Further demands on the reconstruction of the Kurdish villages 
destroyed during the armed conflict, and the ‘creation of a socio-economic and political 
environment that would enable the forced migrants to return to their original places of 
residence in dignity’ were also included in the petition.  
LOCAL POLITICS IN FACE OF DEMISE OF THE WELFARE STATE 
Municipal Government for Politics  
As the capability of the state to be a guarantor of social rights has declined as part 
of economic transformation, urbanization and neo-liberal entrenchment, citizens have 
become even more dependent on welfare provision because of extreme economic 
insecurity.  The recently changing role of local governments has however, emerged as a 
factor counterbalancing the decline of central social state. As noted by Bugra and Keyder 
(2006: 224) “while central government funds to the poor have declined, these types of 
assistance have significantly increased at the municipal level” since mid-1990s. Under 
the general socio-economic insecurity in the country, municipal governments have 




citizens all around Turkey. Political parties that are highly organized at the very local 
level have taken over the municipal governments in the most recent local elections; pro-
Islamists across Turkey including many eastern and southeastern provinces and Kurdish 
ethno-nationalists in strategic southeastern provinces such as Diyarbakır, Şirnak and 
Hakkari (see Maps 4, 5 and 6 in chapter 2).  
In my interviews with the local government representatives and sub-district 
mayors in Diyarbakır, the centre of pro-Kurdish politics in Turkey, the migrant 
informants highlighted the strategic leverage and ‘legitimate’ status of the pro-Kurdish 
political party in domestic politics, a peculiar leverage and status gained through support 
from the citizens in democratic elections. Through their takeover of the metropolitan 
local government in Diyarbakır and several provincial and district municipalities in 
southeastern Turkey, the pro-Kurdish party has adopted the role of the representative 
focal point of Kurds in Turkey and of their demands despite the party not succeeding in 
surpassing the 10 percent threshold to send representative to Parliament. The party also 
did not manage to win over the pro-Islamists in many eastern and southeastern provinces. 
The pro-Kurdish DEHAP; however, has consolidated its power in five southeastern 
provinces in the 2004 local government elections including Diyarbakır102.   
The pro-Kurdish party has been well organized in Diyarbakır at the neighborhood 
level especially after the arrest of the PKK leader in 1998. On the one hand, declining 
power of the guerilla resistance of the PKK demoralized the pro-Kurdish mobilization; on 
the other hand, civil organization gained more importance for the movement. The 




suitable spaces for the pro-Kurdish political party to better organize at the local level. 
During my visits to the district branches of the DEHAP in 2004-- this was just following 
the 2004 local elections -- there was a restructuring of neighborhood commissions going 
on, aiming to reach ‘each and every single family’ in the neighborhoods. There was also 
a conscientious interest among the municipality representatives and workers in local 
people’s everyday problems. A neighborhood commission representative affiliated with 
the pro-Kurdish municipality stated 
People fight to survive. Nobody can be helpful to the other… Considering this, 
we want to help them through the municipality and the associations. 
The mayor of the Bağlar sub-district with the largest displaced migrant population 
in Diyarbakır provincial center prioritized the major areas of concern about which the 
Diyarbakır municipal government was most sensitive; 
Health issues and environmental hygiene, women’s problems and street children 
are our major concerns… The main problem in Diyarbakır is actually joblessness, 
but it is something that we, as the municipality, cannot do a lot about. 
When I asked her about the main difference between the DEHAP municipality (working 
since 1999 local elections) and the previous municipal government in Diyarbakır, she 
subtly indicated the political aloofness of the previous local government from ‘the 
realities of the Kurdish question and war’ in the region. 
We know what has happened to these people, we know what kind of violence and 
oppression they have experienced so far, because we have experienced everything 
with them along the way. We know that there is at least one person in each 
family, who is either in the prison, or at the mountains [among the guerilla] or in 
the grave due to the war. This is our difference. We acknowledge these realities 
and act accordingly with sensitivities. (Interview with Yurdusev Özsökmenler, 
Sub-district Mayor from the pro-Kurdish DEHAP, June 20 2004, 
Bağlar/Diyarbakır)  
                                                                                                                                                 
102 The other provinces that the DEHAP won the provincial municipalities through its coalition with the 




During my six months stay in the province, the pro-Kurdish Diyarbakır 
metropolitan municipality organized ‘neighborhood meetings’ each week in a different 
neighborhood with participation of the metropolitan municipality mayor and urban sub-
district mayors. The meetings were inspired by a ‘Porte Allegro’ spirit as said by the 
metropolitan Mayor, Osman Baydemir who gave the Brazilian example of participative 
budgeting as a model for democratic citizen participation in Diyarbakır. The main goal of 
the meetings was to ‘identify the problems of the neighborhoods and residents…to 
resolve the problems in the neighborhoods with the residents’ (Metropolitan Municipality 
Bulletin, 2004).  
The findings of my migrant interviews in Diyarbakır also revealed that the poor 
migrant communities were very pleased to be under the jurisdiction of ‘our [their] own’ 
local government that is seen as something independent from the elements of the Turkish 
state, something ‘Kurdish’. In compliance with the role assumed by the Diyarbakır 
municipality as the representative of the oppressed Kurds in Turkey, displaced migrant 
communities expected the pro-Kurdish municipality to have a broader role than that of a 
municipal body. The(ir) municipality was not only an elected local government body 
responsible for providing infrastructural and social services, but it was also the 
representative of the Kurds in the region, the Kurdish demands, the Kurdish struggle and 
the PKK that politicized displaced Kurds are organically103, ideologically and/or 
emotionally attached to. Pro-Kurdish DEHAP’s popularity among the displaced masses 
in Diyarbakır was in fact mainly due to the party’s image as the legal extension of the 




that I questioned, many displaced Kurds indicated their conviction that the candidates for 
provincial mayor positions were selected by the imprisoned leader of the PKK. Murat, a 
displaced interviewee, made a statement in a parallel vein that was also mentioned in 
several other migrant interviewees and in one interview that I conducted with a 
representative of a pro-Kurdish civil society organization104;    
…..We like the mayor [of Diyarbakır]. He has been working for the Kurdish 
people for years. He takes very bold steps to defend our rights…He was chosen to 
be the mayor by ‘the president’ [referring to the currently imprisoned head of the 
PKK]. (Murat, Migrant interview, Diyarbakır October 2004)  
On the one hand, considering the domestic political conjecture, political leverage 
of DEHAP/DTP in the southeastern region at the local government level could have been 
an opportunity for the region as well as Turkish politics. First, DEHAP/DTP is 
successfully organized at the local level, which none of the mainstream political parties 
have been able to do in southeastern Turkey105. Second, there is a strong persistent 
support and sympathy from the local people for the party which is perceived as the 
representative of the oppressed Kurds in Turkey. Hence, DEHAP/DTP appears as the 
only legitimate political party among many Kurdish citizens in southeastern Turkey with  
                                                                                                                                                 
103 By organic relationship, I mean membership with the illegal organization, personal membership 
affiliation and/or affiliation of family members. 
104 Indeed, the organic relationship between the PKK and the pro-Kurdish DEHAP was something 
indicated freely during my causal meetings and talks with the pro-Kurdish actors and the civil society 
organizations. There has also been quite substantive evidence supporting the direct relationship between 
DEHAP and the PKK including Öcalan’s own statements. But, during the formal interviews with the party 
members and representatives, they cautiously tried to emphasize their separateness from the PKK 
organizing though many freely stated their sympathy for the PKK and Öcalan.  
105 Pro-Islamist AKP (Justice and Development Party) is an exception to this. AKP has been very well 
organized at the local level. However, DEHAP still stands as a big challenge for the AKP in southeastern 
provinces especially in the local municipal government elections. DEHAP never manages to surpass the 
10% threshold in the national elections, which is necessary to send representatives to the parliament. 
However, the party receives the majority of the votes from the southeastern provinces and therefore, takes 
over the municipal control in the local municipal government elections in strategic southeastern provinces 




the potential to voice local demands and ease the political contention. Among politicized 
civil society groups and actors, there is a willingness to be a part of the municipality’s 
projects and programs. The highly collaborative networks between the pro-Kurdish 
municipality and the civil society organizations are at first sight very promising and a 
positive development in resolving the local problems through combining the local 
political and civic resources.   
On the other hand, however, DEHAP/DTP (and also its previous sister parties) 
has maintained organic relations with the PKK cadres, that antagonized the central state 
and governments towards this party. Pro-Kurdish actors have consistently avoided 
denouncing the PKK activities, violence and ideology. On numerous occasions, former 
party members have joined the PKK cadres and the party has welcomed former PKK 
members into its own ranks.106 The fact that pro-Kurdish DEHAP/DTP derives its 
support from the local people who have had family members among the guerilla also 
make it impossible for the party to distance itself from the PKK and/or denounce the 
PKK. As I explain further in the next chapter, the party’s local constituency not only sees 
the party as an extension of the PKK. Many displaced stated that they want the party to 
remain in compliance with the PKK politics and strategies. As a power actor in the 
region, it is the DEHAP/DTP’s interest to capitalize on the local sensitivities for local 
support and not to agitate the local people compromising the Kurdish ‘struggle’.   
 One important implication of the institutionalization of the identity politics at the 
local level is newly emerging forms of urban clientelism based on politically defined 
                                                 
106 While this statement is based on my informal meetings with these people who consider their position in 
the DEHAP cadres legitimate and their political right since they are not formally affiliated with the PKK 
anymore, there have also been political, public and media reaction towards the DEHAP’s welcoming 




ethnic (as well as religious) identities. In this respect, DEHAP/DTP is potentially creating 
new power structures among the local population that may create new urban forms of 
clientelist relations between the pro-Kurdish actors and their constituency through ethno-
political identity. This may in turn reinforce ties of loyalty between the local migrant 
communities and the PKK.  A kind of conflict-induced urban clientelism that the PKK is 
at least symbolically involved is part of the life chances of many displaced families. Even 
complaints about the pro-Kurdish municipality voiced during my interviews evinced the 
nature of the local people’s affiliation with the pro-Kurdish party. The major problem 
stated by the displaced was the municipality’s ‘favoring’ certain groups of people over 
the others especially in the cases of recruitment for municipality jobs. Limited resources 
of the municipality were allocated by a peculiar form of urban clientelism defined in 
terms of who were (more) deserving Kurds, which I discuss in the next section in this 
chapter. The informal favoritism pursued by the municipality was known by the poor 
urban communities, sometimes accepted as if it was the moral way of doing things and 
sometimes it was criticized severely. The following quote presents the frustration voiced 
by a forced migrant in Diyarbakır.   
My son is unemployed. I would like the municipality to give him a job. Certain 
people are favored by the municipality and they are employed in the municipality 
jobs…They [the municipality] should also give chances to the others… people 
should be employed in turns, and nobody should be favored…at the end, it [the 
municipality] belongs to everybody. 
Municipalities around Turkey currently do not have the ability to create job 
opportunities for local people except the limited number of service jobs available through 
municipal services. This is especially true of the ones with substantively small resources 
despite their huge populations and serious urban problems such as Diyarbakır 




of the pro-Kurdish party’s neighborhood commission [Mahalle Komisyonu] in his 
neighborhood, said: 
People expect the municipality to find jobs for them. They come to me to ask me 
to find jobs for them. I myself do not have a regular job… I tell the people that it 
is not the municipality’s responsibility and not in its ability to find jobs for 
them… 
He also admitted that certain ‘families’ should have priority for municipality-
sponsored jobs and financial assistance due to their specific vulnerabilities [Özel 
Durumlarından dolayı]. Lacking the ‘head of the family’- referring to single mother 
families, having a family member in  prison, having family members killed and/or 
disappeared were mentioned by Gıyaseddin when I inquired about what constituted ‘a 
specific vulnerability’. In the eyes of many local people and the pro-Kurdish 
municipalities, those Kurdish families have proved their commitment to the ‘Kurdish 
cause’, which rendered them socio-economically and political vulnerable in the first place 
since they were displaced and gave away their loved ones. Families falling into these 
categories definitely suffer social, economic and also political insecurities that qualify 
them for social assistance anyway. However, these conflict-induced ‘vulnerabilities’ are 
in turn producing certain forms of patronage relations for distribution of services and 
municipal opportunities based on a politically defined understanding of which citizens 
were more deserving ‘yurtsever107’ Kurds than  others. These are the children of the 
imprisoned and killed fellow Kurds or who are the ‘proud’ wives and mothers of the 
guerilla fighting in the mountains.   
                                                 




As the articulation between the local population and the pro-Kurdish municipality 
was defined in ethno-political terms antagonistic towards the state, the local municipal 
government replaced the role of the state for many displaced families. The relationship 
between the displaced Kurds and the state in citizenship terms became even more 
extraneous as the municipal government tried to constitute its own local citizenry 
deriving its legitimacy from the pro-PKK politics. Very few politicized Kurds I 
interviewed had faith in the possibility of communication and negotiation between the 
pro-Kurdish municipality and the central state, despite the optimism of some:      
I expect the municipality to be our voice, to carry our problems to Ankara 
[meaning the central state] and to different platforms… Municipality is the only 
place for these people to voice their problems; they do not know how to 
communicate with any other state institution. So the municipality should be 
responsible to demand in the name of the people who demand from it, if it is 
unable to meet people’s needs by itself. (Interview with Gıyaseddin Diyarbakır, 
summer 2004). 
As opposed to Giyaseddin’s account, for many Kurds social and economic 
insecurities, problems and needs are quite inseparable from the realities of the war for 
what the state is perceived as the only responsible side to blame. Therefore, further 
engagement with the central state could make the things worse not better. Displaced 
Kurds tend to perceive socio-economic problems such as inequality, poverty and 
unemployment as identity-related problems embedded in the facts that ‘we have been 
made suffer, because we are Kurds’, ‘Turkish state doesn’t want Kurds to eat, to have 
jobs or to be wealthy’, ‘if my children are hungry today, it is because that the Turkish 
state wants Kurdish kids to be weak and ill108.’ This local ethnicized rhetoric of the 
politics of unemployment, social exclusion and poverty is also promoted by the organized 
                                                 




Kurdish groups such as the pro-Kurdish local municipalities and has further antagonized 
the conflict-affected Kurdish citizens of Turkey against the central state.109 In a forced 
migration conference I attended in Istanbul in June 2004, pro-Kurdish municipality 
mayor, Osman Baydemir made his point very clear by saying ‘...I am not talking about 
poverty here, I am talking about a systematic process of getting impoverished… imposed 
upon this region’ meaning poverty imposed upon southeastern Turkey by the Turkish 
state.  
Among the grassroots level, this ethnicized rhetoric of poverty works as a factor 
of alienation from the Turkish state. Among more organized pro-Kurdish groups 
including the pro-Kurdish local municipalities and the party, this ethnicized rhetoric of 
poverty seems to be reflecting some of the major predicaments with identity-based 
recognition movements. Nancy Fraser summarizes them under three categories, the 
problem of reification of the politically defined group identities, the problem of 
displacement in shifting the attention from redistribution to recognition and the problem 
of misframing the actual causes of poverty and underdevelopment in an era of ethnic 
tensions created by broader transnational trajectories (Fraser 2003: 92). Quite parallel to 
Fraser’s three points, since 1990s, Pro-Kurdish demands have not been articulated by the 
pro-Kurdish actors in social and economic terms, but rather in ethno-political terms (i.e. 
Kurdish language and culture). Pro-Kurdish politics has tended to reduce the entire 
region’s social and economic underdevelopment to the conviction that the reason for the 
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armed conflict and subsequent socio-economic misery was that the Turkish state wants to 
oppress the Kurdish identity, culture and language.110  
Parallel to the discourses of the organized pro-Kurdish actors, socio-economic 
needs and expectations are not articulated on the ground among the displaced masses in 
terms of social and economic rights engaged with social justice. Issues such as poverty, 
unemployment, lack of (access to) social services are considered as consequences and 
repercussions of the ethnicized armed conflict, and state and military oppression of the 
Kurdish population. The central Turkish state (constructed monolithically in discursive 
language) is considered responsible for all the problems and instability in lives of 
displaced families and poverty is seen as a consequence of one’s being a Kurd in Turkey. 
Samet, a displaced man noted  
We are happy with the municipality. It would work much better if it was not a 
poor municipality…The state does not like DEHAP to serve the people in our 
region. (Migrant interview with Samet, Diyarbakır, August 2004) 
Again, to one of my questions about what they would demand from the state in 
terms of their concerns and everyday problems, Ahmet stated  
I want the state to be honest about what happened in the region, about what it did 
to us. I want compensation for my property destroyed by the army, nothing more. 
I do not want any favor, any help. This would dishonor me to expect anything 
from the state that destroyed the lives of my children… Right now, we are even 
ready to starve but with our honor. 
Nusret another displaced young man at his early 30s stated 
I personally do not want the state to do anything for me. Today, if I am 
unemployed, if my children are hungry at home; it is ok as long as I believe that 
one day we will be given our rights as a Kurdish nation… All our problems will 
be resolved when the state agrees to speak with the Kurds.  
                                                 
110 Even recently elected pro-Kurdish MPs (members of parliament) in the Parliament are still going 
around the discourses of ‘language’ and ‘culture’ and unable (or unwilling) to incorporate in their agenda a 
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With whom the state should speak directly? (DG) 
I meant the PKK, of course! 
 
Municipality Services and Identity Politics 
With a feeling of being ignored and disregarded, the pro-Kurdish municipalities in 
the southeast construe their roles as providers of the things that the local people have 
been deprived of by the central state. The priority is given to the daily needs of the poor 
migrant sectors of the city. In this respect, Diyarbakır municipality has initiated some 
social services in selective neighborhoods mainly targeting migrant women and youth. 
These include the Beyaz Kelebekler (White Butterflies) ‘laundry houses’ in socio-
economically isolated neighborhoods. Women are assigned a day to do their laundry 
using the latest technology washing machines and dryers.   
Laundry houses provide a space of socialization for women where they can leave 
their children in the playrooms that have a proctor and use the tea-making facility and TV 
equipment to entertain themselves waiting for their laundry to be washed. During my stay 
in Diyarbakır, there were three laundry houses in three neighborhoods; one in Hasirli, 
one in Ben-u-Sen and the other one in a relatively peripheral neighborhood Aziziye. In 
laundry houses, the municipality provides women with various other services including 
Turkish literacy classes, birth control and official marriage arrangements. Laundry houses 
are also designed to accommodate a nearby tandirevi (the earthen bread pits) for women 
to cook their bread in a traditional way that they are used to. Bread pits help to free the 
poor families from the financial burden of buying the bread, which is staple food in 




There are also ongoing municipality projects intended for specific segments of the 
urban poor including again migrant women and youth with an aim to provide vocational 
training (Key informant interview, Interviews with representatives from DIKASUM and 
Local Agenda 21-Diyarbakır). These projects are currently financed by the European 
Commission and partially by municipal resources. There is also close collaboration with 
civil society organizations and development foundations such as the Development 
Foundation of Turkey-Türkiye Kalkınma Vakfı (TKV) (also see Diyarbakır Municipality 
Web-Report, 2005).  
During my visit to another southeastern province, Van, I was also informed by the 
mayor of a district municipality affiliated with the pro-Kurdish DEHAP that her 
municipality was about to initiate four different projects with financial support from the 
European Commission and several Europe-based civil society organizations; a temporary 
shelter houses project for the poorest migrant families in need, a health center and a 
carpet and Tricotage fabric workshop project. Municipality projects and services are 
effective means for the pro-Kurdish party to expand its networks even within 
marginalized neighborhoods and broaden its constituency.   
Project-based social services are not limited to the pro-Kurdish municipal 
activities in Diyarbakır. Indeed, pro-Islamists are quite active on the ground among their 
own constituency.111 From micro-credit to ‘food bank’ projects, the pro-Islamist AKP has 
initiated several poverty alleviation plans in Diyarbakır since 2002. One of the pro-
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Islamist Diyarbakır MPs (Member of Parliament), Aziz Akgül, is actually known as the 
‘walking project office’ of his party. He has started various poverty alleviation projects in 
Turkey, with priority given to the southeast. The most important of all is the micro-credit 
project of Muhammed Yunus, with which Akgül has primarily targeted poor middle-aged 
and elderly women in Diyarbakır’s rural and urban areas. In presence of Muhammed 
Yunus of Grameen Bank, Akgül initiated the micro-credit project implementation in 
Turkey, first in Diyarbakır in 2003 to be expanded to other provinces across Turkey. The 
target group of the project was defined as “women and unemployed youth; landless 
peasants; small-scale peasantry; abandoned street children; forest peasants and 
unemployed elderly” (TBMM 2003).  
The goal of the project was defined as “alleviating poverty and disseminating 
welfare”. Akgül further proposed that the aim of the micro-credit was to turn ‘every 
household into a workshop’ for production (TBMM 2003). Akgül is also the founding 
father of the controversial ‘food bank’ project in Diyarbakır, which provides the poor 
with free food stuff donated by major Turkish food companies. For his poverty 
alleviation efforts-- practices based on ‘target group’ mentality to deal with problems--, 
Akgül was given the title of the father of the poor (fakir babası) by his party. As a native 
of Diyarbakır coming from an ordinary Kurdish family, a Ph.D. holder in Business 
Administration and a former Turkish army affiliate, Akgül stands in the showroom of the 
pro-Islamist AKP as a model MP representing the southeast. His success, previous 
affiliation with the Turkish army, position in politics in a way confirms the traditional 
welcoming stance of the Turkish state towards the Kurdish citizens.    
Akgül is, however, not very popular among local people in neighborhoods that I 




neighborhoods showed me a thick booklet about Akgül projects in Diyarbakır including 
the food banks and micro-credit opportunities. The booklet was given to the shop owner 
by Akgül himself who visited each and every shop in the neighborhood and distributed 
his booklet. I asked the shop owner if I could keep the booklet; “go ahead and keep it, I 
do not need to know about his projects, who he thinks he is…a sneaky politician trying to 
beat off the power of the DEHAP…”  
Local constitute of DEHAP/DTP is quite aware that having access to Akgül 
projects requires voting for the AKP in the elections, which is considered a betrayal of 
the Kurdish cause. In a parallel vein, my interview with another pro-Islamist Kurdish MP, 
Ali İhsan Merdanoğlu, revealed that the micro-credit project had started to be 
implemented in localities where there was the strongest support for the pro-Islamist party, 
those areas primarily included the rural and district areas of the province of Diyarbakır. 
Yet, the antipathy towards the pro-Islamist party among politicized local Kurds had less 
to do with the pro-Islamists being ‘Islamist’ and more to do with the pro-Islamists being 
anti to the pro-Kurdish cause. Otherwise, local Kurdish communities are quite 
conservative in religious terms.             
Both the pro-Kurdish DEHAP/DTP and the pro-Islamist AKP have in turn been 
establishing their own patronage relations in rural and urban areas of Diyarbakır 
capitalizing on social and economic insecurities of the local people using service 
provisions as a reward mechanism. Social assistance, services and poverty alleviation 
projects provide the means for the pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist actors to recruit 
supporters and gather local votes in exchange for temporary social and economic 




provisions are channeled towards the Kurds who support the Kurdish cause112, peculiar 
forms of rituals have characterized the process of receiving pro-Islamist micro-credit.  
Limited municipal aid is meant to go to the Yurtsever families (families whose 
members are involved in the ‘Kurdish Mücadele/Struggle’ such as families of prisoners, 
guerillas and militia (milis)). Yurtsever families are the first priority of the pro-Kurdish 
municipality because they are assumed to be ‘most committed’ to the ‘struggle’, and most 
vulnerable and needy due to their lacking male members and consequently suffering 
economic, social and political insecurity (Interview with a representative from a 
neighborhood commission who was responsible for identifying the ‘poor families’ to 
distribute food aid, Diyarbakır, summer 2004; see also my interview notes with 
Giyaseddin in the section above). In a similar vein, I was told anecdotal stories on several 
occasions by local journalists and academics about how beneficiaries of the micro-credit 
in Diyarbakır were asked by the pro-Islamist party members to give their words to pay 
off their debts in presence of a Quran in order to prove their being decent Muslims and 
supporters of the pro-Islamist party113. Both political groups try to identity their own 
‘deserving citizens’ based on a politically defined Kurdish identity and Islamist identity.  
Indeed, the social assistance provisions including workshop activities, micro-
credit implementations and food bank projects are not likely to promise eradication of 
poverty in the long-term in face of structural unemployment and underdevelopment in 
Diyarbakır and in the southeast in general. They rather discipline poor rural and urban 
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masses according to the rationality of the market economy. They make certain groups of 
citizens more able to tackle poverty on a temporary basis. However, these practices 
supported by the broader processes of transnational economic restructuring (as food 
banks and micro-credit are supported by the IMF and World Bank across the world and 
other local government services are financed by funds from European Commission 
geared towards supporting decentralization as well as poverty management) create 
political patronage relations that subtly and obliquely strengthen the local grounds of 
ethnic and religious identity politics in Turkey (and across the globe). Likewise, recent 
processes of decentralization across Turkey pose significant threats by encouraging 
institutional entrenchment of ethnic and religious politics (and cleavages) across Turkey.  
CONCLUSION 
What do conflict-induced migrants want? Is theirs a quest for justice or more? 
Why do not the voices raised find echo in national politics and are the demands 
marginalized? How would justice be done in Southeastern Turkey? Within a spectrum, 
local demands voiced in interviews range from compensation for the damages to access 
to homelands; from an amnesty for the imprisoned and the guerilla to exercising Kurdish 
culture, education in Kurdish language and to a lesser extent an independent Kurdish 
state.  The Turkish state is mainly seen as ‘the enemy;’ and there is no solid faith in 
peaceful negotiation.  
The state is not present in the lives of the Kurds affected by the conflict and 
displacement as a socio-economic and political guarantor to heal the wounds of the past 
and to ensure a secure present and future. It is then not surprising that forced migrant 
Kurds question their affiliation with the Turkish state while establishing linkages with the 




available for social, economic and political security. They have developed a particular 
understanding of their experiences with political violence, which they consider as a 
consequence of their belonging to the ‘Kurdish ethnicity.’ The general articulation of the 
situation in this respect is parallel to how Sait “came to the realization that” he was 
displaced because he was a Kurd as he states “…now I know what to be a Kurd is and 
what the PKK has been fighting for.”  
Identity-based demands are mostly even prioritized over demands for material 
compensation and return. Demands are expressed around this ethnicized perception of 
one’s experiences with violence, which in turn defines how displaced Kurds see their way 
out of the war, violence and poverty through recognition of Kurdish identity and cultural 
rights. As Ahvelat noted “[u]nless we are given our rights, our situation will not improve 
and the conflict will not end.” Displaced Kurds have in turn become a part of the 
‘Kurdish struggle’ and the ‘Kurdish movement’ for recognition of Kurdish identity and a 
discursively defined form of political autonomy in southeastern Turkey. A significant 
portion of the displaced Kurds in southeastern city centers like Diyarbakır now 
ideologically follow and are tied to the PKK via their blood meaning that they have their 
blood among the PKK members, but also that their blood got wasted by the Turkish 











A FOCUS ON WOMEN:  
A GENDERED ANALYSIS OF VIOLENCE, CITIZENSHIP AND PRO-
KURDISH RESISTANCE 
This chapter aims to clarify and add to the preceding discussion by focusing on 
the experiences of the displaced women within the general pro-Kurdish politicization and 
mobilization. I suggest that dramatic social and political transformations in conflict times 
entail changing power dynamics with repercussions in private and public arenas. 
Women’s position in, and engagement with, those spheres differs substantially from that 
of men. This study particularly aims to elucidate that Kurdish women’s subjugation as 
well as liberation/emancipation is strongly embedded in power relations at the familial, 
communal/local, national and international level, changing and shaping during and after 
the years of intense conflict and political violence in southeastern Turkey. The context of 
the social, economic and political transformations wrought by the armed conflict is 
imperative to imagine the social and political spaces of empowerment for ordinary 
Kurdish civilians carrying the most hardship.  
Throughout this dissertation there are three main processes that come to the fore 
in discussions, which I will apply to the specific case of women in southeastern Turkey in 
this chapter. 1) Processes of the conflict and displacement have opened up social and 
political maneuvering spaces for local people in Southeastern Turkey making them 
visible in public as well as in politics but in exchange for poverty, unemployment and 
social insecurity. 2) Increasing salience of Kurdish ethno-nationalism has had debilitating 
implications for citizenship consolidation, civic consciousness and demand-making in 




been further hampered due to declining legitimacy of the state and the politicized Kurdish 
citizens in each other’s respect. 3) Declining social state and penetration of neo-liberal 
rationality and its policy practices among the poor urban migrant communities has 
dubious long-term implication especially for socio-economic well-being of vulnerable 
social groups and distributive justice in southeastern Turkey.  
 Using a gendered perspective, I illustrate some of the specificities of these 
three processes considering the changing nature of state-society relations in southeastern 
in terms of a state-citizen legitimacy problem, ethno-nationalist claims and a problem of 
poverty and social citizenship. All three processes above-mentioned are intertwined with 
each other within the context of the changing state-society relations in the southeast and 
entail contradictory dynamics concomitantly enhancing and hampering women’s ability 
to make demands, to make their voices heard as well as to make a change at the policy 
level. These three processes further bring in question the contradictory dynamics therein 
a group of ethnically distinct women’s agency might or might not turn into an 
emancipatory, inclusive, democratic force in face of divisive ethnicized conflict, political 
violence and poverty. 
Social and political spaces opened throughout the years of violence have enabled 
many Kurdish women to question traditional gender relations and norms. Exploiting the 
changing power dynamics in their families, especially through a redefinition of women’s 
power vis a vis the declining social, cultural and economic leverage of the male kin in the 
families, many Kurdish women have been more assertive in their familial relations and 
visible in the public sphere. Though, most of the time this visibility is limited to their 
proximate neighborhood and still strictly scrutinized by fathers, brothers and husbands. 




positions and also facilitated their encounters with organized pro-Kurdish civil actors 
including the pro-Kurdish political party, bar associations, migrant and human rights 
associations.  
Rights discourses including human and cultural rights and the notion of 
democracy have been internalized by many Kurdish women as a part of their experiences 
with the armed conflict, displacement and violence. This particular political awareness 
has enabled many Kurdish women, young and elderly to engage in political demand-
making as activists that has become manifest with presence and even sometimes 
overrepresentation of women in pro-Kurdish street protests. This particular awareness at 
the very personal level is indeed tied to the transnational rights discourses discursively 
understood and imagined by the women in the process of seeing themselves as legitimate 
political actors with demands and particular agendas to realize.     
In a parallel vein, Kurdish feminist organizing has experienced fragmentation and 
disorientation with the priorities of the pro-Kurdish politics overshadowing women’s 
demands and interests and also with the impediment entrenched in radical ethnic politics 
against negotiating with the state in a reciprocal state-citizens articulation. Grassroots 
mobilization subservient to the radical ethno-nationalist factions, rather than engagement 
with women’s rights, interests and concerns have further contributed to dissemination of 
partisan politics on the ground without democratic civic consciousness.  
Political radicalization and increasing resonance of antagonistic perception of the 
state among the conflict-induced migrant communities go hand in hand with 
impoverishment and unemployment in the provincial centers of southeastern Turkey. 
Especially, with the lack of and/or distortion of the traditional social safety nets, women 




conflict and displacement have coupled with the already limited existence of the state as a 
social guarantor in the region. Along with the declining ability and willingness of the 
social state to be the service provider for vulnerable social classes, the penetration of neo-
liberal policy practices into provincial centers, in the form of social services and target 
group programs have brought in peculiar changes into the everyday lives of poor migrant 
women. While mitigating the burden of poverty, and increasing women’s social visibility 
in the city life, the role of neo-liberal practices in women’s gaining a social agency is still 
dubious.  
DISCOVERING WOMEN’S ‘AGENCY’ IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 
CONFLICT AND DISPLACEMENT 
Indeed, “[t]he incorporation of civilians into contemporary conflicts has been a 
highly gendered practice,” that require systematic gendered perspectives to disentangle 
social, economic and political processes at local, national and international level (Giles 
and Hyndman 2004: 5). As Rajasingham-Senanayake (2004) notes “[v]iolence is no 
longer merely the business of male combatants and trained militaries”; but rather diffused 
into the domain of civilians-male, female, children, elderly etc.- with palpable socio-
economic and political; physical, psychological and emotional faces. Women and men 
have experienced wars and violence in gender-differentiated ways. As earlier forms of 
traditional social relations and networks are broken down by the dynamics of conflict and 
displacement; previous systems and structures of power and justice change considerably; 
gendered power relations are redefined as new forms of patriarchy and of systems of 
subjugating women emerge in the destination areas.     
A gendered approach to the aftermath of the armed conflict and displacement 




demand-making and in a quest for social space, justice, rights and inclusion on the one 
hand; and broader social relations, systems and structural dynamics that render women 
marginalized, excluded and/or subjugated on the other. A gendered perspective to 
analyze political violence as ‘a form of conflict114’ (Braubaker 1998:425) indeed enables 
us to “explore the possibilities for changing power imbalances” in which women have to 
maneuver to survive and socially, culturally and politically assert their interests, demands 
and expectations (Giles and Hyndman, 2004:4). Previous research cognizant of gender 
has revealed that women still tend to remain powerless in face of conflict-driven changes 
that bring physical, social, economic and political vulnerabilities and insecurities both for 
them and their male counterparts.  
Conflict dynamics rarely work for the interests of women enabling them to 
capitalize on radical transformations in traditional systems of subordination. Furthermore, 
(some) women’s organized attempts in conflict geographies to promote peace have not 
succeeded in creating substantive impact for social and political reconciliation (Koraj 
2006 for example calls the limited success of anti-war women’s groups in former 
Yugoslavia the ‘politics of small steps’). Ruptures in, and the collapse of, previous social 
systems and arrangements may empower women at home and/or in public life in certain 
ways whilst further subjugating them in many other ways. Nor do spaces for positive 
change opened up through conflict transformation necessarily refer to long lasting gender 
transformations (Cockburn 2004: 41).   
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 Civilians, including women’s, involvement in identity-based conflicts have been, 
further complicated, contradictory and controversial in such that political violence and its 
repercussions such as displacement could work as catalysts in enhancing social agency, 
political consciousness and community organizing for peace, justice, reconstruction and 
reconciliation and/or in contributing to deepening social cleavages, identity politics of 
exclusion and political radicalization and militancy. Feminist analysis has become 
enthusiastically interested in gender aspects of identity conflicts informing about 
embedded issues of power relations, differentials and social, economic and political 
subordination at the level of family, community and nation that women are situated in 
ethnic, class and other structural terms (Cockburn 1998, Kaldor 1999, Moser & Clark, 
2001, Giles and Hyndman 2004, 2004a; Rajasingham-Senanayake 2004, Koraj 2006).  
An important strand of feminist research has further critically been engaged with 
the roles of women to perpetuate identity-based violence and/or promote peace against 
exclusionary, violent and regressive constructions of ethnic, religious and nationalist 
identities (Cockburn 1998, Kaldor 1999, Koraj 2006, also see Moser & Clark, 2001, 
Giles and Hyndman, 2003;). This strand of critical feminist analysis warn us against 
essentialist understanding of ‘womanhood’ and ‘feminism’ as well as of primordial 
conceptions of ‘ethnicity’, ‘identity’, ‘community’ and ‘nation’ (see especially Cockburn 
1998, Kaldor 1999, and also Koraj 2006). Scholars such as Kaldor (1999) bring in 
question the ‘identity’ politics prevalent in contemporary wars and its destructiveness in 
terms of introducing divisions within communities as well as among women situated 
differently in ethnic and other social terms (also see Cockburn 1998). Kaldor (1999) 
further points out the imperativeness of organizations around alternative forms of 




social alliances instead of ethnic politics among women to fight against the divisiveness 
of armed conflicts and civil wars.    
As in other cases of political violence and conflict-induced displacement (see the 
edited volumes Moser and Clark, 2001 and Giles and Hyndman, 2004), the armed 
conflict and the emergence of a Kurdish movement around the PKK ideology have been 
in fact gendered coupled with a class component. Not only have Kurdish women and men 
experienced the conflict and political violence in different ways, but also their 
involvements have been distinct and their politicization through the processes of the 
conflict including displacement/uprootedness has been different. In the same vein, groups 
of Kurdish women from different socio-economic classes (i.e. middle class and 
professional women vs. urban poor and rural migrant women) have experienced the 
armed conflict and its consequences in various scales.    
Throughout the radical social, economic and political changes that hit women 
hardest because of their structural subordination, women have developed different 
identities (including a political one), strived for different hopes and expectations than 
men, and struggled for different rights and a different notion of justice. The city and its 
settings have had a drastically different meaning for Kurdish migrant women as 
compared to men. As Merteens points out in her research on displaced women in 
Columbia; “one of the most striking gender contrasts is that women, unlike men, seem to 
gain some autonomy and visualize new horizons for their life projects in the urban 
environment” (Merteens, 2001: 134). Even in the case of exploitation of female labor 
when men are unable to find jobs, new challenges face Kurdish women, such as a public 
struggle over their earnings and for social mobility, which push the boundaries of their 




(Şen, 2005). A representative of a regional women’s NGO in the Southeastern province 
of Diyarbakır states  
[Kurdish Women] have found leverage points in order to breakdown the 
traditional gender relations imposed upon them for years. Not only becoming a 
part of the city and all the spaces of the city, but also the difficulties, hardship, 
violence and suppression faced, have weakened the men and empowered the 
women in their relationship with the men… The notion of ‘honor’ which 
imprisoned Kurdish women for centuries has been redefined… Women have 
entered into a clash with the social and cultural heterogeneity they see in the city 
and through the media; these processes have forced Kurdish women to search for 
new meanings in their lives and to develop new visions. (Interview with the 
director of the ASVWR”, Diyarbakır, July 2004) 
Women and men have been integrated (or unable to integrate) into the urban 
centers in different ways and to different degrees. The urban environment was actually 
not that alien for Kurdish men since they had moved back and forth between the rural 
areas and the urban centers even before the conflict and displacement, mostly due to 
seasonal jobs they would take in the cities or their ordinary trade relations. For women, 
the city was an alien setting, imposing a new definition of ‘private’ and ‘public’, a 
dramatic challenge to reorganize their lives based on the new ‘ways of doing things’. 
Throughout this radical experience, young women especially looked for spaces to breathe 
and maintain their dignity. Twenty seven year-old Merve states:     
My father used to be a porter [Hamal], and then he fell very sick. My two brothers 
were very young and attending the school, they could not work. My sister and I 
started to look for jobs. I was ready to work outside, maybe in a textile factory 
where some of the young women that I know work. But my father and mother did 
not agree with me going out by myself. My uncle had also a bad influence on my 
father. We [her sister and herself] started to do some needle work at home to earn 
some money… But I was very frustrated…. I talked to my uncle’s daughter, 
Züleyha, I convinced her to come to the literacy class with me here at DIKASUM 
[Diyarbakır Municipality Women’s Center].  I told my father that there would be 
only women and it would be very good for me to have some command of reading. 
Fortunately he and my uncle agreed… We are no longer in the village; we are in a 
big city. Life is different here…, if you have some reading [skills], it is very good 




myself much safer in the city, I won’t look around with illiterate eyes (Merve, 
Interview, Diyarbakır, 2004).  
 Both women and men now know that they have to face a different future; 
and their perceptions of the future(s) are projected differently. Women in the new private 
and public domains have to find ways not only to assert themselves as actors of change 
but also as actors of resistance and struggle within the changing social, economic and 
cultural context in which the previous patriarchal systems are redefined, but also 
reproduced. Despite the overwhelming and oppressive social and political circumstances, 
women are capable of dealing with the implications and consequences of their 
experiences as much as they are able to make sense out of them. A form of agency for 
women (as well as men) is reshaped throughout their social and political experiences with 
the conflict and the political violence.  
 Agency is an important element of analysis to understand the implications 
of the conflict and its aftermath for individuals. It not only refers to what women ‘do’ but 
also who they are (being) (Merteens, 2001 and Sen, 1989). In this respect, women’s 
agency is their ability to speak and decide for themselves, to distance themselves from 
the previous patriarchal structures of family and kinship, to deal with tragedies of the 
conflict and displacement. It is also their capacity to search for justice, to speak in the 
name of their lost husbands and sons, to develop survival strategies for themselves and 
their families and their willingness to be active agents of change for themselves and also 
for the ‘Kurdish struggle’. Drawing upon Jelin’s and Fraser’s conceptualization of 
justice, the way that I read Kurdish women’s agency in southeastern Turkey refers to 




economic and cultural terms. 115The ‘agency’ of women is not necessarily a political 
activism, but rather women’s ability to evaluate the past under the present circumstances, 
to assess the situation back in the village in terms of the city and of the contemporary 
political situation and their capability (though limited) to make demands in regard to their 
social and political, human and women’s rights. 
The processes of agency are further complicated. In the urban setting, some 
women have faced constraints and/or possibilities in the face of reconfiguration of the 
traditional social control mechanisms and gender hierarchies as well as traditional social 
safety nets. They have become socially mobile after their husbands were taken away 
(murder, disappearances, arrest, joining the guerilla) and pushed to work outside the 
home, most of the time doing undesirable domestic work and in some cases engaging in 
prostitution116. Also, the conflict has made many Kurdish women become fierce political 
activists fighting for the ‘Kurdish struggle’ in reaction to experiences with displacement, 
murder, violence and torture that they or their family members (especially husbands and 
sons) faced. So, agency cannot be defined simply as something that is 
‘liberating/emancipating’, but rather should be conceptualized in terms of the ‘politics of 
                                                 
115 An engagement with the notion of justice rather than ‘Kurdish identity’ is necessary to acknowledge 
and deal with social inequalities, and social, economic and political fragmentation among the Turkish 
Kurds as well as to establish solidarities and alliances across women in Turkey situated differently in 
ethnic, class and other social terms. An articulate mutual culture of citizenship between the state and 
(Kurdish) citizens, restored trust relations and a strengthened welfare state to guarantee social equity for 
socio-economically subordinated classes would also help for emancipatory, inclusive and democratic forces 
dealing with women’s problems and subordination in southeastern Turkey in face of divisive ethnicized 
conflict, political violence, traditional/tribal oppression and poverty. 
116 Prostitution has recently emerged as a widespread social problem in Diyarbakır- in the agendas of civil 
society organizations dealing with women and their problems (Aker, et.al, 2006). Although I did not ask 
specific questions about this issue due to its sensitivity; in some interviews mainly the ones conducted with 
women, there were occasions that the women pointed out the prevalence of prostitution among young 
single women. One interviewee living with her children with no husband did not hesitate to reveal that her 
oldest daughter was not living with the family anymore, working in an infamous ‘night club’ and would 




survival’ as a process of re-socialization, politicization and social mobilization to struggle 
for social space, justice and rights as well as to make ends meet on a daily basis.  
Notwithstanding the possibilities of opening socio-political maneuvering spaces 
for women under radical conflict-induced transformation at familial and communal level,    
stressing women’s ‘agency’ may result in overlooking the social economic, cultural and 
political processes of the conflict and political violence that disempower women in many 
ways and render them powerless in face of the overwhelming forces of radical 
transformation. Starting from the late 1990s, many Kurdish women systematically 
committed suicide, especially in the southeastern province of Batman. Despite 
inquisitions to attribute a kind of conscious political motivation to those acts, with the 
same logic as suicide bombing but in a self-sacrificial pacifist manner (Bozarslan, 2004), 
in-depth research supports the idea that those committing suicide were women caught in- 
between traditional/rural and newly emerging/urban forms of patriarchal relations, 
escaping their destiny (Halis 2001).   
Those acts of suicide, conducted in a chain reaction manner, have attracted 
academic, policy and media attention to the women’s motivation for ending their lives 
(see Halis 2001, Oktay-Yilmaz 2003). A kind of feminist consciousness and civil society 
awareness (that might be called collective agency) emerged among organized women 
(Kurdish and Turkish) as a means of understanding the conflict and migration related 
causes of female suicide and its relation with traditional tribal systems of women’s 
oppression, as well as to prevent the other young women committing suicide. Women’s 
individual and collective agency is in fact a product of those overwhelming social 
transformations which should be recognized and examined accordingly. A gendered 




forces imposing social, economic and political, in other words structural, constraints on 
potential agencies. 
RISING ‘FEMALE/FEMINIST’ CONSCIOUSNESS VS. RISING ETHNO-
NATIONALISM IN SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY 
Although originally a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist movement, the PKK mobilized the 
grassroots as a ‘nationalist’ movement, aiming to carve an independent Kurdish state out 
of Turkey’s official boundaries and to spread its ideology to the neighboring states 
populated predominately by Kurds. Grassroots mobilization of the organization in this 
respect was around the promise of an independent ‘Kurdistan’ for the Kurdish rural 
masses mired in poverty and oppressed by the Kurdish tribal system as well as 
marginalized by the Turkish state.  In the same way as the earlier Kurdish nationalist 
discourses of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the PKK discourse heavily drew upon the 
role and importance of women in the ‘Kurdish struggle’ and ‘nationalist movement.’(For 
an eloquent account of the ‘woman question’ in Kurdish Nationalist Discourse of the late 
Ottoman Period, see Klein, 2001, also see Rygiel 1998 for a more contemporary 
discussion). Incorporation of ‘women’ into the discourses of the PKK is a part of the 
movement’s project to attack and challenge the traditional feudal system. PKK 
organizing had to break down traditional feudal power structures in order to mobilize 
support for guerilla activities. The PKK was in fact very well organized, especially in 
areas with the least powerful tribal structures and many tribes considered the organization 
as a challenge to their status quo therefore preferring to collaborate with the Turkish 
security forces in the village guard system. 
Hence, the PKK systematically and pragmatically incorporated ‘women’ into its 




subjugates women severely by the notion of ‘honor’ defined through women’s ‘purity’. 
Secondly, as a guerilla organization, the PKK needed female ‘warriors’ to help populate 
its guerilla ranks. It also needed female activists to disseminate its ideology. Many 
Kurdish females have joined the PKK organizing in Turkey, in the neighboring countries 
in which the PKK has been physically based as well as in the European Diaspora where 
the PKK has been extracting financial and political support. In fact, the emergence of the 
PKK has had important, but contradictory, implications for rising ‘female consciousness’ 
in Southeastern Turkey, on the one hand, and for the exploitation of women and their 
bodies (PKK protagonist, guerilla, suicide bomber or self-immolator) for political ends, 
on the other.     
The emergence of Kurdish feminist discourses has been associated with the PKK 
ideologies and the representation of women in the PKK-sponsored ‘Kurdish nationalist 
struggle’. It has also developed in relation to other forms of feminisms in Turkey, 
including secular Turkish and Islamist feminisms (Arat, 2004). Kurdish women’s own 
experiences with the conflict and the political violence that were distinct from their male 
counterparts have also enabled some of them to distance themselves from the PKK-
sponsored ‘emancipation’ discourses written by males (i.e. the head of the organization, 
Abdullah Öcalan) as well as from the Turkish feminist discourses that do not understand 
the specific situation of the Kurdish women.  
The PKK ideology and sympathy for it are currently quite conspicuous in Kurdish 
feminist circles in civil society organizations in southeastern Turkey, especially among 
the ones affiliated with the pro-Kurdish political party (DEHAP/DTP). As a 




municipality states, certain segments of Kurdish feminist circles explicitly or subtly 
sympathize with the PKK.       
We benefit a lot from the ideas and writings of Öcalan [the head of the PKK] in 
order to develop an ideological basis for our activities and for our future activities. 
It is he first of all, questioning the oppression of women in our society… (Key 
informant interview with the director of the ASVWR (Association for Vulnerable 
Women’s Rights- a pseudonym for privacy and security purposes Diyarbakır, 
summer 2004)    
In spite of the PKK influence among the Kurdish activist groups, the armed 
conflict and political violence have pushed the limits of feminist/female consciousness in 
southeastern Turkey as well as in Turkey in general. The political violence imposed on 
the rural areas by the fighting between the Turkish security forces and the PKK has been 
carried into the urban centers with the extrajudicial practices of the emergency rule 
(including forced migration) which rendered any civilian authority powerless in face of 
the increasing militarization of the region and with the forced migrations of thousands of 
rural Kurds into the city centers in search of safety.  
The conflict discursively opened a highly politicized space for the civil society to 
come together, to unite and act together in provincial centers like Diyarbakır during the 
1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, civic organizing was highly radical and involved with the 
‘Kurdish movement’ and ‘human rights’ rather than specifically interested in women’s 
problems and suffering (Gambetti, 2005). While incorporating women into its ‘nationalist 
discourse’, the PKK was not interested in the emergence of an independent feminist 
consciousness in the region and/or among its ranks. The first women’s organization in 
southeastern Turkey, KA-MER (Women’s Center) was founded in 1997-its first support 
came from Istanbul-based Turkish feminist circles- and its founder was an ordinary 




oppression before and after the armed conflict through her and her husband’s experiences 
with violence in 1980s and 1990s (Gambetti, 2005). As Gambetti notes; 
The state eyed her suspiciously for having been an activist…. officially 
stigmatized as being pro-PKK. The Kurdish movement, on the other hand, 
criticized her for introducing a division within the movement between men and 
women. Women’s rights came after human rights and the Kurdish movement 
considered itself as having other priorities (Gambetti, 2005:63).              
Kurdish women’s movement was, especially entrapped in between the bifurcated 
political environment during the armed conflict years. Polarization between the ‘state-
friendly’ civic forces and the civic and political agendas inclined towards the PKK 
ideology was ineluctable in the face of radical politicization. The political space available 
for women’s mobilization, such as the one initiated by KA-MER, independent from the 
ethno-nationalist politics and also the state subservience, was limited to cultivate. KA-
MER established alliances with Turkish feminist circles in the 1990s to attract attention 
to the occurrence of honor-killings and suicide among young migrant Kurdish women. 
Especially starting from the end of the 1990s, parallel to the declining political tension in 
the region, this organization has managed to create a kind of synergy between various 
groups of Kurdish and Turkish feminists. However, it could not escape criticism from 
more politicized Kurdish feminist circles that accused KA-MER for being a ‘pragmatist, 
elite organization’ aloof from Kurdish reality and struggle (Interview with a pro-Kurdish 
female activist, Diyarbakır, 2004).   
State antagonism towards ‘suspicious’ Kurds on the one hand, increasing salience 
of ethno-nationalist and chauvinist tendencies in the Kurdish movement and among the 
grassroots on the other hand have hindered a coherent, prudent, representative and 
legitimate pro-Kurdish mobilization in Turkey. In a parallel vein, Kurdish feminist 




pro-Kurdish politics overshadowing women’s demands and interests and also with the 
impediment entrenched in radical ethnic politics to negotiate with the state in a reciprocal 
state-citizens articulation. Grassroots mobilization subservient to the radical ethno-
nationalist factions, rather than engagement with women’s rights, interests and concerns 
have further contributed to dissemination of partisan politics on the ground lacking 
democratic civic consciousness.    
Partisan politics and affiliation with the ethno-nationalist circles have 
characterized the agendas of various female/feminist groups. Grassroots initiatives such 
as Peace Mothers (Bariş Anneleri)- Kurdish guerilla mothers and Democratic Free 
Women Initiative (Demokratik Özgür Kadin Haraketi) have developed in close affiliation 
with the women’s branches of the pro-Kurdish political party (DEHAP/DTP). Those pro-
PKK initiatives have been unable to gather sympathy either from the Turkish media or 
the public, civil society and politicians due to their contradictory stance as supposedly 
being peace seekers, but unable to distance themselves from the discourse of war, whose 
members are concomitantly advocates of the PKK and its imprisoned leader Öcalan.117 
Meryem, a displaced woman in her 50s, affiliated with the Peace Mothers, states in a 
manner ironic to her stance as a ‘peace’ seeker 
I think with such an attitude of the state, the war will never end. My son got killed 
in the fighting; now I am more than ready to send his daughter to the mountain to 
fight for peace! (Interview with Meryem, Diyarbakır, fall 2004)  
Pro-PKK politics have dominated these grassroots women initiatives as almost 
‘mystical’ nationalist sentiments are associated with women’s suffering and subjugation 




ambiguous agendas (see for example Amigra 2006). In a parallel vein, Kurdish 
female/feminist consciousness has been unable to gather forces that could go beyond 
ethnic, ideological and class divisions. As Moser and Clark (2001:9) point out “[t]his 
challenges assumptions that women’s gender identity, as a unifying force, transcends all 
other identities…while women’s agency can be supportive, it can also be divisive for the 
women’s movement.” Ethno-nationalist tendencies among the Kurdish female activists 
and radical politicization among the grassroots risk legitimacy of many pro-Kurdish 
women’s groups and organizations’ as democratic civic actors vis a vis moderate, less 
politicized Kurdish feminists as well as the state circles of decision making.  
Towards the end of the 1990s PKK was losing its strength as well as international 
support. During those years, the nature of the violence waged by the organization 
changed significantly. During late 1990s, there happened a substantial increase in the 
number of suicide attacks and self-immolation protests committed by the young PKK 
militants, especially the female, in Turkey and Europe suggesting that weakening guerilla 
forces were looking for other spaces than rural areas to carry on their violent protest 
activities using young (predominately female) bodies (see Bozarslan 2004: 24). My own 
interpretation of this seemingly gendered phenomenon based on my discussion with the 
local people as well as with the previous PKK members is that female guerilla perceives 
her body (or her body is perceived) physically less competent for the guerilla war on the 
mountains and see the suicide tactic as a rational option to achieve her highest potential 
for giving damage and killing. It was also mentioned in my talks with the guerilla  
                                                                                                                                                 
117 See for example Amigra, 05/03/2006, Demokratik Ozgur Kadin haraketinden 8 Mart Cagrisi [March 8 




families and the local people that it was easier for female militia to guise herself against 
police surveillance and stage self-immolation events and/or suicide attacks in crowded 
city centers118.   
In the interviews that I conducted with the conflict-affected Kurdish communities 
in 2004, those guerillas who lost their lives in these self-destructive and violent occasions 
are called ‘the martyrs of democracy’ and the ‘heroes and heroines of the Kurdish 
struggle’, and their pictures together with the pictures of their fellows killed on the 
mountains decorated with flowers and the PKK colors are today hung on the walls in 
many houses in southeastern Turkey. Their deaths are perceived brutal but also sacred 
and necessary to make the unheard voices heard by the domestic public as well as the 
international community. Suicide attacks and self-immolation acts stopped when the 
leader of the organization, Öcalan, declared a ceasefire after he was arrested in Kenya 
and the PKK guerilla forces withdrew from the Turkish territory into Northern Iraq 
(Bozarslan 2004). Until the year 2004, PKK induced political unease in Turkey declined. 
After ending the ceasefire in 2004, the PKK has recently started using the female militia 
one more time in its attempt to stage terrorist attacks in city centers in Turkey. It is indeed 
ironic that many civilian Kurdish women have been victimized by the armed conflict 
between the PKK and the Turkish security forces, while many young Kurdish women in 
search of a social status and liberation from tribal oppression have joined the guerilla, 
became ‘terrorists’, ‘heroines’, victims and victimizers all at once.     
                                                 
118 In 1998 and 1999, for example, there happened eight suicide attacks and sixty four self-immolation acts 
committed by the PKK militants in Turkey and in Europe, with four other people killed and dozens more 




The civic potential in Southeastern Turkey is currently limited in its capacity to 
transform the social, economic and political problems of the region into meaningful 
demand-making. Indeed, understanding the trajectories that women go through during 
radical social and political transformations and their relation to self-consciousness and 
demands for change requires a differentiation between ‘two types of gender 
consciousness: female and feminist consciousness’ (Peteet, 1992).  According to Peteet, 
female consciousness refers to the language of rights and aims to enhance women’s 
position within the existing social order. Female consciousness tries to make women 
more able to deal with the circumstances and exploit social, cultural, political and legal 
channels to demand their rights within the system. Feminist consciousness, on the other 
hand, requires more; it strives to transform the existing system and social order (such as 
familial, communal or national) (Peteet, 1992). In this respect, organized women  not 
only have to assert the rights of the Kurdish women within the existing system of 
citizenship culture and practice. They also have to struggle to transform the systems of 
repression, exclusion and violence in the region, which are not only the creations of the 
Turkish state, but also the products of years-long PKK-led radicalization in the region 
and Kurdish feudal/tribal structures resistant to secularization and democratization.  
Feminist consciousness waged by the local NGOs such as KA-MER that seeks to 
stop, for instance, ‘honor-killings’ in the region does not only have to focus on ‘survival’ 
strategies for the women targeted, such as legal help, police assistance and shelter to 
insulate them from the threat coming from the familial and communal circles, but also 
has to demand change in “a host of social, economic, cultural, political, and religious 
structures” that “produced and reproduced honor-killing” before, during and after the 




women who engage with the state in terms of the contingencies of the political violence 
and displacement have to protect themselves within a state structure hostile towards civil 
participation especially in predominately Kurdish provinces. They also have to distance 
themselves from radical ethno-nationalist political agendas overshadowing women’s 
specific problems, rights, concerns and demands. They are further compelled to make 
demands on the state to change the repressive power dynamics of gender, class and ethnic 
relations in Turkey. While the PKK-initiated politicization has introduced a kind of 
‘female’ consciousness into the movement, it is subservient to the radical ethno-political 
agendas and has yet to transform into an independent ‘feminist’ consciousness able to 
negotiate with the political power holders in Turkey and/or articulate with the general 
civil society in Turkey.     
ORDINARY WOMEN’S BECOMING POLITICAL 
… [D]isplacement – a particular form of movement – refers to the shift of the 
corporeal being into a new social space/place. But, as importantly, it refers to the 
changing expectations and repressions, opportunities and exclusions among those 
who move, and those who are dislodged from their positions of physical, social, 
political, economic, and personal security. (Feldman, Geisler and Silberling 
2003:8) 
Conflict and displacement have actually wrought competing social and political 
processes for women. The burden of new familial and residential arrangements and social 
and economic hardship have created new forms of repression for women, but at the same 
time granted them a certain form of bargaining power within the changing power 
dynamics at home and in communities. The survival strategies developed by women to 
deal with the new circumstances and newly emerging power dynamics broaden women’s 
horizons and shape their experiences and identities as well as hopes, expectations and 




There is no way to settle back in the village. Some have gone back. They repaired 
the road [to the village]. The primary school is reopened. My husband is a bit 
willing about going back. But I do not want to go back. The current situation is so 
concerning. Everybody knows that the war is not over. I cannot risk the lives of 
my children. If nothing improves; this time, I will try to go to Europe and seek 
refuge with my children. I don’t want to raise them in war circumstances. I want 
them not to live like us. I want them to get education, to live like respected 
people, not like us (Nida, interview, Diyarbakır, August 2004).   
When asked if her husband agrees with her, her answer is “he can join us if he 
wants, I really do not care about him that much. My children are my primary concern and 
I won’t let my husband stay in my way.” Indeed, as women have gained access to pro-
Kurdish civil society organizations and observed the conflict-related experiences of the 
others, they have been exposed to information (mostly misleading since it doesn’t inform 
people about the complications involved) and gained understanding (mostly naïve since 
people are not totally aware of the functioning of international systems) about the 
international adventures available to them including asylum in European countries. On 
the one hand, the availability of international protection mechanisms empower people 
convincing them of the possibilities of better life chances; on the other hand, as people 
come to the realization that it is not easy to engage with the international systems 
(particularly the international refugee system) due to structural obstacles, they further 
embrace a ‘victim’ identity unable to change the oppressing circumstances.  
One of my female activist interviewees, Munise119 a mother of three separated  
                                                 
119 Munise was not a displaced person. She was affiliated with the pro-Kurdish political party and has been 
a pro-PKK activist since 1990s. She had been arrested and tortured several times during 1990s. During my 
stay in Diyarbakır, Munise was detained once due to her participation in a pro-PKK protest. Protestors 
clashed with the police and several of them were detained including Munise. She was released a day after. 
When I saw her about a week after her release, she looked somehow disappointed since she ‘was not 
treated badly in detention’ (thank to EU pressure on Turkey to maintain a ‘zero tolerance to torture’ 
principle in police stations). She was thinking that if she was treated badly in detention, this would be a 




from her husband and a fervent pro-PKK activist, had already started the official RSD 
(Refugee Status Determination) process for political asylum in Germany as she was still 
residing in Diyarbakır with her children. During my stay in Diyarbakır, I talked to 
Munise several times and asked her about how everything was progressing with her RSD. 
Munise, who in our first meeting was enthusiastically convinced that she would be 
granted political asylum by Germany no matter what, started to lose her faith as first she 
learnt that her children could not go with her in case she received protection and then she 
was informed about the abject conditions in asylum centers in Germany, isolated from 
city centers with refugees’ access cut off even from basic service provisions (a news 
about the inhumane conditions of refugee centers in European countries also appeared in 
the local pro-Kurdish newspaper Yerel Gündem fall 2004).      
The impact of the armed conflict on family formations among the conflict-
affected Kurds has been substantial. The conflict has also left many female-headed 
households behind as men have been recruited by the PKK and/or killed or having been 
‘disappeared’ via the Turkish security forces and sometimes the Kurdish Islamist 
Hezbullah. Here it is also important to note that socio-economic vulnerabilities, poverty 
and unemployment are coupled with the frequency of families missing male family 
members, female-headed households, high numbers of street children, and high rates of 
prostitution in Diyarbakır. (Field Interviews with key informants and the displaced 
families, 2004; also see TMMOB, 1998; TESEV, 1998; Global IDP, 2003). Although 
cultural traditions encourage Kurdish families to accommodate the women who lose their 
husband and their children within the extended household, forced migration, the 




structures, loosened up family ties and provided legitimate ‘excuses’ for the close 
relatives to abandon the widowed women.  
In certain cases, it is the widowed women who prefer to live apart from their 
relatives and set up their own households with their children. The disruption that conflict 
and displacement has caused has provided some women with the ability to challenge 
traditional family arrangements and make their own decisions for themselves and their 
own children. These processes of losing the ‘heads’ of the family have encouraged 
women to take on new roles and to engage in income generation activities, with 
sometimes coterminous impacts of empowering and burdening. Women’s participation in 
income generating activities is limited however, possibly due to lack of informal 
employment opportunities in Diyarbakır and/or the social control mechanisms over 
women that prevent their engagement with cash generating activities. Despite their 
willingness to be income generators, very few displaced women are involved in those 
activities. 
My husband was arrested. He was in prison in Istanbul. Our relatives took us to 
Adana [a southern province] but I could not stay there. It was a foreign place. I 
came back to Diyarbakır with my children[;] waited for my husband to be 
released (Şilan, interview Diyarbakır, 2004). 
My husband got murdered [persecutor unknown] in Diyarbakır shortly after we 
were driven away from our village. His parents and brothers were also in 
Diyarbakır and we were staying together. They wanted me and my children to 
continue to stay with them. I knew that nothing would be the same for me in that 
house. I did not have my husband anymore. They would want to control me and 
my children. I was scared that they would force my children to quit their school 
and to work on the street. I left their house. I rented an apartment by myself. Now 
I go to clean others’ houses, my children work on the street. They have to. But 
they work in shifts and they go to school too. I spend the money they earn for 





In cases that men are present in the family, they are very likely to suffer 
emasculation due to their inability to sustain the family well-being as they used to do. 
While men prefer to talk about the lack of employment, women prefer to talk about the 
impact of unemployment on family’s survival such as children working on the street, 
inability to meet basic survival needs, food insecurity, lack of medicine, inability to go to 
hospital in case children are ill, etc. On one occasion, during my interview with a man 
who was unable to work due to a chronic illness, his wife intervened telling me about her 
difficulties in preparing a meal for dinner. “Lunch is ok; I try to prepare something small 
for the children. But for dinner I would like cook something better.” As she started to cry, 
she got scolded by her husband who responded to her saying “we are people with honor; 
we should not be telling the others if we are hungry.”  
Within the changing power configurations between men and women, men might 
use strategies ranging from resorting to domestic violence against women in order to 
recoup their previous status in the family to letting women step up and be active in public 
to make up for what men are not able to provide anymore. In the latter case, forced 
migrant women undertake major roles as mediators between various organizations, and 
their families and communities120. Those organizations include a wide range of 
governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that displaced Kurdish 
women have contacted after they ended up in the cities such as the state’s Social Services 
Administration, schools and hospitals, human rights organizations, women’s 
organizations, migrants’ organizations, political parties and pro-Kurdish municipality 
                                                 
120 Indeed, research suggests that women in poor families, rather than men, are active in Turkey in 
approaching authorities to apply for social aid, service provisions and/or whatever welfare support is 




social service centers. It is again   the women who are most willing to approach relevant 
social and political actors to ask for financial support, medicine, food aid and even 
employment for their husbands and sons.  
Engagement with the local and national organizations, pro-Kurdish political 
parties121, state agents and local municipality activities provides the women with social 
and political awareness on issues ranging from human and women’s rights discourses to 
new laws and amendments in law that directly concern them. Encounters with organized 
actors in the city equip the women with social relations, up-to-date political and legal 
information as well as the ability to be involved with those organizations that they see as 
relevant to their needs. These interactions of the local populations at the civil society 
level also further contribute to the dissemination and strengthening of Kurdish ‘identity’.  
Many Kurdish women have become politicized through the vacuum left by their 
husbands and sons. Upon losing their husbands and sons to the war, women have taken 
control of the space opened by the absence of men not only in the household, but also in 
the communal and public arena. They have come to recognize the existence of power 
dynamics in a variety of social spaces ranging from home and communities to the local 
and national level. This process, in turn, made women become more articulate in 
questioning the power differentials in gender, class, ethnicity and citizenship terms.  
                                                 
121 Although there have been various political parties with particular agenda on Turkey’s ‘Kurdish 
Question’, the  ones with the strongest local support was the successors of the HEP followed by DEP, 
HADEP, DEHAP and currently DTP since the parties have been successively annulled by the 
Constitutional Court. During my fieldwork, DEHAP was controlling the metropolitan and sub-district 
municipalities in Diyarbakır and several other cities in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. The party has 
recently liquidated itself not only because of the numerous criminal cases opened against the party and its 
members on the grounds of promoting terrorism, but also it has been in the process of transforming itself 
into a new political initiative (DTP) guided by a group of Kurdish politicians who are themselves former 




Politicization has become a quest for justice and the settling of accounts with the Turkish 
state for having been uprooted, human and citizenship rights violations, torture, 
disappearances and extra-judicial killings that they and/or their loved ones suffered. Not 
all conflict-affected Kurdish women have turned into political activists, but their highly 
political experiences have politicized those women. This is a form of political awareness 
that makes Kurdish women realize that their social, economic, political as well as gender-
related vulnerabilities are actually their strengths. A particular form of victimization is 
associated by the women with their social, economic and political insecurity so that being 
Kurdish is perceived as the major reason for the displacement, suffering and poverty that 
they experience.   
What I want from the state is basically nothing. The state is like something evil in 
my eyes. It made us migrants, left our children hungry… My only wish is to live 
in security, freedom for Apo [imprisoned leader of the PKK] and an independent 
Kurdistan.   
It is ironically this peculiar victim psychology that grants a form of empowerment 
to women in their positioning themselves vis a vis the state through rights discourses.  
Jelin (2005: 197) explains the implications of this victim status under circumstances of 
state repression, “[b]ased on their position as victims, they can look to repair and correct, 
demanding that the state assume and recognize responsibility for its past wrongdoings”. 
Leyla, a 42 year-old woman provides the following account as her husband sits next to 
her listening quietly 
I don’t think that someone else other than us could understand how much we 
suffered… The soldiers burnt down the village, everything we had. They burnt 
down our lives together with our trust in the state. We don’t want the state to help 
us. We want what we deserve and what we lost due to the state activities. We 




Social, economic and gender-related vulnerabilities indeed legitimize women’s 
demands for justice and rights, justify their search for non-conventional ways of doing 
things and, to a certain extent, insulate them from violence in the form of 
police/gendarme detention and surveillance. Zeren, a displaced woman whose husband 
was killed extra-judicially, states: 
Shortly after we came to Diyarbakır, my husband was taken away [by the JITEM-
a special unofficial counter-terrorism team used by the Turkish security forces in 
southeastern Turkey during the emergency rule period]… I was the only one in 
the family trying to find out what happened to him. Everybody else was scared 
and told me that nothing could be done for him. I started going to the JITEM base 
everyday. I went to them every single day to ask them about my husband’s 
whereabouts. I was not scared… I would take my children with me, what could 
they do to a woman with little children?... One day, they confessed to me that my 
husband had been executed and asked me not to go there anymore.  
After learning about her husband’s execution, Zeren “started to search for someone who 
could help me [her] seek my [her] rights”   
I went to consult with IHD (Human Rights Foundation) in regard to my husband’s 
murder. They helped me to take my case to the ECHR (European Court for 
Human Rights). It is going to finalize very soon hopefully… I am a member of 
Migrants’ Association and Human Rights Organization (HRO). I follow their 
activities. I do not want any money in exchange for my husband’s life. I want the 
Turkish state to be held liable for what it did to us. I want a general amnesty for 
the imprisoned and the guerillas. I want justice be done (Zeren, 30 year-old, 
mother of 3, no formal education (illiterate), Interview, Diyarbakır 2004).  
 Encounters of the Kurdish women with organized Kurdish groups, local 
and national civil society organizations and internationalized discourses of rights (human, 
cultural and women) have been distinct from those of their male counterparts. Local and 
national women NGOs, organized Human Rights groups, migrants’ associations, bar 
associations and pro-Kurdish municipalities, have come up with specific projects and 
programs specifically aiming to help women deal with the social, economic, 




the time perceiving or presenting women as ‘victims’. Literacy classes, workshop 
(handcraft) activities, legal and psychological consultancy are some of the activities 
undertaken by the local NGOs. Laundry houses, literacy classes and health services of the 
metropolitan and sub-district municipalities also specifically target migrant women in 
‘poor’ neighborhoods. Domestic violence, honor-killings, prostitution, and women and 
displacement are some of the specific issues in the agendas of these organized groups.122  
 Women’s encounters with those organized groups have in turn shaped 
their perceptions of their position in society as women, and also as Kurds, as civilians 
‘victimized’ and people ‘impoverished’ by the Turkish state and the security forces. 
These interactions between the grassroots and the local and national civil society 
initiatives further contribute to the disseminating and strengthening of the ‘Kurdish 
identity’ and pro-Kurdish politics among the civilians including women. Women can be 
very vocal in articulating their problems and demands in line with the general political 
rhetoric of the Kurdish movement and its demands for ethnic(ized) ‘rights’ and 
‘democracy’. The right to speak Kurdish, the right to practice Kurdish culture and more 
radical demands such as the right to have an independent ‘Kurdistan’ are discursively 
added to the end of women’s statements about expectations for the future. 
We suffer a lot here in Diyarbakır, I feel the pain of seeing my children hungry all 
the time. Unless we are given our rights, our situation will not improve and the 
                                                 
122 Diyarbakır Bar Association had just started a new Project ‘Justice for Everyone’ in Diyarbakır and 
neighboring provinces during my field study in the summer of 2004 with support from the European 
Commission- women has been specified as a sub-group among the others which included ‘children’, 
‘tortured’, ‘forced migrants’ ‘relatives of the ones killed in extra-judicial murders and disappeared’, 
‘victims of landmines and explosives’, ‘imprisoned-sentenced and their relatives’ (Interview with Cihan 






conflict will not end. Our right is independence, this is what we deserve (Ahvelat, 
interview Diyabakir 2004). 
What I demand from the Turkish state is not anything material like I don’t want 
money, I don’t want food.  I demand a general amnesty for the prisoners and 
peace… I demand the rights of my people [Kurds]. I want to speak my own 
language, I want to live in my own country, I want my home (village) back 
(Berivan, interview, Diyarbakır 2004).   
Women voice their demand for ‘justice’- compensation for their losses and to 
settle the problems of ‘the past’ from the Turkish state including killings, disappearances, 
torture, displacement etc. in order to reconstruct their lives in a different environment. 
However, beyond their demand for ‘justice’, they reevaluate their current situation in 
regard to their ‘rights’- cultural, social, political and human rights as well as the 
‘democracy’ rhetoric to which they have been exposed to as a part of their experiences 
with the conflict, violence and displacement.   
People talk about the European Union all the time, about democracy and human 
rights it will bring to us… Then they say that we should go back to our villages. 
In order for me to go back to the village, I need democracy and human rights in 
my village. If there will be democracy in my village, then I consider going back to 
the village. (Sultan, peace mother, interview, Diyarbakır 2004) 
[The] Turkish state should pay for the damage caused in the village. Our houses 
got destroyed, our harvest was burned down, and people got killed in the chaos. 
We are struggling with hunger here [in the city]… but still I do not want to go 
back to the village. I want to believe that everything will be better here in 
Diyarbakır and our situation will improve…if there will be schools, hospitals, 
roads in my village, if there will be peace and dignity then I may go back 
permanently (Leyla, interview, Diyarbakır 2004). 
DEHAP [pro-Kurdish municipality] works very well. They care about us. The 
municipality goes to the people; they conduct public forums for us to participate. 
This is what we need. But there are a lot of things to do, we need shelters for 
women and elderly, we need anti-drug programs targeting youth, we need anti-




the region. (Zuhal123, involved in political activism after her husband was 
arrested, interview Diyarbakır, Novermber 2004) 
Any analysis of women’s quest for social spaces, justice and rights should not 
lose sight of the international and national contexts that interact with the very local terrain 
in which women maneuver. In fact, Kurdish women’s demands and expectations are 
strongly engaged with the state and articulated through internationalized rights 
discourses, such as human and cultural rights. Whether they search for justice and want to 
settle accounts with the wrongdoings of the state and security forces during the conflict, 
or they look for jobs, access to education and health services for themselves or their 
children; women as social actors articulate with the state as the focal point for demand-
making.   
WOMEN’S AGENCY TRAPPED IN ‘NEO-LIBERAL DISCIPLINING’ 
Conflict-induced migrant women are not merely concerned with past atrocities, 
including human rights violations in the form of forced migration, torture, disappearances 
and extra-judicial killings, but in face of the increasing burden of 
impoverishment/poverty, social exclusion and inequalities; they also start integrating 
today’s concerns into the rights rhetoric to which they have been accustomed throughout 
the socio-political processes of conflict and displacement. Two intertwined political 
processes have developed on the ground; the widening gap between the central state and 
the Kurdish masses in the region and the increasing state-society alienation and 
increasing salience of ethnic politics.  
                                                 




Neo-liberalism as global restructuring and a part of transnational regionalisms, 
such as European Union integration, has limited the state’s governance competency, 
which rises as a major obstacle in countries like Turkey where notion of citizenship is 
still under consolidation. At the juncture where processes of the conflict and 
displacement meet the processes of global neo-liberalism transformation, it is important 
to disentangle the processes through which Kurdish women find empowerment, agency 
and voice and the processes through which they get further marginalized and victimized.  
As Giles and Hyndman say; 
New definitions of citizens as ‘special interest groups” or “consumers” have 
emerged. The rights of citizens and those of global capital are being constantly 
negotiated at a time when neo-liberal rationality prevails over welfare state 
models of governance. Women’s issues tend to be marginalized within the 
domestic and feminized sphere of home and family. These issues are artificially 
separated from more pressing “public” challenges of security and economy (Giles 
and Hyndman: 304). 
This is a relevant observation to make in the context of the Southeastern 
provinces where ‘women’ and ‘displaced persons’ are two specific social categories 
currently targeted by the state initiatives such as GAP (Southeast Anatolian Project) and 
UNDP co-sponsored development programs, local municipality projects and civil society 
activities. Women’s disproportionately limited access to the public sphere, jobs, 
education, health services and their lack of command of Turkish and lack of control over 
familial relations in their communities have become ‘visible’ together with the conflict 
and displacement of the Kurdish communities from rural into the urban centers.  
Processes of displacement have made women more ‘visible’ by their appearances 
in the city centers as opposed to their ‘invisibility’ in geographically remote rural 
communities. From the Turkish literacy classes to psychological consultancy services 




municipality neighborhood social services (such as laundry and bakery houses), the 
majority of the local services all primarily target women in southeastern provinces such 
as Diyarbakır. In a symptom therapy manner, the general aim appears to make the local 
population (especially women) more able to deal with the problems of structural poverty 
and unemployment and to mitigate the social, economic and domestic burden carried by 
the poor. In the presence of the systems of underdevelopment, and social, economic and 
political problems of the region, project-based ‘development’ initiatives seem to be 
inadequate for a systematic and long-term change.  
It is important to note that migrant women’s (Turkish as well as Kurdish for that 
matter) problems are mainly addressed at the civil society and local government level 
across Turkey rather than the central social state level. The central government has 
initiated policy initiative to address issues with poverty and ‘street children’ since 2002 
(see for example Buğra and Keyder 2003 and 2006). Upon the arrest of the leader of the 
PKK, the lifting of the regional emergency rule concomitantly with the democratization 
reforms undertaken by the central government created temporary hopes for 
depoliticization and the ending of the conflict. It was in this environment that the central 
government reevaluated the displacement issue as a ‘social risk’ to be reduced through 
social policy, socio-economic development and reconstruction in the southeast (Aker et.al 
2006). However, no concrete policy initiative has been undertaken to specifically address 
the migrant women’s gender specific problems at the social policy level.   
Women’s vulnerabilities, rather tend to be defined within the discourses of social 
development (including illiteracy, family planning, and women’s and children’s health) 
and ‘culture’ (honor-killings and domestic violence). Social, economic and political 




as conflict-induced economic impoverishment and/or problems with accessing judiciary 
and legal mechanisms have been marginalized within state circles and national decision-
making mechanisms. The presence of ubiquitous pro-PKK sentiments within certain 
Kurdish feminist circles has further contributed on the side of the state to equating 
legitimate citizen demands seeking justice for extra judicial killings, disappearances and 
displacement with the pro-PKK politics. The state’s security minded approach towards 
the pro-Kurdish politics together with the radicalization among the pro-Kurdish circles to 
the extent of seeing the PKK violence right and legitimate has most injured the ordinary 
Kurdish civilians.   
Political radicalization and increasing resonance of antagonistic perception of the 
state among the conflict-induced migrant communities go hand in hand with 
impoverishment and unemployment in the provincial centers of southeastern Turkey. 
Especially, with the lack of and/or distortion of the traditional social safety nets, women 
have found themselves in poverty and socio-economic insecurity. Burdens of conflict and 
displacement have coupled with the declining already limited existence of the state as a 
social guarantor in the region. Along with the declining capacity of the social state to be 
the welfare provider for vulnerable social classes, the penetration of neo-liberal policy 
practices into provincial centers, in the form of local municipality social services and 
target group programs have brought in peculiar changes into the everyday lives of poor 
migrant women. While mitigating the burden of poverty, and increasing women’s social 
visibility in the city life, the role of neo-liberal practices in women’s gaining a social 
agency is still dubious. Neo-liberal practices directly and indirectly undermine the state’s 
and citizens’ ability to articulate and negotiate with each other by rendering women’s 




of the ‘target group’ rationality on the one hand, and promoting the ethnicization of 
impoverishment and unemployment on the other. Both processes in turn weaken the 
democratic civic citizenship consolidation in southeastern Turkey.   
CONCLUSION: IMAGINING DEMOCRATIC SPACES FOR WOMEN  
In this chapter, I have discussed the gendered repercussions of changing power 
dynamics and social and political transformations throughout the conflict years in 
southeastern Turkey. The main point that I have aimed to make is that women’s 
subjugation as well as liberation/emancipation are heavily embedded within the power 
relations that interplay at the familial, communal, national and international levels. 
Radical transformations in social relations and general politicization in society might in 
fact open spaces of opportunity, voice and dignity for women. (Some) women are able to 
exploit newly emerging power dynamics at home, in their community as well as in the 
national and international arena whenever they are able to step outside the traditional 
forms of subjugation and newly imposed conflict-induced constraints. However, new 
opportunities for women might come with a high price especially under conflict 
circumstances. Displacement, violence and loss of the traditional safety nets and family 
members have made many Kurdish women struggle with the newly emerging systems of 
oppression, poverty, insecurity and marginalization in city centers. Claims for property 
damage, employment, education, health services are also instrumental for migrant 
Kurdish women to socially and politically situate themselves in relation to the state as 
neglected and less than legitimate citizens of Turkey.  
How local interacts with the national as well as international focal points after the 
conflict can create democratic spaces that might be offering women potential bargaining 




developed around human rights, cultural rights and the notion of democracy are 
especially instrumental for women’s gaining social and political awareness. In fact, 
transnational processes of global restructuring of economic and power relations have 
reinforced the leverage of human rights discourses in domestic and international politics. 
This, in turn, grants the socially and politically oppressed groups of citizens a kind of 
bargaining power to be used against the state, which also in turn promotes the relevance 
of citizenship (Roberts 2005: 144, Sikkink and Keck 1998). However, rights rhetoric 
might be most effective at the policy level and unifying at the societal level when it 
articulates with the focal points in terms of justice and citizenship rather than inherently 
divisive identity politics. 
Ethno-nationalist radicalism asserting ethnicity and culture over social, economic 
and political vulnerabilities cross-cutting ethnic and religious identities further 
antagonizes the state-society relations in predominately Kurdish geographies. It also 
undermines women’s ability to develop social, economic and political claim-making 
independent from rampant and rabid ethno-nationalist agendas. Presence of a receptive 
social state and well-functioning rule of law especially in areas of conflict would be a 
counter force against political radicalization and deepening political cleavages resulting 
from ethnic politics that undermines the consolidation of democracy and citizenship 
culture.   
Organizing by the Kurdish women and/or for the Kurdish women would benefit 
social alliances and allegiances between the Turkish women and Kurdish women in 
Turkey. Not only traditionally embedded social problems such as honor-killings, but also 
conflict-induced subordination of the Kurdish women, their search for peace and justice 




Kurdish women positioned differently in political orientation, class and other social 
terms. Beber (2004: 268) notes “[c]rosscutting allegiances do not only serve as a means 
to prevent armed conflict. They also help to maintain just and fair opportunities, as they 
empower individuals to redefine their positions in society by weighing competing 
allegiances as they see fit.” As contended by Fraser; the notion of justice, and as stated by 
Kalder; civic consciousness rather than ethnic politics could have been crucial to 
establish much needed allegiances between the organized Turkish and Kurdish women’s 
groups in Turkey. A prudent state structure therefore would facilitate state-society 
articulation through systematic social, economic and political initiatives grappling with 
the root causes of inequality, poverty and unemployment as well as the impediments for 
practicing rights and political, legal and judiciary barriers in doing justice.  
The increasing socio-economic burden of neo-liberalism falls on the shoulders of 
the most vulnerable social classes in the form of poverty and unemployment. This burden 
feeds ethno-nationalist politics in southeastern Turkey and further endangers state-society 
articulation and reconciliation between the Turkish state and the conflict-induced migrant 
groups caught in between the violence of the past and social, economic and political 
vulnerabilities of the present. When social and political transformations open spaces for 
negotiation between the state and conflict-affected Kurds, women are more likely to get 
their voices heard in demand-making and policy implementation as legitimate social 
actors and citizens. As Turner (2000:36) observes ‘a conflict model of democratic 
citizenship’ might emerge out of radical social and political turmoil; “[w]arfare, 
occupation, and civil wars can often produce unintentionally the modernizing force 
necessary to erode gender hierarchies, status divisions, and the presence of primordial 




Democratic spaces can emerge as long as women are empowered in their families 
and outside to make demands and to participate in decision making processes, and further 
to establish alliances with each other across social groups and within social groups in 
class, ethnicity and political orientation terms. Power dynamics in geographies of 
violence could be changed for democratic consolidation when women are equipped with 
social and political agency to challenge systems of oppression capitalizing on conflict-
induced radical transformations with spaces for change at familial, communal, national 



















THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE STATE AND POLITICAL 
MOBILIZATION AMONG THE DISPLACED 
 
September 2004  
“I was invited by Isa to his house to have lunch with his mother and siblings. ‘My 
sisters will like you. You are like a good role model for them. I want them to 
study, like you’ he said to me to convince me for the lunch. His father was 
disappeared by the Turkish security forces in 1992 when Isa was 14 years old and 
his youngest brother was just a couple of months old, and his family was forced 
by the Turkish army to leave their village in 1993. Now he lives in one of 
Diyarbakır’s inner city neighborhoods with his mother, three younger sisters and 
one 12 year-old brother. His sister, Berfin opened the door with hesitation and a 
concerned look. After Isa introduced me to her, she started smiling and admitted 
that I looked to her ‘like not from [t]here’ and she first thought I was an under 
cover Turkish cop. She told me that once a female cop with civilian clothing went 
to their home to ask them about Isa’s whereabouts. Something had happened and 
they got suspicious that Isa was involved. ‘They very likely knew that there was 
no adult male in our household other than Isa, so they sent a female cop, as tall as 
you are, to ask us questions. Isa did not do anything wrong’ she said timidly… 
When I told her that I was a Turk too, she giggled, ‘yah! But you are a good 
one’…  
After a while we entered the house, we heard children outside shouting the 
famous pro-PKK124 slogan ‘Biji Serok Apo!, Biji Apo Serok Apo!125’ And then 
we heard the Turkish security patrols shouting back to the children ‘Go to your 
homes children! don’t make us go in there!’ Isa checked the street from his 
balcony and said to me, ‘This is children’s favorite play, going closer and closer 
to the security patrols, throwing small stones to them, running back into the 
neighborhood shouting “Biji Serok Apo!”’ He started laughing, ‘This is so much 
fun to watch.’… I asked him what the patrols would usually do as a reaction. He 
told me that unless anything serious happens, they would do nothing. ‘At least not 
anymore’ [he continued] ‘before, they would run after the children, get some of 
them and maybe detain them for a while. Now they just stay calm. They don’t 
even want to step in the neighborhood, afraid that things might get out of their 
                                                 
124Kurdistan Labor’s Party (PKK) is the Marxist-Leninist separatist Kurdish organization waging a guerilla 
war against the elements of the Turkish state and the opposing Kurdish communities. The organization is 
officially considered as a ‘terrorist’ organization by many countries around the world including the US and 
western European countries.  
125 ‘Long live leader Apo!, Long live Apo, leader Apo!’. Apo means uncle in Kurdish and is used by the 




control. Europe is watching; they can’t do anything, especially to young children.’ 
Then, I asked him if he knew the children and if they were from the forced 
migrant families like that of his. He said, ‘all of them!’ Unlike Isa, I got 
concerned not only because there are nothing more than children in Diyarbakır 
and these kids are socializing ‘playing’ with armed ‘security’ forces who are not 
necessarily feeling responsible for the security of those children, but also because 
that sympathy for a violent organization and its leader seems like turning into a 
religion in this geography”126  
 In this chapter, I lay out the major actors that have been concerned with 
the displacement of Kurds in southeastern Turkey and have recently negotiated over the 
issue. I am particularly interested in how displacement and the displaced Kurdish 
population have been perceived, negotiated about and dealt with by different actors 
including the international community, Turkish state, civil society organizations and local 
municipal governments. The following discussion is important to disentangle the 
discourses that ‘rights’ of and ‘risks’ posed by the displaced Kurds have been articulated 
by those actors other than the displaced themselves. At a juncture of international, 
national and local spaces of politics and policies, I propose that displaced Kurds have 
turned into ‘victims’, ‘citizens’, ‘security threats’, ‘potential refugees’, ‘client electorate’, 
and/or ‘partisans’ in their contextually defined position in relation to different actors 
involved. This chapter is important to be able to conceptualize forced migration as a 
politically defined process involving actors with various degrees of leverage over 
negotiations. The discussion in this chapter is important to see how international actors 
and processes are involved in an internal conflict, therefore in turn to conceptualize the 
recent nature of the Kurdish Question in relation to international conjecture and 
international developments. 
                                                 




The reason that displacement has attracted international attention is that the 
displaced population is perceived by the international actors in terms of the ‘risks’ 
associated with governability of displaced Kurds within the discourses of ‘reconstruction’ 
and ‘development’ and ‘rights’ associated with the international human rights regime. 
International involvement using the requisites of the international rights of internally 
displaced people drawing upon international human rights discourses together with the 
pressure coming from the European Court for Human Rights has changed the Turkish 
state attitude towards displaced Kurds.  
An emphasis has been put on social problems and legal demands of displaced 
masses across the country with attempts to formulate social policy initiatives to meet the 
basic needs of displaced Kurds and encourage them to return with a promise of socio-
economic reconstruction in their places of origin. The government initiatives, indeed, 
have introduced a seemingly promising dynamic through which articulation between the 
poor displaced Kurdish communities and the central government is to develop in terms of 
social and legal rights rather than exclusion and disregard. On the other hand, displaced 
Kurds’ direct encounter with organized actors happens at a very local level. Local 
governments and political party organizations on the ground (i.e. pro-Kurdish and pro-
Islamist political parties); capitalize on socio-economic vulnerabilities of local 
constituents trying to establish new forms of clientelistic relations in exchange for social 
services and provisions, in face of the lack of effective social state. My specific focus on 
the southeastern provincial center-Diyarbakır reveals that pro-Kurdish actors facilitate the 
creation of an ethnicized discourse of poverty and unemployment in Diyarbakır- the city 




In this chapter, I further illustrate that politicization among displaced Kurds has 
the potential to turn into violent protest activities in southeastern Turkey with a 
manifestation of the radical face of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist sentiments among the 
grassroots, particularly the young generation men and women. I further point out the 
importance of the ‘urban space’ in turning politicization and antagonism among the 
grassroots into mobilization and activism. The very local domain of Diyarbakır is quite 
receptive to the changes at the national and international level, particularly the 
sporadically changing attitude of the pro-Islamist central government towards the 
Kurdish Question, and developments with Turkey’s European Union accession process 
and interests of the EU actors in Turkey’s southeastern region.  
This chapter is important to see that local contention turns into activism under the 
conjunction where national and international changes meet local and regional 
developments. Urban activism in that respect is much more limited and weaker in 
western city centers despite the fact that western city centers also received substantial 
amount of conflict-induced Kurdish migration during 1990s. Peculiar local dynamics as I 
discuss in this chapter are important in instigating and organizing mobilization in 
southeastern city centers. 2006 violent urban rampage that started in Diyarbakır and 
spread to the neighboring city centers in the southeast is an example in point. Mass urban 
activism in southeastern Turkey has indeed recently become a regular manifestation of 
the Kurdish ethno-nationalist contention in southeastern Turkey. Preceding discussion in 
the chapter provides a picture to understand the root causes and demands of the violent 
urban street battles of 2006 as well as the incentives of the participants to join. I explain 
that the pro-Kurdish movement at the elite level and episodic events carried out at 




peace beyond their identity-based ethno-nationalist circles127 using the language of 
justice, rule of law, welfare, social democracy and social equity.128. 
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SOCIAL STATE  
In this section, I show that socio-economic insecurities of displaced Kurdish 
population carry potential social and political risks for different power actors. Those 
‘risks’ are defined in different terms by different actors, and dealt with different political 
means. The international community-- including the UN and EU as well as the 
ECtHR129-- defines the ‘risks’ in terms of the discourses of socio-economic 
underdevelopment in southeastern Turkey and governance of displaced population for 
international and regional stability. Operationalizing the discourses of rights including 
international human rights and international IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) rights, 
international community pragmatically balances (and sometimes covers) their concerns 
about potential ‘threats/risks’ that uprooted Kurdish communities might pose for 
international security in general and European countries in particular. The recent Turkish 
state attitude towards the displaced population in terms of developing policy initiatives to 
accommodate the poorest sectors of displaced in urban centers in fact pleases the 
international community, who is interested in overturning the problem as an international 
concern and reducing it to a domestic issue.    
                                                 
127 As I explained in chapters 4 and 5, the language of peace in the current pro-Kurdish movement is 
contained within a language of war glorifying the PKK and justifying the PKK violence. 
128 Instead, pro-Kurdish movement –now its ideology is ubiquitous among forced migrant grassroots- has 
been so far crippled by the futile language of culture, language and identity staunchly committed to the 
violent PKK ideology. 
129 ECHR is established under the structure of the Council of Europe, which is an independent body from 
the EU within the European system. Turkey, although is not a member of the EU is one of the signatory 




The state construes the ‘risks’ associated with the displacement issue in terms of 
displaced population’s becoming more ‘visible’ to the international community as they 
get more marginalized and silenced in the domestic arena. Recently, the central 
government is willing to address the displacement issue and negotiate the policy 
initiatives with the international community for three main reasons 1) to reduce the 
‘social risks’ associated with irregular/informal housing, poverty, street children and 
crime in urban centers by treating the displaced population in terms of social citizenship 
and/or encouraging them to return back homes 2) to manage the growing international 
pressure on Turkey that requires the Turkish state to deal with the displacement issue in 
compliance with the international guiding principles on ‘IDPs’ drawing upon rights, 
reconstruction and development concerns in conflict areas; 3) to overturn the problem as 
an international concern and invalidate the legal cases against the Turkish state at the 
ECtHR. Lack of articulation between the central government and the conflict-induced 
migrant Kurds has the risk of prioritizing the politically defined concerns over local 
needs, demands and interests. However, what has emerged as a by-product of the 
international negotiation with the central government to accommodate the displaced 
population especially in city centers is the government predisposition to evaluate the 
consequences of displacement such as poverty in terms of social citizenship.   
Along the way throughout negotiations between the international actors and the 
central Turkish government since 2002, national civil society organizations have been left 
out of the decision-making processes to a large extent. This is partially associated with 
the general weak position of the civil society actors in Turkish politics; and partially a 
consequence of the state’s endeavor to dominate the negotiation process by leaving out 




International Actors and International Rights Discourses  
Internal population displacement arises as an issue of international concern not 
only because it falls under the international humanitarian and human rights law130 but 
also because it might spill over national borders and turn into an international security 
concern (see for example Hyndman 2000, Dubernet, 2001 and Mooney, 2002). 
International refugee regime particularly after the Cold War has developed with such a 
concern of mass human flights towards European countries. With growing number of 
people displaced in late 1980s, there emerged systematic international concerns leading 
to changes in the ways that the international regime governs displaced populations.   
In the year 1992, a Special Representative on ‘Internal Displacement’, Francis 
Deng, was for the first time nominated by the UN Secretary General, who produced the 
“Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” drawing upon international refugee, 
human rights and humanitarian law. Together with specific interest on ‘internally 
displaced persons’, international community including UN has tended to control the 
displaced populations within the borders of the nation-states creating safe havens in 
places like Northern Iraq in 1991 (Operation Provide Comfort) and Bosnia in 1993. 
Displacement governance policies in turn prevented border crossings and boosted the 
number of internally displaced people in the world in 1990s (for a general discussion see 
for example Harrell-Bond 1996 and Hyndman 2000, for a discussion on the Kurdish 
refugees in Iraq see Adelman 1992). The new era of increasing intra-state violence across 
the world in 1990s has also wrought new problems of economic underdevelopment, 
                                                 
130 Indeed, too much international involvement with conflict-induced population displacement increased 
the salience of international human rights discourses, as international actions (intrusion of national 




social marginalization/exclusion as well as new national and international projections to 
tackle these problems including economic and social reconstruction and development in 
conflict areas/geographies. International involvement with the internally displaced 
populations has increased enormously in contradiction to the original notion of 
sovereignty. Martin (2002:37) notes; 
The changing context for humanitarian action also affects the roles and 
responsibilities of international organizations with regard to forced migrations. 
Formerly, most responsibility for handling forced migration crises went to 
UNHCR, which mobilized resources from sister agencies. Today, new sets of 
actors drawn from security, military, human rights, and development communities 
have growing involvement, particularly in situations involving internal 
displacement. [emphasis added]  
The Turkish case of the displacement of Kurds however, was an exception for 
international involvement until the end of 1990s. Within the interested international 
community, Turkey was called ‘a tough nut to crack’ for international actors concerned 
with the situation of displaced Kurds (Cohen 1999). The UN, its sub-units and the 
humanitarian agencies had been ineffective in their attempts to pressure the Turkish state 
to address the displacement of Kurds in Southeastern Turkey (see Cohen 1999 and 
Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004)131. UNHCR, UNDP and the other UN subagencies 
as well as international humanitarian organizations were not (still are not, except for 
limited UN collaboration with the central state after 1999) allowed to work with 
                                                 
131 Selectivity in international intervention and involvement, therefore, indicates the importance of power 
relations in the international arena versus the concerns for national sovereignties. Hence, the traditional 
meaning of sovereignty in the international law should be questioned in any attempt to understand the 
international involvement in humanitarian situations. As Krasner (1999) points out, it may not be the 
concerns with sovereignty, but power dynamics that determine intervention politics. Also see Andreas 
Feldmann (2002) for a discussion of selectivity in international responses to internal displacement 




displaced communities in Turkey132. Parallel to Krasner’s (1999) proposition, 
diplomatic power that Turkey had in international arena gave her the leverage to prevent 
international intrusion into her national sovereignty while international actors including 
international humanitarian organizations do not struggle a lot to cross national borders of 
many non-western countries around the world notifying international human rights 
violations and stipulation of humanitarian assistance.  
Despite Turkey’s resistance against international involvement with the issue of 
conflict-induced mass population displacement in 1990s, Kurdish Question could not 
escape becoming an international issue as masses of Turkish Kurds started spilling over 
the Turkish borders towards Europe and towards Northern Iraq en mass, which was an 
indication of state’s failure (and/or systematic policy) (not) to protect and accommodate 
its own conflict-affected civilian population. Human rights organizations such as HRW 
(Human Rights Watch) and AI (Amnesty International) became the most diligent actors 
trying to point out the human rights violations involved in displacement process and 
calling for the Turkish state to facilitate return. A tension has also emerged between the 
Turkish state and international community including EU and UN. Relatively less 
influential EU institutions such as the EU Parliament periodically called attention to the 
                                                 
132 Part of the explanation for this may be the Turkish state’s commitment to keep its ‘Kurdish Question’ 
insulated from international intervention. However, operations of international organizations (and even 
national NGOs) have always been strictly limited and under state control in Turkey. Even during the 1999 
earthquakes that officially claimed the lives of more than 17,000 people and displaced a much greater 
number of people in western Turkey, involvement of  national and international NGOs including the 
humanitarian aid organizations was strictly prevented (Jalali 2002). So it would be a grave mistake to 
associate a direct ethno-political connotation to the Turkish state’s resistance to international involvement 
in the situation of displaced Kurds. Majority of the academic and non-governmental policy research has 
attributed ethnic connotations to the Turkish state’s resistance to international involvement in the situation 
of displaced Kurds and in turn contributed to what I call ‘ethnicization’ of the perception of processes of 
the armed conflict and population displacement. Ethnic connotations discursively attributed to certain 
processes of the armed conflict distract attention away from broader structural problematiques embedded 




instability in the region and village evacuations by the Turkish security forces. More 
powerful EU units including the EU commission and the EU council however remained 
cautiously reluctant to bring the issue into the negotiation agenda (Personal email 
correspondence with Sugden of HRW-Human Rights Watch; also see Sugden 2004).  
As a unity aiming to stabilize its immediate periphery, European Union was, 
during the 1990s primarily concerned with the disrupting impact of the ‘Kurdish 
question’ on its own geography through uncontrolled migrations. In a parallel vein, EU 
approach towards the internally displaced Kurds in Turkey—except less than systematic 
declarations of the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe concerned with human rights violations-- was closely associated with the 
concerns over instability and disoriented human mobility in Southeastern Turkey133. 
When uprooted Kurdish refuges from Turkey (and also Northern Iraq following Saddam 
Hussein’s attacks on Iraqi Kurds) started accumulating at the doors of the West European 
countries in mid 1990s; Europe saw them as a social, economic and political threat to be 
rebuked (see for example, Bloch and Levy (1999); Hyndman (2000); Joly (2002); Ugur 
(1995). Going further, European countries associated the uncontrolled refugee flows to 
Europe from Asia via Turkey with the political instability in the Middle East including 
Turkey’s southeast (Council of Europe (COE), 2002; European Parliament (EP), 2003; 
Commission of the European Communities, 2002).  
EUROPE BLAMES TURKEY FOR REFUGEE CRISIS 
                                                 
133 As a local director of a development NGO operating in the major provincials in the eastern Turkey 
reported in an interview that “through the funds that the European countries channel to Turkish 
development agencies, they aim to keep the unstable Kurdish population of Turkey in their original place of 
residence by increasing their living standards and encouraging socio-economic development in the region; 
therefore, they aim to prevent the uprooted Kurdish population- [not only the displaced but also rural-urban 
economic migrants]- from being migrants in the European countries” (Interview: 17/8/2004; TKV-Turkish 




In a recommendatory decision regarding the flow of Asian and Far East refugees 
through Turkey to Europe, the European Parliament said that the refugees could 
be stopped only when a political solution brought an end to clashes in Northern 
Iraq and instability in southeastern Turkey. The European Parliament urged the 
EU to begin international initiatives for finding a political solution to the growing 
refugee problem (Hürriyet, 1998 in Turkish Press Review). 
Since 1990s, ‘Kurdish Question’--as it has been mainly equated by the EU system 
and actors with socio-economic underdeveloped, inter-regional disparities and human 
rights violations in Turkey-- has become an increasingly essential bargaining power on 
the side of the European countries in their attempts to put further barriers along Turkey’s 
alleged ‘accession’ process to the Union. The Kurdish card has been persistently used to 
keep the ‘Turkish allies’ out of the Union by reiterating that Turkey suffers from the 
deficiencies of its democracy and house a socio-politically unstable, economically 
underdeveloped Southeastern region. Rather than an engagement with human rights 
violations, population displacement and/or finding a ‘political solution’ to reconcile the 
PKK problem, all EU institutions and countries some way or another have displayed a 
pragmatic, security minded approach towards Turkey’s Kurdish Question including the 
displacement problem.  
EU has recently integrated the displacement issue into its recommendations in 
such a negligent way that acutely disappointed the politicized Kurdish Diaspora in 
Europe (EU-Turkey Civic Comission 2005). In a 2004 accession report the issue was 
worded very briefly as part of the following policy recommendation; “[t]he normalisation 
of the situation in the South-east should be pursued through the return of displaced 
persons, a strategy for socio-economic development and the establishment of conditions 




2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, COM (2004) 656 final, 6 
October: 55) 
The arrest of the PKK leader and so-called ‘success’ against the organization, 
subsequent lifting of the emergency rule in the southeast and the official starting of the 
membership negotiations with EU in 1999 inscribed a turning point in the Turkish state 
attitude towards international involvement in the displacement issue. However, more than 
anything, it was the increasing financial burden of the ECtHR cases and the fear of 
potential future cases that convinced the Turkish government to settle the issue with the 
corresponding international community.134 Displaced population who was a population 
victimized by the Turkish state in the eye of the international organizations with human 
rights agendas therefore, would have been embraced by the state as ‘citizens’ to be taken 
care of.  
By agreeing to collaborate with the international actors, Turkish government 
actually attempted to take control of the issue, which ironically enabled the government 
to evade international pressure and human rights violation accusations. Accordingly, 
starting from the year 2001, by inviting the Special Representative, Francis Deng, the 
Turkish state has expressed its willingness to negotiate with UN over how to 
accommodate the ‘internally displaced persons’ in Turkey with necessary legal 
arrangements and a social policy. The recent cooperation between the state and UN might 
be a first step in developing social and economic policies targeting urban as well as rural 
poverty and unemployment within a broader perspective that integrates the political 
situation in Southeastern Turkey. As I explain further in detail below, international 
                                                 




involvement with displaced population in Turkey has recently encouraged the central 
government to embrace the vulnerable segments of the displaced population with an 
understanding of social citizenship and justice. Dynamics of this collaboration and which 
groups are destined to be excluded from the social development policies are yet to be 
seen.  
Civil Society and Representation of the Displaced 
Involvement of national civil society organizations with displacement and their 
effectiveness in negotiations between the international community and the Turkish 
government have been limited, fragmented and controversial for various reasons. During 
1990s, displacement entered the immediate agenda of several human rights organizations 
in Turkey including the Human Rights Foundation (IHD, NGO with pro-Kurdish 
overtones), the Foundation of the Oppressed (Mazlum-Der, NGO with pro-Islamist 
overtones) and the Foundation for Society and Legal Studies (TOHAV, NGO with pro-
Kurdish overtones). These organizations prepared regular reports and called attention to 
the human rights violations involved in displacement process including the torture, 
detention, extrajudicial killings and disappearance cases that many displaced Kurds and 
their family members suffered during displacement. IHD with its professional cadre was 
particularly well-equipped and effective in organizing many displaced villagers and 
carrying their cases to the ECtHR135.    
Other than human rights-oriented organizations run by professional staff (i.e. 
lawyers), there was only one migrants’ organization run by pro-Kurdish activists with a 
specific focus on displaced Kurds, (Im)migrants’ Association for Social Cooperation and 
                                                 




Culture (Göç-Der). During 1990s, Göç-Der offices were closed down several times due 
to the organization’s close affinity with and sympathy for the PKK. Despite interferences, 
the organization conducted various studies on forced migrant communities including the 
first wide-ranging survey in several western, southern and southeastern provinces (Göç-
Der 1999). It has, however, never managed to be treated as a side by the central 
governments and its policy recommendations have never been taken seriously (Interview 
with Göç-Der).  
Though, Göç-Der together with the other human-rights organizations became 
effective in inviting international attention on displacement of Kurds in Turkey; aside a 
few survey and research studies, the organization has never managed to be a grassroots 
organization and/or organize the grassroots for demand-making (explained by the director 
of the organization as a self-critique136). Many displaced Kurds’ affiliation with the 
organization has remained as a piece of membership contract paper signed in their first 
and likely to be the last encounter with the organization.  This last point was particularly 
evident in the case of Diyarbakır as many displaced in interviews indicated that they had 
been much more in contact with the IHD rather than Göç-Der. IHD with its much more 
professional team and effectiveness in carrying cases to the national courts as well as to 
the ECtHR had much more credit in the eyes of the displaced migrants than Göç-Der 
Diyarbakır office that was not able to provide any concrete legal and/or material 
assistance to the displaced137.    
                                                 
136 Interview with Göç-Der. 
137 My short visit to the province of Van provided me with a slightly different picture regarding the Göç-
Der’s relationship with the local people. Together with a predominately forced migrant-populated district 




Nationwide civil society organizations treated the displacement issue within the 
boundaries of human rights discourse and to some extent within the context of citizenship 
rights violations. However, the anti-state stance of the organizations concerned with the 
displaced Kurdish population has hindered their legitimacy in the eye of the elements of 
the state and rendered any communication impossible. Civil society organizations were 
also unable to frame the issue in such that displacement would be seen as part of a larger 
picture of political violence with its implications in terms of rule of law, social justice and 
political corruption concerning not only Kurds but also everybody else in Turkey.  
To the general Turkish public, the issue remained so marginal and distant despite 
the fact that its consequences have been ubiquitous all around Turkey in the form of 
urban poverty, street children, irregular urbanization, gettoization and crime. A 
meaningful articulation between the state and national civil society organizations in terms 
of the issues of citizenship, rule of law, social reconciliation of political violence and/or 
distributive justice for conflict affected masses has never been realized. The state and the 
civil society organizations have continued to be antagonistic towards each other rather 
than collaborative or reconciliatory.   
When the central government started communicating with UN in addressing the 
situation of the displaced citizens and formulating policy initiatives to tackle their needs 
in 2002; above mentioned civil society organizations have been left out of the picture. 
The government discourse has dominated the international collaboration as even the UN-
                                                                                                                                                 
sponsored projects including a health center and a carpet and tricotage fabric workshop projects targeting 




Ankara office has had to conform to the sensitivities and priorities of the state138. 
However, a newly founded civil society organization- TESEV (Economic and Social 
Studies Foundation of Turkey) has recently entered the picture as the civil society actor 
that the central government and international actors such as UN and EU prefer to 
communicate with regard to the issue (Ayata and Yükseker 2006).  
Although certain elements of the state including the bureaucratic circles and the 
Turkish army are in tension with the TESEV due to the financial and supposedly 
ideological ties of the organization with the Soros Foundation139, TESEV with its liberal 
(economy), pro-EU stance is in amity with the current pro-Islamist government that 
pursues aggressive economic liberalization140 and is ironically pro-western. With 
TESEV dominating the ‘civil society’, Pro-Kurdish civil society organizations such as 
IHD and Göç-Der have been further excluded from negotiations at the national and 
international level (for a policy oriented study, see for example Ayata and Yükseker 
2006).                     
The Welfare State and Displacement 
The first serious policy initiative concerned with the displaced Kurdish population 
was taken by the state in 1998. A “Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project” (RVRP) 
                                                 
138 One important implication of this has been the adoption of a language diluting the state responsibility 
for village evacuations and putting the emphasis on ‘terror’ in justifying the state actions during the course 
of the armed conflict. Another sensitivity of the state has been to carry on policy programmes without a 
reference to the ‘ethnic’ dimension of the issue. Therefore, in none of the policy documentations and 
legislations has there been a reference to the ethnicity of the citizens displaced (see for example Ayata and 
Yukseker 2006 Birikim).  
139 TESEV is considered subservient to the neo-liberal interests and its social, economic and political 
recommendations are perceived as undermining rather than strengthening the legitimacy of the institutions 
protecting democracy in Turkey including the state bureaucracy, judiciary and the army- staunch defenders 
of laicism/secularism in the country.  
140 Including rapid privatization, pro-market economic orientation and a full compliance with the IMF (see 




was initiated by the government. Similar to a previous “Return to Village” project in 
1994; this project particularly targeted the southeastern region and its displaced 
population once the intensity of the armed conflict reduced drastically in 1998. In 1999 
and 2000 major state actions including an “Action Plan for the Eastern and Southeastern 
Regions” were taken to broaden the scope of the RVRP to integrate social and economic 
development strategies to be implemented in the eastern and southeastern Turkey.141 
The state was diligent to grapple with the displacement issue as part of the initiatives to 
‘normalize’ the situation in the southeastern region after the PKK was repressed to a large 
extent. The lifting of the emergency situation regime was accordingly accelerated at the 
eve of the EU negotiations of 1999.   
In the mean time, accumulating financial compensations to be paid to the 
displaced villagers for the cases lost at the ECtHR has turned the displaced Kurds a 
financial burden for the central government towards the end of 1990s. The ECtHR cases 
lost to the displaced villagers also proved that Turkey’s politically antagonistic group of 
suspicious citizens (who would later on be called by the Turkish army ‘so-called’ 
citizens142 in 2005) were taken seriously by the international community and given 
leverage to the detriment of the Turkish government in the presence of evidence that 
actions of Turkish security forces against civilians could not be justified under 
international law (see for example ECtHR-case of Akdivar and others v. Turkey- 1996).  
                                                 
141 Ayata and Yukseker (2005: 22) notes “The content of the “Action Plan” was never made public. 
Reportedly, the 107-item plan had 47 clauses related to economy, 30 about public administration, 14 on 
education, 13 on health and 3 miscellaneous items (R. Kazim Yucelen, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 74 (Donem 
21), November 1 2001; available from http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanakdonem21/yil4/bas/b015m.htm)” 
142 Although, displaced Kurds had been treated as second class citizens since the moment they were 
uprooted, this label of ‘so-called citizens’ was not used in official discourse until the year 2005 when Kurds 




In 2002, the central government started to communicate with UN/UNDP over developing 
a socio-economic policy program to tackle with the consequences of population 
displacement including how to return the displaced back to their rural settings143. The 
“Law on Compensation for Losses Resulting from Terrorism and the Fight against 
Terrorism” was enacted by the Parliament in July 2004 to pay compensation to the 
conflict-affected citizens for the state-caused destruction during the course of the conflict.  
The displaced communities who were previously treated as accomplice of the 
terrorist forces came to the government attention as ‘citizens’144. Not surprisingly, the 
implementation process of the law has so far indicated that the state is still inclined to 
differentiate between the displaced Kurds within a scale including the displaced who are 
the least deserving of the compensation—for example families of the PKK members on 
the one end and the ones most deserving— for example previous and/or current village 
guards on the other end145 (see for example Dilek Kurban 2006 2007 for a legal policy 
analysis). However, this law is still an important step in such that for the first time, the 
central government did not fail to articulate displacement and related material damage 
within the terms of rights and the state responsibility towards citizens.  
Starting from 1998, the Kurdish Question came to dominate the state agenda 
again as a socio-economic development problem, so did the displacement issue. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
authorities after two Kurdish children from migrant families in the southern city of Mersin put fire on a 
Turkish Flag on May 2005 during the Newroz Spring festival. 
143 Interview with a representative from UNDP, Poverty Reduction Program, January, 5, 2004, also see 
www.undp.org/tr/  
144 There is no reference to ethnicity (i.e. Kurdish) in any official document/report/legislation.  
145 During the interviews I conducted with the displaced migrants, many interviewees indicated that the 
law was not enough to compensate neither for the material nor non-material costs of displacement. While 
many displaced families had made and/or were planning to make an application to benefit from the Law, 
they expressed frustration and anger for that has been too late for them to consider the law as a meaningful 




locus of the state discourse changed from an attention on ‘terror’-temporarily believed to 
be over by the state circles- to an engagement with ‘socio-economic development’ in 
southeastern and eastern Turkey. Growing ethnicized social tension in city centers and 
growing urban problems associated with displacement have become further triggering 
factors for the central government to encourage return. In August 2005, the government 
formulated a framework document for policy titled “Measures on the Issue of IDPs and 
the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project in Turkey” (see for example Aker et.al 
2006). Although return is not considered as a permanent option for the majority of 
displaced Kurds, even the ones with least incentive to return demand to (re)establish 
previous socio-economic survival mechanisms through rural-urban connections. 
Therefore, return is a pragmatic means of social risk reduction in the urban centers on the 
side of the central government, and a demand to access homeland and regain the socio-
economic survival nets in the rural on the side of the displaced masses.     
The state actually avoided any actions and discourses that might have led to 
politicization of the displacement issue. Accordingly, new state initiatives have 
constructed the issue as a social justice problem (‘the law on compensation for losses 
resulting from terrorism’) and a concern with development and reconstruction (‘return 
and rehabilitation’ policy). Indeed, recent government initiatives addressing the situation 
of displaced citizens aim to depoliticize the displacement issue in the international arena, 
and develop a new form of articulation with the displaced population in terms of social 
rights and an emphasis on return. Therefore, international actors such as ECtHR which 
had been unwelcome mediators between the Turkish state and the displaced communities 




created discourse of displacement started to dominate politics and policies regarding the 
displaced population in Turkey.        
Another important development happened with the initiation of a large-scale 
survey undertaken by a state university in Ankara, titled “Study on Migration and the 
Displaced Population in Turkey146” in December 2004. Although it is at this point not 
clear what type of policy initiatives will follow the results of this state-initiated field 
study, the central government seems to be willing to treat the displaced population as part 
of the general urban poor population by facilitating their access to available welfare 
provisions. The results of the state Study might further invoke a necessity to design 
specific policy programmes to tackle with the needs and demands of the displaced 
population. A policy focus on displaced migrant communities in urban centers; however, 
would provide insights for evaluating urban poverty under a different light. Changing 
nature of urban poverty and emergence of ‘new poverty’ –as cited by Buğra and Keyder 
2003, 2006 and I discuss in previous chapter--in western and eastern city centers since 
1980s have been closely interrelated with the armed conflict and its socio-economic 
impact spilling across the conflict territories.  
There are however, several complications in formulating social policy specifically 
targeting conflict-induced migrants in the city centers; including  1) the inability of the 
social state to come up with any kind of social policy initiative for poverty reduction due 
to limitations of neo-liberal restructuring imposed upon it, including the IMF restrictions 
on the budget transfers to the social sector 2) the difficulty to distinguish between forced 




implications of doing this, such as creation of social tension between different migrant 
groups in the cities and 3) the embeddedness of social and economic urban problems into 
broader political trajectories that are not possible to deal with especially without public 
investment, systematic redistribution strategies and employment creation that are beyond 
the logic of social policy.   
GEO-POLITICS OF SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY:  
EU ENTERS POLITICS OF URBAN SPACE 
In this section, I provide a geo-political picture of the post-1999 era in 
southeastern Turkey in order to clarify the context in which the displaced communities 
currently live. In 1990s, the political violence in Southeastern Turkey reached its highest 
level. Those years were the years that the number of displaced people and extra-judicial 
killings by the Turkish security peaked (Global IDP, HRW reports). PKK’s guerialla war 
started losing ground towards the end of the 1990s. One major reason for that was the 
depopulation of the rural areas that provided human and logistic support for the 
organization since the mid 1980s. (Bozarslan ve Gurbey, reference) It is important to 
distinguish the post-1999 era from the pre-1999 conflict. The latter refers to the armed 
conflict era with emergency rule across the southeast. The former refers to substantial 
decline in the intensity of the armed conflict after the arrest of the PKK leader, the lifting 
of the emergency rule in the region and the start of the membership negotiations between 
the EU and Turkey.  
The intensity of the armed conflict between the Turkish security forces and the 
Kurdish insurgent organization decreased substantially in 1999 after the arrest of the head 
                                                                                                                                                 




of the PKK. The same year, the PKK declared a ceasefire, which lasted until 2004. 
Between 1999 and 2002, emergency rule law (martial law) in the region was gradually 
lifted. Diyarbakır, where the fieldwork data was collected, was one of the last two 
provinces to have the rule of emergency lifted in the year 2002. Together with the EU-
sponsored democratization reforms at the political level, there emerged an environment 
of relative stability and security in the urban centers in Southeastern Turkey.  
Civic activism in Southeastern Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s was highly 
politicized and concerned with Turkish state violence and repression in the region. The 
influence of the PKK and its ideology was dominant in local public debate and in the 
recurrently politicized civil society (see also, Gambetti, 2005). The easing of the armed 
conflict after 1999 with the arrest of Öcalan, the PKK ceasefire and the gradual lifting of 
the emergency rule opened a new civic space in the region especially in the provincial 
centers such as Diyarbakır. This newly emerging space, misleadingly seemed to have a 
potential for ‘different subject positions and political movements …be rearticulated, in 
order to create new hegemonic configurations of power that might open up trajectories 
for negotiation [in Southeastern Turkey]. (Öktem (2005: 241)”147 The upcoming 
developments however, would bring new socio-political tension and different forms of  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2006. 
147 It is important to note that the PKK ended the ceasefire in June 2004 when I was in the field in 
Diyarbakır. Currently, the fighting between the Turkish security forces and the PKK continues in certain 
rural areas in southeastern Turkey, though the intensity of the fighting is less than before and it’s 
geographically limited. PKK has also engaged in hit and run attacks against Turkish security points in 
several Southeastern provincial centers since 2004, several of them happened during my stay in Diyarbakır 
in the second half of 2004. There have also been declarations of the PKK cadres being published in pro-
PKK media, regarding the change in their guerilla war strategies, which they plan to move to urban centers 




violence to the southeastern urban centers now predominately populated by the forced 
migrant communities. 
The post-1999 period had the potential of peacefully transforming the Kurdish 
movement and its demands under the newly emerging power configurations that also 
involve international and regional actors such as the UN and European Union. 
Interestingly, there is still substantial military surveillance in southeastern Turkey in 
political, social, economic and cultural realms alongside political immunity discursively 
granted by the European Union’s leverage in the Turkish domestic arena through its 
demands for democratization reforms and zero-tolerance to human rights violations 
policies. The nature of the political immunity enjoyed in the region is indeed conducive 
to demand-making and ‘making the voices heard’, and even the poorest migrants living in 
precarious periphery neighborhoods in the cities like Diyarbakır and Van have the sense 
of this political space immune to the state oppression as I discuss later in detail. In this 
respect, geography as a regional concept and also as an urban space presents 
‘opportunities and constraints’ for organization and claim-making (Tilly 2003). American 
journalist Stephen Kinzer notes after his visit to southeastern Turkey in 2005: 
These talks [Turkey’s EU negotiation] could last for a decade or more, and the 
final outcome is far from guaranteed. Some European leaders, including Angela 
Merkel, the new German chancellor, and the French interior minister Nicolas 
Sarkozy, oppose Turkish membership. A host of issues, from terrorism in Europe 
to the status of Cyprus, could erupt to block Turkey. Yet in the Kurdish region, 
people are behaving as if they are already under Europe's protection. (Kinzer, 
2005) 
In the summer of 2004, then Secretary of the European Union responsible for 
enlargement, Günter Verheugen,  paid a visit to Diyarbakır, where he met the mayor of 
the provincial municipality (Pro-Kurdish Party), representatives of local civil society 




Turkish security forces for ‘security reasons’. Internationalization of Turkey’s Kurdish 
question together with the country’s entire internal affairs has contributed to the political 
space available for the contentious pro-Kurdish actors to put themselves to the fore in a 
quest to communicate with mainstream Turkish politics via international channels 
including the EU system, ECHR as well as the use of internationalized rights discourses. 
Diyarbakır, for example has gained (unofficial) recognition from the international 
community, European states and the EU. Rapprochement between the EU and the 
organized pro-Kurdish actors has not facilitated any negotiation between the Turkish 
state and the Kurds, which in fact caused further antagonism and suspicion on the side of 
the state and the pro-Islamist central government towards the pro-Kurdish actors.  
The EU process has also not been totally satisfying for the organized pro-Kurdish 
actors in the southeast or for the Kurdish European Diaspora.  The EU that was once a 
safe-haven for the PKK organization, had already started to express its resentment over 
continuing organic ties between legally operating pro-Kurdish political and civil circles, 
and the PKK by the end of 1990s. European countries stepped back in their willingness to 
further support the PKK when the violently militant face of the radical Kurdish 
nationalists and the criminal activities in which they got involved mushroomed across 
Europe especially in the urban centers of Germany (Eccarius-Kelly, 2000). Among the 
organized Kurds, the discontent with the EU overtures over Turkey in regard to the 
situation of the socio-politically excluded Kurds has increased steadily especially during 
2004 and 2005. In its 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, the 




one more time in a vaguely worded brief statement148. The European Union, which was 
considered as the most imperative political opportunity for the pro-Kurdish politics has 
turned into a disappointment as the Union’s pragmatic use of the ‘Kurdish card’ against 
Turkey is now more apparent than ever.149  
International developments have also found their resonance on the ground with 
disappointment among these local Kurds as their confidence in the EU as a leverage point 
against the state started fading away. Local population in the Southeast has been restless 
after 1999 with immediate expectations in terms of peace, cultural rights and social 
problems such as poverty and unemployment as high as 60% in Diyarbakır150. Provinces 
such as Diyarbakır, Batman, Hakkari, Şırnak and Tunceli have remained as the castles of 
the pro-Kurdish political parties in the 2004 local elections with a significant portion of 
their population highly politicized PKK sympathizers. In other southeastern provinces 
such as Van, Mardin and Siirt, pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) took 
over municipal control with its appeal to the poorest segments of the population with 
premises of welfare and justice. There is still however a politically agitated, mobilized 
pro-PKK population in Van, Mardin and Siirt, which makes itself visible in guerilla 
                                                 
148 ‘The normalisation of the situation in the South-east should be pursued through the return of displaced 
persons, a strategy for socio-economic development and the establishment of conditions for the full 
enjoyment of rights and freedoms by the Kurds’ European Commission, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s 
Progress Towards Accession, COM (2004) 656 final, 6 October: 55 
149 In a 2005 international conference on ‘The EU, Turkey and the Kurds’, pro-Kurdish groups organized 
in Europe stated their resentment over ‘the EU’s failure to address the situation of the Kurds in any kind of 
substantive or coherent manner,’ noting the ‘the highly negative potential implications of this scenario for 
the Kurds, other citizens of Turkey and the EU.’ EU-Turkey Civic Commission, The EU, Turkey and the 
Kurds. Second International Conference, (Brussels: European Parliament, 2005). 




funerals and in recent urban protests demanding an end to the incommunicado 
imprisonment of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan151.    
Another historical turning point was witnessed in Turkey in 2004 with the start of 
the fighting and bombing attacks by the PKK against the Turkish security units in the 
rural and the urban centers of the southeast. The PKK terror also targeted the civilians. 
Tension between the Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms restarted to climb with the 
Turkish public witnessing political conflict in the urban centers in the form of terrorist 
attacks against civilians and security units with anonymous perpetrators. In many 
occasions in western city centers, Turkish nationalists have attempted to lynch pro-
Kurdish protesters. Southeastern Turkey has also witnessed mass violent protests and 
demonstrations of various politicized Kurdish groups and civilians on the eve of Turkey’s 
EU negotiations.  
One year after the restarting of the conflict, in August 2005, the Prime Minister of 
Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid a visit to Diyarbakır where the pro-Kurdish party 
had gathered close to half of the provincial votes (41.84%) in the last local elections 
while his party followed it as the second (30.79%). This was not a regular visit but a 
political act in search of some kind of reconciliation of the political and the armed 
conflict as well as local support for his pro-Islamist party. Such a gesture was extended 
especially to the pro-Kurdish political party controlling the provincial municipalities in 
the region152 and its local constituency radically antagonistic towards the central state. 
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Erdoğan’s motivations on the other hand were strongly associated with the party’s 
commitment to the EU accession process that entered into a stalemate in the year 2004, 
rather than a sincere systematic political agenda to resolve the issue and/or a political 
program rooted in the party’s internal dynamics. Erdoğan did not find the local 
enthusiasm in Diyarbakır that he was looking for. He instead faced a local resentment 
that revealed that political radicalism and polarization in the region could not be easily 
smoothed over.   
Erdoğan’s currently ruling pro-Islamist government is in fact ready to admit the 
misdeeds of the state ‘in the past’ since he and his party had been in conflict with the 
central state bureaucracy and army that have been the guarantors of the secular state 
structure since the foundation of the Republic. The pro-Islamist government is also 
willing to entertain the pro-Kurdish demands in terms of ‘culture’ and ‘language’. 
However, pro-Kurdish politics are further in a quest to attain certain forms of 
decentralization that would give the Kurdish actors some form of ‘self-determination’ in 
the provinces in which they are in control as well as seats in the Turkish parliament that 
they never got to occupy due to the 10% national electoral threshold (stated publicly by 
pro-Kurdish actors in many occasions and also in my key informant interviews with the 
pro-Kurdish local municipality mayors as well as pro-Kurdish civil society 
representatives).  
Pro-Islamists on the other hand, are in search of an institutional restructuring 
undermining the secular foundation of the Kemalist state and changing the civic  
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membership of the Turkish nation to a religious solidarity or Islamic community (see for 
example Atacan 2001, Duran 1998). Under this understanding, Pro-Islamists argue that 
the secular basis of the Republic of Turkey has suppressed the Islamic identity in Turkey 
and in turn antagonized the country’s Kurdish population (see for example Yavuz 1998 
for a discussion supporting this Islamist proposition and see Cizre-Sakallioğlu 1998 and 
Ercan-Argun 1999 for two excellent critical accounts invalidating the same Islamist 
proposition). Pro-Islamists are however, not willing to make any concessions that would 
jeopardize the territorial integrity and/or lead to institutionalized cleavages in ethnic 
terms.  
Pro-Islamists are also not willing to welcome the PKK guerilla back to Turkey 
with ‘their dignity respected’ as demanded by the pro-Kurdish politics. Domestic and 
international development during the years 2004 and 2005, and Erdoğan’s Diyarbakır trip 
that turned into a political humiliation on his part proved the intricacy of any further 
negotiation and rapprochement between the pro-Islamist and the pro-Kurdish actors. 
Most importantly in relation to the 2006 urban protests, political stalemate in the Kurdish 
question during those years indicated that the PKK militants would continue to fight an 
elusive war, while their counterparts in the city centers like Isa would be looking for 
different ways of making themselves a part of the Kurdish mücadele (struggle).  
FROM GUERILLA WAR TO URBAN RADICALIZATION  
Changing Visions, Changing Expectations 
Today, more than two decades after the start of the armed conflict, Turkish state 
repression and the Kurdish insurgent violence continue to feed each other in a symbiotic 
relationship, in a vicious circle. With cessation of the armed conflict in the year 1999, 




reconciliation of the Kurdish Question in Turkey. The post 1999 period marked the pro-
Kurdish party’s coming to power in the local governments in many Southeastern 
provinces and also saw EU sponsored democratization reforms.   
These were the heydays of pro-Kurdish politics and pro-Kurdish civil organizing 
in Southeastern Turkey with political opening enabling these pro-Kurdish actors to 
establish themselves as active and legitimate representatives of the Kurds in the region. 
As Gambetti (2005:53) points out “[t]he municipality became the engine force that 
opened new spaces of communication and expression, which not only fostered cultural 
life, but also allowed for new political publics to emerge.”  In a similar vein, Öktem in his 
2005 study on Mardin a Southeastern province bordering Diyarbakır and located on the 
Turkish-Syrian border argued that urban spaces emerged ‘as the site of negotiation’ with 
the end of the armed conflict in 1999.    
While the large part of the territorial struggle of Kurdish insurgents was fought in 
the countryside, it is the urban space that emerges as the site of negotiation during 
the depolarization of politics, in the realm of symbols as well as in the everyday 
practice of its residents. (Öktem, 2005) 
I however, aim to show that these early hopes and projections are too much 
optimistic about both supposedly opening democratic spaces in Turkey as well as about 
the ability of the pro-Kurdish actors to capitalize on democracy in a reconciliatory 
manner.  
The pro-Kurdish political party (HADEP/DEHAP), considered as the legal 
extension of the PKK, came to the municipal government in several strategic 
southeastern provinces in 1999 and again in 2004, including Diyarbakır where 2006 
violent urban protest events were initiated. The party’s taking over municipal control 




citizen articulation in the region and set the basis for social and political reconciliation. 
The party with its local activities and civil society organizing on the one hand has 
functioned as a mediator between the pro-Kurdish movement and its grassroots 
constituency facilitating a better integration of the grassroots into the movement. 
Moreover, the pro-Kurdish actors have tried to maintain the delicate balance in their 
relations with the central state and their local constituency. While looking for spaces of 
communication where they can negotiate with the Turkish state, they have contributed to 
further politicization of their constituency through disseminating pro-Kurdish discourses 
centering around ‘culture’, ‘language’ and ‘identity’.   
International channels including the international human rights organizations and 
European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) have encouraged the organized pro-Kurdish 
groups to reach out to the grassroots and organize them to file cases against the Turkish 
state. International human rights discourses have turned into a bargaining power for 
thousands of Kurdish citizens to negotiate with the Turkish state in order to settle 
accounts of political violence in the form of displacement, torture and/or extra-judicial 
murders of family members. On the one hand, there are past accounts to be settled with 
the state including the wrongdoings of the state during the conflict years; on the other 
hand there are new concerns with the new circumstances including poverty and 
unemployment and new discourses internalized such as over human rights and cultural 
rights. Ordinary Kurdish citizens previously distant from the state circles have become 
involved in claim-making mechanisms. The urban centers to which the majority of the 
displaced Kurds moved turned into geographic catalysts for the ordinary civilians to 




space offering physical visibility, networks and communication as well as political 
opportunities to mobilize.    
Processes of ‘becoming political’ are multifaceted and complicated. Pro-Kurdish 
and more radical pro-PKK discourses operationalize Kurdish population displacement by 
accentuating the centrality of the ‘Kurdish homeland’ in the ‘Kurdish struggle’. These 
discourses incorporating international human rights, internally displaced people’s rights 
(IDP rights) and (Kurdish) cultural rights discourses are welcome, reproduced and 
disseminated on the ground by various organized Kurdish groups ranging from pro-
Kurdish CSOs to pro-Kurdish political parties with close ties with the Kurdish Diaspora 
in Europe as well as in the USA. The concepts of ‘war’, ‘violence’, ‘bloodshed’, 
‘oppression’, and ‘migration (göç)’ that have stricken the ‘Kurdish homeland’ (or 
Kurdistan) are integrated into these discourses and used to maintain political sensitivity 
as well as political activism among the Kurdish masses.  
Aras (2005) for example argues that pro-Kurdish groups including the pro-
Kurdish political parties working at the municipal levels in Southeastern Turkey 
deliberately attempt to maintain the tension between the masses of Kurds and the Turkish 
state through politicization of the displaced populations. This is, he argues, a political 
survival strategy for pro-Kurdish politicians through discourses that touch the 
sensitivities of the people through using Kurdish culture, language and identity with 
which everybody could easily associate themselves. Although this argument has some 
validity, it underplays the delicate balance that organized Kurds have to maintain in their 
relations with the central state and their local constituency.  
My impression in the field was that the attitudes of pro-Kurdish actors towards 




DEHAP, as well as pro-Kurdish CSOs look for spaces of communication where they can 
negotiate with the Turkish state. On the other hand, the politicized Kurdish population 
obliges them to be decisive in their ‘struggle’ against the state and expects them not to 
make any concessions on the ideals of the Kurdish struggle and Kurdish demands. Within 
this web of local, national and international dynamics, urban spaces --such as the highly 
pro-Kurdish Diyarbakır and the more divided Van where pro-Islamists are strong enough 
to challenge the pro-Kurdish political party-- have emerged as geographies of politicized 
identities, where there are local and national political struggles for control and power that 
have international repercussions.  
In the particular case of the displaced migrants, material demands and 
redistributive demands are articulated in ethnic identity terms, in other words they are 
seen as conditional to recognition of ‘Kurdishness’ and the ‘Kurdish struggle’ carried on 
by the PKK which they now ideologically follow and are tied via their blood.  
Interactions of the local populations at the civil society level also further contribute to the 
dissemination and strengthening of Kurdish ‘identities’.  Identity-related labels emerged, 
developed and were used among/by the pro-PKK Kurdish elite as well as organized pro-
Kurdish groups, such as notions of ‘yurtsever’ and ‘arkadaş’ with ethnicized/politicized 
connotations. Yurtsever is a Turkish word that literally means the person loving his/her 
nation/land (here means Kurdish nation/land/people). In the pro-Kurdish/pro-PKK 
discourse, Yurt (nation/land) refers to Kurdish nation and transstate Kurdish lands, 
‘Kurdistan’.  
In my interviews, I observed people using ‘yurtsever’ often to call themselves or 
their fellows in terms of their commitment to the Kurdish identity and ‘Kurdish struggle’ 




one another as ‘yurtsever’ call each other ‘arkadaş’ added after their first names153. 
These labels have emerged in a context where elite-produced discourses have been 
welcome and reproduced by the local people’s perception of their identity as the main 
reason for the oppression and violence that they have experienced. The dissemination of 
Kurdish identity and its politicization at the local level among the local communities 
through their PKK affiliations as well as via their encounters with pro-PKK civil 
organizing networks have also promoted solidarity through transnational bonds with the 
Kurds in other parts of Turkey, in Europe and in the other Middle East countries in which 
their fellow Kurds currently reside.    
Politicization of Kurdish identity has been; however, exclusive. Being Kurdish 
has been associated with all the suffering, human rights violations, killings, 
disappearances and displacement. The ones who stayed back home and collaborated with 
the Turkish state and the security forces have been attributed a lesser ‘Kurdish identity’ 
not only by the victims of displacement and state violence, but also by the organized 
Kurdish groups, activists and pro-Kurdish/pro-PKK civil society. There has emerged an 
internal enmity between ‘yurtsever’ Kurds who support the pro-Kurdish politics and 
sympathize with the PKK and the Kurds who refuse to challenge the mainstream Turkish 
politics and distance themselves from pro-Kurdish politics and the PKK.  
Kurds considered state friendly include a wide range of people such as Kurdish 
politicians, businessmen and Kurdish intellectuals who take on a more moderate, critical 
and at times pragmatic stance in relation to politics, as well as rural tribal communities 
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and village guards who agreed to collaborate with the Turkish security forces against the 
PKK. They are labeled as the opprobrium of the imagined ‘Kurdish nation’, threats to 
‘Kurdish struggle’, ‘betrayers’ who collaborated with the ‘enemy’, the ‘non-humans’ who 
failed to reason about what was right and what was wrong, and the ‘immoral’ who 
exchanged their souls and the cause of the Kurdish struggle for money, power and/or 
arms. Conflict-affected Kurdish communities that stayed back in rural areas have 
remained distant from the process of grassroots politicization associated with the 
organized Kurdish groups in the city centers. Rural communities, such as village guards 
fighting against the PKK got trapped in between their tribal leaders and the Turkish 
security forces. They have remained mute, marginalized by the pro-Kurdish politics and 
disregarded by the international human rights organizations if not identified as 
perpetrators of violence together with the Turkish state.   
It has been argued within some scholarly circles that the emergence of identity 
politics in Turkey after the military coup (1980) was a resurgence of the previously 
repressed local (or peripheral) identities (Keyman 1998). I argue that it was in fact a 
redefinition of local identities within a new neo-liberal era with particular political 
economic forces encouraging ethnic and religious politicization and polarization around 
the world. It was also a result of the constantly changing specificities of the local, 
national and regional context of the armed conflict and political violence in Turkey. 
Kurdish identity politics further refers to the politicization of the traditional, local 
peripheral identities at their intersections with the processes of migration, disorganized 
urbanization, neo-liberalism and globalisation. In this respect, identity politics has less to 




‘ethnic identity’ is defined and politicized as leverage in the making of particular 
demands and for political ends.  
Current pro-Kurdish politics including the PKK’s legal political and civil 
extensions in Turkey and in Diaspora, has an engagement with and/or quest for 
reinvigorating an imagined authentic Kurdish identity, that contingencies of ‘ethnicity’ 
and ‘ethnic identity’ are defined and politicized as leverage in the making of particular 
demands and for political ends. In this respect, this politicization of identity process is the 
pro-Kurdish politics’ demands to institutionalize ‘ethnic’ differences in Turkey to 
challenge the ‘ethnic visage’ of Turkish citizenship (Kirisci, 2000), ironically with 
ethnic(ized) demands that themselves are more likely to deepen the ethnic cleavages than 
to achieve social, economic and political integration of different ethnicities in Turkey. 
Politicization of Kurdish identity refers to attempts on the part of the pro-Kurdish politics 
to institutionalize ‘ethnic’ differences in Turkey. Politicization of Kurdish identity further 
entails demands on the side of the organized pro-Kurdish politics to institutionalize 
differences between southeastern Turkey and the rest of the country through a 
discursively defined form of self-determination. Kurdish identity, culture and language 
are in the center of these processes of identity politicization; and the poorest segments of 
the Kurdish migrants with peasant background constitute the grassroots base.  
Engaging with the concepts of ‘war’, ‘violence’, ‘bloodshed’, ‘oppression’, 
‘Kurdish homeland/Kurdistan’ and ‘forced migration’, and the demands for reviving and 
preserving ‘Kurdish culture’, ‘language’ and ‘identity’; the party and the pro-Kurdish 
civil society organizing has deliberately maintained the tension between the masses of 
Kurds and the Turkish state as a political survival strategy. In this way, political activism 




the civil society level have also further contributed to the dissemination and strengthening 
of a particular form of Kurdish identity associated with the PKK ideology. Certain labels 
with ethnicized/politicized connotations emerged to distinguish the friends and the foes; 
such as ‘yurtsever’ (lover of the [Kurdish] homeland). 
The restarting of the fighting in June 2004 proved the vulnerability of peace in 
Southeastern Turkey. Pro-Kurdish political party’s and its municipalities’ continuous 
commitment to the PKK ideology have further increased the tension between the state 
including the Turkish military and the pro-Islamist government and the pro-Kurdish 
actors. In June 2004, PKK declared an end to the ceasefire and restarted its attacks 
against the Turkish security points when I was in the field in Diyarbakır. This was just 
several months before the EU decision over whether or not to start negotiations with 
Turkey for full membership. The organization’s decision, in this respect, was strategic to 
put pressure on the Turkish state as well as the EU to take steps for political 
reconciliation with the PKK.  
The fighting between the Turkish security forces and the PKK resumed in certain 
rural areas in southeastern Turkey, though the intensity of the fighting has been so far 
lesser than before and it is geographically limited. PKK also started to conduct hit and 
run attacks against Turkish security stations in several southeastern city centers, several 
of them happened during my stay in Diyarbakır. There have also been declarations of the 
PKK cadres being published in pro-PKK media, regarding the change in their guerilla 
war strategies, which they plan to move to urban centers and metropolitan areas in 
Western Turkey. Although, the organization targeted civilians in city centers including 




centers have been specifically referred by the high-ranked PKK leaders as new places for 
future PKK activism (See for example Pro-PKK daily Yerel Gündem since 2004).    
In a parallel vein, if this new era started with the imprisonment of the PKK leader, 
the organization’s legal extensions in political and civil arena had already started to talk 
about new ‘domains and spaces’ of activism. In a local civil society assembly in the 
southeastern province of Diyarbakır on October 2004, one representative from a pro-
Kurdish NGO (ORUP- a pseudonym) acknowledged that the forced migration of the 
Kurdish communities has been an integral part of the ‘Kurdish struggle’. In fact, national 
and local civil society organizations concerned with forced population displacement, 
some of which are ideologically tied and sympathetic to the insurgent organization (PKK) 
have used ‘Kurdish displacement’ in their rhetoric and political discourses for a long 
time. In this particular occasion, however, the pro-PKK NGO representative addressed 
the difficulties of carrying out the armed conflict any further under the current regional 
and international conjecture and called for a united pro-Kurdish civil activism that would 
replace the armed ‘struggle’.   
Göç [migration] has emerged as a consequence of our mücadele [Kurdish 
struggle]. It has also showed us some of our internal problems… Armed conflict 
has not been a solution, we realized that armed struggle be carried into the civil 
domain, as Öcalan [imprisoned leader of the PKK] calls it, the 3rd space 
(Fieldnotes, 16/10/2004, Civil Society Assembly organized by ORUP, Kurdish 
Institute, Diyarbakır)154.    
Ironically, pro-Kurdish/pro-PKK organizing has been recently using two 
contradictory strategies. On the one hand, pro-Kurdish actors have been replacing the 
discourse of independence (an independent Kurdish state) with rhetoric of ‘Democratic 
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Republic’ in Turkey referring to ‘Turkish-Kurdish solidarity under the roof of Turkey’. 
On the other hand, they have been subtly encouraging new forms of pro-Kurdish 
organizing and activism with discursive references to new forms of violence, ranging 
from violent urban attacks in ‘Turkish cities’ promoted by the PKK to peaceful urban 
protest activities organized by the pro-Kurdish civil society to attract international 
attention.  
As top-down changes in the movement have not yet penetrated evenly into the 
grassroots, both pro-Kurdish politics and its local constituency seem perplexed about how 
to redefine the movement and its demands according to the changing domestic and 
international conjecture. Moreover, the consequences of the armed conflict and 
displacement are not easy to erase from the political memory of the displaced population. 
Firat’s account reveals the differential impact of the transformations in the Kurdish 
movement on different ranks of the PKK organization and on the sympathizers and 
followers of the organization. His interview points out the gap between the Kurdish 
movement as an elite project pragmatically altering its discourse as a result of the 
declining leverage of the PKK in the guerilla war and changes in the national and 
international context, and the pro-Kurdish politicization at the grassroots level.  
We left Batman [a southeastern province neighboring Diyarbakır] in the year 
1993. The cause was not directly the Turkish security, our problem was with 
Hezbullah. We were PKK sympathizers, they were against us. The state was also 
supporting them as a counter-guerilla strategy… My brother was murdered by a 
Hezbullah militant. After this, my entire family came here… Then I got arrested. I 
had been in prison for 7 seven years for PKK membership… The prisons are like 
PKK universities155, we are all together in there. We read, learn and discuss 
about politics all the time… Today, we want new developments that can bring 
democratic openings in this country. We want our Kurdish identity to be protected 
under constitutional rights. We demand this for all the other people [different 
                                                 




ethnicities] living under the roof of Turkey too. We believe that democracy will 
resolve all our problems in terms of cultural rights, but also women’s and 
children’s rights…. It is not easy to explain this to my 60 year-old father. He still 
talks about an independent Kurdish state. He is not able to understand the changed 
conjecture; he is still stuck with the possibility of an impossible Kurdistan for 
Kurds in Turkey (Interview with Firat, 29 year-old, winter 2004, Diyarbakır).      
Firat’s father interrupted the interview at this point: “If we won’t have our 
independent Kurdistan, then what the hell did you spend your 7 years in jail for and made 
your mother cry every single day during those years? Did she suffer for nothing? Did we 
suffer for nothing?” (Firat’s interview notes, 2004 Diyarbakır). The stance of Firat’s 
father in fact represents the feelings of many Kurds I interviewed. However, in general, 
the majority of the interviewees stands somewhere in between Firat and his father. In tens 
of interviews, the desire for an independent Kurdish state was discursively added to the 
accounts when the interviewees were asked about their major demands from the Turkish 
state and major expectations from the pro-Kurdish political party.   
Yet, in those accounts, interviewees also admitted that an independent Kurdish 
state was ‘just a desire in our hearts’ and difficult to achieve. In fact, the recent mottos of 
pro-Kurdish discourses propagated by the PKK as well as the pro-Kurdish political party 
were incorporated by the interviewees into their accounts such as ‘Democratic Republic 
under the roof of Turkey’, ‘Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood/sisterhood’, ‘peace for the 
guerilla, peace for the soldiers’ etc. However, when the interviewees were asked how 
peace could be achieved, the answers were striking. The overwhelming majority of the 
displaced migrants still support the PKK and see the organization’s violent acts against 
the Turkish state as well as against the pro-state Kurdish communities as legitimate acts 
to achieve ‘justice’, ‘rights’ and also ‘peace’. In those interviews, Kurdish women and 




to contribute further to the ‘Kurdish struggle’ by participating in and supporting the PKK 
guerilla activities. Meryem, a displaced woman in her 50s, ironically affiliated with the 
‘Kurdish Peace Mothers Initiative’ states 
I think with such an attitude of the state, the war will never end. My son got killed 
in the fighting; now I am more than ready to send his daughter to the mountain to 
fight for peace! (Interview with Meryem, Diyarbakır, fall 2004) 
Some displaced Kurdish youth, who were the children of the present and former 
PKK guerilla or rural militia, contradicting  Firat’s cautious and peaceful stance, stated 
that the ‘struggle’ should not have been limited to the mountains. Admitting the limited 
effectiveness of guerilla wars in the long run, those young people thought that the 
Kurdish resistance should have been carried into the metropolitan centers through various 
protest activities including violent tactics. The PKK violence was justified in the 
interviews with the counter-violence coming from the Turkish state and security forces, 
and internalized as a prerequisite for ‘justice’, the end of the years-long ‘oppression’ and 
gaining access to ‘cultural rights’. Isa, whose father was disappeared by the Turkish 
security forces when he was 14 years-old and whose family got displaced in 1993 notes 
I am a member of the DEHAP youth branch and the liveshield initiative… We 
want a general amnesty for the PKK guerilla and want the Turkish army to end its 
operations against the PKK immediately. We are not scared to face the Turkish 
soldiers. We want to show that we are ready to sacrifice our bodies for peace… 
Our protests are very peaceful, but we keep getting detained then released, then 
detained again… Nowadays, Turkey goes through interesting times due to the EU 
negotiations… Turkey’s EU membership would not change a lot for us. We want 
what we want! Turkey in the EU or not, we don’t care… If peace cannot be 
established, if our rights are disregarded, we may get violent. But this time we 
won’t go to the mountains to join the guerilla; we will enter into the hearts of the 
Turkish cities. [Emphasis added]  
(Interview with Isa, 26 year-old, Diyarbakır fall 2004)  




PKK is losing power and getting dissolved by groups detached from the 
organization after Apo’s [Abdullah Öcalan] imprisonment. Now there are 
independent militant groups that are and will be more violent than the PKK in the 
rural and in the cities. PKK may want to pause the fighting, but those groups will 
not listen to anybody156.  (Interview with Isa, 26 year-old, winter Diyarbakır 
2004) 
Despite democratic openings, Southeastern provincial centers still remain 
politically vulnerable as well as radical with local populations’ expectations of peace, 
cultural rights and the presence of social problems such as poverty.  It is dubious if we 
can still talk about a depolarization of politics in Southeastern Turkey after 1999 as 
Öktem (2005) argues above, since DEHAP/DTP’s coming to the local governments in 
many provinces and democratic reforms such as the legalization of private education in 
Kurdish. The intricacy of the political dichotomy of pro-PKK vs. pro-state still seems to 
be too rigid to break down in the southeast. Public frustration growing with the increasing 
political tension after the restart of the fighting, news coming from the country side with 
regard to the violent clashes with causalities, and dead bodies of the PKK militants sent 
to their families, many of them now living in the city centers as forced migrants, 
shattered the hopes for peace and reinforced political polarization and local radicalism 
among the PKK sympathizers157.   
‘Pawns of Terrorism out of Control!’  2006 Urban Riots in the Region 
Southern Turkey, March 21 2005. Two Kurdish children of migrant families from 
Southeastern provinces, Diyarbakır and Mardin put fire to a Turkish flag during the 
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Newroz158 celebrations in Mersin, an ethnically mixed Southern province with a 
considerable forced migrant Kurdish population. The event provoked enormous reaction 
from the elements of the Turkish state as well as Turkish nationalist groups who 
perceived it as the utmost threat to the premises of the unified Turkish nation. In a 
statement by the military, Kurdish citizens who were allegedly involved in what now was 
called a terrorist provocation were called Turkey’s ‘so-called citizens’. The Military 
declaration did not solely refer to the two children involved in the event, but rather 
targeted a specific group of citizens who did not have a legitimate status in the eyes of the 
Turkish army. The same controversial term was also adopted by a state university in 
Ankara that made a similar declaration to that of the army when denouncing the flag 
event.  
For the first time in the history of Turkish Republic, a group of Turkish citizens 
were labeled as ‘so-called’ citizens whilst Turkish citizenship, until 1980s, had been 
committed towards embracing the Kurdish population in Turkey without any institutional 
discrimination based on ethnicity. The ‘threat’ that Turkey was symbolically facing on 
March 2005, came not from foreign enemies, but from its own ‘so-called citizens’ a term 
that took its place in official discourse. The furious army statement received considerable 
public reaction, forcing the army to readjust its statement in a more cautious manner. 
However, the problem of legitimacy between a group of citizens with Kurdish origin who 
happened to be conflict-affected migrant groups in city centers and certain elements of 
the Turkish state was already more than conspicuous. Years-long armed conflict and its 
socio-political consequences embodied in the processes of displacement of millions of 
                                                 




civilian Kurds in southeastern Turkey seemed having changed the articulation between 
the state and conflict-affected Kurdish masses, with repercussions in terms of citizenship 
and national identity.  
On March 28, 2006, a week after the relatively peaceful 2006 Newroz 
celebrations under extreme security surveillance, in the city center of Diyarbakır, five 
thousand young Kurdish protestors clashed with Turkish police after the funeral of 4 of 
14 PKK guerillas killed by the Turkish army in an ambush in the mountainous areas of 
the region. The timing was interesting in that two years after the last time the fighting 
restarted, the hopes that the PKK guerilla would be brought back ‘with their dignity 
respected’ had been shattering. The pro-Islamist government was stepping back from its 
first tendency to further steps to reconcile the ‘Kurdish question’ after its coming to the 
realization that concessions the government was ready to make in the areas of ‘culture’ 
and ‘language’ would not be enough to gain the hearts of the radically politicized 
segments of the pro-Kurdish movement, which sees the PKK violence legitimate and 
virtuous, demanding a special amnesty for the PKK guerilla and cadres.  
Although state violence against civilians was prevailing in southeastern Turkey 
during 1990s, the PKK has been the accomplice of this armed violence that took the lives 
of 35,000 civilians (including Turks and Kurds) in southeastern Turkey; and the pro-
Islamist government was not willing to make any concessions favoring the pro-PKK 
politics. Moreover, the year 2006 made obvious more than ever to the Turkish Kurds that 
the EU adventure was coming to an end, with no more hopes that the EU could be a point 
of leverage to put further pressure on the state for the Kurdish demands. But on the other 




Turkish government to take some concrete steps with regard to the issue as a gesture for 
the sake of the EU negotiations.   
Agitated protestors grew into fifteen thousand people in the second day of a 
week-long rampage and threw stones and petrol bombs at the Turkish security forces, 
smashed the windows of police stations, banks, post offices, local shops and public 
buildings whilst the Turkish army moved combat vehicles and armored personnel to the 
region and responded to the protestors with tear gas and rubber bullets. Pro-Kurdish 
municipality mayors, especially that of Diyarbakır Osman Baydemir, refused to denounce 
the street violence; on the contrary, he expressed his sympathy for the guerillas killed and 
the protest participants in several occasions during the rampage159. In a national TV 
channel, Baydemir was shown kissing a masked rioter on the cheek and saying ‘I 
congratulate you because of your courage’160.  
A legal investigation was also initiated for inciting violence and making pro-PKK 
propaganda about another pro-Kurdish party member who supposedly called the local 
people to join the protests during the guerilla funerals161. The pro-Kurdish media 
Including a Denmark-based pro-PKK television channel (Roj TV) broadcasted 
intensively about the riots praising the ‘courage’ of the young protestors. Together with 
the pro-Kurdish party representatives in the region, the TV channel was accused by the 
Turkish state authorities and security personnel of inciting and inflicting violence. In a 
chain reaction, the street battles spread to the neighboring provincial centers (and with 
less intensity to Istanbul) with thousands of Kurdish children and youth shouting pro-
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PKK (Kurdistan Labor’s Party-the separatist Kurdish insurgent organization) slogans and 
attacking the Turkish security forces with stones and Molotov cocktails.    
Interestingly enough, the Turkish security units acted in a ‘prudent’ manner and 
the events ended with relatively few causalities (16 deaths nationwide, at least 3 of them 
caused by the protestors) that could otherwise rise to a hundred as happened in the urban 
protests of 1992. The Diyarbakır Police Chief was reported as ordering the police ‘not to 
fire at protestors unless absolutely necessary’162. State spokespersons stated that the 
Turkish state and the Turkish police ‘would never be tricked by dirty games of the 
separatist forces’ by acting violently and degrading the image of Turkey in front of the 
international community. A police spokesperson praised the security personnel’s prudent 
approach towards the young protestors and stated that no effort ‘to create a clash between 
the state and its citizens’ would succeed163. Diyarbakır Bar Association however, 
claimed that the security forces had used excessive force against the young detainees 
(including many children).  
Diyarbakır’s state-appointed provincial governor, Efkan Ala, stated in the 
aftermath of the days-long rampage, that the majority of the protestors, predominately 
young people, were the children of the displaced migrants who were forced out of the 
rural communities in the 1990s during the armed conflict between the Turkish security 
forces and the PKK, and now live with unemployment and in poverty in city squatter 
settlements. The governor-- the local representative of the central state close to the pro-
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Islamist AKP circles164-- wanted to call attention to the social and political processes of 
the armed conflict that radicalized the conflict-affected Kurds against the state, which 
refused to acknowledge responsibility for the forced village evacuations and human 
rights violations during the emergency rule period. The intention associated with his 
peroration was very likely to divert Turkish public attention from seeing those young 
protesters as criminals towards questioning the social and political consequences of the 
two decade long violence in the region in which those children had grown up. His 
remarks did not find their true resonance among the general Turkish public mainly 
unaware of the ‘forced’ nature of the village evacuations and/or perceiving the state 
actions in the region as legitimate strategies to protect the territorial unity of the country 
against separatist threats.  
These days long protest events were therefore cast by the state, general Turkish 
media and public as an ‘abrupt violent unrest’ carried out by the ‘pawns of terrorism’. On 
the third day of the rampage, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that ‘no illegal acts will be 
tolerated’ indicating that any form of negotiation with the protestors and/or the PKK was 
out of consideration. He also denied the wish of the pro-Kurdish political party 
representatives to have a meeting with him citing the pro-Kurdish party’s reluctance to 
denounce the PKK violence and refusal to call the PKK a ‘terrorist organization’. Those 
moments of the violent mass contention have not so far led to negotiation and/or further 
                                                 
164 Although the local governor of Diyarbakır, Efkan Ala, is a name close to the pro-Islamist AKP circles; 
he is very liked and respected by the people I interviewed and talked in Diyarbakır. Despite that many 
displaced Kurds and politicized Kurdish actors do not like the pro-Islamist AKP (Justice and Development 
Party), I heard only positive things about the local governor Ala whom people called ‘a nice, honest, 
hardworking person’, ‘sensitive towards the local population’, ‘a good person with commonsense and 




articulation between the state and the protestors about the root causes of the protest 
and/or the demands that were voiced, though in a violent manner165. 
Indeed, besides various forms of pro-PKK demonstrations staged mostly in 
predominately Kurdish provincial centers but also in western Turkish cities, PKK guerilla 
funerals have become the major events of gathering and voicing the anti-state sentiments. 
The funerals display symbols such as the PKK colors and posters of Abdullah Öcalan- 
the imprisoned leader of the organization, and slogans praising the guerilla and 
demanding an end to the incommunicado imprisonment of the PKK leader. The 
contradiction in these protests has been the way of expressing the desire for peace, but 
not putting a distance to the discourse of war. The tendency in the protest activities to 
attribute almost religious/holy meanings/values to the PKK, the guerillas and the 
imprisoned leader of the organization not only limits the grassroots articulation of the 
problems to the symbolic boundaries of an almost ‘mystical’ Kurdish struggle that has no 
concrete social, economic and political articulation. It also further gathers antagonism 
from the rest of the Turkish society including Kurds opposed to the PKK who also 
                                                 
165 I would like to note here that I agree with the strand of scholarly work on political violence seeing 
violence as counterproductive for social and political reconciliation and democracy. But I also think that 
motives for violence are as important as the act of violence for political violence scholars to explore. I 
therefore would agree with Goringe’s (2006: 119) statement, ‘[B]y seeing violence as instrumental (Arendt, 
1970, p. 46) and expressive (Riches, 1986, p. 11) can we appreciate why people resort to violence and the 
meaning they invest in’. In a similar vein, I agree with Bozarslan’s (2004: 4) statement in regard with 
problematic labeling of various forms of violence as ‘terrorism’,  ‘As a concept, terrorism is highly 
normative and, as such, it is of very poor analytical utility for the social sciences…The invocation of the 
term “terrorism” might allow us to express indignation or to reinforce our normative and  ethical positions, 
but it does not help us understand the aims, motives, and minds of the people who have embraced 
violence.’ Therefore, I avoid using the terms ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ in this dissertation unless they are 
used by the others referred to and quoted in the text. However, while trying to understand the motives of 
the use of violence on the side of the state as well as on the side of the PKK, I also try to maintain a critical 
and analytical stance in understanding violence, its meanings, and claims associated to it, and its 




suffered the armed conflict in various differentiated ways (personal, familial, communal-
social, economic, political).    
CONCLUSION 
Certain developments in Turkey have marked the changing social and political 
trajectories in Southeastern Turkey and in the Kurdish movement in the aftermath of the 
1990s. First, there was a decline in political polarization with the sudden decline in the 
intensity of the armed conflict between the Turkish security forces and the PKK. Pro-
Kurdish actors with legitimate political positions have taken the stage across 
Southeastern Turkey as municipal actors and civil society activists. The end of the 
emergency law in the region and the democratic reforms pushed by the European Union 
have provided a kind of political immunity for many pro-Kurdish actors to emerge as 
‘legitimate’ spokespersons in the domestic and international arena on behalf of the 
Kurdish citizens of Turkey.   
Secondly, PKK organizing has dissolved at the local level by giving way to 
various forms of - what Bozarslan (2004) calls- “privatized forms of violence”. Young 
urban Kurds-forced rural-to-urban migrants of the conflict years- have also become 
disoriented after losing their faith in the guerilla war. My interviews with groups of these 
young people revealed that they are radically politicized and frustrated by the declining 
guerilla capability of the PKK. Many of them are affiliated with the pro-Kurdish political 
party and their protest repertoires move back and forth between the boundaries of ‘legal’ 
and ‘illegal’ actions since they do not mind opposing the police and the Turkish security 
forces, and even getting arrested.  
Thirdly, identity-based movements including the pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist 




power structure in the Turkish state. The declining power of the PKK guerilla movement 
did not discredit it in the eyes of its sympathizers. Rather, the organization channeled its 
radical political potential into different available political outlets. New socio-political 
developments in Turkey have even put further barriers between the central state and the 
marginalized social groups in which Kurds of Southeastern Turkey are predominately 
represented, including the increasing social and economic burden of neo-liberal politics, 
with increasing unemployment, poverty, and the evaporating social state and its already 
limited social safety nets.    
The pro-Kurdish political party DEHAP despite its popularity among the Kurds in 
Southeastern Turkey was unable to beat the pro-Islamist AKP in many Southeastern 
provinces in the 2004 local government elections. The pro-Islamist AKP’s coming to the 
power in the last national elections has also enabled the political domain to internalize 
political Islam. Political Islam finds channels, i.e. state institutions, media, political 
parties, capital, available to dictate and establish itself as part of the state structure.  The 
pro-Kurdish movement, being excluded from the political system, finds itself divided in 
either radical, violent ethno-nationalist factions (ie. disoriented, sporadic violent acts) or 
trapped into the depoliticized discourses of human rights and socio-economic 
development in Southeastern Turkey. EU promoted human rights and development 
discourses have recently become a frustration for organized Kurds in Turkey due to these 
discourses’ limited expression of Kurdish political demands for self-determination.  
What is important for me at the end of the discussion in this chapter is the 
implications of these developments in terms of democracy, equality and social 
empowerment. In her study on political violence and human rights movement in Latin 




The concerns about issues such as inclusion and the individual or collective 
character of demands emerge in a historical moment of change…The issue raised 
focus on how to contribute to the construction of democracy and equity. This 
includes institutional processes, concerns with equality and distribution, and 
social empowering processes.  
My concern with the Turkish case is that the processes of democracy, equality, 
(re)distribution and social empowerment have been hampered by obstacles; some of the 
structural ones discussed in the preceding chapters and some of them are strongly 
associated with the nature of the Kurdish movement since 1980s and the grassroots’ 
problematic affiliation with it since 1990s.     
Social mobilizations that are over concerned with ‘recognition’ may in fact fail to 
achieve their goals by overemphasizing identity-based ‘differences’ in terms of culture 
and language. They carry the potential risk of depoliticizing and obscuring structural 
problems and inequalities in society (as Fraser, 1997 2003). In a similar vein, while in the 
1960s and 1970s, various pro-Kurdish groups were welcome, integrated and 
accommodated within the circles of leftist politics, the Kurdish movement, including the 
Kurdish human rights movement after 1980s, has been unable to establish effective 
strategic alliances with social, political and intellectual factions in Turkish society.  
The dilemma here is the question of how to accommodate ‘differences’ within the 
system while at the same time addressing the structural inequalities and injustice in 
society that crosscut ethnic divisions. In their use of human rights discourses and/or the 
rhetoric of cultural and linguistic rights, pro-Kurdish politicians have not yet achieved a 
sophisticated articulation of the ‘Kurdish struggle’ that would appeal to an international 
audience that has social, economic and political allegiances to the local Kurdish 
communities and to the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe. In this regard, pro-Kurdish politics 




particularism’ a notion elaborated by Miller (2004), Swyngedouw (1997) and also 
Harvey (2000).   
Internationalization of the PKK activities (based in Northern Iraq with complex 
networking across European countries) as well as the pro-Kurdish politics (including the 
Kurdish Diaspora in Europe, USA and Canada) also confuses the Turkish state responses 
to the Kurdish movement. Although it is eventually Turkish politics and the public within 
Turkey with which Turkey’s Kurdish question should be negotiated and reconciled; the 
internationalized nature of the problem weakens the impact of the Kurdish movement in 
Turkey as well as the impact of the localized grassroots activities such as urban protests 
could otherwise have created on  domestic politics. Transnational pro-Kurdish politics 
complicates the Turkish state’s responses to the Kurdish question in a democratic 
manner, since pro-Kurdish demands are perceived as manipulated by the ‘external 
powers’ and considered as the wicked games of foreign countries to destabilize Turkey 
for regional political interests.  
So far, neglected are politics to achieve social and political reconciliation in the 
region and/or negotiation in terms of rights and access to rights through well-functioning 
political, civic and judicial channels. Neglected are politics to socio-economically and 
politically empower the local Kurdish communities by encouraging civic consciousness 
in the region independent from radical Kurdish nationalism, partisanship and 
subservience to the ethnic boundary keepers. Neglected are also politics to create 
economic restructuring guaranteeing better channels of distribution and creating material 
resources and employment in Turkey with particular attention to the southeast. Neither 
the Kurdish movement, nor the human rights movement, nor international-national 




and/or orientation to find a structural solution for the political violence and its 






















CONCLUSION                                                                                        
CAUGHT INTO THE SNARE OF VIOLENCE AND IDENTITY POLITICS                                   
A QUEST FOR JUSTICE AND MORE BICYCLE  
 After spending six months in the southeastern city of Diyarbakir-- the city 
that is considered as the center of Kurdish mobilization in Turkey-- in 2004, I realized 
that my field work had left me with an invaluable amount of intellectual luggage that I 
was not exactly sure which way to carry. Developments in Turkey in general and in the 
southeast in particular in 2005 and 2006 clarified the framework that I had first planned 
as well as complicated the premises of my study. Throughout the writing process, I have 
had to incorporate the rapid domestic and regional changes that shed light on my subject 
matter as much as I could into my analysis. Considering the ever-changing nature of the 
Kurdish contention in Turkey throughout the history of the Republic, I have come to the 
realization that my fieldwork had occurred at the hub of the recent transformations in 
Turkey’s new Kurdish contention after 1980s.  
 En masse population displacement has been the most striking element 
available in   the recent manifestation of the Kurdish discontent and the new faces of the 
Kurdish Question in Turkey. From peaceful street protests and signature campaigns to 
aggressive and violent activism including urban rampages and demonstrations in the 
PKK guerilla funerals; from silently voiced ethno-nationalist sentiments to pro-PKK 
slogans on the streets; from human rights violation cases pending at ECtHR to urban 
poverty, hunger, street children, child prostitution; all of which I observed in the field 
among and around the displaced migrant Kurds during my research. Displacement of 
millions of Kurdish civilians in southeastern Turkey during the course of the armed 




changing Kurdish Question with multi-faceted implications that were not possible to 
capture in their entirety.  
 This study calls for paradigmatic shifts in our understanding of the 
ethnicized conflict in Turkey and its socio-economic and political repercussions in 
relation to the broader global trajectories defining the everyday experiences of Kurdish 
citizens (as well as Turkish) with violence, subjugation, poverty and injustice. An 
overarching goal has been to explain the changing nature of state-society articulation 
(and/or lack of articulation thereof) in relation to these newly emerged forms of social, 
economic and political insecurities under circumstances of political violence, identity 
politics, increasing salience of the local governments and the rapidly declining salience of 
the central state as a socio-economic safety guarantor in Turkey in general and in the 
southeast in particular following the neo-liberal restructuring starting from the 1980s. In a 
parallel vein, political insecurities have been mainly defined through violent encounters 
between the local communities and the Turkish armed forces that became the only 
embodiment of the Turkish state in the minds of many displaced Kurdish communities.  
In presence of the conflicting processes evolving at the local and national level, I 
still think that the displacement of Kurdish citizens in southeastern Turkey could turn into 
a political opportunity.  It can allow Turkish politics and civil society to reconsider the 
premises of Turkish citizenship and to consolidate state legitimacy in the eyes of the 
marginalized Kurdish citizens in southeastern Turkey. Finally displacement can lead to 
the emergence of political initiatives and democratic, independent civil society in search 
of justice for citizens oppressed by the recently ethnicized social, economic and political 




In this concluding chapter, I reflect on the implications of the most important 
findings presented in this dissertation. Then I discuss directions for further studies of the 
state, citizenship and violence.  
ARMED CONFLICT, DISPLACEMENT AND THE CHANGING PARAMETERS 
OF CITIZENSHIP IN TURKEY 
The Turkish state was not the only violent actor in southeastern Turkey during the 
1990s. Kurdish village guards who sided with the Turkish state also became the 
perpetrators of violence against the PKK supporters and the civilians in between. 
Traditional cleavages and enmities among the Kurdish tribes in the region have deepened 
and militarized. PKK also perpetrated its own violent tactics among the civilians. PKK 
victimized thousands of Kurds in the region blaming them for betraying the ‘Kurdish 
cause’. Thousands of Turkish civil servants including the school teachers were killed by 
the PKK as well as thousands of Turkish soldiers (including many with Kurdish origin) 
and Kurdish village guards who sided with the Turkish army. The civilians victimized by 
the PKK have to a large extent remained silent and invisible in this study; not because 
they were neglected, but because they fall out side of the scope and the space/geography 
of this study. The civilians victimized by the state came to the fore as they were visible in 
urban poverty, concentrated in squatter houses of the city centers, actively engaged with 
the organized civil society, mobilized on the streets. And most importantly their peculiar 
position obliges the state to face up to the consequences of its actions in order to maintain 
legitimacy and a good face in the international arena.  
The contentious stance of the civilians victimized by non-state actors such as the 
PKK still materialize in the form of Turkish nationalism and/or hatred against the PKK 




discrimination against the Kurdish citizens associated with that terror and with the 
separatist threat (which is a subject matter of another dissertation). The contentious 
stance of the civilians victimized by the state however directly engages with the state in 
demands for justice and rights, to reinstate what have been taken away by the state and/or 
to settle the accounts for the suffering caused by state actions. Politicized Kurdish 
discontent targets the state, challenges state legitimacy and makes claims in ethno-
nationalist terms.166 In the same vein, pro-Kurdish radicalization calls for institutional 
changes (including the institutionalization of the Kurdish language and culture), policy 
reforms (such as welcoming the PKK guerilla back to the country ‘with their dignity and 
honor respected’) and/or rearrangements of the state structure (allowing and encouraging 
decentralization, local self-determinacy and Kurdish ethno-nationalist party politics) as a 
means to insulate the Kurdish population from the state that is perceived as the 
perpetrator of the oppression and violence167.     
One important aspect of understanding Kurdish contention is to explicate its 
implications in terms of citizenship. I construe citizenship in relation to the exercise of 
state power over a territorially defined population and the legitimacy of this state 
authority. Through the dynamics of violence, the premises of Turkish citizenship have 
                                                 
166 This antagonism and ethnic politicization can not be generalized to the entire Kurdish population in 
Turkey.  This is an important point that I have tried to make in this dissertation in order to argue that ethnic 
politicization is not only divisive between ‘Turks’ and ‘Kurds’ in Turkey, but further divisive among the 
Kurdish citizens of Turkey. 
167 While the general Turkish public tendency is to see the state violence as legitimate, general pro-Kurdish 
public tendency is to conceive the PKK violence as a quest for justice and rights. Neither polar side is able 
to see that violence is pervasive beyond the borders of the social and political entities that it originally 
targets. Armed conflict and violence also have the potential to create interest groups on each side that want 
to capitalize on the social, economic and political resources offered by a conflict environment.  What is 
important and interesting here is to remember that violence coming from different power groups are 
symbiotically dependent on each other, not only feed each other but also need each other, complete each 




been redefined by the state based on the notion of who was ‘loyal’ to a unified Turkey. 
These premises have also been redefined by the Kurdish citizens who experienced state 
violence   within a political spectrum ranging from a demand for inclusion (as citizen 
members of the Turkish state) on the one end and skewed towards a feeling of exclusion 
and a demand for separation (as outsiders and/or victims) on the other end.  Upon the 
arrest of the leader of PKK, the lifting of the regional emergency rule concomitantly with 
the democratization reforms undertaken by the central government created temporary 
hopes for depoliticization and the ending of the conflict. It was in this environment that 
the central government reevaluated the displacement issue as a ‘social risk’ to be reduced 
through social policy, socio-economic development and reconstruction in the southeast.   
International encounters with the Turkish central government have opened 
political spaces for negotiation particularly using the language of human rights where 
issues of citizenship have recently come to the fore. These attempts have instigated policy 
formulations on the side of the government to address the socio-economic needs and 
legal demands of the conflict-affected Kurdish citizens. The language of rights seemed to 
be effective for demand-making to turn into policy to the extent that it articulates itself 
within the discourse of social rights, civil rights and justice for the citizens. Rights 
discourses with a call for ethnic, cultural and linguistic rights however, have been treated 
much more vigilantly by the Turkish government, and translated into various legal 
reforms mainly because of the sake of the EU accession process.    
Although limited, new forms of articulation have emerged between the state and 
the displaced Kurds based on social rights and the reconstruction of livelihoods in the 
conflict areas, which seems like a last chance to restore the state-society relationship in 




initiatives to tame a socio-politically unstable population will be enough to satisfy more 
radical demands for the institutionalization of the Kurdish identity, language and culture.  
CONTROVERSIAL IMPLICATIONS OF IDENTITY POLITICS FOR 
EXPANDING CITIZENSHIP 
Jean-Francois Bayart is right to advise us not to be fooled or naïve when 
confronted with the “search for identity,” in which identity is often merely a 
resource manipulated for political ends (Wieviorka 2003: 132) 
In no case do we see the kind of inherent conflict between ethnic groups that 
seems to be assumed by journalists and the public. Although media depictions 
have tended both to glamorize and to demonize the worldwide upsurge in ethnic 
identity, ethnicity in this context is merely one criterion for organizing 
competition in a society. In different contexts, competition is organized equally 
well by other criteria, such as class or religion. (Tainter 2003:72) 
Indeed, ‘Turkish identity’ was originally formulated by the Kemalist founding 
elite to embrace ethnic cosmopolitanism in Turkey without privileging one ethnic group 
over the other. The idea was a ‘state-nation’ formulation for Turkey under a top down 
conceptualization of “Turkishness” open to all distinct ethnicities living in the Turkish 
state territory. Ethnic minorities (other than the religious minorities) have not been 
officially recognized due to the initial commitment of the Republic to the civic notion of 
citizenship, similar to the French case (see for example Ercan-Argun 1999).  
Despite the state bias favoring Turkish ethnicity in conceiving of “Turkishness” 
and the ambiguities and contradictions in law (Yegen 1999), the definition of 
“Turkishness” has been primarily based on citizenship rather than race and ethnicity. 
Kurds have always been welcome in public life and politics, and able to achieve any 
public and political status as long as they do not assert their ethnic identity distinct from 
their officially granted “Turkishness.” Politicization of Kurdish identity and culture, on 




that accommodated politicized Kurds during the 1960s and 1970s started to lose their 
salience in the face of precipitate militarization of the state attitude towards the 
‘suspicious’ civilian Kurdish masses.   
Ercan-Argun (1999) for example argues that citizenship consolidation as a liberal 
democratic process has not yet been completed in the case of Turkey. As a response to 
the advocates of ethnic group rights, she suggests that the redefinition of state-society 
relations in terms of   universal citizenship rights (as originally intended by the founding 
Kemalist elite in the first place)- instead of group rights, ethnic self-determination and/or 
decentralization- would help to tackle the Kurdish question in Turkey. Although, I agree 
with Ercan-Argun   that institutionalization of ethnic differences would further destabilize 
societal relations and politics in Turkey, I am also convinced that consolidating 
citizenship on the basis of civic notions is not easy in practice considering the more than 
a decade long mass political violence in southeastern Turkey that has changed even the 
nature of the traditionally stable, established state-society relations in the region168.  
I should note that displaced Kurds’ demands and claims are heterogeneous, in 
certain cases aiming to push the boundaries of the membership to the Turkish state to get 
themselves included and seen as legitimate members of the nation-state, in some other 
cases aiming to assert their distinctiveness to be considered ‘different’, but still legitimate 
members with rights over the Turkish polity, and in other cases aiming to affirm their 
complete separateness from the Turkish nation and society altogether. However, the 
penetration of ethno-nationalist politicization has been endemic among the most 




centers such as Diyarbakir where the organized Kurdish elite is most effective. This form 
of radical politicization does not only endanger the prospects of political integration of 
these Kurdish citizens into a civic notion of citizenship, but it also further hinders any 
form of demand making articulated in social terms and/or in terms of social democracy, 
rule of law, social equity, anything but rabid ethno-political claims. A particular group of 
Kurdish citizens has been positioned by the hands of the Kurdish nationalist elite and 
ironically of the Turkish state in a militantly antagonistic stance towards the Turkish 
state.  
As Beber (2004) eloquently explains, ethnicized conflicts have the potential of 
“empowering “boundary keepers” that enforce divisions between ethnic groups and by 
not empowering individuals to be able to choose more freely, the likelihood of violent 
conflict may actually increase.” In the Turkish case, not only pro-Kurdish politics but 
also the state (both civil and military actors) itself has functioned as a “boundary keeper” 
throughout the conflict distinguishing between the ‘suspicious’ Kurds and the ‘loyal’ 
ones. The Turkish state has contributed to ethnic radicalism among the Kurdish 
grassroots by failing to protect and insulate the civilian Kurds from radical Kurdish 
politics and socially, economically and politically integrate them into the safe non-
conflict areas. Tainter (2003:72) further notes “[w]e are presented here with a dilemma. 
States are often inhibited in their cohesion by ethnic differences, but in many cases, 
ethnic distinctions are a product of, or are reinforced by, states.”   
In a vicious circle, 1) ethnicization of political violence feeds the upsurge of  
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radical politicization on the ground particularly among the most socio-economically 
vulnerable groups of people 2) pro-Kurdish politics turn into a politics of ethnic 
‘boundary keeping’ with Kurdish identity, culture and language at the center of the 
recognition claims despite the EU-sponsored democratization reforms granting 
substantial freedom and space for practicing Kurdish culture, identity and language and 
3) the central government, the state bureaucracy and the Turkish army become more and 
more resistant to incorporating  pro-Kurdish politics into the Turkish polity.  
The dilemma is indeed beyond how to (re)consolidate universal citizenship rights 
in Turkey. It is also how to reconcile the contention between the state and the Kurdish 
citizens affected by the conflict especially considering the organic ties with the PKK and 
wide-spread sympathy for the organization among the Kurdish masses, how to 
(re)establish trust relations between the state and the ‘suspicious’ and/or ‘so-called’ 
(Kurdish) citizens, how to settle the accounts of human rights violations committed by the 
state on the side of the Kurdish citizens and the acts of ‘betrayal’ committed by the 
Kurdish citizens on the side of the state. The dilemma is also further about how to 
reconstruct the lives of the displaced citizens, accommodate them socio-economically 
and ensure their socio-economic security.  
Finally, the real dilemma is about how to achieve all of these by reassuring and 
without exasperating the general Turkish population that wants the state to ensure 
democracy, rule of law, justice and equity for everybody in Turkey. This population has 
experienced the armed conflict in their lives directly or indirectly in the forms of political 
corruption, mafiazation within the state, political oppression, political favoritism, 
economic deterioration, urban poverty, deteriorating social equity, million dollars 




soldiers killed by the PKK guerilla and the PKK terror attacks on civilians all across the 
country in the 1990s. Leaving aside the declining state legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Kurds in Turkey, the swift rise of the pro-Islamist politics in the 1990s heretofore has 
been a repercussion of the declining state legitimacy in the eyes of the general Turkish 
public (see for example Onis 2000, 2003 and Cizre-Sakallioglu and Yeldan 2000 for this 
last point).      
One of the most serious predicaments for redefining Turkish citizenship is the 
lack of state legitimacy on the part of the Kurdish citizens. Ferguson (2003: 29) explains 
this in terms of the effect of the violence experienced in creating socio-political 
vulnerabilities, insecurities and fears.  
…promotion of such fear is one of the best documented roles for ethnic 
entrepreneurs (Kaufman 1997: 167-170). Still, where lived experience, current 
conditions and relentless propaganda lead people at the grass roots to conclude 
that old authorities will not protect them, and that others who have victimized 
them in the past may be doing it again soon, there will be a strong tendency to fall 
back into local networks- of kinship, clientage, neighborhood, faction, sect, etc.- 
and get ready to fight (Ferguson 2003:29).  
This is the point where identity politics based on ethnicity is not only something 
about claim-making for ‘recognition’ by and ‘inclusion’ into a nation-state unity and/or 
the definition of citizenship. Rather ethnic identity politics may work just in the opposite 
direction challenging the civic notion of citizenship rendering it obsolete if not dangerous 
for identities, rather than relating to the notion of civic citizenship. The state ceases to be 
a focal point to articulate with in peaceful terms for negotiation and reconciliation. More 
complication is introduced into the picture by realizing that ethnic identities are actually 
political constructions excluding sometimes the ethnic fellows who do not wish to 




actors since they do not embrace the PKK ideology and/or the pro-Kurdish cause are the 
case in this point.   
An important contradiction involved in the newly developing trajectory of the 
Kurdish issue in the 1990s is the internationalization of the multiple faces of the Kurdish 
Question. My focus in this regard is particularly the role of the human rights language in 
the processes of encounters between the Turkish government and the international actors 
whenever the displacement of the Kurdish population is concerned169. Indeed, mutual 
reinforcement between identity politics and human rights discourses has antagonized the 
Turkish state against the pro-Kurdish civil society and actors whilst trapping the pro-
Kurdish mobilization within the boundaries of ethnicity and demands for cultural rights.  
Democratization reforms induced by Turkey’s elusive European Union accession 
process have also introduced peculiar dynamics in the redefinition of the Kurdish 
question. Human rights discourses have been embraced by the pro-Kurdish actors 
including the Diaspora and helped to internationalize the human rights violations 
committed by the Turkish state and army including the village evacuations. While, pro-
Kurdish politics has always successfully capitalized on the international human rights 
discourses, they have also been disappointed by the pragmatic approach of EU in 
defining the Kurdish question mainly within the human rights perspective, which 
according to the pro-Kurdish agenda constrains and disregards the broader Kurdish 
ethno-political demands (EU-Turkey Civic Commission 2005).  
                                                 
169 Rights discourses have had contradictory implications.  International discourses drawing upon human 
and cultural rights discourses have further implications in terms of ‘self-determination’, an issue that is 
recently discursively mentioned by EU actors in their media statements rather than at an intergovernmental 




Particularly the concept of minority rights has caused a controversial debate on 
whether or not the Kurds in Turkey constitute a minority group. Not only the Turkish 
state and the integrated segments of the Kurdish population, but also pro-Kurdish actors 
did not like the notion of ‘minority’. The Turkish state on the one hand has been resistant 
to the idea of officially acknowledging the ethnic diversity among the Muslim population 
of the country. On the other hand, pro-Kurdish actors have been irritated by the idea of 
‘reducing’ the Kurdish population in Turkey to a ‘minority entity’ which would 
contradict with their political agendas casting the Kurdish population as a ‘nation’ and/or 
‘the main constituency of Turkey together with Turks’. Kurdish ethno-nationalism, using 
the language of ‘democracy’ has pragmatically shifted its focus back and forth between 
the territorially concerned separatist and/or federalist claims to socio-politically 
exclusionary ethnicist demands leaving the non-Kurdish (and non-Turkish) ethnic 
composition of Turkey out of their political agenda.  
Rights discourses attached to the democratization reforms have confused the 
Turkish state (particularly the central bureaucracy and the army) about how to ‘get 
democratized’ without empowering the challenging societal and political forces, 
especially the pro-Islamist and pro-Kurdish factions deriving their power from the 
discourses of rights and liberties. Rights discourses have contributed to the state 
perception in conceiving the Kurdish question as a divisive ethno-political demand that 
may be justified in the international arena using the rights discourses. On the side of the 
pro-Kurdish actors and the local Kurds affected by the political violence, rights 
discourses have contributed to their self-perception as a ‘victimized’ population. Both 




Kurds; rather than a factor of negotiation and/or reconciliation between the state and its 
citizens.  
The concrete basis of the Kurdish question in the 1990s; including the issue of 
justice and also state and citizen legitimacy, and the problem of social equity, social 
citizenship, integration and cohesion have been overshadowed by the international 
involvement mainly around a counter-productive discourse of “human rights” and 
“minority rights”. The political concerns of the state have tended to ignore and/or 
criminalize one of the most vulnerable segments of the general Turkish population (i.e. 
the displaced Kurds) whilst the political interests of the pro-Kurdish actors including the 
pro-Kurdish civil society have tended to victimize and romanticize these people and their 
background and identity. Even academic discussion and debate on citizenship in Turkey 
has been trapped in a parallel vein by the terms of ‘identities’ (Kurdish as well as Islamist 
in the same vein) and not been able to advance beyond how to accommodate them, how 
to co-opt them and/or to what extent give them space for practice in public and politics. 
Issues of social citizenship, justice and rule of law, political and social empowerment and 
representation, social equity and distributive justice have been largely missing in the 
literature on citizenship in Turkey (see for example Keyman and Icduygu 2003 Yegen, 
2004 Kirisci 2000 among the other work that appear in the international social science 
index).  
In addition to this general picture, recent developments in Northern Iraq have 
turned into a hope for the marginalized, dissident local Kurdish population in 
southeastern Turkey who-during my stay in Diyarbakir- were not hesitant to express their 
praise and sympathy for the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, particularly for Mesut Barzani. If there 




crystallization and politicization in the country might have been dissolved; on the one 
hand the Turkish state would have less fear of national disintegration; on the other hand, 
pro-Kurdish actors at the elite level and at the grassroots could have been more willing to 
condemn the PKK activities and remain socially, economically and politically integrated 
into Turkish politics and society170.        
POVERTY, POLITICS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
In this dissertation, I have shown that previous socio-economic insecurities of the 
displaced Kurds have been reinforced as rural subsistence survivals got destroyed and 
urban centers in southeastern Turkey turned into places characterized by the miseries of 
over-urbanization and/or urban ruralization with neither urban nor rural jobs and/or 
socio-economic survival mechanisms to depend on.   
This dissertation has further pointed out that displacement is a political process in 
itself and a socio-economic transformation with a spill over impact beyond the displaced 
population and beyond the conflict areas. Different than previous social, economic and 
political insecurities, the course of displacement and its aftermath introduced new forms 
of socio-economic and political insecurities that have been experienced by the Kurdish 
migrant communities affected by the conflict. Previous entrenched socio-economic and 
political insecurities have been (re)articulated under the context and forces of mass 
violence and uprootedness; and later on intertwined with further insecurities arising from 
social and economic transformation of the urban centers. Among those citizens living in 
                                                 
170 The results of the recent July 22 2007 general elections evinced an interestingly evident shift among the 
pro-Kurdish electorate from the pro-Kurdish DEHAP/DTP to pro-Islamist AKP. However, pro-Kurdish 
DTP still managed to enter the parliament with 17 representatives. For the first time in the modern Turkish 
history, ethnic politics will be represented in the parliament, which refers to countless possibilities in the 
future trajectory of the Kurdish Question in Turkey. Whether this development leads to a democratic 




social, economic and political insecurity; poverty, unemployment and hunger are blamed 
upon the Turkish state’s discrimination against the Kurds. People’s demands reiterate the 
pro-Kurdish political mottos claiming cultural and linguistic accommodations as if these 
were the only solutions for the problem(s) of poverty and unemployment in southeastern 
cities like Diyarbakir171. Pro-Kurdish local government actors have also been catalysts 
in perpetuating an ethnicized discourse of poverty.   
Indeed, the armed conflict and forced migrations of the Kurdish communities in 
the 1990s coincided with the processes of economic globalization and liberalization, 
market economy, changing urban labor and housing markets as well as the declining 
salience of the traditional social state and weakening traditional social safety nets. The 
increasing urban poverty and unemployment concomitantly with the declining social 
equity has been endemic in Turkey in the 1990s. Displaced Kurdish communities have 
found themselves in deteriorating social and economic city centers both in western and 
eastern Turkey; and have further contributed to the urban poverty. To a large extent, 
displaced Kurdish communities are not able to deal with the new forms of urban poverty 
as opposed to the previous forms of rural poverty, which they had managed at least at a 
self-sufficiency level. The local governments on the ground have become imperative for 
the survival of the urban poor in the absence of a substantive central government welfare 
policy.  
                                                 
171 This point is relevant to Nancy Fraser’s (Fraser 2003) conceptualization of the three main deficits with 
the ‘recognition’ movements, which I discuss in chapter 4 of this dissertation (p:19), “the problem of 
reification of the politically defined group identities, the problem of displacement in shifting the attention 
from redistribution to recognition and the problem of misframing the actual causes of poverty and 




The controversial outcome of decentralization has been the entrenchment of 
religious and ethnic identity politics among the local constituencies (as I discuss in 
chapter 4).  Local governments and political party organizations on the ground (i.e. pro-
Kurdish and pro-Islamist political parties) have capitalized on the socio-economic 
vulnerabilities of local constituents trying to establish new forms of clientelistic relations 
in exchange for social services and provisions, in face of the lack of effective welfare 
state. As presented in the Maps in Chapter 2, in the 2002 general elections and the 2004 
local government elections Turkey was divided into three major zones; the provinces 
along the Aegean and Mediterranean coastal areas going to the secular party (CHP-
Republican People’s Party); the strongholds of the pro-Kurdish politics in southeastern 
Turkey going to the pro-Kurdish party (DEHAP-Democratic People’s Party) and the rest 
of the country including many southeastern provinces going to the pro-Islamists (AKP-
Justice and Development Party). In the recent 2007 general elections, DTP maintained its 
power in few provinces in southeastern Turkey while another political party outside the 
mainstream Turkish politics and antagonistic towards the central state bureaucracy and 
the Turkish army, the pro-Islamist AKP, gained a victory over the pro-Kurdish party in 
many other pre-dominantly Kurdish southeastern provinces. While pro-Kurdish MPs 
finally made their way to the Turkish Parliament for the first time in the Republican 
history, increasing support for the pro-Islamist AKP among the Kurds has evinced that 
the contention in southeastern Turkey may not be contained within ethno-nationalist 
discourses.       
Together with the pro-Kurdish political party’s (HADEP/DEHAP/DTP) coming 
to the municipal government in several strategic Southeastern provinces after the nation-




Kurds has found new channels of expression and new forms of urban patronage relations 
between the pro-Kurdish political party and the Kurdish masses at the local level in 
southeastern Turkey. While the ‘suspicious’ geography was perceived as the rural areas 
by the Turkish army and civil politics during the peak days of the armed conflict, the 
displacement of politicized masses into city centers has changed the locus of concern 
from rural to urban. The displaced masses’ integration with pro-Kurdish politics in 
southeastern Turkey has marked the city centers in southeastern Turkey as places of 
political tension between the civilians and the elements of the state (i.e. the army and the 
mainstream political parties172)173. 
VIOLENCE AND ETHNIC COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Where the political conditions for dynamic response are established or 
reestablished such violence can equally well decline or disappear as a result of an 
institutional processing of the demands that it harbors. Some of these conditions 
depend on the actors themselves and in particular on their capacity to constitute 
themselves as subjects who are conscious of what a political or institutional 
overture can bring them. An excellent example of this is the “Zapatistas” of 
Chiapas, who have broken with the logic of guerilla movements and are anxious 
to obtain a democratic form of recognition that associates a respect for human 
rights and for their collective identity (Le Bot 1997). Other conditions depend on 
the capacity of political actors to impose, by conviction or by pressure, a system 
of exchange of views, negotiation and discussion. This would enable the 
protagonists of violence to learn how to replace violence by a relationship 
involving communication, even if tense and conflictual. The decline of violence 
often depends on a conjunction of factors. Some are specific to the actors, who 
must be capable of being subjects and of giving up behavior based on pure hatred. 
Others are specific to the system within which the action develops and to the 
power of significant actors within the system (Wieviorka 2003 136).     
                                                 
172 Therefore, anti-system parties such as the pro-Kurdish parties and the pro-Islamist AKP have emerged 
as the major actors in local politics in southeastern Turkey. 
173 Dynamics of politicization and mobilization have been different in western city centers where displaced 
communities are much more fragmented, disoriented and away from the reach of pro-Kurdish organizing. 
This actually explains the fact that majority of the conflict-induced Kurdish migrants have been mingled 
with the constituency of the pro-Islamists in western cities like Istanbul. However, this dissertation has 
focused on southeastern Turkey; therefore displaced Kurds in western provincial centers are out of the 
scope of this dissertation. Relevant comparisons, though, have been done in throughout the dissertation 




 Displacement brought the uprooted Kurdish citizens from geographically distant, 
politically isolated and undeveloped ‘rural’ into the city centers making them 
geographically and socio-politically ‘visible’ and more able to integrate into pro-Kurdish 
politics and civil society. In a sense, systematic displacement of Kurdish rural 
communities by the Turkish security forces has backfired and created new forms of 
politicization and mobilization in the southeast among and around the forced migrant 
Kurds.  The Turkish state and military disappointedly realized this outcome more than 
two decades after the waves of forced migrants first started to accumulate in the 
politicized squatters of the urban centers.   
Moreover, this study has shown that space/geography plays an important role in 
urban politics and economics. Urban space under a peculiar geopolitics shapes the nature 
of experiences, problems, perceptions and expectations of a contentious local people, and 
also manifestations of local demand and claim-making. In the particular case of 
southeastern Turkey, space/geography therefore provides the context in which political 
contention between the Turkish state and (Kurdish) citizens is being continuously 
[re]defined. Political arrangements and the local power dynamics in the southeast 
function as a catalyst for example, for the pro-Kurdish identity politics to exploit and 
transform the previous and recent social, economic and political insecurities into local 
support and to consolidate local constituency throughout time.  
 Endemic Turkish army operations against the civilian communities stopped by 
the end of the 1990s. The lifting of the emergency rule compelled a return to the rule of 
law and the restoration of democratic spaces in southeastern Turkey. However, Turkish 
security forces and the armed personnel are still visible in the rural areas and even in the 




region which scares and irritates not only the local population but also the strangers like 
myself. The Turkish state still continues to exist in the imagining of the millions of 
Kurdish children in the region as gun carrying security personnel wandering around the 
city which easily justifies the image of the armed guerilla and/or the violent urban 
juvenile rebel. The physical forms of state violence against the civilians might have 
declined substantively, but they still exist in different forms as evinced in 2005 when two 
Turkish soldiers (supposedly acting independently from their chain of command) were 
captured by the local people after throwing a bomb at a stationery store in the 
southeastern province of Hakkari, whose owner was allegedly a PKK-supporter.   
And finally, in this dissertation, I have discussed the gradual integration of 
southeastern Turkey into the social, economic and political processes of globalization and 
‘Europeanization’, which requires further research.  The repercussions of globalization 
and ‘Europeanization’ are expected to unfold differently in a southeastern city center 
such as Diyarbakir and in a western city center such as Istanbul. The processes of 
globalization, internationalization and ‘Europeanization’ in southeastern Turkey have 
gained a real momentum after the 1999 with the lifting of the emergency rule in the 
region together with the democratization reforms following the official starting of the 
negotiations between EU and Turkey in 1999.   
In 2004, during the visit of the EU enlargement commissioner Gunter Verhagen, 
the entire Diyarbakir city center was decorated by the pro-Kurdish municipality with 
posters stating that Diyarbakir was indeed ready to be a part of Europe and Turkey’s EU 
accession was through the heart of Diyarbakir. In almost every household I visited people 
had something to say about EU referring to ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ and ‘the rights 




informing the local people about their rights/ our rights brought by the lifting of the 
emergency rule and the restoration of the rule of law in the region following the EU 
accession process—including the statements that the security forces could not search 
homes and could not ask for IDs on the street without written authorization, could not 
detain on a whim etc.  
University students, a majority of them with no employment prospects, were 
gathering in the cafes, continuously talking about politics and also visiting the internet 
cafes to chat with their Arkadas/friends on the other side of the border in Northern Iraq. 
One university student that I met in the Dicle University of Diyarbakir told me 
enthusiastically that he learnt a lot about the ‘Kurdish culture’ since he started to surf on 
the internet. But he was disappointed that he was not able to communicate well with the 
Iraqi Kurdish friends via chat rooms because 1) his mother tongue was Turkish despite 
being from a Kurdish family (which he explained as “My family has been assimilated”) 
and trying to self-teach himself Kurdish 2) Turkish Kurds and Iraqi Kurds speak two 
considerably different Kurdish dialects.  
Moreover, southeastern Turkey is also becoming a part of the global consumption 
culture. Young people in Diyarbakir go to the shopping centers, sometimes just to watch 
and wander around even if they cannot afford to buy. Cellular phones are wide-spread 
among the young people as they are in the western Turkish city centers. The forms of 
global consumption, although limited, constitute sharp contrasts with the poor and socio-
economically debilitated face of the city including literally thousands (about 30,000) of 
children working on the street as petty sellers and garbage collectors. Kurdish collective 
demands as well as collective actions are shaped under the nationally, internationally and 




different than those of the Kurdish communities in western city centers who might be 
sharing the same socio-economic desperation but are not a part of the pro-Kurdish 
organizing, politicization and/or mobilization in the same way.    
Contention and violence help us understand the structural deficiencies of Turkish 
citizenship and politics that led to the emergence of the ethnic(ized) conflict in the 
Southeast, and in turn to imagine better political structures that redefine relations between 
the state and society as well as between different social groups in society.  As Unger et.al 
(2002:6) notes “what is required is an analysis of the relationship of politics and violence 
that can inform strategies for building equitable, pacific, and participatory democracies.” 
The strategies formulated for conflict reconciliation should not, however, lead to 
deepening ethnic cleavages in Turkey (or anywhere else for that matter), failing to 
produce crosscutting social and political allegiances that would guarantee a well 
functioning rule of law and judiciary, social, economic and redistributive justice as well 
as social equity and citizen empowerment.    
FINAL THOUGHTS 
Why should anyone care about the displaced Kurds in Turkey?  In this 
dissertation, I have brought up important issues that are relevant to the many other 
ethnically diverse societies around the world (including the western as well as the non-
western world). Declining nation-state legitimacy in the eyes of citizens is not something 
unique to Turkey; neither are the ethnicized forms of contention and violence and/or 
increasing salience of the social and political agonies of neo-liberal globalization, 
decentralization and democratization. We are living in a peculiar era where different 
ethnic and religious groups are much more assertively seeking rights and aiming to 




arrangements within the state and civil society. Contentious politics is nothing new, but 
the nature of social and political contentions as well as their manifestations change. And 
especially in sociology we need a greater commitment to examine and understand the 
dynamics between the state, citizenship, ethnicity, justice and violence. Examining a 
socio-economically and politically vulnerable social group in relation to these issues, this 
dissertation opens up for me multiple research directions and possibilities for 






















RESEARCH METHODS AND SAMPLE 
 In this appendix, I provide detailed information about the methods 
employed in this project, the research site, the sample and the ethical issues involved. The 
appendix is divided into four sections. The first section contains general information 
about the methods and sample, and the rationale behind them. Next I describe the 
research sites, sample details and migrant interviews. I then summarize the formal key 
informant interviews of this research. In the final section, I discuss ethical issues that 
came up over the course of this project.  
General Information about Methods and Sample 
I carried out the fieldwork for this study in Turkey between June 2004 and 
January 2005. I made a follow-up trip to Turkey in summer 2006 to discuss some of my 
findings with Turkish academicians and politicians in informal meetings, and to gather 
further information about the ongoing state and NGO research on Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs as they are officially called) going on by the time being.    
In order to understand the social and political processes of the armed conflict, I 
used a multiple-level research design. Since I was particularly interested in the 
dissemination of   pro-Kurdish politics among the grassroots and in the forms of 
articulation between the state and the politicized Kurdish masses, I concentrated my 
interviews on forced migrants among whom grassroots mobilization and politicization 
against the state are widespread. My principal method was semi-structured, open-ended 
interviews, the majority of them conducted with the displaced Kurdish communities in 
Diyarbakır city center. Diyarbakır is the major provincial center in southeastern Turkey 




lesser number of interviews were also conducted in the provincial center of a second 
major southeastern city, Van with a different social, economic and political composition- 
for the findings in the second place to be juxtaposed against the findings derived from the 
interviews conducted in Diyarbakır. Van is different from Diyarbakır in such that in 
addition to the strength of the pro-Kurdish politics and organizing in the province there is 
also considerable power of pro-Islamist political party competing with the pro-Kurdish 
politics effectively; as evinced in the last local government elections with the victory of 
the pro-Islamists against the pro-Kurdish political party. In Diyarbakır, in that respect, 
pro-Kurdish organization is much stronger and effective in reaching and mobilizing the 
grassroots. Van is also socio-economically more isolated and culturally traditional and 
closed in comparison to Diyarbakır that is the center of pro-Kurdish civil society and 
politics in Turkey with a relatively more complicated urban socio-economic system.     
Interviews were conducted in the major migrant receiving neighborhoods in all 
local districts under the jurisdiction of the Diyarbakır metropolitan center. Interviewees 
were identified via my personal networks with the local NGOs, the local municipalities 
and the informal neighborhood commissions as well as through my personal efforts to 
reach out to displaced Kurds who were basically out of reach of the organized groups. 
These interviews may or may not represent the views of the entire displaced population. 
However, certain patterns presented in the data are enough to draw conclusions with 
regard to the trajectories of radical politicization, increasing marginalization and social 
exclusion experienced by the urban poor and the past and the present root causes of the 
declining legitimacy of the state in the eye of local Kurds.  
I chose in-depth interviews as my principal method because I was interested in 




violence, their encounters with the state agencies and interactions with the organized 
Kurdish groups. I was interested in how these people perceive their own ability (and/or 
agency) to make changes, to engage with the local and national power holders to initiate 
change as well as their judgments about the limits of their agency. More importantly, I 
was interested in how these people interpret their needs, concerns, expectations, demands 
and rights, and how they imagine their future ‘life projects’ to secure material well-being, 
peace and political safety. More than half of the migrant interviews were conducted in 
Kurdish (in Kurmaji or Zazaic dialect) with the help of an interpreter. The rest were 
conducted in Kurdish and Turkish or only in Turkish. All migrant names have been 
changed in the dissertation for privacy purposes. 
I also conducted in-depth interviews with a group of local and national key 
informants to investigate relations and channels of communication between the 
organizations with which the informants were associated and the state and the civil 
society on the one hand and the displaced groups of people on the ground on the other. 
My key informant interviews include the mayors of local municipalities (Diyarbakır and 
Van), representatives of NGOs (Diyarbakır, Van, Ankara and Istanbul), ‘Socio-economic 
Development Program’ officers in the GAP administration (Southeastern Development 
Project) (Diyarbakır, Urfa), one representative from Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce, 
representatives from the state’ s “Social Services Provincial Administration”-Sosyal 
Hizmetler il Mudurlugu (Diyarbakır), UNDP and UNHCR representatives (Ankara), one 
Kurdish MP (member of Parliament) from Diyarbakır (Ankara) and lawyers (Diyarbakır, 
Istanbul) to assess the social, political, economic and legal consequences and 
implications of the conflict related population displacement. The key informant 




can be found in the Appendix. Some of the key informant names are omitted and the 
names of their organizational affiliations have been replaced with pseudonyms upon 
informants’ request or based on my discretion for privacy and security purposes.    
In Diyarbakır and Van, I had a chance to meet and have informal talks with many 
people from various backgrounds including local, national and foreign journalists, people 
working for pro-Kurdish local news media, engineers and architects working in state 
agricultural development projects as well as in municipality projects, local and foreign 
social workers, village teachers, Kurdish writers and activists including a group of 
foreigners from Syria and Iraq. I also had meetings with several former PKK members 
who were at the time of the encounters officially or unofficially affiliated either with pro-
Kurdish political party (DEHAP) or pro-Kurdish NGOs.  
I also conducted participant observations in Diyarbakır and Van. This entailed 
attending NGO meetings, activities and seminars, attending weekly municipality 
neighborhood conventions, participating in cultural events and traveling with the key 
informants to learn about their activities and engagements with their local target groups. 
These observations were an integral part of this project because they enabled me to learn 
more about the internal dynamics in the NGOs that I interviewed and also the local 
dynamics between the organized pro-Kurdish groups and their constituency. Participant 
observation also allowed me to diversify my networks and to reach out to migrant 
communities with different characteristics.      
Finally, I collected documents from the Turkish parliament, NGOS and political 
organizations and the local municipalities, as well as relevant issues of national 





Research Site, Sample Details and Migrant Interviews 
The impact of conflict-induced migration of the Kurdish population has been 
pervasive across Turkey including the western metropolises such as Istanbul, Izmir and 
Bursa; central Anatolian city centers such as Ankara; southern cities including Adana and 
Mersin; and of course all southeastern provinces. However, I decided to focus on the 
southeast Turkey for various reasons. My research interests and questions were beyond 
the urban consequences of population displacement per se. I was interested in the 
changing dynamics of Kurdish movement and its grassroots mobilization. I was further 
interested in political pro-Kurdish organizing and its gaining ground among the displaced 
Kurdish population. I wanted to position my analysis of population displacement within 
the broader context of violence, identity politics, changing state-(Kurdish) citizen 
relations and contingencies of the socio-politics of the southeastern Turkey since the start 
of the armed conflict in 1980s.  
At the time that I started contemplating on my dissertation study, research on 
urban consequences of the conflict-induced Kurdish migration had already started in 
Istanbul. There was (and still is) almost no substantive academic study on (urban) politics 
and economics of Turkey’s southeast region. This is why I turned my face to the region, 
with a focus on Diyarbakır the most populous province of the conflict-stricken 
Southeastern Turkey. A short trip to another important eastern city, Van, provided me 
with additional insights and reflections on my research questions. I also visited several 
other southeastern cities including Tunceli- north of Diyarbakır, where some of the most 
aggressive village evacuations happened in 1990s, Mardin- on the Syrian border- one of 




center of the GAP project (Southeastern Anatolian Project), a relatively stable 
southeastern province outside of the major conflict zones.  
The old city center of Diyarbakır is surrounded by historical city walls-according 
to the municipality sources the second longest after the Great Wall of China- that are 
currently accommodating a significant migrant population squeezed in between the 
labyrinth-like narrow streets inside the historical landmarks. I conducted 19 formal 
interviews with the self-defined forced migrants living in neighborhoods of the old city 
called Suriçi (Metropolitan sub-district). The total population of Suriçi constitutes about 
16.8 percent of the total urban provincial population in Diyarbakır. Today, Diyarbakır 
provincial urban center spills over the historical city walls with gradually emerging 
shantytowns and slum areas spreading towards the outskirts as well as emerging middle 
class neighborhoods with modern, tall apartment buildings and complexes away from the 
crowds of the city center.  
I conducted 39 formal interviews with residents of the neighborhoods in Bağlar, 
another Metropolitan subdistrict with-according to the municipality sources- largest 
amount of displaced migrant residents. In contrast to Suriçi, many neighborhoods under 
the jurisdiction of Bağlar sub-district are relatively new, emerged during 1980s and 
1990s due to massive in-migration. According to 2000 census data, Bağlar population 
constitutes about 53.3 percent of the total provincial urban center population in 
Diyarbakır. I also conducted 25 formal interviews with the migrants residing in the 
neighborhoods of the third metropolitan sub-district in Diyarbakır, Yenişehir (literally 
means ‘Newcity’) that makes up about 30 percent of the provincial urban center 
population. I conducted 78 interviews in the neighborhoods (at the houses, municipality 




networks (including civil and political actors); 12 interviews in the local branch of a 
national Migrants’ Association (Göç-Der, (Im)migrants’ Association for Social 
Cooperation and Culture). I conducted 34 interviews with women and 56 interviews with 
men.  
I conducted 90 formal migrant interviews (34 women and 56 men) in Diyarbakır 
provincial city center.  
I tried to have a meaningful balance of people in my interview sample based on 
these people’s original place of residence: Districts of Diyarbakır and neighboring 
provinces 
The census statistics I obtained from the ministry of interior affairs gave an idea 
about the district populations. I also took into account the information coming from 
previous research, NGO, IGO reports and my previous key informant interviews 
regarding the scope and severity of the armed conflict in Diyarbakır districts. Under the 
light of this information, I expected to have larger number of interviews with the people 
from conflict zones. Since Kurds from neighboring provinces live somehow marginalized 
from the social networks and/or they are less visible than the Kurds from Diyarbakır 
villages, I had to spend extra effort and time in each neighborhood to locate the families 
from different provinces.  
I tried to have a meaningful balance of people in my interview sample based on 
the neighborhood and central districts (urban districts that the interviews conducted) 
where those people currently reside 
I used the information on the current population of the urban districts in 
Diyarbakır to conduct a larger number of interviews in districts with larger population. I 




1990s or on the neighborhoods that emerged together with the migration during 1980s 
and 1990s. In order to identify the neighborhoods in each districts, I used information 
from a local mayor that I interviewed, together with a detailed urbanization report on 
Diyarbakır prepared by the TMMOB (Chamber of Turkish Engineers and Architectures 
Association) in 1998.  
I tried to have a meaningful balance of people in terms of their socio-economic 
situation (or I should say level of poverty)  
Poverty is widespread throughout Diyarbakır although the city has emerging 
suburban areas where socio-economically better off people move in rapidly. The 
neighborhoods that I studied were poor neighborhoods but still heterogeneous in terms of 
the level of poverty, quality of infrastructure and basic services available for the people 
such as social programs and public centers (Toplum Merkezi).  I tried to reach 
neighborhoods with different characteristics where I found people with different levels of 
poverty. I also tried to reach families who managed to pull themselves out of poverty by 
managing to find a ‘regular job’ or starting up their own businesses, although these cases 
constituted a handful of interviews within my sample.  
I also paid attention to one other factor in establishing my interview sample. I 
informed the people in my networks that I was interested in people with various amounts 
of land ownership, which I thought might have created differences in socio-economic 
well-being of the households in case they still have access to their land and be able to use 
it. Therefore, I tried to look for people with different characteristics of landownership 
such as “landless peasants”-they would work for others in their villages as well as they 
would go for seasonal jobs in cities, “small land owners”-they would work on their farm 




for seasonal jobs to meet the need for cash, “medium landowners”- they would work on 
farm as a household and sometimes with relatives, but they would still have ties with city 
centers since they would go to urban markets to sell the excess crop, “large landowners 
who define themselves as ‘Aga’”- they would have peasants working for them, they 
would do large scale agriculture, had/have access to credit etc.   
In arranging interviews with the displaced households, I contacted certain groups 
of people including the mayors of the local districts, social workers, neighborhood 
headmen, NGO representatives and university student activists. I arranged some of my 
contacts in Diyarbakır, before going there, through NGOs and university professors in 
Istanbul and Ankara, who were familiar with Diyarbakır through their activities and 
research. The people I met in Diyarbakır helped me to reach more people who could help 
me especially on the ground with neighborhood interviews. In certain neighborhoods, it 
was the social workers working in municipality social projects who put me in contact 
with the families, in the others it was either the headmen, local people in neighborhood 
commissions (Mahalle Komisyonu) affiliated with NGOs and/or the local municipality or 
a group university student activists whom I met through a friend who himself was also a 
student activist and working for Amnesty International’s local youth branch in 
Diyarbakır. This group of students when I met them, were preparing a voluntary 
education program- tutoring and social support activities for high school children. They 
had already started several tutoring classes in classrooms reserved by the provincial 
municipality for them. But they wanted to institutionalize and formalize their activities in 
order to secure long-lasting financial and logistic support through the provincial 
municipality. Interestingly, they would mainly target the children whose parents got 




were familiar with many neighborhoods in Diyarbakır. After explaining to them that my 
research was on the “migrants” of 1980s and 1990s, they took me to the houses of 
‘migrants’ where I conducted interviews with the families.  
Therefore, throughout my stay in Diyarbakır, I was able to establish a broad range 
of networks in this province as well as the neighboring provinces that I visited with short 
trips. The people in my networks did not only help me to reach the displaced families, but 
also to establish trust relations with my interviewees. Without their presence, as an 
outsider, a single female, a Turk, I could not even imagine interviewing these many 
people asking questions that were often politically sensitive. In contrast to my 
expectations and previous concerns, not one single family refused to talk to me. They 
were helpful and willing to answer the questions. They were content that somebody was 
interested in their situation.  
In order to minimize any biases regarding the definition of “forced migration”, I 
asked the people within my networks to put me in contact with ‘migrants’ who came to 
Diyarbakır in 1980s and 1990s. My main concern was that I was afraid that I was going 
to be put in contact with certain characteristics of people based on who my mediator was. 
This was actually the case since my mediators put me in contact with the people in their 
closest reach, most of the time the people that they were already in contact. Therefore, I 
tried to keep my network diverse trying to meet people with different backgrounds and 
with different relations with the local communities in neighborhoods. The “formal 
interviews” were conducted with the households who reported their reason of migration 
as ‘involuntary’, ‘by force’, ‘village evacuation’, ‘activities and abuses of security forces 




In addition to the migrant interviews in Diyarbakır, I conducted twenty formal 
interviews in the city center of Van during my short trip to the province. My interviews 
were arranged by the local Van branch of Göç-Der and the local Van branch of the 
national Human Rights Foundation (IHD). Van is population vise smaller than 
Diyarbakır, more rural and culturally much more conservative than Diyarbakır. Tribal 
structures are much stronger in rural and urban areas of Van in comparison to Diyarbakır. 
The pro-Kurdish organizing in van is not as well-developed as it is in Diyarbakır. Despite 
that there is a significant pro-PKK population in Van, the PKK’s legal extension in the 
party politics, pro-Kurdish party DEHAP, could not beat the power of pro-Islamists in 
Van. While provincial municipality was taken over by the pro-Islamist AKP, some 
district municipalities including Bostaniçi with a significantly large forced migrant 
population remained under the control of the pro-Kurdish party. I use my Van interviews 
and observations selectively in this dissertation in order to further illuminate certain 
patterns of political behavior among the displaced Kurdish population.   
All migrant interviews were hand-written; none of them was audio taped in order 
to ensure privacy and security of the migrant participants of this study. All forced migrant 
and some local NGO names have been changed throughout the writing process again to 
protect anonymity and for security purposes. Some key informant names including the 
names of the local municipality mayors, government employees and national NGO 
representatives are kept original upon informants’ permission. Again, all key informant 
interviews were hand written (not audio-taped) in order not to disturb the informants 
during the interview process considering the sensitivity of some of the questions asked.  
Despite my earlier concerns regarding the security situation, police and gendarme 




completed without any major tension with the local state authorities and the Turkish 
security forces. In contrary to my earlier expectations, I was welcome and very well 
treated by the state authorities and also Diyarbakır police forces. In several occasions, I 
was given rides by the local policemen to the city center from the state’s water 
administration unit that hosted me for a while as their guest in their guest house. The 
local authorities were quite used to the visits from academicians, journalists and 
international human rights activists; and paying attention to not to agonize any visitors. I 
should also admit that 2004 was maybe the best year in recent times to conduct this 
research due to various reasons. Since 1999, things were normalizing in Diyarbakır and 
across the southeast. The PKK stopped the fighting and withdrew from the Turkish 
territory; its leader had been captured and put in a special prison-island. The EU process 
was progressing quite rapidly and the democratization reforms were promising for many 
Turks and Kurds willing to see the ethnicized conflict over. As Jonathon Sugden of the 
Human Rights Watch said to me in one of our email correspondence before I went to the 
field; ‘there is [was] nothing to worry about doing research in the southeast anymore’.  
The restarting of the fighting between the PKK and the Turkish security forces in 
June 2004 just couple of weeks after I entered the field; however, reintroduced some 
concerns. My fieldwork took place in such a peculiar atmosphere of contradictions- I was 
able to see how much ‘normal’ the things could get in the region and how easy 
everything could be toppled down. I was able to see how much hope for peace, dignity 
and reconciliation could be cultivated by the local people as well as to observe how these 
hopes could easily be postponed for vengeance under the disturbingly changing dynamics 
of local, national, regional and international conjecture. The year of 2004 was not a year 




Between 1999 and 2004 many politicians, political analysts, journalists and academicians 
thought that the war was over and everything would get just better and better in the 
southeast. The developments in 2004 proved that the projections could not be that 
straightforward. The year of 2004 was then again not a year of malicious pessimism 
inscribed the region during the armed conflict and emergency regime years of 1990s. The 
year of 2004 was a year both in between these two extremes and beyond them. 2004 was 
a start of a new era in the region witnessing democracy (after the lifting of the emergency 
rule), instigating hopes and demands together with old and new forms of violence, 
identity-based politicization and protest activities.         
Village Trip 
I managed to visit only one village174 where some of the villagers had returned 
permanently and some seasonally. The main reason that I had so many difficulties to visit 
rural areas was  road destructions or unavailability of vehicle roads in the area. I was also 
warned by many people including some interviewees, that there was still security 
surveillance and small military operations conducted by the Turkish security forces 
and/or hit and run attacks by the PKK guerilla in the rural areas, which made me 
concerned about my security as well as my assistant’s security. In the village I visited 
mid September, I talked with people in households and in groups in the only coffee house 
of the village to get information about the current socio-economic situation in the village, 
                                                 
174 Diyarbakır’s Lice district (I prefer to keep the name of the village anonymous based on my discretion). 
The district of Lice was one of the centers with highest PKK activity not only within the provincial 
boundaries of Diyarbakır, but also within the entire southeastern region. Almost the entire district was 
destroyed by the Turkish security forces in the year 1992. Interestingly, two weeks before my village visit, 
then European Union Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, visited another return village in 
Lice District, few kilometers away from the village I visited. In his statement regarding his impressions 
about the village he visited, Verheugen indicated to the Press that he was quite disturbed by the abject 




economic activities, problems with infrastructure and security issues. I conducted only 
one in-depth ‘formal interview’ with a household staying in Diyarbakır during the winter 
and fall and in the rural during the spring and summer. 
Formal Key Informant Interviews/Correspondence  
Jonathan Sugden, Human Rights Watch, Specialist on Turkey- email correspondence 
Cengiz Çiftçi, Researcher, Specialist on Civil Society in Turkey and the Middle East-
email correspondence 
Erkan Özçelik, email correspondence 
Interviews 
Istanbul 
Şefika Gürbüz, Director of Göç-Der ((Im)migrants’ Association for Social Cooperation 
and Culture) 
Ruhşen Doğan, Lawyer, TOHAV (Foundation for Society and Legal Studies) 
Ankara 
Yeşim Oruç, UNDP Poverty Reduction Programme, Director 
Metin Çorabatır , UNHCR-Ankara, Director  
Ali İhsan Merdanoğlu Diyarbakır MP, AKP (Justice and Development Party)  
Algan Hacaloğlu, Istanbul MP, CHP (Republican People’s party) 
Aygül Fazlıoğlu ,GAP (Southeastern Anatolian Project), Project Director 
Şanlıurfa 
Mehmet Açıkgöz , Director for the Social and Economic Development Project, GAP 
Van 
Gıyaseddin Gültepe, Director/Lawyer, Göç-Der-Van, (Im)migrants’ Association for 




Gülcihan Şimşek , Mayor, DEHAP, Van-Bostaniçi 
Zeki Yüksel, IHD (Human Rights Foundation), Van Branch 
Hanifi Eren, Project Director, TKV-Van (Development Foundation of Turkey) [Interview 
Conducted in Diyarbakır] 
Diyarbakır 
Yurdusev Özsökmenler, Mayor, DEHAP, Bağlar/Diyarbakır 
Osman Kazıcı, Project Manager, TKV- Diyarbakır (Development Foundation of Turkey)  
Gülcan Yalçın (Psychologist) and Rozan Kahraman (Director); Epi-Dem-(Education and 
Psychological Consultancy for Women  
Ayfer Yürük, Second Project Coordinator, AÇEV (Mother Child Education Foundation) 
Cihan Aydın, Lawyer, Diyarbakır Bar Association, General Project Director, Justice for 
Everyone Project (Herkes Icin Adalet projesi) (EC funded Project)  
Mahsuni Karaman, Lawyer, Diyarbakır Bar Association, Project Director for the Forced 
Migration Unit of the ‘Justice for Everyone Project’. 
İrfan Polat, Social Worker, did work on Street Children and their families, 
Serdar Talay, Director, Göç-Der ((Im)migrants’ Association for Social Cooperation and 
Culture) Diyarbakır Branch,  
Hacer Özdemir, Director, Selis Women’s Organization,  
Handan Coşkun, Director, DIKASUM, Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Women’s 
Center 
Haydar İpek, Director, Sosyal Hizmetler Il Mudurlugu, Diyarbakır Social Services 
Administration, 





Anonymous Informant, Journalist, Dicle News Agency (Dicle Haber Ajansi) 
Anonymous Informant, Second Director, Local NGO, ASVWR- Association for Vulnerable 
Women’s Rights- a pseudonym for privacy and security purposes 
Anonymous Informant, Unofficial Director, Local NGO, ORUP – Organization for Urban 
Poor-a pseudonym for privacy and security purposes; previous PKK member; released 
after 23 years prison sentence 
Anonymous Informant, Member of DEHAP Neighborhood Commission; previous PKK 
militia  
Anonymous Informant, Member of DEHAP Neighborhood Commission 
Anonymous Informant, Member of DEHAP, pro-Kurdish Activist 
Anonymous Informant, DEHAP member, Unofficial Director of a local cultural center in 
a southeastern province; previous PKK member; released after 22 years prison sentence  
Anonymous Informant, Agricultural Engineer, State’s Water Administration (DSI), 
provided me with his work experiences in conflict zones during 1990s     
 
Field Trip to several Diyarbakır provincial villages (outside of the conflict zones-no 
displaced population and no village guards) within the project site of the TKV with the 
expert team of the TKV (Development Foundation of Turkey)- 05 August 2004 
 
Field Trip to the neighboring province Batman for a routine check in Batman Dam, 
irrigation sites and forestry sites with the expert team of the State’s Water Administration 






Ethical Concerns and Respondents Rights 
Throughout my fieldwork and the writing process, there emerged several ethical 
concerns for me. There were certain imbalances especially between my migrant 
informants and myself that I had to deal diligently before and during the interview 
processes. I was an educated Turkish female from a middle class Turkish family from a 
western province, studying in the USA, doing research on conflict-affected Kurdish 
people in a socio-economically and politically most insecure position in Turkey. Stories 
of these people were unknown to many Turks (and also Kurds) living in ‘my world’ in 
Turkey. I was very clear to my informants about my identity, position and motivations for 
the research. All my migrant interviewees knew that I was Turkish (some thought that I 
might have been Kurdish). I felt the ethical responsibility to reveal my ethnicity at the 
beginning of each interview thinking that it was the only way to figure out if the migrant 
informant was comfortable with giving personal information to ‘the other’. I told the 
informants that they had no obligation to talk to me and had the right not to answer the 
questions that they did not want to answer, to stop the interview whenever they wanted 
and let me know whenever they did not understand the questions.  
Throughout time, I started to realize my own prejudices, biases and 
misconceptions about my informants. There was no given distinction in many Kurdish 
people’s minds as Kurds vs. Turks; the distinction was rather in terms of (some) Kurds 
vs. the Turkish state. I can say that on most occasions, migrants were content that 
somebody was interested in their situation and that one was a Turk whose word could be 
taken more seriously by the state authorities than that of a Kurd. In some occasions, 
migrant informants made the distinction between ‘good Turks’ and ‘bad Turks’ and put 




representative who served 23 years in prison based on his PKK membership, he 
commented “there should be no separation between Turks and Kurds. In 1960s, we used 
to struggle together [referring to the leftist student organizations]… I have had Turkish 
friends that I would not exchange for a million Kurds”. Pro-Kurdish political actors and 
pro-Kurdish civil society representatives were very welcoming towards me and willing to 
share their opinions with me despite  some of my questions being quite critical of the pro-
Kurdish municipality activities and pro-Kurdish politics. They treated the interviews in a 
very professional manner as a kind of forum for them to make their points and critiques, 
and voice their demands in an academic research.  
In a similar manner, my interviews with the state and government representatives 
were completed smoothly. On several occasions, though, the state and government-
affiliated informants were upset with the terminology that I used (two informants refused 
to use the phrase ‘village evacuation’ arguing that Kurdish villagers were ‘relocated’ by 
the Turkish security forces in order to ‘protect’ them from the PKK terrorists). Again in 
another interview, the informant occupying a state office found one of my questions ‘too 
much critical’ of the Turkish state. Under these circumstances, I thought that it was my 
responsibility to make sure that the informants were clear about my position as an 
objective researcher with no affiliation and/or political sympathy neither towards the state 
and pro-state actors nor towards the PKK and pro-Kurdish actors.  
Considering that the majority of my migrant informants were pro-PKK, I made it 
clear to all informants that I would be analyzing and evaluating the PKK activities and 
politics as I would also be assessing and criticizing the state activities and politics. This 
might have changed interpretation of events by some of the informants making them 




sympathetic with the PKK might have introduced certain asymmetries into the 
information provided to me as the informants might have preferred to manipulate their 
stories to justify the PKK violence and condemn the state activities. Some informants 
might have also been selective in providing information. It was my discretion that it was 
much more important to ensure that the informants knew how the information they 
provided would be used than to extract information by concealing my stance.  
No informants refused an interview. At the end of each interview, I asked the 
interviewee if he/she was content with the interview process and still willing for their 
input to be included in my research. They all agreed to collaborate. I believe that I was 
able to establish trust relations with my informants by making my identity, position and 
research clear, by assuring them that I was an independent and objective researcher trying 
to assess their social and economic situation as well as demands and political orientation. 
The local people who put me in contact with my migrant informants were also effective 
in me being able to minimize any misgivings that my informants would have had. My 
Kurdish assistant was also an important factor in enhancing my ability to establish trust 
relations with my migrant informants assuring the migrant informants that he had 
confidence in me that the information they provided would not be used in any way to 
harm them.    
There were several occasions on which my migrant informants voiced their 
disappointment in me. On one occasion I was nicely scolded by a male migrant informant 
who thought that it was incomprehensible to him that I was doing research on Kurdish 
people but was not able to speak and/or understand Kurdish. In another occasion, one 
female migrant, who was affiliated with the ‘Peace Mothers Initiative’ of the PKK 




Turkish. This was a routine question in my interview questionnaire to assess the 
command of Turkish that my Kurdish-speaking migrant informants had. She got furious 
and told me  
It is me who should ask you if you are able to communicate in Kurdish. You are 
doing research on Kurdish people, writing a book on us, but you don’t know 
Kurdish. It is you who should be ashamed of not being able to speak Kurdish not 
me for not being able to speak Turkish… I would not speak to you in Turkish 
even if I was able to do so. I speak Kurdish, this is my language!  
I was indeed not questioning ‘how come’ she was not able to speak Turkish, and I 
of course never thought that it was a ‘shame’ not to be able to speak Turkish. Considering 
the years-long state oppression on Kurdish language and the central importance of the 
Kurdish language in the recent Kurdish mobilization in Turkey, her reaction was quite 
understandable. In her eye, I was an educated Turkish woman ‘questioning’ her lack of 
command over Turkish, maybe ‘reproaching’ her for not having acquired Turkish yet 
and/or feeling sorry for her not being able to speak a ‘superior’ language. Until that point 
I had not realized the ubiquity of quite disturbing power imbalances between my 
informants and myself. She was actually definitely right that my lack of command of 
Kurdish (especially Kurmanji Kurdish widely spoken among Turkish Kurds) was a 
shortcoming in this research. Although, in certain cases, it was impossible to avoid those 
power imbalances between my migrant informants and myself, I tried to do my best to 
explain my research to my informants and to provide them with necessary information in 
cases that I felt they had misgivings about the interview process and the questions asked.    
Respecting the rights and privacy of my migrant and key informants was a major 
concern for me. But there were contradictions involved. It was my decision that I would 
not reveal the real names of my migrant informants during the writing process. I told this 




occasions, migrants asked me to use their real names in my work. On one occasion, a 
male migrant asked me if it was possible for him to sign the interview notes and let me 
send them to ‘Ankara’ [meaning the Parliament].  
I want Ankara to hear what we say. They should not turn their back to us. I would 
like to put my name and signature under the interview notes and would like you to 
send these notes to Ankara for me…I am not afraid at all! I have already lost 
everything, I mean ‘everything’; after this point, it is the ‘TC’ that will lose” (TC 
is the abbreviation for the “Republic of Turkey”. Instead of saying “the state” or 
“Turkish government”, especially politicized Kurds use the abbreviation with a 
negative connotation).  
I told him that I could not send my interview notes to Ankara, but I would be 
happy to give him a copy of my (or his) interview notes and help him to write ‘a letter’ to 
be sent to one of the Diyarbakır MPs in the Parliament. I also told him that it was my 
principle not to reveal the identities of my migrant informants in my work and asked for 
his understanding. I used pseudonyms throughout this dissertation for all migrants I 
interviewed.  
With the key informant interviews, I pursued a different strategy and gave my 
informants an option of revealing their identities. Five informants chose to appear 
anonymously. In the cases of three other informants, I chose to keep their identities 
anonymous considering certain sensitivities involved. It was my discretion to do so, while 
those three informants told me that they did not care if their identities were revealed.  
Kurdish Assistant/Interpreter 
There are two main dialects spoken by Kurds in Turkey: Kurmanji spoken widely, 




Kurds175. Usually, Zazas that I met were able to speak more widely spoken Kurmanji, but 
Kurmanji speakers were not likely to speak Zazaic. In all migrant interviews, I had my 
Kurdish assistant/interpreter with me; though more than one third of the migrant 
interviews were conducted in Turkish. My assistant/interpreter was a Zaza Kurd and able 
to speak both Zazaic and Kurmanji fluently. He was a university student from Diyarbakır 
and familiar with the province very well. He was also extremely helpful for me with 
making contacts, following publications in Kurdish as well as surviving in an alien 
setting.   
Reliability and Validity 
The findings presented in this dissertation are reliable in a sense that I am able to 
explain to anyone interested what I did, when I did it, where I did it and why I did it. I put 
substantive effort in this appendix to make my activities as transparent as possible. I also 
think that the findings presented in this dissertation are valid. The migrant and key 
informant interviews support my discussions, my evaluations and my arguments in this 
dissertation. In this respect, they ascertained what I intended them to ascertain. I should 
however note that I utilized only a small part of the field data I gathered. Considering that 
the interviews were quite lengthy and detailed in all social, economic and political 
aspects of the course of the armed conflict; I was selective during the writing process to 
identify the segments of the data referring to my research questions and illuminating my 
hypothesis. I also have confidence that my informants provided me with the realities of 
their lives and experiences, and their true feelings and sincere opinions. My analysis 
                                                 
175  Some Zazas I met in Diyarbakir refused their Kurdish identity evincing the complications involved in 




further draws upon a quite substantive secondary source of data; that helps me to better 
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